'Every inch a fighting man' : a new perspective on the military career of a controversial Canadian, Sir Richard Turner by Stewart, William Frederick
  
 
“EVERY INCH A FIGHTING MAN:” A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE MILITARY CAREER OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL CANADIAN, SIR RICHARD 
TURNER 
 
by 
 
WILLIAM FREDERICK STEWART 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of History 
School of History and Cultures 
College of Arts and Law 
University of Birmingham 
March 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Ernest William Turner served Canada 
admirably in two wars and played an instrumental role in unifying veterans’ 
groups in the post-war period. His experience was unique in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force; in that, it included senior command in both the combat and 
administrative aspects of the Canadian war effort.  
This thesis, based on new primary research and interpretations, revises the 
prevalent view of Turner. The thesis recasts five key criticisms of Turner and 
presents a more balanced and informed assessment of Turner. His appointments 
were not the result of his political affiliation but because of his courage and 
capability. Rather than an incompetent field commander, Turner developed from 
a middling combat general to an effective division commander by late 1916. His 
transfer to England was the result of the need for a proficient field commander to 
reform the administration. Turner proved to be an excellent administrator, a 
strong nationalist, and was crucially responsible for improvements in 
administration and training in England. Finally, the conflict with Sir Arthur 
Currie, the commander of the Canadian Corps, rather than being motivated by 
obstructionist jealousy was the outcome of competing institutional imperatives 
and Currie’s challenging personality.  
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Nomenclature 
Times: Time is given as a twelve-hour clock following contemporary practice. The 
British Army did not shift to a twenty-four hour clock until late in the war. 
 
Distances: Distances are measured in metric units, with yards equal to meters. 
This avoids the inelegant appearance of a 914 metre advance for a 1000 yard 
advance, without unduly distorting the narrative. 
 
Unit Designations: Canadian units are described without a national modifier, so 
the 2nd Division and 16th Battalion. British, Australian, French, and New Zealand 
units include a national designation, such as the 3rd British Division. Following 
contemporary practice, battalions, brigade and divisions are presented as Arabic 
numerals, corps as Roman numerals and Armies are written out, so the 14th 
Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 51st Highland Division, II Corps, and Reserve Army. Italics 
designate German units, for example the 45th Reserve Division.  
 
Imperial: One of the confusing aspects of nomenclature of this period is the 
multiple meanings of the term ‘Imperial.’ Canadians used it to refer to British 
forces raised in the United Kingdom, while the British used it for forces raised in 
colonies under the auspices of the War Office. The head of the British Army was 
titled the Chief of the Imperial General Staff indicating a mandate that 
encompassed more than just the forces raised in the United Kingdom. The 
Australians called themselves the Australian Imperial Force, but also referred to 
the British as Imperials – often in a derogatory sense. The term is avoided in the 
thesis, as it is particularly confusing to modern audiences, but it is retained in 
quotations.  
 
To reduce repetition, allusions to France, England and Canada refers to Canadian 
forces in those locations, unless explicitly indicated otherwise. 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Gen Turner the great Canadian General, was here today. He is very 
popular as [he] is every inch a fighting man.  
Cadet Cecil Frost, 1 February 19171  
 
 
Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Ernest William Turner, VC, KCB, KCMG, 
DSO was a controversial and unconventional First World War Canadian 
general. This thesis will demonstrate that Turner, unlike many of his Canadian 
confrères in the Boer, First, and Second World Wars, was capable, affable, 
engaging, courageous, and charismatic, despite his unprepossessing appearance. 
He was also highly esteemed by his officers, staff, and other ranks. The dominant 
narrative in Canadian historiography, described later, however portrays Turner 
as a political appointee and repeated failure in combat command. It also claims 
he was exiled to England and obscurity. The only time he emerges in this 
standard interpretation is when he clashes with Sir Arthur Currie, the 
commander of the Canadian Corps. The only biographical study on Turner 
belittlingly refers to him in the title as a ‘dashing subaltern.’2 This portrayal is 
badly skewed. It ignores, minimises, or ascribes to others Turner’s successes as a 
combat commander and head of Canadian forces in England. Turner played a 
critical part in every stage of the development of the Canadian Corps for the first 
                                            
1  Cecil Frost was the brother of Leslie Frost who was later the sixteenth Premier of Ontario from 
1949 to 1961. Leslie M Frost, Cecil Frost, and Rae Bruce Fleming, The Wartime Letters of Leslie 
and Cecil Frost, 1915-1919  (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 118. 
2  Thomas P. Leppard, "The Dashing Subaltern - Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect," Canadian 
Military History 6, no. 2 (1997). 
Introduction 
 2 
half of the war and contributed significantly to the Canadian Corps’ success 
thereafter. His experience was unique in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) 
in that it included senior command in both the combat and administrative 
aspects of the Canadian war effort. Examining Turner’s career also allows an 
important window into the wider issues of tactical, operational, and 
administrative matters. The tactical and operational matters include the debates 
on command centralisation versus decentralisation, the increasing combat 
capability of the British and Canadian forces, described as a ‘learning curve,’ the 
role of pre-war British tactical and operational preparation, and responses to the 
challenges presented by trench warfare. The administrative issues include the 
appropriate organisation for overseas forces in a hybrid control environment and 
the impact of a mixed managerial/professional approach to administration and 
training. He was at the nexus of the evolution of the Canadian military in the 
First World War but is a peripheral caricature in current Canadian 
historiography. 
Turner was the senior Canadian officer in the CEF throughout the war, 
meaning he outranked Currie.3 He commanded the 3rd Brigade in the 1st 
Canadian Division at the Battles of Second Ypres and Festubert. In August 1915, 
Turner received command of the newly formed 2nd Division, while Currie took 
over the 1st Division in September 1915. Turner commanded the 2nd Division at 
the Battles of St. Eloi Craters and the Somme. Appointed commander of 
                                            
3  It is a common error to claim Currie was the senior officer during the war. Turner had seniority 
throughout the war, based on his appointments pre-dating Currie’s. For example, see David A. 
Borys, "The Education of a Corps Commander: Arthur Currie's Leadership from 1915-1917" 
(Masters, University of Alberta, 2006), 13. 
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Canadian forces in England in November 1916, Turner was also the chief 
military advisor to the newly formed Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of 
Canada (OMFC). His mandate was to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Canadian forces in England. In June 1917, the rivalry between Turner and 
Currie culminated in a struggle over who would command the Canadian Corps, 
after Sir Julian Byng’s promotion to command the Third Army. In the end, Currie 
received the corps, while Turner’s consolation prize was promotion to 
Lieutenant-General in advance of Currie to maintain Turner’s seniority. For the 
rest of the war, Currie and Turner had an uneasy relationship marked by periods 
of cooperation but also of tension and conflict. Turner returned to Canada in the 
summer of 1919 and held no further formal military office but played an 
instrumental role in the formation of the Canadian Legion.  
While there are multiple biographies of Sam Hughes, the Minister of 
Militia and Defence, and Currie, there is no full biography of Turner. Neither has 
there been much attention paid to the significant Canadian presence in England 
and the effect of Turner’s improvement in administration of Canadian forces in 
England on the Canadian Corps’ effectiveness in 1917/1918. The majority of 
both popular and scholarly works has focused on the active front to the neglect 
of the essential role of training and administration in England, as well as support 
units in France and Belgium.4 This thesis will address this lacuna in our 
understanding by delineating the full scope of Turner’s military career. 
                                            
4  On 11 November 1918, there were 130,000 troops in England, 152,000 troops in France. Of 
the troops in France, approximately 105,000 were serving with the Corps and the remainder 
being service units, replacements, Railway, and Forestry troops. Demoblisation Factors, Folder 
41, 74/672 Box 8, DHH. 
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 Historiography 
Turner’s historiography is sparse. There is no full-length biographical study, 
other than a perfunctory article in the journal Canadian Military History.5 Other 
works that provide some limited coverage are a Master’s thesis on the Battle of 
St. Eloi, an excellent PhD thesis on the 2nd Division, and three articles on St. 
Eloi.6 As a comparison, there are three full biographies of Currie, plus one book 
of his selected writings, three biographies of Sam Hughes, and one shared 
biography of Currie and Hughes, plus multiple theses and articles.7 
Thomas Leppard is the published authority on Turner as he has produced a 
biographical article and a Master’s thesis on Turner and St. Eloi. In his article, 
Leppard makes the case that historians have treated Turner as a ‘peripheral 
                                            
5  Leppard, "The Dashing Subaltern - Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect." 
6  Thomas P. Leppard, "Richard Turner and the Battle of St. Eloi" (Masters, University of Calgary, 
1994); David Charles Gregory Campbell, "The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.: A Social 
and Operational History of the 2nd Canadian Division, 1915-1918" (PhD, University of 
Calgary, 2003); David Campbell, "“A Leap in the Dark” – Intelligence and the Struggle for the 
St. Eloi Craters: Reassessing the Role of Major-General Richard Turner," in Andrew B. Godefroy 
(ed.), Great War Commands: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Army Leadership 1914-1918 
(Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010); Terry Copp, "Slaughter at St. Eloi," Legion 
Magazine Army Part 55(2004); Tim Cook, "The Blind Leading the Blind - the Battle of the St. 
Eloi Craters," Canadian Military History 5, no. 2 (1996). 
7  On Currie, see Daniel G. Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography  (Methuen, 1985); A. M. J. 
Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography, Canadian War Museum Historical 
Publication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Hugh MacIntyre Urquhart, Arthur 
Currie, the Biography of a Great Canadian  (Toronto,: J.M. Dent & Sons (Canada), 1950). For 
Currie’s selected writings see Arthur Currie and Mark Osborne Humphries, The Selected Papers 
of Sir Arthur Currie: Diaries, Letters, and Report to the Ministry, 1917-33  (Waterloo, ON: 
LCMSDS Press of Wilfrid Laurier University, 2008). On Hughes, see Ronald Haycock, Sam 
Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916, Canadian War Museum 
Historical Publication (Wilfrid Laurier University Press in collaboration with Canadian War 
Museum, Canadian Museum of Civilization, National Museums of Canada, 1986); Charles F. 
Winter, Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Sam Hughes, K.C.B., M.P., Canada's War Minister, 
1911-1916: Recollections of Service as Military Secretary at Headquarters, Canadian Militia 
Prior to and During the Early Stages of the Great War  (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1931); 
Alan R. Capon, His Faults Lie Gently : The Incredible Sam Hughes  (Lindsay, Ont.: F.W. Hall, 
1969). For the shared biography, see Tim Cook, The Madman and the Butcher  (Toronto: Allen 
Lane, 2010). 
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figure,’ but ‘he deserves better.’8 Leppard’s portrayal of Turner’s combat record is 
bleak, as he claims Turner never learned to command, but he does not discuss 
Turner’s victory at Courcelette in his article. Leppard, however, credits Turner 
with the improvements in England and makes the salient point that Turner in his 
battles with Currie never allowed “their animosity to interfere with the welfare of 
the Corps.”9 
David Campbell’s thesis on the 2nd Division is a well researched and 
argued divisional history, and he treats Turner carefully, albeit in the context of 
the standard narrative. As Campbell’s thesis focuses on the 2nd Division, Turner 
disappears from the account when he moves to England. Campbell has also 
published two articles on the battles of St. Eloi and Courcelette that are generally 
favourable to Turner.10 
The majority of historians writing about Canada’s participation in the First 
World War follow a standard narrative for Turner. They credited him with 
physical courage but in a manner that suggests his bravery diminished his 
suitability for high command.11 They characterised Turner as a repeated failure 
as a combat commander at Second Ypres, Festubert, St. Eloi, and the Somme.12 
                                            
8  Leppard, "The Dashing Subaltern - Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect," 21. 
9  ibid. 
10  David Charles Gregory Campbell, "A Forgotten Victory: Courcelette, 15 September 1916," 
Canadian Military History 16, no. 2 (2007); Campbell, "“A Leap in the Dark” – Intelligence and 
the Struggle for the St. Eloi Craters: Reassessing the Role of Major-General Richard Turner." 
11  Examples include “Brave men do not necessarily make good generals” and “Personally 
fearless, he was unsuited for command in the field.” Brereton Greenhous, Canada and the 
Battle of Vimy Ridge, 9-12 April 1917  ([Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, Directorate of 
History], 1992), 27; George H Cassar, Hell in Flanders Fields: Canadians at the Second Battle 
of Ypres  (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), 61. 
12  On Second Ypres “Even accounting for the disorder of the battle, the messages Hughes and 
Turner sent to Loomis are nothing short of absurd” and “Turner clearly reacted badly and was 
not in contact or control of his Brigade for much of the time.” Nathan M. Greenfield, Baptism 
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They also asserted that his promotion to General Officer Commanding (GOC) 2nd 
Division and subsequent retention in command were due to unjustified political 
interference.13 They also claimed Turner sacrificed his men for political 
advantage.14 Further, the interpretation states the authorities sacked Turner 
because of the bloody fiasco at St. Eloi, and Byng, the Canadian Corps 
commander, actively supported his removal.15 
                                                                                                                                
of Fire; the Second Battle of Ypres and the Forging of Canada April 1915  (HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2007), 197.; Wesley Gustavson, C., "Missing the Boat? Colonel A.F. Duguid and the 
Canadian Official History of World War I" (Masters, University of Calgary, 1999), 59. 
Regarding St. Eloi Craters, “Costly mistakes by Major-General Turner of the 2nd Division and 
Brigadier-General H. D. B. Ketchen of the 6th Brigade at St. Eloi.” and “The operation was 
ineptly conducted by the divisional commander, Major-General Richard Turner, who had done 
so poorly at Second Ypres as a brigadier.” Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden: A 
Biography, vol. 2 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 63.; Daniel G Dancocks, Gallant 
Canadians: The Story of the Tenth Canadian Infantry Battalion, 1914-1919  (Calgary, Alta., 
Canada: Calgary Highlanders Regimental Funds Foundation, 1990), 81. 
13  For example, “Mercer and Currie received their promotions on merit. Even if he was not 
completely beloved by the Minister, Turner had not” and “The other division commander in 
the Canadian Corps was Richard Turner. He owed his advancement entirely to Sam Hughes, 
who was among the few who held him in high regard, particularly after his weak performance 
at Second Ypres” J. L. Granatstein, Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace  
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 81.; Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography: 
60. On the aftermath of St Eloi, “The defeat so tarnished his reputation that not even Hughes 
could override British objections to his becoming the Canadian Corps GOC; he was lucky to 
keep his division.” and “kept the questionably competent Canadian--born General Richard 
Turner in command of the 2nd Division.” Leppard, "Richard Turner and the Battle of St. Eloi," 
11.; Tim Cook, "Documenting War and Forging Reputations: Sir Max Aitken and the Canadian 
War Records Office in the First World War," War in History 10, no. 3 (2003): 278. 
14  “Turner revealed his greatest weakness as a military commander. He was willing to 
subordinate the wishes and best interests of his men to his personal ambitions, his political 
loyalties and his desire to settle scores with Alderson. Set within their context, Turner’s action 
and decisions regarding the Ross rifle may be comprehendible but they are not condonable.” 
Campbell, "The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.: A Social and Operational History of the 
2nd Canadian Division, 1915-1918," 157. 
15  “Nine men commanded the Corps’ four divisions in battle during WWI and only Richard 
Turner was sacked” and “Turner was transferred to an administrative post in London after he 
bungled the 2nd Division’s first battle at St. Eloi early in 1916.” Patrick Brennan and Thomas 
Leppard, "How the Lessons Were Learned: Senior Commanders and the Moulding of the 
Canadian Corps after the Somme," in Yves Tremblay (ed.), Canadian Military History since the 
17th Century : Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 
2000 (Ottawa: Directorate of History and Heritage, Dept. of National Defence = Direction--
Histoire et patrimoine, Ministère de la défense nationale, 2001), 138.; Cassar, Hell in Flanders 
Fields: Canadians at the Second Battle of Ypres: 321. “Byng, delighted to be rid of an 
inadequate commander.” Granatstein, Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace: 
86. 
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The standard narrative will usually admit that Turner was of some value as 
the commander of Canadian forces in England, but often will attribute the 
success in England to the first Minister of the OMFC, Sir George Perley.16 A 
conspicuous exception is Desmond Morton who accurately observed in When 
Your Number is Up that Perley left Turner to make the military decisions.17 
Another major strand of the standard narrative was Turner clashed with Currie, 
while Turner was in England, to the detriment of the Canadian Corps.18 The 
more informed historians, however, do not accept Currie’s claims that Turner 
deliberately subverted him.19  
Turner’s subordinates, both officers and men, extolled his competence, 
approachability, and courage. Memoirs, diaries, and contemporary letters rarely 
mention senior officers, but a surprising number of Turner’s subordinates refer to 
                                            
16  “Major-General Richard Turner had been found wanting on the Somme and was sent to 
England to bring order out of the chaos of army administration where, as it would turn out, his 
talents really lay” and “He did a good job. It took several months to sort out the mess, but there 
would be no further complaints about the standard of training of the replacement troops 
reaching the Canadian Corps.” Patrick Brennan, "Julian Byng and Leadership in the Canadian 
Corps," in Andrew Iarocci Geoffrey Hayes, Mike Bechthold (eds.), Vimy Ridge: A Canadian 
Reassessment (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 89; Dancocks, Sir 
Arthur Currie: A Biography: 81. “Perley achieved an impressive transformation.” and “the 
architect of the new system was Sir George Perley.” Desmond Morton, "Exerting Control: The 
Development of Canadian Authority over the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919," in 
Timothy Travers and Christon Archer (eds.), Men at War (Precedent, 1982), 12; Hyatt, General 
Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography: 62. 
17  Desmond Morton, When Your Number's Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War  
(Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1993), 92. 
18  “That this appointment should of aroused personal jealousies was natural; that the jealousies 
should of led to personal animosities, bitter recriminations, and political intrigue was indicative 
of immaturity and a lack of a proper sense of military discipline.” George F. G. Stanley, 
Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People, 3d ed. (Toronto: Macmillan of 
Canada, 1974), 312. 
19  “From his combat record alone it was obvious Turner was not a particularly good commander, 
but he did not attack Currie behind the latter’s back.” Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A 
Military Biography: 130. 
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him and do so in a positive light.20 The regimental histories published before the 
Second World War were also commendatory, with two containing forwards 
written by Turner, indicating the esteem with which he was held.21  
During the war and immediately post-war, Turner had a distinguished 
reputation, much like Douglas Haig.22 As to be expected during the war, works 
like J.A. Currie’s The Red Watch and Max Aitken’s Canada in Flanders praised 
Turner.23 Immediate post-war accounts were either laudatory, triumphal 
commentary devoid of significant criticisms of leaders, or detailed regimental 
histories where the battles of reputation were irrelevant.  
Turner’s reputation has declined precipitously, again like Haig’s, while 
Currie’s has ascended. In the 1920s without detailed academic or official 
histories, the rumours of Currie’s poor standing with the men of the Canadian 
Corps affected the narrative. Currie’s victory at his libel trial in 1928 lifted the 
pall over his reputation and encouraged both officers and men to rally around 
                                            
20  Some of the examples from each category are D.E. Macintyre on Turner transferring to England 
“certainly is the right man in the right place. Unfortunately, it is a great loss for us, everyone 
was his friend out here. He is not only a capable solider but an absolutely honest and fearless 
man and should go far.” Macintryre Diary Entry, 26 November 1916, MG 30 E241 v1, D.E. 
Macintyre Fonds; LAC. Diary Entry, November 26 1916. Another is Private Fraser writing about 
the contempt the men felt towards their officers “One officer I can single out as a decided 
exception. He is General Turner, V.C.” Donald Fraser and Reginald H. Roy, The Journal of 
Private Fraser, 1914-1918: Canadian Expeditionary Force  (Victoria, B.C.: Sono Nis Press, 
1985), 75. Another example, “Gen Turner the great Canadian General, was here today. He is 
very popular as [he] is every inch a fighting man.” Frost, Frost, and Fleming, The Wartime 
Letters of Leslie and Cecil Frost, 1915-1919: 118. 
21  R. C Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment: 14th Battalion, C.E.F. 1914-1925  (The 
Gazette Printing Co. Limited, 1927); Kim Beattie, 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1891-1928  
(Canada: The Highlanders, 1932). 
22  Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, (Aurum Press, 2011). Amazon 
Kindle. 340. 
23  John Allister Currie, "The Red Watch"; with the First Canadian Division in Flanders  (London,: 
Constable and company, ltd., 1916); Max Aitken Beaverbrook, Canada in Flanders  (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1916). 
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Currie.24  
The publication of the long delayed first volume of the Canadian Official 
History in 1938 damaged Turner’s stature, despite A.F. Duguid, the official 
historian, burying much of his criticism of Turner.25 Turner feuded repeatedly 
with Duguid over Duguid’s portrayal of the 3rd Brigade and, by extension his role 
in its command, especially during the Battle of Second Ypres.26 Turner, and his 
Brigade-Major, Garnet Hughes, wrote long memos, met repeatedly with Duguid, 
and Turner even threatened to escalate the matter to the Prime Minister.27 In the 
end, Duguid did obfuscate what he regarded as Turner’s errors as he did not 
believe the story could be told while Turner was alive.28  
The British Official History treatment was circumspect because of the 
bruising battles fought by Duguid and senior Canadian officers with J. E. 
                                            
24  In 1928, Currie sued a Port Hope newspaper and won for libel over accusations that Currie 
unnecessarily ordered a costly attack on Mons on the last day of the war. For details on the 
trial, see Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 336-359; Robert Scott Demill, "The 1928 
Coburg Libel Trial of Sir Arthur Currie and the Port Hope Evening Guide: The Rehabilitation of 
the Reputation of a Corps Commander" (Masters, University of Ottawa, 1989); Barbara M. 
Wilson, "The Road to the Coburg Court Room: New Material from the Archives of the 
Canadian War Museum on the Sir Arthur Currie - Sir Sam Hughes Dispute, 1918-19," Canadian 
Military History 10, no. 3 (2001). 
25  A. Fortescue Duguid, The Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914 -1919, vol. 1 (Ottawa: 
Minister of National Defence, 1938). 
26  Tim Cook, Clio's Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars, vol. 10 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Gustavson, "Missing the Boat? Colonel A.F. Duguid and the 
Canadian Official History of World War I."; Timothy Travers, "Allies in Conflict: The British and 
Canadian Official Historians and the Real Story of Second Ypres (1915)," Journal of 
Contemporary History 24(1989); Timothy Travers, "Currie and 1st Canadian Division at Second 
Ypres - Controversy, Criticism and Official History," Canadian Military History 5, no. 2 (1996). 
27  Comments on Official History, DHS 10-10-E, RG 24 v1756, LAC; Memorandum, HQ 683-1-
30-5 v2, RG 24 v1756, LAC. 
28  Cook, Clio's Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars, 10: 88. Major-
General F. O. W. Loomis, a battalion commander in the 3rd Brigade and later GOC 3rd 
Division, also did not approve of Duguid’s account. Loomis writing to Garnet Hughes thought 
the history was written in close contact with members of the 2nd Brigade but not the 3rd 
Brigade. “It was my opinion that the action of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade had not been 
done justice and especially the work of the 13th Battalion.” Loomis to Hughes, 20 January 
1934, File 22, MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds; LAC. 
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Edmonds, the British Official Historian. It is quite evident from reading Edmonds’ 
account of Second Ypres that he was treading a careful line to avoid triggering 
another battle with the Canadians. Edmonds’ coverage of St. Eloi and 
Courcelette was short and uncontroversial.29  
After a long hiatus due to the Second World War, the looming fiftieth 
anniversary of the First World War caused historians to return to the war with a 
deluge of books. Identifying a hero to rally around, writers elevated Currie to his 
rightful place as the dominant Canadian military leader in the First World War. 
In the process, however, it was apparently necessary to undermine Turner’s 
reputation to build up Currie’s.  
In the wake of Duguid’s failure to publish more than a single volume of the 
projected eight, G.W.L. Nicholson’s one volume history published in 1962 had 
to cover the entire Canadian war effort.30 Therefore, Nicholson had to be 
concise, but despite this, it is an excellent narrative history, with especially 
strong battle descriptions. Nicholson tended to avoid most of the controversial 
topics and his treatment of Turner was neutral, while burying criticisms in 
footnotes.  
The opening of the British and Canadian First World War archives 
triggered academic interest in delving deeper into the First World War, and 
another flood of books emerged starting in the 1980s that further solidified the 
                                            
29  James Edward Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1916, vol. 2, History of the 
Great War, Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (London: Macmillan, 1932), 413. 
30  G. W. L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919  (Ottawa: R. Duhamel, Queen's 
Printer, 1964). 
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standard narrative, discussed above. These works concentrated on the combat 
operations of the Canadian Corps.31 Works such as Hyatt’s biography of Hughes, 
Haycock’s on Currie, Desmond Morton’s multiple works, and Harris’ on the 
Canadian staff provided a broad coverage and were based on previously under-
utilised primary documentation.32 This trend culminated in Tim Cook’s two 
award-winning books on the Canadian Corps that covered not only the battles 
but also the experiences of the soldiers at and away from the front.33 
Nevertheless, in all these works aspects of the standard narrative persisted. 
The two indispensable works on the administrative portion of Turner’s 
career are Desmond Morton’s A Peculiar Kind of Politics and Stephen Harris’s 
Canadian Brass. Morton covers the previously ignored history of the OMFC. This 
groundbreaking work is the only substantial narrative that deals with the CEF’s 
administrative structure, governance, and changes.34 Morton explores the 
evolution of Canadian administration from the chaos of Sam Hughes to the more 
                                            
31  René Chartrand, Canadian Military Heritage, vol. III (Ottawa: National Defence, Directorate of 
History and Heritage, 2000); Bill Freeman and Richard Nielsen, Far from Home: Canadians in 
the First World War  (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1999); Granatstein, Canada's Army: 
Waging War and Keeping the Peace; J. L. Granatstein, Canada and the Two World Wars  
(Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003); Norman Hillmer and J. L Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: 
Canada and the World to the 1990s  (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994); J. K. Marteinson, 
We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Army  (Montréal: Ovale 
Publications, 1992); Stanley, Canada's Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People. 
32  Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916.; Hyatt, 
General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography.; Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, 
Toronto ed. (University of Toronto Press, 1982); Morton, When Your Number's Up: The 
Canadian Soldier in the First World War.; Stephen John Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of 
a Professional Army, 1860-1939  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 
33  Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916  (Toronto: Viking 
Canada, 2007); Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918  
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008). 
34  The only other work dealing with administrative matters is Love’s A Call to Arms. It is an 
explanatory work that exhaustively details the organisation of the CEF. It provides essential 
detailed order of battle information for all units in the CEF including combat, training, railway, 
and forestry troops. David W Love, A Call to Arms: The Organization and Administration of 
Canada's Military in World War One  (Winnipeg: Bunker to Bunker Books, 1999). 
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structured and bureaucratic experience of the OMFC. Morton’s focus is on the 
political level and not the military, so generals appear only when they affect or 
interact with the politicians. Morton, more than most, appreciates the 
contribution Turner made to the improvement in the administration. 
Harris investigates the transformation of the Canadian military from a 
militia force to a professional army in 1939 through the lens of command and 
staff. Harris’ study showed the evolution from a militia dominated by political 
influence, to increasing professionalism during the First World War. Harris’s 
interpretation was conditioned by the lens of Currie’s papers, as he approached 
the process from primarily the Canadian Corps’ perspective. 
 Research Questions 
The thesis explores five key questions that will determine the nature of 
Turner’s contribution and assesses him as a general in his combat and 
administrative roles. These questions fall out of the primary elements of the 
standard narrative and are presented as four case studies. Each case study 
provides points for evaluation within the constraints of a thesis length work.  
The first question revolves around the extent to which Turner’s selection, 
appointments, and retention were the consequence of Turner’s purported 
Conservative Party affiliation, so important in the patronage-driven Canadian 
Militia. The thesis will explore the underlying reasons for the political support for 
Turner. 
The second question is Turner’s combat generalship. The conventional 
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interpretation has Turner as, at best, a mediocre combat leader. The thesis 
explores whether this is a valid appraisal by reviewing in depth, the two battles 
Turner commanded as a divisional commander at St. Eloi Craters, regarded as a 
bloody failure, and Courcelette, a ‘forgotten victory.’35 The thesis also 
investigates whether Turner demonstrated a learning process as a divisional 
commander in an unprecedented situation. To supplement this analysis, the 
thesis will also assess three of Turner’s key decisions at Second Ypres. 
The process and rationale for Turner’s selection to command the OMFC is 
the third major question. The thesis will test whether the standard narrative’s 
explanation that Turner was effectively dismissed with Byng’s support is valid. 
The penultimate question is Turner’s performance as an administrator. The 
thesis analyses the changes in the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
administration in England with a special focus on the first seven months of 
Turner’s command. It also evaluates Turner’s responsibility for the 
improvements.  
Many historians accept uncritically Currie’s assertion that he was at 
constant loggerheads with the administration in England. The fifth principal 
thread examines the extent to which Currie’s claim was well-founded. No other 
work has examined this ‘battle’ from Turner’s perspective and reviewed his 
responses to Currie’s demands. 
To provide context, the thesis also briefly evaluates Turner’s Boer War 
experiences; how he related to his political masters; his role in demobilisation; 
                                            
35  Campbell, "A Forgotten Victory: Courcelette, 15 September 1916." 
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the abortive formation of the Canadian airforce; the election of 1917; and the 
establishment of the Canadian Legion. 
Canadian First World War studies, unlike many Australian works, often 
have a limited awareness of the equivalent Australian, New Zealand, and British 
experiences.36 These other perspectives provide a useful comparison with the 
Canadian approach to understand how other organisations in analogous 
conditions solved the challenges. This is an effective tool to help evaluate 
Turner’s performance. Hence, where applicable, the Australian, New Zealand, 
and British approach to an issue will be compared with the Canadian response.37 
                                            
36  James Wood’s recent book is an exception. James A. Wood, Militia Myths : Ideas of the 
Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921, Studies in Canadian Military History, (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2010). 
37  E. M Andrews, The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations During World War I  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); E. M Andrews, "Managing the War: The Department of 
Defence, 1914-1919," in Peter Dennis and Jeffery Grey (eds.), Defining Victory 1918 (Army 
History Unit, Department of Defence, 1999); Bruce Douglas Faraday, "Half the Battle: The 
Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918" (PhD, University of New South 
Wales, 1997); Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army, The Australian Centenary History of Defence 
(South Melbourne, Australia ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jeffrey Grey, A 
Military History of Australia, 3rd ed. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Roger 
Lee, "The Australian Staff: The Forgotten Men of the First AIF," in Peter Dennis and Jeffery Grey 
(eds.), Defining Victory 1918 (Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 1999); Ross Mallett, 
"The Interplay between Technology, Tactics and Organisation in the First AIF" (PhD, Australian 
Defence Force Academy, 1998); John Dermot Millar, "A Study in the Limitations of Command: 
General Sir William Birdwood and the A.I.F., 1914-1918" (PhD, University of New South 
Wales, 1993); Christopher Pugsley, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire 
in the First World War  (Auckland: Reed, 2004); Christopher Pugsley and Laurie Barber, Kiwis 
in Conflict: 200 Years of New Zealanders at War, New ed. (Auckland: David Bateman in 
association with Auckland Museum, 2008); L. L Robson, The First A.I.F.: A Study of Its 
Recruitment 1914-1918  (Melbourne University Press, 1970); Christopher Wray, Sir James 
Whiteside McCay: A Turbulent Life, Australian Army History Series (South Melbourne, Vic. ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Richard Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the 
Western Front, 1914-1918  (London: Harper Perennial, 2005); Matthew Dominic Hughes, 
"General Allenby and the Campaign of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, June 1917-November 
1919" (PhD, King's College, 2000); Changboo Kang, "The British Infantry Officer on the 
Western Front in the First World War: With Special Reference to the Royal Warwickshire 
Regiment" (PhD, University of Birmingham, 2007); Charles Messenger, Call to Arms: The 
British Army 1914-18  (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005); Keith Simpson, "The Officers," 
in I. F. W Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British 
Army in the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985); Keith Spiers, 
"The Regular Army in 1914," in I. F. W Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), A Nation in Arms: A 
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A formidable challenge facing the biographer is to steer between Scylla 
and Charybdis of advocating or loathing the subject.38 It is the biographer’s duty 
to present the facts and analysis reflecting the context of the period under study 
and what the subject could or should have known and done but not act as a 
prosecutor or advocate. The other pertinent issue is to separate the personal 
aspects from the professional. It is his role as a military commander with 
responsibility for thousands of men and by his works that Turner will be 
evaluated. The objective, therefore, is to assess Turner’s personality as relevant 
to his military role and provide a considered analysis of his achievements and 
failures as an officer. The overarching goal is to present Turner in all the relevant 
military dimensions.39 
Source Review 
Both the primary and secondary materials for the thesis are extensive and 
in some instances unexploited. The paramount sources are the archival records 
of the Canadian National Archives, Canadian War Museum, and the Department 
of National Defence, Directorate of History, and Heritage. This was 
supplemented with evidence found at the McGill University archives in 
Montreal, Queens’ University Archives in Kingston, and The National Archives, 
Imperial War Museum and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives in 
                                                                                                                                
Social Study of the British Army in the First World War (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1985). 
38  Hughes, "General Allenby and the Campaign of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, June 1917-
November 1919," 13. 
39  An absence of evidence restricts the ability to portray Turner outside of his military role. 
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London, England. Over 1,200 volumes of archival material were consulted in 
preparation of the thesis. 
The Canadian National Archives’ materials consist of official documents, 
personal papers, and service records; and records of the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Royal Canadian Legion. The official documents are split 
between RG 9 (Department of Militia and Defence), RG 24 (Department of 
National Defence) and RG 150 (Service Records). The RG 9 volumes are the 
contemporary records of the CEF, and the RG 24 volumes consulted relate to the 
writing of the official histories, while RG 150 contains the service records of the 
officers and men of the CEF. 
The most critical set of volumes are the RG 9 collection, which consists of 
four series – A, B, C, and D. Historians have thoroughly mined the A, C, and D 
series files. Three groups of volumes, however, have been hitherto virtually 
untouched – the correspondence files of John Wallace Carson, the OMFC’s 
ministerial personnel correspondence, and the B series of volumes on 
administration in England. There are 127 volumes of individuals’ 
correspondence sent and received by Major-General John Wallace Carson, Sam 
Hughes’ ‘Special Representative’ in England. Unlike the other volumes in the A 
series, historians have not thoroughly examined Carson’s correspondence, 
except the files on the most senior officers. There was much useful information 
scattered throughout the files that help explicate events, characters, motivations, 
and major-generals behaving badly. This information ceases with Carson’s 
unseating in December 1916. 
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The second set was the 105 volumes of personnel correspondence of the 
ministers of the OMFC. Similar in purpose to Carson’s files, they provide useful 
background information on motivations and relationships. 
The other major unexplored set were the series B volumes on Turner’s 
command and his immediate staff in England, including Turner’s office, 
Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, General Staff, and Assistant Military 
Secretary. For the most part, historians have not reviewed these files.40 They 
reveal the management style of Turner and the contribution he and his staff 
made in reforming the administration in England. These materials were the by-
product of the administrative process and were not developed to aid later 
historians. Like all such materials, they must be evaluated in terms of their 
purpose and context. 
The pertinent RG 24 files relate to the writing of the Canadian official 
history and officers’ comments on the British and Canadian official histories. 
While Duguid completed only one volume, Duguid’s researchers did extensive 
work on the second and some preliminary effort on the third. Duguid for all his 
failings was a careful researcher, and he and his staff greatly facilitated later 
historians in their painstaking amassing of material. The comments made by 
officers on both the British and Canadian official histories can be rewarding, as 
they often provide information that is unavailable elsewhere and makes explicit 
                                            
40  To confirm this assertion, I queried the LAC regarding the number of requests since 1993 for a 
selection of five Series A and five Series B volumes. These volumes were all ones I found useful 
and would likely be of interest to other researchers. On average, excluding my requests, the 
Series A volumes were requested fourteen times since 1993, while only v806 in Series B was 
requested and that just six times. RG9 III A1 and B1 Circulation Stats 15 02 2011 Email from 
LAC, 12 February 2011 in Author’s possession. 
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how the officer in question wanted their story presented. These comments, 
however, have to be rigorously evaluated, as they are subject to both 
unintentional and deliberate errors.  
Another important category of source material was the personal papers of 
men and officers in the CEF, historians, and politicians. Currie’s personal papers 
are an especially valuable source. Sir Edward Kemp’s papers, the second 
Minister of the OMFC, are well organised and cover his time as the minister in 
depth and, as a result, are a rich source of information. Researchers have 
selectively consulted them before, but this thesis is the first to use his ministerial 
files in almost their entirety. Perley’s papers are less abundant but provide useful 
information. Prime Minister Robert Borden and Lord Beaverbrook’s (Max Aitken) 
papers are extensive, and historians have thoroughly investigated them.41  
Turner left limited personal papers, letters, or diaries that show the interior 
man. His available papers amount to just twelve volumes in the National 
Archives – consisting primarily of official documents – and letters, clippings, and 
certificates at the Canadian War Museum. His diaries are compilations and 
extracts of letters to his wife that stop when he moves to England. Therefore, 
there is little evidence of his innermost feelings and thoughts. His actions have to 
be traced through the paper trail left behind in the archives and the Canadian 
War Museum, and his motivations inferred in most cases.  
                                            
41  Max Aitken was raised to the peerage as Lord Beaverbrook in 1917. He will be referred to as 
Max Aitken in the thesis for clarity. 
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Organisation Overview 
To answer the questions posed earlier, the thesis is divided into two 
sections, of four chapters each, focused on Turner’s combat and administrative 
career. Chapter One briefly explores Turner’s early life, service in the Canadian 
Militia, and exploits in the Boer War. It also describes the pertinent aspects of 
the pre-war Canadian military. The second chapter provides an overview of 
Turner’s command of the 3rd Brigade, and three select incidents of his conduct of 
the Battle of Second Ypres cited as major failures. Chapter Three is the first of the 
case studies, and it analyses Turner’s command of the 2nd Division and 
especially his prosecution of the Battle of St. Eloi Craters. The chapter also deals 
with the post-battle attempts to oust Turner. The fourth chapter and the second 
case study examines Turner’s victory at the Battle of Courcelette and the two 
subsequent less successful engagements at the Somme.  
The second section on Turner’s administrative role opens with Chapter 
Five’s discussion of the disastrous state of Canadian administration and training 
in England, and Turner’s appointment to reform this flawed organisation. 
Chapter Six is the third case study concerned with Turner’s actions in the first 
seven months of his command in England and his responsibility for the resulting 
transformation. The final case study is Chapter Seven’s analysis of Turner’s often-
fractious relationship with Currie in the period from June 1917 to August 1919. 
Chapter Eight focuses on Turner’s challenging relationship with a new minister. 
The chapter starts with the federal election of December 1917 and covers 
Turner’s remaining military career until his retirement in 1919, and his 
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endeavours to unify the fractured Canadian veterans’ movement. The conclusion 
brings together the answers to the key questions and assesses Turner as a military 
leader.  
Conclusion 
This study revises the prevalent view of an important Canadian officer 
based on new primary research and interpretations. Five key questions are the 
focus of the thesis related to Turner’s appointments, his competence and 
evolution as a combat commander, his transfer to England, his role in the 
acknowledged transformation of the administration in England, and his 
relationship and rivalry with Currie. The study also weaves into the narrative a 
comparison where appropriate with the British and Anzac experiences and 
solutions. The thesis presents Turner in all his facets related to his military roles 
and evaluate his contributions, his failures, his flaws, and his virtues to bring a 
more balanced and accurate assessment. 
 1 
BOER WAR HERO: TURNER TO 
1914 
 
Never let it be said the Canadians had let their guns be taken. 
R.E.W. Turner, 7 November 1900 
 
Richard Turner’s First World War military career was, in part, the product of 
his pre-war active service and experience as an officer in the Canadian Militia, 
and the nature of the pre-war Canadian military. This chapter, therefore, will 
concisely review Turner’s early life, his initial experiences in the Militia, his 
service in the Boer War, and in the inter-war period. In addition, the structure and 
state of the Canadian military will be analysed, as it played a critical role in 
preparing Turner for the demands of active service.  
Early Life 
Richard Ernest William Turner, the future Lieutenant-General, was born on 
27 July 1871 in Quebec City. He was the fourth born and the first of four sons of 
Richard and Emily Turner.1 They had five daughters, as well. Turner’s father was 
                                            
1  Maria was born in 1867, Amy in 1869, Effie in 1870, Leila in 1872, Albert in 1873, William in 
1875, Erie in 1879 and Evan in 1886. Maria, Amy, and Leila died as infants. Albert served in 
the Boer War in the Royal Canadian Regiment, and William was a doctor who served in the 
First World War. Christopher Smyth, 'Descendants of William Ellis,' Email, 6 February 2012; 
Department of Militia and Defence, The Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada 
(Corrected to June 30, 1914)  (Ottawa1914), 341; 1901 Canadian Census, Quebec, 10, Ward 
Saint-Louis, Family 87, (Quebec1901); Turner Diary Entry, 1 November 1899, MG 30 E46 Roll 
M-300, Turner Fonds; LAC; Donald Stuart Macpherson, A Soldier's Diary: The WWI Diaries of 
Donald Macpherson  (St. Catharines, Ont.: Vanwell Pub., 2001), 156. 
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born in 1843 in Quebec City and was of English/Irish origin. He entered the work 
force at age 15, and formed a partnership with Joseph Whitehead in 1870 in a 
wholesale grocery firm called Whitehead and Turner. Turner married Emily Ellis 
in 1865. Turner took over the firm in 1885 with Whitehead’s retirement and 
expanded his business interests into lumber and importing from China, Japan, and 
the West Indies. His business success translated into a family home on the Rue 
d’Auteuil, amongst the better addresses in Quebec City. He was also active in 
social, business, and local and provincial political affairs. He was the Honorary 
President of the provincial Liberal Party, for a term.2 
R.E.W. Turner attended private schools and graduated from Quebec City 
High School in 1889.3 He received what was, for the time, a first-class education 
that equipped him socially and intellectually for a career in business and the 
military. Turner grew up in the late Victorian era, and this shaped his views on 
imperialism, honour, and duty. He had the conventional views of his time and 
social position. Unlike many other Anglophones in Quebec City, he did learn to 
speak French with relative fluency. He was an Anglican, but religion did not play 
a central role in his life, as evidenced from the lack of references in his diaries and 
letters.4 
Turner started in his father’s company as an office boy in 1891 and steadily 
received more responsibility in his father’s wide-ranging business interests. Turner 
                                            
2  Henry James Morgan, ed. The Canadian Men and Women of the Time: A Handbook of 
Canadian Biography, 1 ed. (Toronto: William Briggs, 1898); Henry James Morgan, ed. The 
Canadian Men and Women of the Time: A Handbook of Canadian Biography, 12 ed. (Toronto: 
William Briggs, 1912). 
3  Leppard, "The Dashing Subaltern - Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect," 21. 
4 Other than his wedding there is only one reference to attending church and that was during the 
Boer War. 
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was affluent, as by 1901, his annual income was $2,000, when the average 
factory worker’s yearly pay was $364, and a manager’s was $1,069.5 Turner’s 
business career would have exposed him to modern management techniques, 
such as setting broad policies and then delegating execution to subordinates. 
Having to deal with the uncertainties and constantly changing circumstances of 
an export and distribution business was an excellent preparation for the 
challenges he later faced in England.  
Canadian Military 
Turner’s military career commenced with appointment to The Queen’s Own 
Canadian Hussars (QOCH) on 22 April 1892, as a Second Lieutenant. The 
Canadian military, at this point, consisted of a tiny Permanent Force (PF) and a 
nominally 40,000 man Non-Permanent Active Militia, referred to hereafter as the 
Militia. The PF were regulars who were responsible for training the Militia, but 
there was considerable friction between the two forces.6 High personnel turnover 
and limited opportunities for its own training hampered the PF. The Militia 
consisted of scattered inadequately manned, equipped, and trained infantry 
battalions, cavalry regiments, and artillery batteries that lacked support services.7 
                                            
5  1901 Canadian Census, Quebec, 10, Ward Saint-Louis, Family 87; Eric W. Sagar, "The National 
Sample of the 1901 Census of Canada: A New Source for the Study of the Working Class," in 
Social Science History Conference (Amsterdam1998), 19-20. 
6  They fought over the limited defence funds. Wood, Militia Myths : Ideas of the Canadian 
Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921: 58. 
7  Carman Miller, A Knight in Politics : A Biography of Sir Frederick Borden  (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2010), 88. 
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As a result, the Canadian military in 1892 was at low ebb.8 
The QOCH was a city unit, with training on weeknights in armouries.9 
Commissioning was expensive, as it cost $300 to $500 for uniforms and officers 
usually stood a round of drinks at the end of a parade night, which restricted 
commissioning primarily to the wealthy.10 City units, also, expended considerable 
efforts on parades and other ceremonies to retain personnel and gain recruits. As a 
result, training tended to be a secondary activity.11 
The General Officer Commanding the Militia of Canada, who was always a 
British Regular Army officer, was in charge of the Canadian military.12 The post of 
GOC was a graveyard of careers – all but one of the GOCs left before their term 
expired.13 Their attempts to reform the Canadian military consistently ran afoul of 
Canadian financial and political realities.  
Canadians shared a strong belief in the “Militia Myth” of the effectiveness of 
the citizen soldier, based on a misreading of past wars, such as the War of 1812.14 
This myth, one shared by Australia and New Zealand, put faith in the innate 
                                            
8  Richard Arthur Preston, Canada and Imperial Defense; a Study of the Origins of the British 
Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867-1919, Duke University Commonwealth-Studies 
Center Publication No 29 (Durham, N.C.,: Published for the Duke University Commonwealth-
Studies Center by Duke University Press, 1967), 183. 
9  James A. Wood, "The Sense of Duty: Canadian Ideas of the Citizen Soldier, 1896-1917" (PhD, 
Wilfred Laurier University, 2007), 48. 
10  Kenneth Eyre, "Staff and Command in the Canadian Corps: The Canadian Militia 1896-1914 as 
a Source of Senior Officers" (Masters, Duke University, 1967), 82; Wood, "The Sense of Duty: 
Canadian Ideas of the Citizen Soldier, 1896-1917," 51. 
11  Wood, "The Sense of Duty: Canadian Ideas of the Citizen Soldier, 1896-1917," 56. 
12  Miller, A Knight in Politics : A Biography of Sir Frederick Borden: 97-99. 
13  Granatstein, Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace: 35. For more on the 
troubled history of the ministers and generals, see Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals : 
Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904  ([Toronto]: University of Toronto Press, 1970). 
14  Wood, "The Sense of Duty: Canadian Ideas of the Citizen Soldier, 1896-1917," 10; William 
Beahen, "A Citizens Army: The Growth and Development of the Canadian Militia, 1904-1914" 
(PhD, University of Ottawa, 1979), 193. 
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superiority of the ‘hard riding and straight shooting‘ citizen soldier over the 
professional.15 The difficulties the British experienced in defeating the Boers in the 
Boer War and the success of the Canadian contingents reinforced this myth. As a 
result, there was limited interest in a more professional military. 
The military was inextricably linked to the politics of the era, and patronage 
was an accepted fact.16 It was beneficial, if not essential, for an officer to belong 
to the right party if he wanted promotion.17 One GOC, Lord Douglas Dundonald, 
claimed his career effectively ended in attempting to stop patronage in the 
Militia.18  
Owing to the lack of direct evidence, the factors that led Turner to join the 
Militia have to be inferred, but they were probably, like most who joined, an 
amalgam of fulfilling the late Victorian ideals of ‘manliness,’ vigour, and service, 
allied with more commercial considerations.19 Young men joined city units 
because, as Carman Miller put it, they “offered a wide range of educational, social 
and recreational services, apart from martial skills.”20 They also offered social 
respectability and the opportunity to gain business and social contacts.21 The 
camaraderie of the regiment, outdoor pursuits, and military training also appealed 
                                            
15  Grey, A Military History of Australia: 77. 
16  Miller, A Knight in Politics : A Biography of Sir Frederick Borden: 90. 
17  Beahen, "A Citizens Army: The Growth and Development of the Canadian Militia, 1904-1914," 
268; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography: 3. 
18  Granatstein, Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace: 46; Douglas Mackinnon 
Baillie Hamilton Cochrane Dundonald, My Army Life  (London: E. Arnold, 1926), 310. 
19  For a in-depth discussion of ‘manliness’ and the Militia, see Mike O'Brien, "Manhood and the 
Militia Myth: Masculinity, Class and Militarism in Ontario, 1902-1914," Labour, no. 42 (1998). 
20  Carman Miller, "Chums in Arms: Comradeship among Canada's South African War Soldiers," 
Histoire Sociale/Social History 18, no. 36 (1986): 362; Carman Miller, "The Montreal Militia as 
a Social Institution before World War I," Urban History Review 19, no. 1 (1990): 57-64. 
21  Desmond Morton, "The Militia Lobby in Parliament: The Military Politicians and the Canadian 
Militia, 1868-1897," in Richard Preston and Petter Dennis (eds.), Swords and Convenants 
(Croom and Helm, 1976), 80. 
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to the adventurous. Turner, throughout, his life belonged to hunting and fishing 
clubs and listed riding as a hobby.22 
In 1892, Turner was of a generation that understood war as “more a manly 
triumph over the obstacles of nature than massive and indiscriminate slaughter.”23 
Wars were frontier adventures – short, sharp, and glorious, with the British 
triumphant. In 1892, Canadians of Turner’s class strongly identified themselves 
both as members of the British Empire and as Canadians. They would view the 
conflicts and victories of the British Empire as their own.24 The Boer War, while 
neither short nor particularly glorious, reinforced this view of war, as Turner’s 
regiment in the Boer War suffered only 7% of its losses due to enemy fire.25 
 The QOCH was a longstanding cavalry regiment, based in Quebec City.26 
Turner was fortunate that, for the first year of his service, the Cavalry School of 
Instruction was located at Quebec City, and would have provided more advanced 
and professional training than would normally have been the case for a Militia 
                                            
22  Turner War Record, G.A.Q. 4-40, RG 24 v1815, LAC; Who's Who and Why, ed. C.W. Parker, 
vol. 5 (Vancouver,: International Press., 1914). 
23  Carl Berger, The Sense of Power; Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914  
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 236. 
24  Patrick Brennan, "The Other Battle: Imperialist Versus Nationalist Sympathies within the 
Officers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919," in Phillip Buckner & R. Douglas 
Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the British World (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 
251; Katharine McGowan, "'A Finger in the Fire': Canadian Volunteer Soldiers and Their 
Perceptions of Canada's Collective Identity through Their Experience of the Boer War," War 
and Society 28, no. 1 (2009). 
25  Canada, Supplementary Report: Organization, Equipment, Despatch and Service of Canadian 
Contingents During the War in South Africa, 1899-1900, ed. Militia and Defence 
(Ottawa1901). 
26  It formed in 1856, and would later be re-designated the 10th Queen’s Own Canadian Hussars 
in 1903. The regiment disbanded in August 1913. Charles H. Stewart, The Concise Lineages of 
the Canadian Army, 1855-Date, 2nd enl. and rev. ed. (Toronto: [s.n.], 1982). Canadian cavalry 
were trained as Mounted Rifles and were not the equivalent of British or Continental cavalry 
units. Cavalry Training Canada 1904, (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1904). 
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cavalry unit.27 
Before the Boer War, Turner worked conscientiously to raise his 
qualifications through training and testing. He scored well in his cavalry test in 
1892 and on the Maxim gun in 1899, but earned a disappointing mark in his 
infantry exam in 1896. He attended the cavalry school in 1896, as well.28 This 
training and testing projects the image of an officer who was committed to 
investing the time and effort necessary to improve his qualifications, and that his 
strengths lay in the cavalry and not the infantry.  
His Troop demonstrated respect by the presentation of a $175 gift on his 
25th birthday in 1896. A newspaper article reported “the troop has never had a 
more faithful and painstaking officer and that the unit’s effectiveness was due to 
him.”29 This was a recurring theme in how Turner was perceived; his positive 
image was probably an outcome of his strong man management skills.  
Given his relative diligence in upgrading his military education and strong 
leadership skills, it should not be surprising that Turner rose rapidly through the 
ranks, receiving a promotion to Captain in 1895 and Major in 1900.30 Leppard’s 
assertion that Turner’s promotions were due to Tory political influence and 
nepotism, rather than his own merits is highly doubtful.31 Turner was not 
                                            
27  It moved to Toronto in 1893 and formed the basis of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. Brereton 
Greenhous, Dragoon: The Centennial History of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1883-1983  
(Belleville, Ont.: Guild of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, 1983), 13. 
28  Turner earned a combined 85% on his Cavalry, 78% on his Maxim and 64% on his Infantry 
examination. Certificate of Military Instruction, 19710147-001/ DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.4, 
CWM. Canada 
29  A Popular Officer: Presentation to Captain R.E.W. Turner Yesterday, Unattributed Newspaper 
Clipping, 19710147-005/DOCS MANU 58E 5 2.1, Turner Fonds; CWM. 
30  Richard Turner Service Jacket, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9842 - 47, LAC. 
31  Leppard, "Richard Turner and the Battle of St. Eloi," 2. 
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politically active and was not likely a member of the Conservative Party – he was 
not a ‘Tory hack.’ The evidence for Turner’s political leanings in the period before 
the First World War is primarily negative in the sense that there are no indications 
of political activity, although there is a paucity of records of the Conservative 
party survive from this period.32 Turner’s father was a prominent figure in the 
Quebec provincial Liberal Party, and while this does not rule out Turner adopting 
a contrary political stance, it is suggestive. Turner ran for no political office either 
before or after the First World War.33 Given he was from a prominent, wealthy 
family, had won a VC, and evidence from his wartime career indicates he was an 
excellent public speaker, he could have had a political career had he wanted one. 
There was no party affiliation listed in any of the pre-war Who’s Who or Canadian 
Men and Women of the Time listings for Turner.34 Searches of pre-war Quebec 
City newspapers reveal no indications of political activity by Turner. Finally, Sir 
George Perley, when evaluating whether to select Turner or Currie to command 
the forces in England, wrote Borden that he believed Turner to be a neutral 
Liberal.35 Given Perley was at one point the Conservative party Whip, he would 
have had familiarity with party supporters, indicating Turner was not active in the 
                                            
32  Dr. John English, 'Request for Advice on Pre-Great War Conservative Party,' Email, 15 August 
2011. Dr. English is the leading expert on the Canadian Conservative party. 
33  Turner was appointed to two one-year terms on the Quebec City Protestant School Board. 
"Turner Appointed to Protestant School Board," Quebec City Daiily Telegraph, 13 June 1923. 
34  Who's Who and Why, 5; Morgan, The Canadian Men and Women of the Time: A Handbook of 
Canadian Biography; Morgan, The Canadian Men and Women of the Time: A Handbook of 
Canadian Biography. 
35  Cable Perley to Borden, 22 November 1916, v7, File 2, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; 
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Conservative party.36 Furthermore, a comparison with the 1914 Quarterly Militia 
List indicates Turner’s promotions were slighting faster than contemporary PF 
officers’ promotions, but not markedly so.37  
South African Campaign38 
In 1899, Turner was a respected field grade cavalry officer from a wealthy 
and influential family, but then so were many other officers in the Canadian 
Militia, who had greater personal accomplishments, were wealthier, and had 
more powerful political influence at their disposal. Moreover, photographs of the 
time reveal an unprepossessing war leader. They show a slim twenty-six year old 
man of slightly over average height at 5’ 9½” with a weak chin and owlish 
glasses, who resembles a mild grocery clerk. Despite his appearance, he was a 
highly successful subaltern, who through personal example later repeatedly 
convinced men to follow him on the battlefield.  
                                            
36  Roy MacLaren, Commissions High : Canada in London, 1870-1971  (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2006), 160. 
37  The Militia List only provides promotion data for Permanent Force officers whose promotions 
were likely slower than in the Militia. Defence, The Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of 
Canada (Corrected to June 30, 1914). 
38  For a more detailed description of Turner’s campaign, see “Turner in the Boer War” in the 
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Figure 1 Lieutenant Richard Turner 1900 
 
 
"Canadian Victoria Cross Winners." 
http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/exhibitions/boer/victoriacrossrecipients_e.shtml 
 
In 1901, Turner returned to Quebec City to a tumultuous welcome, as a 
Lieutenant-Colonel with two wounds, a Victoria Cross, a Distinguished Service 
Order, and an enviable war record.39 In 1914, when it was time to appoint senior 
commanders of the first Canadian Contingent, there were PF officers more 
qualified to lead. However, Sam Hughes wanted Militia officers to command, and 
there were none with Turner’s record of active service, seniority, proven 
capability, and reputation for valour.40 
                                            
39  Turner also was awarded the Queen’s South Africa Medal 1899-1902 with clasps 
Johannesburg, Diamond Hill, Belfast, Cape Colony, Orange Free State, South Africa. See 
Appendix 1 Awards for Turner’s complete list of decorations. 
40  Defence, The Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to June 30, 1914). 
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Turner’s Boer War participation was critical for his military career in three 
respects. It developed his reputation and profile to legitimately differentiate him 
from other Militia officers of the same age and class. It moulded his character as a 
leader. It also raised his confidence through successful military service. 
Turner served in the second Canadian contingent sent to South Africa to 
support the British Empire in its conflict with the Boers. The British authorities 
accepted the offer of the contingent on 16 December 1899. Within a month, a 
regiment of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, formed into two battalions, along with 
three batteries of field artillery were assembled, equipped, and were waiting 
transport to South Africa. This was a creditable performance considering the state 
of the Canadian Militia.41 The name of Turner’s unit, the 1st Battalion of the 
Canadian Mounted Rifles, changed in August 1900 to the Royal Canadian 
Dragoons (RCD), at the behest of the unit’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F. 
Lessard.42 This is the name used in the chapter. Turner thought the change absurd, 
and told Lessard so.43 This was an early example of Turner’s willingness to 
confront authority. 
On 28 December, Turner was appointed to command the 3rd troop, from 
                                            
41  Hugh John Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900" 
(Masters, University of Ottawa, 1983), 13; Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and 
the South African War, 1899-1902  (Montreal: Canadian War Museum and McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1993), 154. 
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43  Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 13; Turner Diary 
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Quebec City, of ‘B’ Squadron RCD.44 Turner, like many other officers, reverted to 
a lower rank to participate in the campaign.45 He was eager to go, and worried 
that he would have to remain behind when not selected for the first contingent.46  
The RCD were Mounted Rifles, who trained and were equipped to fight both 
mounted and dismounted as infantry.47 They were usually the first to fight and the 
last off the battlefield. The Mounted Rifles had to be consummate horsemen, 
physically tough, masters of field craft, and possess endurance and stamina.48 
Successful leaders had to have quick intelligence, coup d’oeil, decisiveness, and 
the ability to motivate exhausted, thirsty, and scared men.  
Before leaving for the war, in what the newspapers chronicled as one of the 
most romantic moments of the departure of the Second Contingent, Turner 
married his fiancée Harriet Augusta Godday, on 8 January 1900. She was 
vacationing in England with her parents when Turner cabled her that they could 
marry, if she returned before the unit departed in a week. She was clearly 
resourceful and decisive, as within two hours of receiving the cable, she packed 
                                            
44  Canada, Supplementary Report: Organization, Equipment, Despatch and Service of Canadian 
Contingents During the War in South Africa, 1899-1900: 70. Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps 
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48  Gary Sheffield’s paraphrase of Douglas Haig’s view was the “MI were not worth their rations.” 
Sheffield. 1091-1109; Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880-1918: 90. As 
the Canadians were Mounted Rifles, Haig’s condemnation may not have applied to the same 
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and was on her way to catch the next steamer to North America. She arrived the 
day before the wedding. They married in the Quebec City Anglican Cathedral in 
appropriate pomp and circumstance. Turner and his new bride had a one-day 
honeymoon in Montreal highlighted in Turner’s diary by buying kit for his 
departure.49 Turner and his wife had one son and two daughters.50 His son, Harold 
Richard Turner, continuing a family tradition, would win the DSO in the Second 
World War, serving as a Major in the 6th Anti-tank Regiment. 
Shortly thereafter, the unit departed to Halifax with Turner and his new wife 
after a torch lit honour guard to the train station. Turner wrote in his diary ‘Happy 
Man’.51 The unit spent six weeks in Halifax, because of shipping problems, which 
probably was not a hardship for the newly married couple. It, also, enabled 
further training of the raw troops.  
Upon reaching South Africa, the RCD was attached to Colonel Edwin 
Alderson’s 1st Mounted Infantry Corps, a brigade strength unit. Alderson, because 
of his successful experience in leading Canadians, including the RCD, would 
command the 1st Division and the Canadian Corps in the First World War. 
Alderson would later develop an exceedingly negative view of Turner’s ability 
during the Great War.52 However, as Turner was three levels removed from 
Alderson, it is unlikely Alderson would have had much opportunity to judge his 
                                            
49  Wedding Article, 8 January 1900, 19710147-005/DOCS MANU 58E 5 2.1, Turner Fonds; 
CWM; Turner Diary Entry, 29 December 1899, MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
50  Harold, Kathleen, and Evelyn. 
51  Turner Diary Entry, January 1900, MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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capabilities in this campaign.53  
During the advance on Pretoria, the capital of the South African (Transvaal) 
Republic, the Northern Boer republic, Turner earned his first recognition on 6 
May. He, with six volunteers, crossed the Vet River and distracted the Boers’ 
defence sufficiently to enable the remainder of the RCD to cross the river at 
another location and compel the Boers to retreat.54 For his initiative and gallantry, 
Turner received the DSO, which given he was a subaltern at the time, indicates 
his actions were highly regarded. Typically, the authorities at that time awarded 
the DSO to officers in command above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel or to more 
junior officers for actions just short of the Victoria Cross.55  
After the capture of Pretoria, the RCD garrisoned towns on the outskirts of 
the capital and defended against probing Boer attacks through June and July. By 
now, the Canadians had developed into an under-strength but effective Mounted 
Rifles force. In a battle near Pretoria, Turner reported a British General saying the 
“Canadians have shown the regulars how to fight.”56  
As an indication of the worth of the Canadians, the British authorities offered 
                                            
53  The command structure was Alderson, Lieutenant-Colonel Francois Lessard, the RCD 
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all RCD officers, including Turner, commissions in the British Regular Army. 
Turner clearly wrestled with this opportunity. He liked the active aspects of the 
military life – he had already been in seventeen engagements by his count – but 
he found camp life dull and the meagre pay of a subaltern an issue. In the end, he 
decided to remain with the Militia and his family’s business.57 
By the end of August, the RCD garrisoned Belfast, which was roughly 
halfway between Pretoria and the Portuguese border. The lack of men and a 
passive British commanding officer, Turner called him an ‘awful old woman,’ 
hamstrung the ability of the RCD to take the battle to the enemy.58 As a result, 
there were an ongoing series of encounters initiated by the Boers that resulted in 
further casualties to men and horses. Boer attacks on trains would require a patrol 
to burn some unfortunate’s farm and send the family to a camp at Middleburg, as 
an object lesson. Turner did not enjoy this duty as he found it, ’unpleasant 
work.’59  
There were constant engagements and in one case, in October, Turner 
demonstrated his leadership skills and sang-froid. While returning from a farm 
burning expedition, the Boers ambushed Turner’s force. Turner expertly extracted 
his troops out of the Boer trap. As one of his troopers put it “Lt. Turner certainly 
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showed good judgment in extricating us from a very nasty operation.”60 The Boers 
wounded and took captive Private Carter, but the Boers, in their characteristic 
excellent treatment of the captured, dropped him off at the outskirts of Belfast later 
that day. Turner dispassionately wrote that he cut a bullet out of Carter’s chest 
with a pocketknife. Surprisingly, given the state of medical care and the rough 
surgery, Carter survived.61 
Turner won the Victoria Cross (VC) at the Battle of Liliefontein on 7 
November 1900, along with two other Canadians. Major-General Horace Smith-
Dorrien, who later commanded the Second Army at Second Ypres in 1915, led a 
‘flying column’ of approximately 1,200 men including the RCD to attack a Boer 
Commando south of Belfast.62 After a day’s hard fighting, Smith-Dorrien 
determined that he did not have sufficient troops to succeed and decided to fall 
back to Belfast, as the Boers gathered elements of three commandos to resist the 
British column.63 Smith-Dorrien assigned the difficult role of the rear guard to the 
RCD, along with two guns and a machine gun in support.64  
By about 10 a.m. on 7 November, after three hours of fighting and a 
                                            
60  Comrades All, MG 30 E339 v1, Hilder Fonds; LAC, 56; Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada 
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Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902: 257. 
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63  Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service  (London: J. Murray, 
1925), 257; Robertson, "The Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Anglo-Boer War, 1900," 181. 
64  The Canadians were better suited to rearguard actions because the 5th Lancers were equipped 
with swords, lances and carbines that were outranged by the Boer’s Mausers. Smith-Dorrien, 
Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service: 254. 
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withdrawal of three miles, the rearguard was in trouble. Their left was wiped out, 
while their right was under intense pressure, and the centre denuded of troops to 
support the wings. The horses pulling the supporting guns were faltering and the 
Boers realized they had the glittering prospect of capturing them. Seizing the 
opportunity, the Boers, untypically for this stage of the war, launched a cavalry 
charge.65 
Lieutenant E.W.B. Morrison, the commander of the guns, realising he could 
not escape, sent his last galloper to seek assistance. The rider encountered Turner, 
who took immediate and decisive action that saved the guns and made his career. 
Turner ’picked up’ a wound in his left shoulder and used this as an example to 
rally about twelve men. He shouted: “Never let it be said the Canadians had let 
their guns be taken.” He positioned the dismounted men in a declivity. The Boers, 
about 100 to 200 strong, charging and firing like a ‘wild west show,’ with their 
two commanders in front, rapidly closed on the guns.66 When the Boers reached 
the optimal range, Turner ordered his men to fire. In the first moments they killed 
the two Boer commanders. The loss of their two leaders disrupted the Boers’ 
cohesion and gave enough of a respite for the guns to escape.67 The surviving 
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Canadians were able to scramble away.68  
Roughly thirty minutes after Turner’s first wound, a bullet struck him in the 
neck just missing his spine and carotid artery. His horse received two wounds as 
well, indicating the battle’s intensity. Morrison claimed that Turner only left the 
field after Lessard ordered a sergeant to take him away.69 
Turner’s actions were sufficient for the third Victoria Cross awarded that 
day.70 Ironically Turner, at the beginning of the advance south, remarked that he 
hoped the men would not take undue chances as he wanted to lead them in a 
promised march through London.71 Turner’s courageous act despite his wounds 
falls into classic officer action of saving a combat situation.72 During the Boer War 
the British High Command was sensitive to the loss of artillery and awarded 
twenty per cent of the VCs won during the war for saving guns.73 Turner 
demonstrated courage and skill in setting up the ambush and steadiness in an 
adverse situation. That Turner was able to rally men in such a dire situation is also 
indicative of his leadership. Military decorations are arbitrary in that factors 
                                            
68  One of the 12 pdr. guns now is prominently displayed in the Canadian War Museum in 
Ottawa. 
69  Turner Diary Entry, 22 and 28 November 1900, MG 30 E46 Roll M-300, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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72  T. Robert Fowler, Courage Rewarded: The Valour of Canadian Soldiers under Fire 1900 to 
2007  (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2008), 14. 
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beyond the circumstances of the act condition their awarding.74 Despite this 
caveat, winning the VC said much about Turner’s prowess and bravery as an 
officer.  
Turner wrote his wife on 15 November to assure her that his wounds were 
not serious and, showing he was recovering, he mentioned that two of his nurses 
were quite pretty. While in hospital a parade of the great and mighty visited him, 
including the formidable General Lord Kitchener, the new Commander-in-Chief 
of South Africa, who complimented him on his plucky fight.75 Turner took the 
sensible precaution of getting a note from Kitchener to expedite his return. He 
employed it when a medical officer presented an obstacle to his departure and the 
situation changed instantly as “The red tape medico got very busy.”76 Turner 
sailed to England, where he met his wife. 
Turner demonstrated sound judgment, sang-froid, and a cool eye in the 
stress of battle. His men, his peers and his superiors, as indicated by his increasing 
responsibilities during the campaign, respected him. He had endurance to survive 
without any illness through to the final stages of the campaign.77 Despite the 
physical demands and pressures of battle he maintained a positive outlook. His 
letters to his wife are relatively honest about the horrors and strains, but his 
attitude is affirmative with few negative comments in comparison to multiple 
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positive references to his men, other officers, and other units. His letters also 
indicate a reflective officer who was much more than just a dashing subaltern. 
Despite all of his excellent service, he was only acting as a junior officer with far 
fewer responsibilities than he would bear in the First World War. 
Were Turner’s two actions at the Vet and Lilienfontein indicative of an 
officer reckless with men’s lives in unsound or unnecessary military actions, and 
one whose ardour for plaudits placed honour above the lives of his troops? In 
both cases, Turner’s actions achieved the desired goal with only minimal losses, 
despite the Boers’ significant numerical advantage. These are not the actions of a 
reckless officer, unlike, for instance, the British repeated attempts to retrieve the 
guns at Colenso.78 There is no evidence in Turner’s letters home of “medal 
hunting” beyond the natural desire to do his duty well. There is nothing in his 
actions or language that was particularly vainglorious in the context of the time 
and place. Turner was a product of the Victorian era, but then so were his men. 
He was a morally and physically courageous man who shrewdly used the 
resources he had available, including his wound, to carry out his duty.  
Turner gained unstinting loyalty from troops under his command and was 
remembered with real affection long afterwards.  Albert Hilder wrote to Turner 
forty-six years later recounting a RCD reunion stating the men in the 2nd Troop 
“respect you and know you as a man, and a gentleman and a brave officer.”79  
                                            
78  The son of Lord Roberts was killed attempting to retrieve the guns. Thomas Pakenham, The 
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The other key factor arising from the Turner’s participation in the Boer War 
was a strong appreciation for the capabilities of the Canadian soldier once 
properly trained. He realized from the start that the Canadians had much to learn. 
As he wrote “It has taken time to learn and teach – but we certainly have an 
efficient fighting unit.”80 Combined with his knowledge of what effective 
leadership could achieve, it undoubtedly contributed to his strong support for 
Canadian control over all aspects of the war effort in the First World War.  
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Map 1 Turner’s Boer War Campaign 
 
 
Period Between the Wars 
After the Boer War, the rising tensions in Europe resulted in increased 
spending on the military and a shift in the Canadian force structure to a more 
balanced organisation capable of fielding complete formations. Under the 
reforming Liberal Minister of Militia and Defence, Frederick Borden, a cousin of 
the later Conservative Prime Minister Robert Borden, the Canadian military 
established new support organisations, including supply and transport, ordnance, 
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veterinary, intelligence, engineering and signals corps.81 Another notable change 
instituted by Borden in 1904 was the abolition of the post of GOC and its 
replacement with a Militia Council modelled on the British Army Council.82 The 
British in the restructuring after the Boer War instituted an Army Council, 
consisting of the Secretary of State for War, senior civilian officials, and the most 
important military authorities to make critical policy decisions integrating civilian 
and military imperatives.83 In part, the goal of the Canadian change was obviate 
the problem of strong willed British Regular Army officers clashing with their 
Canadian political masters.84  
The budget of the Ministry of Militia and Defence, hereafter referred to the 
Ministry of Militia, increased from $3 million in 1904 to $13 million in 1914 and 
the size of the Permanent Force grew from 900 to 3,100 in 1914.85 Staff training 
was instituted by sending Canadian officers to the British staff college at 
Camberley starting in 1903, and a Canadian Militia Staff Course was developed, 
albeit one lasting weeks versus the two years at Camberley.  
Another major development was the British initiative to standardise 
organisation, staff duties, training, and equipment across the Empire. For the most 
part, this endeavour was successful, as other than minor differences, the British 
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and Dominion forces were identical in all respects, other than equipment.86 
Canada adopted an independent approach with equipment, and this will be 
discussed later.  
Turner’s military career prospered after his return from South Africa. As 
further recognition of his accomplishments, he commanded the right wing of 
Canada’s contingent at the Coronation of Edward VII in 1902.87 In 1903, he 
reached the pinnacle of most Militia officers’ career with command of the QOCH. 
While in command of the regiment, Turner and his command received high 
marks in the yearly inspections, such as “A most efficient and energetic officer. 
Has brought his regiment to a very efficient state.”88 The 1905 and 1906 
inspections recommended him suitable for command of a brigade.89 After a four-
year period in command, Turner transferred to lead the 3rd Cavalry Brigade based 
in Quebec City on 3 February 1907.90 Without Turner’s presence and probable 
financial support, the QOCH disbanded in 1913. Turner was the leading cavalry 
officer in the country, and he was elected President of the Canadian Cavalry 
Association in 1910.91 As a further mark of distinction, Turner was made an 
Honorary Aide de Camp to the new Governor General, the Duke of Connaught in 
1911. In 1912, Turner’s career ostensibly ended with his retirement and transfer to 
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the Reserve Officer list.92 Hughes, believing war with Germany was imminent, 
restored Turner to active service on 1 June 1914 with the rank of Colonel, 
however, without Turner taking the required exam for tactical fitness.93  
Other than his presidency of the Cavalry Association, Turner does not 
appear to have engaged in discussions about the future course of warfare. Turner 
did not take the Militia Staff Course introduced in 1908, probably as he was at the 
end of his career.94  
Turner’s active service and long duty as a senior regimental officer 
developed his man management skills and facility in motivating and leading 
officers and men, his understanding of minor tactics, and administration at the 
regimental level. His four years of command of a cavalry brigade exposed him to 
some of the issues of commanding higher formations. What he lacked was staff 
training and even an appreciation of the necessity for trained staff officers, and a 
thorough understanding of contemporary infantry tactics. His later performance 
needs to be considered against this background. How Turner performed as a 
brigade commander on the Western Front is the topic of the next chapter. 
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 2  
‘AN AWFUL WAR:’ TURNER AS 
BRIGADE COMMANDER 
 
Still very tired, and my head and brain seem to act slower than usual - 
It has been an awful war.1 
R.E.W. Turner, 11 June 1915  
 
The official cable from the British Government arrived at 8:45 p.m. on 4 
August 1914, notifying Canada she was at war with Germany.2 Turner, seeing it 
as his duty, joined the first Canadian contingent. This chapter examines Turner’s 
role as a brigade commander, three key incidents of his conduct at the Battle of 
Second Ypres, and the validity of his resulting reputation for incompetence. The 
focus of the chapter is on analysing Turner’s key decisions, his performance in 
the battle, and his relationship with his divisional commander, rather than a 
detailed battle study. The subsequent battle of Festubert will also be briefly 
examined, as well as the context of Canada’s participation, as it is necessary to 
understand the factors that would contribute to the problems that would plague 
the Canadian war effort. 
Context of Canada’s Participation 
The scale, scope, and nature of the First World War were unprecedented 
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challenges for Canada. Like the British, Australians, and New Zealanders, 
Canada vastly increased its armed forces.3 In Canada’s case, as with Australia 
and New Zealand, the factors of distance, lack of experience in raising and 
maintaining overseas forces, and having to operate in a hybrid control 
environment of reporting to British and Dominion authorities all magnified the 
war’s complexity. All these elements placed a tremendous strain on Canada’s 
military, political, and societal structures, and were critical in shaping the 
problems Canada encountered in raising, maintaining, and controlling its forces 
in the first half of the war. 
Canada’s army was overwhelmingly an amateur force.4 In the first two 
contingents, PF officers held only nine of the forty-four senior positions.5 At the 
start of the war, Canada had only twelve Camberley trained staff officers and so 
had to rely on British supplied staff.6 This amateur ethos changed as officers at 
the front increasingly recognised the need for professionalism and trained staff 
officers. As long as Sam Hughes was the Minister of Militia, however, the same 
drive for professionalism was absent from the Canadian administration, unlike at 
the front.  
The geographic isolation of Canadian units in the pre-war period was an 
                                            
3  For more on the expansion of the Territorial and New Army forces, see Peter Simkins, 
Kitchener's Army : The Raising of Britain's New Armies, 1914-1916  (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988). 
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during the war. 
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additional impediment, because Militia officers had little opportunity to work 
with fellow officers located in another province or area. There were few if any 
transfers, so officers had minimal contact outside of their own unit, with the 
result they did not know each other, unlike in the pre-war British Regular Army.7 
The scope of the war was staggering. Canada expanded its infantry from 
one PF regiment to fifty active service battalions by the end of the war.8 
Canada’s previous experience in the Boer War of an overseas force was 
restricted to raising, equipping, and shipping units to South Africa, but not 
maintaining these forces in the field. The scale of the losses in the First World 
War was immense, meaning the Canadian authorities had to improvise a 
massive recruiting and training infrastructure in Canada and England. Inevitably, 
given the scale of requirements and their rapid introduction, there was waste, 
failures, and fiascos, as the British and Australians experienced in the early days 
of the war.9 The difference was the Canadian retention of the faulty system and 
commanders until 1917. 
The nature of the war, with the rapid evolving tactics, technologies, and 
new weapons, materially added to the complexity of training. Contrast an 
infantry battalion in the First Contingent in 1914 needing drill, bayonet, rifle, 
                                            
7  One of the few opportunities to meet other senior officers was Sam Hughes’ military 
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and machine gun instruction, with the requirements of a battalion in 1917 that 
included all the above plus Lewis Gun, anti-gas, trench warfare, grenades, rifle 
grenades, and new communications technology training.  
Finally, Canadian forces were in a hybrid and constantly evolving control 
environment. The flawed Canadian command structure in England will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. On the continent the Canadian Corps and support forces 
were under the operational control of the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF), meaning GHQ directed the Canadian units in 
battle. In England, the Canadian training units were under the operational 
control of the War Office through the various area commands such as Aldershot 
Command. Initially, Canadians had limited authority over promotions, 
decorations, and other administrative matters, but Canadian authorities wrestled 
more control over the course of the war. The result was the Canadian forces 
followed British regulations in most matters, but there were exceptions and this 
caused delays as the various headquarters involved in any decision tried to 
determine what rules applied. Further, as these control responsibilities evolved, 
the rules had to be relearned. It was confusing for the British and the Canadians. 
As late as February 1918, the Canadian Adjutant-General in England wrote a 
sharp letter to the War Office asking them to follow procedure and pass all 
orders affecting the administration of Canadian units through the Canadian 
headquarters first. He complained that it was the fifth letter he had written on the 
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subject.10  
The CEF was dependent on the British for most matérial. Canada provided 
the men and officers, cap badges, pay, and record keeping, while the British 
provided clothing, personal equipment, rifles, bayonets, artillery, grenades, 
machine guns, ammunition, stores, and rations.11 The following chart comparing 
the CEF in France and the British demonstrates how the Canadians relied on the 
British to provide the full gamut of military support necessary to maintain its 
troops in the field. This dependence was illustrated by the difference in ratios of 
British to Canadians in the combat arms (infantry, engineers, field artillery, and 
machine guns) with the supporting services (Army Service Corps, Army 
Ordnance Corps and Labour Corps). The ratio of the combat arms ranged from 
5.3 to 1 in the engineers to 6.8 to 1 in the infantry while supporting services’ 
ratio extended from 21.1 to 1 for the Army Service Corps to 61.9 to 1 in the 
ordnance service. 
                                            
10  Thacker to Secretary War Office, A.G. 1-2-36, 4 February 1918, O-29-33, RG 9 III B1 v2881, 
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Figure 2 Comparison of Effective Strengths by Arms Between British and 
Canadian Forces in France, 3 June 191812 
Combatants 
 British Canadian Ratio 
HQ Army 4,324    
HQ Corps 1,664 141 11.8 
HQ Division 2,326 249 9.3 
HQ Bases 1,033 918 1.1 
Army Corps 
Schools 
4,618 213 81.5 
Cavalry 17,353 2,334 71.1 
RFA 165,833 14,973 5.1 
RGA 76,944 2,964 34.7 
RE 102,940 19,389 5.3 
Infantry (+ Pioneers, 
Garrison, Lt T Mortar) 431,670 63,828 6.8 
Cyclists 4,889 393 12.4 
MG Corps 44,160 7,614 5.8 
Tank Corps  10,578    
Total Combatants 868,332 113,016 7.7 
 
Non-Combatants 
 British Canadian Ratio 
ASC 134,961 6,408 21.1 
RAMC 47,960 5,565 8.6 
Army Vet Corps 13,874 703 19.7 
AOC 15,858 256 61.9 
Army Pay Corps 518 37 14.0 
Transportation 55,767 14,568 3.8 
Military Police 4,208 120 35.1 
Total Combatants 273,146 27,657 9.9 
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Non-Effectives 
 British Canadian Ratio 
Labour Corps 199,769 5,798 34.5 
WAAC 6,414 0   
Total Non-
Effectives 206,183 5,798 35.6 
 
Valcartier 
Unlike at the outset of the Boer War, there was no debate in Borden’s 
government that Canada would take an active role in the war. The British 
Government accepted the offer of a Canadian expeditionary force on 6 August. 
Acting on the recommendation of the British Army Council that the Canadian 
force be a division, Hughes concentrated close to 35,000 men at Valcartier just 
outside of Quebec City.13  
The forces started arriving in Valcartier in early August. Constant 
reorganisations of units, officers, and commands characterised the time in 
Valcartier. As Tim Cook phrased it, “Hughes cleared up things by embracing 
chaos.”14 The instability meant minimal effective training during the six weeks 
the men were in camp. The problems the Canadians encountered, however, 
were not that different from those experienced by the Australians, and British in 
raising the New Army divisions. The division had a solid core of Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCO) and men with previous military experience, so 
the division was not entirely raw. In the rush of volunteers, recruiters preferred 
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men who had served in the military. A greater challenge was with the officers of 
the division. Most had no previous active service and were learning on the job.15 
One-third of the Canadian officers in the two first contingents did not even have 
the undemanding Militia qualifications for their post.16 Turner wrote his wife that 
he was “studying hard as there is a lot to learn.”17  
A key decision for Hughes was the selection of the division’s brigade 
commanders. Hughes’s antipathy to PF officers meant well-qualified 
commanders, such as Brigadier-General Francois Lessard, commander of the 
RCD in the Boer War, did not receive appointments.18 In their place, Hughes 
selected militia officers Colonel Malcolm Mercer, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur 
Currie, and Colonel Richard Turner as the commanders of the three infantry 
brigades of the division.19 Turner was an obvious choice for Hughes, as Turner 
had the experience of successfully commanding a cavalry brigade, was only 
forty-three, with a sterling reputation with active service in the Boer War, was a 
genuine war hero, with a VC, and had long service in the Militia.    
Did Turner warrant selection? Turner, in comparison to the other two 
brigade commanders, had the advantage of having seen active service and 
receiving awards for courage. He also represented the important province of 
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Quebec, while Mercer represented Ontario and Currie the West. Turner’s 
reputation from the Boer War meant many of the officers and men would know 
of him, and as a result, Turner claimed the 3rd Brigade requested him.20 The 
history of the 15th Battalion indicated the unit was elated with Turner’s 
selection.21 The Duke of Connaught, the Canadian Governor-General and a 
Field Marshal in the British Army thought Turner was a suitable choice. He 
informed Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, 
that  
A Col. Turner, VC, DSO, who has been commanding a militia Cavalry Brigade, 
is I think the best of them. He is quick, hard working and conscientious and 
will loyally carry out every thing he is told and has a certain sense of discipline 
and duty, both of which characteristics are hard to find in Canada.22 
 
Hughes appointed Turner on 6 August to brigade command and to be the 
Assistant Adjutant-General of the camp.23 As Valcartier was near Quebec City, it 
was likely Turner was one of the first senior officers to arrive.24 According to 
post-war interviews, the brigade commanders drew lots for their brigades and 
Turner drew the 4th Brigade, which would be used to supply replacements, but 
Turner was able to persuade the Minister to make his brigade the third.25 The 3rd 
Brigade consisted of four battalions: the 13th from Montreal, the 14th also from 
                                            
20  Tuxford Comments, File 39, MG 4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives. 
21  Beattie, 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1891-1928: 28. 
22  Connaught to Kitchener, 19 August 1914, WG/21, PRO 30/57/56, Kitchener Papers; TNA. 
23  Turner War Record, G.A.Q. 4-40, RG 24 v1815, LAC. 
24  From internal evidence, a misdated entry in Turner’s ‘diary’ suggests he was at Valcartier on 10 
August. The diary is actually a collection of letters to his wife similar to the ones from the Boer 
War. Turner Diary Entry, 10 August/September? 1914, 19710147-001/ DOCS MANU 58A 1 
9.1, Turner Fonds; CWM. 
25  Tuxford Comments, File 39, MG 4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives; Comments on 
Skeleton History by Sutherland Brown, GAQ 2-1 v2, RG 24 v1811, LAC; Duguid, The 
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Montreal, the 15th from Toronto and the 16th, a mixed highland battalion from 
across the country. 
Figure 3  3rd Brigade Order of Battle, 22 April 1915 
 
 
Turner selected the staff for his brigade.26 His most crucial appointment 
would be his Brigade-Major, the senior staff officer in the unit. As Roger Lee, in 
his work on the Australian staff, phrased it, “The ability of the Brigade-Major was 
a key factor in a brigade’s combat effectiveness.”27 Turner selected Lieutenant-
Colonel Garnet Burke Hughes.28 Hughes’ selection was a logical choice for 
Turner for professional and political reasons. Professionally, Hughes had 
graduated from Canada’s Royal Military College (RMC) – graduating first in his 
class in 1899 – had passed the Militia Staff Course, had long service in the 
Militia, and was the junior major in Currie’s 50th Regiment in Victoria.29 Garnet 
Hughes knew Turner, was a friend of Currie’s, and, most importantly, was the 
                                            
26  At this point in the war, brigade commanders could choose their own staff. Currie wanted 
another officer before selecting Major Kemmis-Betty as his Brigade-Major. Later in the war, 
commanders could not select their staff other than Aides des Camps. Gordon-Hall Comments, 
File 11, MG 4027 Acc. No 391 Ref 1-2, Urquhart Fonds; McGill. 
27  Lee, "The Australian Staff: The Forgotten Men of the First AIF," 120. 
28  Brigade-Majors for obvious reasons were rated as majors, but Hughes according to the 
Directorate of Historical Studies was a Lieutenant-Colonel, while acting as Brigade-Major. 
Career Outline for Garnet Hughes, RG 24 v1754, LAC. 
29  Royal Military College Results for 30 June 1899, File 14-1, MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds; 
LAC; Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, eds., Warrior Chiefs (Dundurn Press, 2001), 19. 
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son of the Minister of Militia, Sam Hughes. Turner would write in October 
“Garnet Hughes is sound and I am well satisfied to have him as Brigade-
Major.”30 However, in the unforgiving combat of Second Ypres, Hughes would 
prove a most unfortunate choice. 
Sam Hughes’ final pivotal decision was the divisional commander. British 
authorities considered no Canadian capable of divisional leadership, and Borden 
dissuaded Hughes from taking command. Hughes, instead, selected Major-
General Edwin Alderson from a list of three senior British generals provided by 
Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War. In a 
prescient move, the British promoted Alderson to Lieutenant-General to out-
rank, the recently promoted, Major-General Sam Hughes.31 Hughes asked Turner 
about Alderson and, based on his experience in the Boer War, Turner thought 
Alderson acceptable.32  
Alderson, a small fastidious man, was a distinguished retired officer, who 
had specialised in the mounted infantry.33 He had staff training and a worthy 
record of active service, including commanding Canadians successfully during 
the Boer War. He was well-connected to the Royal family, including the Duke of 
Connaught. He had most recently commanded a division in India from 1907 to 
1912.34 He was a well-known horseman and had published on the subject.35 He 
                                            
30  Turner Diary Entry, 11 December 1914, 19710147-001/ DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.1, Turner 
Fonds; CWM. 
31  Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 25. 
32  Turner Interview, 14 March 1934, 2001/10, Duguid Fonds; DHH. 
33  Lieut-Gen. Sir Edwin Alderson, KCB, The Khaki Call, XII.1, W.A. Griesbach, GAQ 4-15K, RG 
24 v1813, LAC. 
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was an experienced trainer and was able to instil needed discipline in the 1st 
Division. Regarded by the Canadians as a gentleman, but not inspiring, or 
particularly brilliant, he played a pivotal role in preparing the 1st Division for the 
front. At age fifty-five, however, he was past his prime, and he lacked the vigour 
needed for commanding a division on the Western Front. There were complaints 
that he did not sufficiently police brigades to enforce policies, and during 
battles, he did not leave his headquarters to visit his subordinates; instead, he 
relied on staff officers.36 Turner’s initial relationship with Alderson was 
satisfactory.37  
The First Contingent reached Plymouth on 14 October. The Canadians 
moved to Salisbury Plain for further training. Weather, organisational changes, 
and an injury to Turner hampered training. It rained on 89 out of 123 days, with 
double the average rainfall, such that one battalion was only able to train for 40 
out of the 140 days it spent on the Plain.38 More time was lost when the 
battalion organisation switched repeatedly between eight and four companies 
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Force, 1896  ([S.l.]: Methuen, 1898); Edwin Alfred Hervey Sir K. C. B. Alderson, Pink and 
Scarlet; or, Hunting as a School for Soldiering, Etc  (London: William Heinemann, 1900); 
Edwin Alfred Hervey Sir K. C. B. Alderson, Lessons from 100 Notes Made in Peace and War, 
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36  Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916: 74; Frith Comments, 
7j, MG 4027 Acc. No 391 Ref 1-2, Urquhart Fonds; McGill; MacBrien Comments, File 34, MG 
4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives; Draft Currie Biography, File 2, MG 4027 C1, 
Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives, 44. 
37  Turner Diary Entry, 11 December 1914, 19710147-001/ DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.1, Turner 
Fonds; CWM. 
38  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: 35; H. M. Urquhart, The History of the 
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until it stabilised at four in January 1915.39 These changes left units in a state of 
constant flux and wasted time and energy. Finally, Turner suffered a broken right 
collarbone, when his car overturned on 23 December. Turner was in hospital, in 
considerable pain, for close to a month and did not return to duty until 17 
January. He still needed a chair to mount his horse, in February, because of 
limited mobility of his right arm.40 As a result, Turner lost valuable time for 
training and evaluating his brigade and staff.41  
Despite these impediments, the division, by contemporary standards, was 
reasonably well trained, contrary to the usual description of the division.42 The 
best evidence of the value of the training was its performance at the tactical level 
at Second Ypres. These disruptions, however, truncated the higher formation 
training, and this probably contributed to the problems experienced at the 
brigade and divisional levels at Second Ypres.43 
The division crossed to France on 7 February, making it the first non-
regular division to reach the front in the British Army.44 The division served a 
tour with the 6th British Division, held a portion of the line on its own, and then 
conducted ten days of intense training, before moving north to relieve a French 
division in the ill-omened Ypres salient. This initial period in France allowed the 
                                            
39  Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment: 14th Battalion, C.E.F. 1914-1925: 21. 
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division to acclimatise to the conditions on the Western Front and do additional 
needed training.45 
Second Ypres 
The Second Battle of Ypres was a grim battle extending for over a month, 
as the Germans attempted to erase the Ypres salient. Turner’s role in the battle 
lasted from 22 to 26 April. Turner’s conduct of the battle demonstrated his 
customary courage and energy, but also grave lapses in staff work, failures in 
communications, and a serious error by Turner.46 To analyse Turner’s 
performance in the space available, three of the most criticised incidents are 
investigated. These are his reaction to the initial German gas attack on 22 April 
1915, the night counterattack at Kitcheners Wood, and Turner’s decision to 
retreat to a rear defensive position that uncovered the left flank of the 2nd 
Brigade, on 24 April.  
The Canadians took over by British standards poorly prepared defences 
overlooked by German positions. Turner’s 3rd Brigade held the left sector of the 
division front, with Currie’s 2nd Brigade on the right. The next major defensive 
position was the GHQ line, 4,000 meters to the rear, which was a series of well-
built and sited redoubts 400 to 500 meters apart protected by a six-meter deep 
                                            
45  Duguid, The Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914 -1919, 1: 143,193; Nicholson, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: 49-53. 
46  A staff officer reported Turner buckled on his revolver and set a fine example saying he would 
not surrender but was prepared to die. Ypres Memoirs, MG 30 E236 v4, Villiers Fonds; LAC. 
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belt of wire.47 Turner’s headquarters was at Chateau du Nord in the GHQ line.48 
Alderson’s headquarters was located at Chateau des Trois Tour, nine kilometres 
behind the front line and on the other side of the Yser Canal. While the location 
had good communications with the controlling corps, it was poorly situated to 
control the division. 
To mask the transfer of forces to the East, the Germans planned an attack 
on the Ypres salient using a secret weapon – chlorine gas. The attack objective 
was a small hill at the base of the salient called Pilkem, whose capture the 
Germans thought would cause the Allies to withdraw from the salient.49 There 
was no contingency plan to expand the scope of the attack.50 The Germans 
assaulted the two French divisions on Turner’s left at 5 p.m. on 22 April 1915. 
The Germans quickly overwhelmed the French and advanced to the Yser Canal 
and having reached their objective stopped and consolidated.  
The British reacted by hastily committing reserves without maintaining unit 
integrity and either overloaded existing formations or formed ad hoc 
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detachments without adequate staff or communications.51 For instance, Turner at 
one point commanded nine battalions, while Mercer, GOC 1st Brigade, only 
commanded two battalions. Alderson preferred to use a British battalion 
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel A.D. Geddes, to command a brigade strength 
detachment, rather than assign British Regular Army battalions to Mercer, 
suggesting a lack of confidence in Mercer or unwillingness to assign British 
troops to Canadian commanders.52 The British high command, also, launched a 
series of imprudent and poorly prepared counterattacks to retake ground and 
support the French that resulted in heavy losses for no appreciable gains. Turner 
conducted one of these counterattacks on the night of 22 April. 
                                            
51  Geoffrey Powell, Plumer: The Soldier's General: A Biography of Field-Marshal Viscount Plumer 
of Messines  (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 1990; repr., 2004), 116. 
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Map 2 Ypres, The Gas Attack, 22 April 1915 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Map 1, Ypres the Gas Attack, 22 April 1915, page 66 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011. Scans by Richard V. Laughton, http://www.censol.ca/research/greatwar/nicholson/maps/Map%201.jpg 
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After spending 23 April failing to expand a foothold across the Yser canal, 
the German army command decided to eliminate the Ypres salient with a 
second gas attack aimed at the Canadians. Attacking in the early hours of 24 
April, the German assault, despite significant advantages in artillery, shells, 
observation, and gas, was initially stopped, except for a breakthrough on the 
front of the 15th Battalion of the 3rd Brigade. Exploiting this hole and renewing 
the attack, the Germans were slowly able to drive the hard-fighting Canadians 
back to St. Julien. It was at this point; Turner interpreted an order from division 
headquarters to mean the brigade was to fall back to the rear defensive position; 
the GHQ line. Hard fighting and the arrival of additional units plugged the gap. 
After falling back to the GHQ line, Turner’s brigade remained in the line until 
withdrawn on 26 April.  
The first incident examined is Turner’s reaction to the initial German attack 
on 22 April. The French collapse exposed Turner’s left flank for 7,300 meters, 
leaving the 3rd Brigade in a catastrophic position.53 Turner’s situation was one 
few First World War commanders faced, where the enemy advanced as deeply 
as did the Germans in only ninety minutes. At 6:30 p.m. Turner thought ‘all was 
lost’ as the Germans swept around his flank and all he had were “our servants, 
the Engineer company and about 50 of my grenade co; all the rest had been sent 
forward to fill the gap.”54 Turner responded quickly by hustling his reserves 
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forward.55  
Turner’s reputation suffered because of three messages issued by his 
headquarters to division reporting that Germans had driven the brigade’s left 
flank back to the GHQ line, which caused consternation at corps and army 
level.56 Garnet Hughes (all messages are in his handwriting) was reacting to the 
move of a front-line battalion to refuse its open left flank, German rifle fire on 
the brigade headquarters, and probably the reports of disaster from men driven 
from their positions.57 At 7:30 p.m. Hughes further confused matters by 
indicating an attack was developing from the southwest of the headquarters that 
if true meant the brigade was almost surrounded.58 Historians have often 
characterised these reports as ‘panicky’, indicating Turner’s and Hughes’ loss of 
control.59 The messages were erroneous and in some cases poorly worded, but 
given the dire news were straightforward and factual and certainly do not 
indicate ‘panic.’60 During this period three divisional staff officers visited Turner’s 
headquarters, who apparently either did not realise or inform the division that 
                                            
55  All actions and messages to and from Turner’s Brigade are based on the 3rd Brigade message 
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the 3rd Brigade lines were intact.61 The valid criticism was neither Turner nor his 
staff confirmed this critical information before passing it on. Turner and his staff 
had a tendency to accept initial reports without ascertaining their veracity.  
The second controversial incident was the night counterattack on 22 April. 
At 8:52 p.m., Alderson ordered Turner to make a night attack on Kitcheners 
Wood, roughly 900 meters north of Turner’s headquarters, with two battalions to 
support a French attack.62 The night attack was successful, albeit at a heavy cost. 
Despite the success, the attack has occasioned considerable criticism from 
historians over the lack of reconnaissance before the attack, the formation 
specified by Hughes, and the lack of consolidation instructions.63 Amidst the 
chaos and shock of the German assault, Turner and his staff had limited time to 
prepare and their inexperience showed in the brevity of the instructions 
provided, but the same strictures apply to attack orders for other formations 
during the battle.64 Tactically, given the time and training level of the units 
involved, one of which was not even from Turner’s brigade, the formation 
adopted best suited getting the units to the objective in a minimum of time and 
disorder. What is surprising is not the loss rate or confusion, but that the units 
                                            
61  The three staff officers were Major Beatty, Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonell, and Lieutenant-
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launched the only successful counterattack by the British during the battle.65 
Even in 1918, with far better trained officers and staff, Currie refrained from 
making night attacks.66  
Map 3 The Apex Lost, 24 April 1915 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Sketch 8, The Apex Lost, 24 April 1915, Page 72 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011 
 
 The final and most serious of the incidents was Turner’s withdrawal to the 
GHQ line. By midday on 24 April, Turner’s brigade was staggering, as the 
Germans slowly pushed it back with their crushing artillery and numerical 
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superiority.67 Turner reviewed the situation, at 1 p.m., with the division’s 
General Staff Officer (GSO) 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Romer, who cancelled a 
planned counterattack, and ordered Turner to strengthen the current line. Turner 
interpreted Romer’s order to mean the GHQ line to the rear of the existing 
positions, and he ordered the brigade to retreat over the protests of some of his 
battalion commanders.68 
Map 4 The Battle of St-Julien, 24 April 1915 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Sketch 9, The Battle of St-Julien 24 April 1915, Page 74 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011 
 
Did Turner misunderstand the order, or did he deliberately misinterpret a 
vague instruction? Historians divide on whether he misunderstood or 
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misinterpreted the order, with the majority believing it was the former.69 Turner, 
after the war, claimed it was a misunderstanding, but given his memory lapses to 
be discussed later, and obvious desire to avoid the blame, this cannot be 
accepted at face value.70 It was clear even before the retreat; Turner looked to 
his rear as demonstrated by a warning message to the 3rd Brigade, Canadian 
Field Artillery (CFA) that a retreat to the GHQ line might be necessary.71 Given 
the lack of prepared defences, the absence of artillery support, the immense 
difficulty in supplying his forward forces, and the crushing German numerical 
and firepower advantages, there was a real possibility that Turner’s brigade was 
going to be destroyed.72 There was a strong incentive, therefore, to fall back to a 
prepared and well-sited position, easily supplied, and supported by artillery. 
Given the situation, it is more likely that Turner was going to take advantage of 
any opportunity to fall back, and so he interpreted Romer’s imprecise 
instructions to save his brigade. Late that night, Turner travelled back to division 
headquarters, to clear up the situation, but he and Alderson talked past each 
other, failing to reach an understanding.73 This was the beginning of a great rift 
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between the two. 
The withdrawal to the GHQ line was unquestionably a mistake and was 
not Romer’s intention. Turner’s withdrawal made sense for saving the 3rd 
Brigade, but it was a potentially disastrous decision, as it exposed Currie’s left 
flank. The factors of poor staff work, exhaustion, shock at the losses, non-existent 
communications, and perceived lack of support from the division all contributed 
to the decision, but do not excuse it. Given the nature of situation, it was a clear 
failure by Romer not to issue a written order to Turner to remove any possible 
ambiguity. A final error by Turner’s staff was not informing the 2nd Brigade until 
1:45 p.m. of the retreat.74 In contrast, Currie was diligent in warning his 
neighbour to his right that he might be compelled to retreat during this same 
engagement. 
Most historians have accepted Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon-Hall’s post-war 
assertion that the GHQ line faced the wrong way, thus making Turner’s decision 
even more inexplicable, and that Turner overcrowded it with troops resulting in 
excessive losses.75 Both of these assertions are disputable and indicate probably 
why Gordon-Hall, a trained staff officer, did not receive any further promotions, 
unlike most officers in his situation. The Germans attacked the Apex from both 
the east and the north, but their greatest success was the eastern attack that 
resulted in the breakthrough of the 15th Battalion line. Given the main thrust of 
the German attack was westward, the GHQ line was not wholly out of position. 
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While the notion of eight battalions crowded in the narrow confines of the 
redoubts of the GHQ line makes for an arresting image, it is misleading, given 
how weak were the units. Turner reported in the evening that the four battalions 
of his brigade amounted to 750 men. The 2nd Battalion had fewer than 200 men 
and the attached British battalion was not much stronger. Therefore, the total 
strength of the brigade holding the GHQ line was probably less than 1,500 men, 
which would not exceed the capacity of the redoubts.76 
Analysis 
A set of factors, some of which were out of his control, conditioned 
Turner’s performance. The first was fatigue. The prolonged strain of battle, lack 
of sleep, and the constant stress led to exhaustion and contributed to poor 
decision-making by Hughes and Turner. Turner reported to his wife that he had 
his boots off twice between 20 April and 4 May.77 A key skill needed by senior 
commanders was to manage their energy and failure to do so resulted in 
breakdowns.78 
Communications and logistics were a constant problem throughout the 
battle. Turner’s situation was particularly difficult, as the Germans effectively 
interdicted his main supply and communications route to the front, because of 
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their flanking position, and observation and artillery domination. Resupply was 
only possible at night, and, even then, was challenging. As a result, the 
Canadians had to fight hungry, thirsty, and short of ammunition. As Andrew 
Iarocci argues, the problems reported with the Ross Rifle were partly due to 
ammunition shortages.79 Contributing to Turner’s failure was the almost 
complete collapse of communications throughout the battle. A staff officer 
claimed the lack of information was ‘stygian’ and that “our energies were as 
much used up in groping for intelligence as in directing operations.”80 For 
example, one message from the 15th Battalion in the front line took eighty-five 
minutes to reach Turner’s Headquarters.81 
Unlike Currie’s compact position, Turner had a sprawling line, oriented at 
right angles, with unprepared defences on one flank, poor to non-existent 
communications, no artillery support, and the equivalent of two brigades of 
infantry to control. Turner commanded at various times nine battalions across a 
division-sized front.82 Despite improvements in communications, the effective 
span of command in modern armies is a maximum of four to five subordinate 
units, so Turner was overloaded.83 Alderson made a serious error in burdening 
an inexperienced brigade commander and his staff, with too long a front and too 
many units. Alderson faced similar problems of having to control thirty-three 
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battalions, and this contributed to the poor control exerted by the division.84 
The staff work in Turner’s brigade was consistently inferior to its 
neighbours, in fact it was less effective than in Geddes’ Detachment, whose staff 
consisted of a captain. The information flow to Currie, to Geddes, and back to 
division was infrequent and at times inaccurate, whereas there are multiple 
instances of Geddes informing Turner of his situation in the message logs.85 The 
commander of the 7th Battalion, while assigned to the 3rd Brigade, complained 
that he had no instructions or contact with Turner or his staff.86 
By the evening of 24 April at staff conference, Hughes was unable to 
coherently describe the brigade’s positions.87 Earlier in the day, Paul Villiers, a 
3rd Brigade staff captain, stumbled badly when he tried reporting the brigade’s 
positions to Major-General Thomas Snow of the 28th British Division. Snow, 
reportedly the rudest man in the British Army, was enraged when his rapid-fire 
questions and constant interruptions flustered Villiers.88 Another staff captain 
went mad from the bombardment of the headquarters on April 25 and fled to 
Geddes’ headquarters claiming the brigade staff was wiped out.89 He had to be 
restrained and evacuated.  
The brigade staff and, especially the Brigade-Major, were essential to 
                                            
84  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: 63. 
85  3rd Brigade Message Logs, 22 April 1915, MG 30 E46 v1, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
86  Ypres Battle Description, MG 30 E300 v24, Odlum Fonds; LAC. 
87  Gordon-Hall to Urquhart, 15 November 1934, MG 4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds; McGill 
Archives. 
88  This was the preamble to the infamous Snow attack on Currie’s courage, when Currie 
attempted to contact Canadian Division headquarters. Statement of Major E.F. Lynn, MC - 
Canadian Engineers, MG 30 E75 v2, Urquhart Fonds; LAC; Iarocci, Shoestring Soldiers: The 1st 
Canadian Division at War, 1914-1915: 154. 
89  Ypres Memoirs, MG 30 E236 v4, Villiers Fonds; LAC; Napier Comments, File 50, MG 4027 C3, 
Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives. 
2 ‘An Awful War’ 
 73 
success and Turner was badly let down by his staff. Turner, however, was 
ultimately responsible for his staff selection and retention. He made no effort to 
replace Hughes after the battle, and this indicates one of his flaws in retaining 
friends in positions, when they had not proven successful. Another factor was 
Hughes’ father. Turner was politically sensitive and would be loath to earn the 
enmity of the minister if he tried replacing Garnet. Although Turner did not 
know it, Sam Hughes was receiving exaggerated reports of the work done by 
Garnet at Second Ypres.90 Alderson moved rapidly to transfer Garnet out of the 
brigade by having him appointed GSO 2 of the 2nd Division in England on 27 
May 1915.91 Turner fought Alderson over whom to appoint in his place, and 
Turner prevailed in appointing Villiers as his new Brigade-Major.92 
In addition, divisional staff work was deficient. Orders were incomplete or 
imprecise, such as not specifying the two battalions to make the night 
counterattack on 22 April, or the confusion of what line Romer referred to on the 
24th.93 Attack orders set unrealistic movement schedules given the conditions. An 
example was the order for the 10th British Brigade to attack on 25 April that was 
to include fifteen battalions, but only the five battalions of the brigade reached 
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the start line in time for the attack.94 The timing expected by Alderson and his 
staff was impractical considering the conditions of the front. This was a fact 
neither Alderson nor his GSO 1 Romer understood, as they remained ensconced 
at the division headquarters throughout the battle.95 Romer, who would later rise 
to the rank of full General, was notorious for being headquarters-bound when 
Brigadier-General, General Staff (BGGS) of the III Corps.96 British observers 
considered Alderson did not properly grip the situation.97 
Turner was dissatisfied with the information coming from the division, 
noting in pencil, on a message claiming the Germans were running out of 
ammunition, while German artillery pummelled his troops, that it was an 
“example of the value of information derived from the rear.”98 Currie also lost 
confidence in the division and was frustrated with Alderson.99 
Turner’s critics have under-appreciated the scale of the challenge Turner 
faced, especially in comparison to Currie; as a result, they judge Turner’s 
performance too harshly. Even Duguid made the invidious comparison that the 
2nd Brigade held and the 3rd did not.100 Despite, having to defend too long of a 
line running at a right angle, with too many units to control, unprepared 
defences, unsupported by artillery, hampered by an inexperienced staff, and 
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hindered by constantly interrupted communications and logistics, Turner and his 
brigade performed surprisingly well for their first battle. Turner’s performance 
was flawed, but not incompetent. 
Turner made mistakes in his first battle as a senior commander, as did 
Currie and Alderson. Currie’s leaving his brigade headquarters to search for 
reserves on the afternoon of 24 April is one example.101 As Cecil Romer phrased 
it, “the Currie of April 1915 was not the Currie of August 1918.”102 Historians 
have assessed Currie’s performance through the lens of his later successes, and 
from comments of officers long after the war, whose views were coloured by 
Currie’s later reputation. The battle was poorly conducted at all levels of 
command from Field Marshal Sir John French, the commander of the BEF, 
through army, corps, division and brigade levels. Had Turner been a British 
officer, the British high command with their limited tolerance for failure would 
probably have removed him, and possibly Alderson and Currie.103 Turner, 
however, was a Canadian Militia officer and given the scale and scope of the 
challenge he faced, allowances had to be made for his inexperience, the 
situation, and the political cost of removing a Canadian hero. 
What is certain is that there was little confidence or trust remaining 
between Turner and Alderson. This eroded further in the aftermath of the battle. 
Turner’s military career up to this point was an unbroken series of triumphs, and 
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he had not experienced failure before, so he did not react well by, unfairly, 
blaming Alderson for his problems, complaining that no divisional staff visited 
his brigade during the battle.104 Alderson easily refuted this grievance by 
providing a list of the repeated visits by his staff to Turner’s headquarters during 
the battle. Turner had to apologise abjectly closing with “I can only explain the 
strange lapse of memory to the awful pounding we received on the 25th April.”105  
Why would Turner make such an obviously fallacious claim? The 
explanation probably lies with the destruction of Turner’s headquarters by 
intense German shelling in the afternoon of 25 April.106 It was so severe that the 
staff had to escape by swimming across a moat that surrounded the farm.107 A 2nd 
Brigade staff officer later reported seeing Turner with his jaw bandaged up, and 
Turner’s later behaviour strongly suggests that he suffered a concussion during 
the bombardment.108 Turner lamented to his wife three times in the next two 
months about feeling thick headed, and that he was “still very tired, and my 
head and brain seem to act slower than usual – It has been an awful war.”109 
One of the after effects of a concussion can be memory loss, and this may help 
explain his unsatisfactory later explanations of his decisions during the battle.110  
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Another incident was Sam Hughes’ bitter denunciation of Alderson to the 
Prime Minister. He asserted Alderson was not competent to command the 
division and Turner should replace him.111 Hughes attack was unjust and deeply 
wounding, and Alderson responded with a detailed letter refuting the claims.112 
While Turner and Garnet Hughes were not directly involved in the exchange, it 
probably further undermined Alderson’s trust in Turner.  
Festubert 
The 1st Division had a brief rest before the British high command 
committed it to the continuation of the First Army’s offensive at Festubert. 
Turner’s 3rd Brigade was ordered to Festubert on 16 May, and the remainder of 
the division followed shortly after. Poor staff work by the division resulted in 
engineer and ambulance units not accompanying the brigade, as was usually the 
case, which angered Turner.113 At Festubert, the brigade was forced, over 
Turner’s objections, to make a series of hasty and ill-prepared attacks, with 
minimal effective artillery support, but it was able to reach most of its objectives 
at the cost of further heavy losses.114  
Two aspects of the battle are pertinent. First, despite Turner’s already shaky 
relationship with Alderson and the divisional staff, he had the moral courage to 
protest obviously flawed orders. In one instance, the British commanders 
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advanced an attack time originally planned for the dark at 9:00 p.m. up to 7:45 
p.m., so the attack would be in daylight. The division order did not reach Turner 
until 3:00 p.m. leaving insufficient time to prepare. Turner protested in vain to 
the divisional staff that the attack was ‘murder’ in daylight against uncut wire, 
but he was over-ruled.115  
Second, General Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the First Army, assigned 
Alderson command of the 51st Highland Division and the artillery of the 2nd 
British and 7th British Divisions, in a repeat of the errors at Second Ypres of over-
loading commanders.116 Alderson and his staff were clearly incapable of fulfilling 
their responsibilities. Alderson, in addition, was trapped between the protests of 
Currie and Turner over the attack timing and the intense pressure from Haig to 
attack as scheduled. Alderson weakly tried to convince Haig to grant more time 
to prepare, but Haig rejected any delays. As a result of his anaemic efforts, 
Alderson further alienated his brigade commanders and angered Haig. 
Lieutenant-Colonel F.S. Meighen of the 14th Battalion claimed to Carson that 
both Currie and Turner went to Alderson to complain about how he was running 
the division.117 Haig was so furious about Alderson’s performance that he 
chastised Alderson and Romer about the ‘sketchy methods of Command’ of the 
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division and brigade staffs.118 Haig did not forget such ‘stickiness’ and this 
probably played a role in Alderson’s replacement after St. Eloi. 
Conclusion 
Turner’s first battle was not a success, as poor staff work, inaccurate 
information transmission and a dangerous decision indicated he was 
overstretched. Turner faced an unprecedented challenge in reacting to the 
effective annihilation of two divisions on his left flank by a new, devastating 
secret weapon. His initial decisions were appropriate for the situation, but his 
and his brigade staff’s performance deteriorated over the course of the battle. 
Alderson erred in tasking Turner with controlling too many troops, over too long 
a front, given the inexperienced state of the brigade. Napoleon famously asked if 
an officer proposed for promotion to General was lucky, Turner at Ypres was 
not. He was dealt an unwinnable hand, but he did not play it as well as he could 
have. 
At Festubert, the brigade reached its objectives and without much 
evidence of the previous problems, indicating some degree of improvement in 
Turner’s performance. Turner proved his willingness to challenge flawed orders, 
but at the cost of a further estrangement from Alderson.  
How Turner would have progressed as a brigade commander was to be moot 
as on 17 August, Turner took over command of the 2nd Division.119 The history of 
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the 13th Battalion reported Turner “had earned an enviable military reputation and 
in addition had gained to an unusual degree the affection and regard of his 
men.”120 Turner’s first eight months in command of the 2nd Division and his 
conduct of the purported fiasco at St. Eloi Craters is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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 3  
WE ARE IN DESOLATE PLACES: 
BATTLE OF ST. ELOI CRATERS 
 
We grope for the wall like the blind, and we grope as if we had not eyes: we 
stumble at noon day as in the night, we are in desolate places like dead men. 
Isaiah 59:10 
 
 
In thirteen days of unrelenting combat in April 1916, the 2nd Division 
struggled and ultimately failed to hold and then retake a narrow 600 meter 
salient of craters, mud, and dead at the tiny crossroads of St. Eloi, Belgium.1 
Characterised by an unsympathetic historian as “ineptly conducted by the 
divisional commander, Major-General Richard Turner,” St. Eloi is often used as 
the exemplar that proves Turner’s incompetence.2 The chapter investigates 
Turner’s performance in the context of the information, resources, and 
conditions of this ill-conceived and strategically purposeless battle. It starts with 
an examination of the formation of the 2nd Division and Turner’s command up of 
the division to St. Eloi.  
Formation of the 2nd Division 
The 2nd Division’s formation followed a different path than that of the 1st 
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Division. The British accepted a second contingent on 31 October 1914.3 Rather 
than being mobilised centrally, as was the 1st Division, the 2nd Division 
conformed to the original 1912 mobilisation scheme of the Military District staff 
raising the battalions in the districts and selecting personnel. The battalions spent 
the winter training in the districts under the supervision of the district staffs, as 
Valcartier was not prepared to barrack troops during the winter.4  
The division consisted of the 4th, 5th and 6th Brigades. The 4th Brigade was 
from Ontario, with the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Battalions. The 5th Brigade was a 
mix of units from the Maritimes and Quebec, consisting of the 22nd (French 
Canadian), 24th, 25th, and 26th Battalions. The 5th Brigade was unique, in 
possessing the only francophone battalion in the Canadian Corps. The 6th 
Brigade included battalions from all four western provinces - 27th, 28th, 29th, and 
31st Battalions. The battalion commanders were a mix of six commanders of 
Militia regiments, two commanders of Militia infantry brigades, one retired 
officer, two majors, and one PF officer. 
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Figure 4  2nd Division Organisation Chart – St. Eloi, 6 April 1916  
 
 
The training of the 2nd Division in Canada faced the same issues that 
confronted Territorial and New Army divisions in Britain, with inexperienced 
NCOs and officers inculcating outdated concepts.5 There were the added 
impediments of being even further removed from the developments at the front 
than British formations and the harsh Canadian winter limiting training.  
A further problem facing the 2nd Division was a dearth of British Regular or 
Canadian PF officers in command positions at the battalion level to add 
experienced professional leadership. Unlike, the 1st Division, all but one of the 
battalion commanders in the 2nd Division were Militia officers, as were all the 
company commanders and the adjutants.6 First wave British New Army 
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Glasgow, 2006), 41; Simkins, Kitchener's Army : The Raising of Britain's New Armies, 1914-
1916: 297. 
6  The one exception was Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bell of the 31st Battalion, who was a captain in 
the PF at the start of the war. The 1st Division had two British Regular Army officers in 
3 We Are in Desolate Places 
 84 
divisions, in contrast, had Regular officers commanding all battalions and most 
companies. Even the last mobilised wave of New Army divisions consisted of 
battalions commanded by retired Regular officers.7  
Figure 5 2nd Division Battalion Commanders’ Origins8 
Officer 2nd Division Canadian Command 
E. Wigle 18th Battalion 21st Regiment 
J. McLaren 19th Battalion 91st Regiment 
J. Allan 20th Battalion 22nd Infantry Brigade 
W. Hughes 21st Battalion 14th Regiment 
F. Gaudet 22nd Battalion Retired Colonel 
J. Gunn 24th Battalion Major, 3rd Regiment 
G. Le Cain 25th Battalion 18th Infantry Brigade 
J. McAvity 26th Battalion 62nd Regiment 
I. Snider 27th Battalion 99th Regiment 
J. Embury 28th Battalion 95th Regiment 
H. Tobin 29th Battalion Brigade-Major, 23rd Brigade 
A. Bell 31st Battalion Captain, PF 
 
An instructive comparison is with the 21st British and 24th British Divisions, 
who had a calamitous introduction to combat at the Battle of Loos. Both of these 
were second wave New Army formations raised and sent to France at 
approximately the same time as the 2nd Division. The British Official History 
ascribed their problems to the relative shortage of trained commanders and staff. 
At a minimum, each battalion in the two divisions had one Regular or retired 
Regular officer, with all the battalion commanders in the 21st Division being 
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active or retired Regulars. The staffs of the two divisions had more trained and 
experienced staff officers than did the 2nd Division.9 As a result, it is not 
surprising that the 2nd Division was not well-prepared for battle when Turner 
assumed command. 
Selecting the commander of the division was a tangled process. The British 
appointment of the British officer and former Secretary of State for War, 
Brigadier-General Jack Seely, to command the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, 
without any discussion with Canadian authorities, goaded Borden to ensure a 
Canadian commanded the 2nd Division.10 Originally, Hughes thought to 
command the division, but Borden again dissuaded him, and instead Hughes 
recommended the PF officer, Major-General Sam Steele.11 Steele, a Canadian 
western icon and legendary Mounted Police and military leader, also had the 
merit of satisfying the powerful cabinet minister Robert Rogers’ demands for 
equal representation for Western Canada in the command ranks.12 Kitchener, 
given Steele’s age (66) and inexperience, rejected him and offered any 
unemployed major-general on the Active List as a commander.13 Any 
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unemployed major-general at this stage of the war, however, was unlikely to be 
a better choice than Steele. The Canadian and British authorities, eventually, 
agreed that Steele could bring the division to England, but not take it to France. 
Kitchener did find Steele a position commensurate with his rank, as commander 
of the Southeastern area, which included Shorncliffe, the major Canadian 
training centre.14  
Sir John French preferred Currie command the 2nd Division, based on an 
adverse report by Alderson on Turner. Alderson thought Turner unfit for 
divisional command, other than that he was ‘physically brave to a fault.’15 
Alderson did not show this document to Turner, as required.16 Canadian 
authorities, however, were adamant that it was Canada’s right to choose and 
they wanted Turner, believing him the most qualified Canadian given his pre-
war and war records. Kitchener had to accede to Canadian demands, and 
appointed Turner.17 On learning of Turner’s appointment, Alderson was to 
lament “Canadian politics have been too strong for all of us.”18 Turner’s 
appointment was generally popular, however, as even an anti-government 
                                                                                                                                
Kitchener Papers; TNA; Intercepted Cable Reaction, 28 April 1915, WG/10, PRO 30/57/56, 
Kitchener Papers; TNA. 
14  Major-General Sir Samuel Steele File, S-9, MG 27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds; LAC; Command of 
the 2nd Division, WG/3 - WG/17, PRO 30/57/56, Kitchener Papers; TNA. 
15  No version of this letter has been found, so the only reference to it is in Alderson’s 1916 
adverse report. Alderson to AMS 2 Army, G.271, 18 April 1916, RG 9 III D3 v5075, LAC. 
16  An adverse report was required to be shown to the subject of the report. The King's Regulations 
and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1917, ed. Department of Militia and Defence (Ottawa: 
King's Printer, 1917), para. 93. Turner did not know of Alderson’s opinion. Turner Interview, 
14 March 1934, 2001/10, Duguid Fonds; DHH. 
17  Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916: 270-273. 
18  Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 40. 
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paper, the Manitoba Free Press, approved.19 Turner officially took over 
command on 17 August. 
In May, Hughes appointed three PF officers to command the brigades. 
Colonel Septimus Dennison commanded the 4th Brigade, but at fifty-six he was 
too old and his health broke down almost immediately. The British Regular 
officer Brigadier-General Lord Brooke replaced him on 25 June.20 Brooke was an 
example of a curious aspect of Hughes’ character: a fondness for aristocrats. 
Brooke was well connected and was the son of the Earl of Warwick, who was a 
friend of Hughes.21  
Colonel J.P. Landry, initially, commanded the 5th Brigade until replaced by 
Brigadier-General David Watson on 30 August. Steele did not believe Landry 
was competent and this was a view shared by other officers in the brigade.22 In 
an indication of Turner’s political sensitivity, he asked Landry be promoted to 
Brigadier-General, given he was a senior French-Canadian PF officer.23 
Watson, the new commander of the 5th Brigade, was a Militia officer who 
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D150 v4, Macphail Fonds; LAC. Landry remained as a training brigade commander and was a 
success in this role. Carson to Hughes, 25 January 1916, 8-5-10c, RG 9 III A1 v45, LAC. 
23  Carson to Hughes, 6 September 1915, 6-L-86, RG 9 III A1 v170, LAC. 
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had commanded the 2nd Battalion with distinction at Second Ypres. Watson was 
the owner and editor of the Tory Quebec Chronicle newspaper, a staunch 
conservative, a shrewd intriguer, and a confidant of Hughes.24 Watson would 
later rise to command the 4th Division and had a poor reputation. Watson’s 
British GSO 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Ironside, thought him “at a loss 
commanding a division,” and the Canadian Corps’ respected chief 
administrative officer thought him ”bad, goodness knows.”25 
The commander of the 6th Brigade, Colonel H.D.B. Ketchen, remained in 
command of the brigade until 1917. Ketchen was a major in the PF in 1914. He 
was educated at Sandhurst, but emigrated to Canada in 1894, and served in the 
North West Mounted Police for five years. He joined Steele’s regiment, Lord 
Strathcona’s Horse in the Boer War, and transferred to the PF afterwards. In 
1914, he was the chief administrative officer in Military District #10 – Steele’s 
command. Hughes selected Ketchen, in part, because he was a protégé of both 
Steele and Robert Rogers.26 
The GSO 1 was Lieutenant-Colonel H.D. De Pree, a British artillery officer, 
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who joined from the Lahore Division, at the end of May 1915.27 The GSO 2 was 
Major C.A. Ker, who transferred from the 21st British Division.28 Ker, an artillery 
officer, was familiar to Canadians, as he was serving at RMC in Kingston, at the 
start of the war.29 De Pree moved at the end of January 1916, and Ker took over 
as GSO 1.30 The head administrative officer was Colonel P.E. Thacker, a PF, and 
Camberley trained staff officer.31 He will be covered in more detail in Chapter 6. 
The division crossed over to England starting in late April in convoys of 
5,000 men and did not finish arriving until June 1915. The division moved into a 
recently constructed base at Shorncliffe near Dover on the English Channel.32 
This was the first time the division was concentrated. 
Turner assumed command of the division on 17 August and he had less 
than a month to place his mark on the division before it crossed to France. 
According to Steele’s aide, Captain F.F. Montague, the division was loyal to 
Steele, but Turner quickly won them over.33 Captain Andrew Macphail, a doctor 
and noted Canadian literary figure, commented Turner “won instant devotion, 
                                            
27  De Pree, a cousin of Douglas Haig, subsequently had an equivocal reputation, with some 
British officers wondering how he rose as far as he did, but he is also credited with planning 
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30  C. A. Ker Service Jacket, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 5109 - 28, LAC. 
31  Thacker was the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General of the 2nd Division. 
32  Diane Beaupré "En Route to Flanders Fields:  The Canadians at Shorncliffe During the Great 
War," London Journal Of Canadian Studies 23(2007/2008): 47. 
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even from myself, who am not disposed to yield devotion upon first demand.”34  
One of the first changes Turner instituted was more pragmatic and realistic 
formation training. Under Steele, the brigades carried out tactical exercises as 
meeting engagements, with columns and advance guards as per Field Service 
Regulations (FSR).35 Turner instructed the brigades to conduct trench and open 
warfare training, and each brigade had to carry out a trench attack.36  
Turner, initially, did not make any changes at the command level, as was 
often the case with a new divisional commander taking over a recently 
mobilised formation.37 It was not necessary in this case, as Steele had already 
replaced one battalion and two brigade commanders. Steele’s dismissal of 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Allan of the 20th Battalion caused a near riot in the 
battalion.38 Turner was obviously worried about the battalion’s discipline, as he 
requested the PF unit, the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), recently arrived from 
garrison duty in Bermuda, replace the 20th Battalion. Turner subsequently 
changed his mind, as the RCR was not ready for active service, and he thought 
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better leadership could salvage the 20th Battalion, which it did under Lieutenant-
Colonel C. Rogers.39 
In France 
The division, on 23 September 1915, took over the Wesoutre sector, south 
of Ypres, and overlooked by the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge. Unlike the 1st 
Division, there was no gradual introduction to the front-line and mentoring with 
an experienced division. The arrival of the 2nd Division also meant the formation 
of the Canadian Corps, with Alderson as corps commander and Currie taking 
over the 1st Division. 
The defences the 2nd Division took over were in deplorable shape, and the 
division expended enormous efforts to improve them. Constant rainfall and the 
Germans pumping water from their trenches on the ridge onto the Canadian 
positions thwarted their efforts, however.40 The men had to stand up to their 
waists in water in the front-line trenches, and some communication trenches 
were impassable because of flooding.41 All of this work meant the battalions in 
reserve could not train but had to supply work parties for repairs. The Canadian 
Corps instructed the division to not initiate actions with the Germans in this 
early period in the trenches, because of the need to work on the defences.42 
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Map 5 Wesoutre Sector, 23 September 1915 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Sketch 17, The Canadian Corps in the Line, 23 September 1915, page 116 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011 
 
Strong leadership was required to keep the division working in these 
dispiriting conditions. One of Turner’s great strengths was his constant visiting of 
the front, and he would endeavour to be the first officer to tour a new part of the 
line. In one eleven day period, Turner toured the trenches of the 5th Brigade on 
five separate days.43 This is in contrast to some formations where senior officers 
seen in the front lines were rare. For instance, a British officer complained that in 
early 1915 over a five-month period, he never saw a member of the divisional 
staff in the front line.44 Turner would spend hours investigating the situation, 
talking to the officers and men, and ensuring they knew their duties. He also 
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tasked his ADCs to always carry copies of illustrated newspapers to hand out to 
men on his tours.45 This fitted the contemporary British model of man 
management.46 
Like most new formations in the terrible weather conditions of the winter 
of 1915/1916, the 2nd Division experienced its share of problems. The first was 
the poor response of the 25th Battalion to the Germans firing four mines on 8 
October, which caused a partial panic in the company holding the affected 
sector. Some men fled but most rallied and denied the Germans a foothold in 
the Canadian line. Mines were a constant dread, a ‘hovering horror,’ and during 
this period, the Germans had an edge in mine warfare.47 The only true 
protection was the trench; mines removed this last vestige of control and 
protection possessed by the soldier, hence the anxiety.48  
That some men panicked indicated problems with the battalion, therefore, 
Watson promptly replaced the commander and the second in command.49 The 
incident would have likely further lowered Alderson’s confidence in Turner, 
given Alderson’s antipathy towards him. 
In November, Alderson was angered by the state of the 6th Brigade after 
inspecting their positions. Men in the 27th Battalion were not wearing required 
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equipment, their rifles were dirty, and the infantry was not in proper 
communications with the artillery. Turner assured Alderson that the 6th Brigade 
was dealing with the problems.50 Alderson, however, undoubtedly took note of 
the offending officers, including Turner, Ketchen, and Lieutenant-Colonel I. 
Snider of the 27th Battalion, as all three would figure prominently at St. Eloi 
Craters. 
The most damaging fault was prevalence of trench foot in the 2nd Division, 
in October and November of 1915, when conditions were at their worst. The 2nd 
Division had one of the highest incidence rates in the Second Army with 
seventy-seven cases in a two week period, while the more experienced 1st 
Division had only seventeen cases. GHQ used the rate of trench foot as an 
indication of the discipline and leadership of a formation. Both the Second Army 
and Alderson pressured Turner to address the problem.51  
Turner responded by issuing a circular that emphasised prevention through 
supervision by regimental officers, with leave revoked for companies with high 
rates of trench foot. The officers commanding in the brigade with the highest rate 
would also lose their leave.52 He also obtained boots, socks, and undervests for 
his troops through back channels from England. In one request to Carson, 
Hughes’ ‘special representative’ in England and the de facto head of the 
administration in England, Turner asked socks be sent in small bales addressed 
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to him to get around War Office regulations. Turner claimed he was following 
the Militia adage of ‘the Lord helps those that help themselves,’ as the British 
authorities and the Canadian Corps were not supplying these goods in sufficient 
quantity.53 Turner’s actions, the improvements to the trenches, and colder 
temperatures addressed the problem and rate of trench foot dropped to a more 
acceptable level.54 
Turner and Alderson clashed over staff and command appointments. 
Turner quickly determined that Brooke, despite his being a favourite of Sam 
Hughes “did not have sufficient experience in this war.”55 According to Max 
Aitken, Sam Hughes’ personal representative to GHQ and consummate fixer, 
Turner, Currie, and Alderson agreed to switch Brooke to command the 1st 
Brigade with Garnet Hughes getting the 4th Brigade.56 Garnet Hughes’ selection 
to command a brigade was wholly unjustified by his experience and 
performance, but it is indicative of the influence Sam Hughes had in the 
promotion process.57 Alderson, subsequently, changed his mind and assigned 
Garnet to command the 1st Brigade, as he believed Currie could keep Garnet out 
of trouble. Turner protested, as he was ‘exceedingly anxious’ that Garnet stay in 
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the 2nd Division, but was unsuccessful.58 Brooke transferred to a training 
command in England to mollify Sam Hughes. In Brooke’s place, on 17 
November, Alderson appointed Robert Rennie, the commander of the 3rd 
Battalion. Rennie, a Militia officer and owner of a Toronto seed firm, would 
prove to be a safe pair of hands, as he commanded the brigade to September 
1918.59 
Turner complained to Aitken about the replacement of a Canadian 
administrative officer, Major Homer-Dixon, with a British officer.60 In turn, 
Aitken lodged a complaint with the British authorities, which paid off, as Homer-
Dixon was reappointed in January 1916.61 Turner also battled Alderson over the 
appointment of Major J.L.R. Parsons, as his GSO 2 for Intelligence, because 
Alderson again wanted to appoint a British officer not trusting Turner’s 
judgement in subordinates.62 Turner won out, with Parsons’ appointment. 
Parsons proved to be successful, because he was subsequently appointed the 
GSO 1 for Intelligence at the Canadian Corps on 25 September 1916.63 These 
complaints were elevated to the highest levels in the British Government, when 
Sir George Perley, the acting High Commissioner, complained to the Colonial 
Secretary about the appointment of British officers when qualified Canadians 
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were available. The Colonial Secretary passed the protest to Kitchener, in 
December 1915, with the advice to treat the grievance seriously.64 It appears to 
have had an effect, as there were fewer British officers selected over similarly 
qualified Canadians. 
As a product of these complaints, Hughes waged a campaign to replace 
British Regular officers in the Canadian Corps. Alderson fought back by polling 
his divisional commanders on dispensing with Regular officers as brigade-
majors. Both Mercer and Currie adamantly opposed the suggestion. Turner’s 
answer was subtly different, as he wanted to retain the Regular officers until 
Canadian replacements were trained. Neither Mercer nor Currie referred to 
Canadians filling these positions.65 This was also an early example of Turner’s 
desire to produce more Canadian staff officers. Later when in command in 
England, Turner fostered an increase in Canadian staff officer training. This 
illustrates that Turner’s strong Canadian nationalism was not a negative reaction 
to the British, but a confidence in what Canadians could accomplish. His view 
of the British became more jaundiced as the war progressed, and especially after 
the armistice.   
Beginning in December, the division was able to shift some of its energies 
to training and to conducting raids. Turner established a series of schools at the 
division, brigade, and battalion levels to train troops in trench warfare and the 
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new weapons, such as the Lewis Gun and Stokes Mortar.66 Even in the worst 
conditions of October and November, the division pursued an aggressive 
scheme of patrolling no man’s land at night. However, it was not until January 
that the division raided German trenches. The 6th Brigade pulled off an 
impressive raid at the end of January, which was reported to be the first 
conducted without using artillery to cut enemy wire.67 Turner sent Ketchen’s 
analysis of the raid to Alderson over his signature, but in a dubious move did not 
credit Ketchen for writing the report.  
St. Eloi 
From 4 April, the 2nd Division fought in the battle of St. Eloi Craters. This 
battle was the nadir of Turner’s military career and his conduct in the battle 
became the focus of opprobrium by historians. It was also an example of the 
problems Canadians, like other inexperienced units, encountered when they 
could not operate within the confines of a structured and well-prepared 
operational scheme. When Canadian formations had to react to German actions 
and could not dictate the course of the battle, Canadian command and control 
floundered.68 The problems encountered at Second Ypres, St. Eloi, and the 
opening days at Mount Sorrel, all demonstrate similar breakdowns. These issues 
were a symptom of the inexperienced Canadian commanders and staff.  
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The impetus for the battle stemmed from a desire by the commander of the 
Second Army, General Sir Herbert Plumer, to salvage his career by recovering a 
small salient that overlooked the British positions at the town of St. Eloi, four 
kilometres south of Ypres.69 The Germans had seized this height of land in 
March 1915.70 The new commander of the BEF, General Sir Douglas Haig, was 
expressing his grave reservations about Plumer to the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS), Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson in January 
1916.71 Haig was dissatisfied with the Second Army’s defensive arrangements, 
and believed Plumer was insufficiently firm with his corps and divisional 
commanders, whom he thought were weak.72 Haig was especially concerned 
with Lieutenant-General Hew Fanshawe, GOC V Corps, and Major-General 
Aylmer Haldane, GOC 3rd British Division, who would lead the initial attack at 
St. Eloi.73 After losing and retaking a small position, the Bluff, in February 1916, 
Plumer was on a short leash with Haig, who decided to give Plumer another 
opportunity to prove himself.74 
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Figure 6 St. Eloi Panorama, 14 March 1915 
St. Eloi Panorama, 14 March 1915, WO 153/1268, TNA. 
 
The Second Army had initiated planning for an attack at St. Eloi in 
November in 1915 with mines tunnelled under the German front-line.75 
Concerned that the Germans would discover the mines, the plan called for an 
attack, as soon as possible after 10 March, when the mines were to be ready. 
The 3rd British Division was to make the attack and consolidate the position. It 
would then hand over the sector to Turner’s division on the night of 6/7 April. 
When Turner learned of the plan, he immediately recommended to Alderson 
that the 2nd Division make the attack, as he believed a fresh division would more 
likely be successful.76 Ker, the 2nd Division’s GSO 1, later suggested the 
Canadians “would of [sic] made a complete success of it.”77 Alderson agreed 
with Turner, but Plumer rejected his request, as he did not want to risk the 
Germans discovering the mines, while the Canadians carried out the necessary 
training. There was probably also a reluctance to place his fate in the hands of 
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an untested colonial division, rather than a Regular Army unit.  
The 3rd British Division was selected because of its experience in crater 
fighting in 1915. Haldane, the divisional commander, did not welcome the 
assignment, as he was bitter about his experience with the small-scale attacks he 
had to make, because they inevitably led to high casualties for little gain.78 
Despite its expertise, the 3rd British Division was a lamentable choice to make 
the attack, as it was tired, under strength, and unfit after its operations to retake 
the Bluff. It was reduced to one effective brigade, the 9th British, as the 76th 
British Brigade had lost 924 men at the Bluff, and the 8th British Brigade was 
crippled by 600 cases of trench feet, indicating a formation with severe 
leadership and morale problems.79 Two of the brigade commanders, including 
the commander of the 9th British Brigade, the Commander, Royal Artillery (CRA), 
and the Commander, Royal Engineers (CRE) were all new, and the GSO 1 was 
sick for most of the battle, so the division’s leadership was in a fragile state. 
During the battle, Haldane would also sack one battalion commander and a 
Brigade-Major.80 
 The key to the plan was exploding six mines under the German front-line 
positions. The resulting mine craters created an obstacle in the centre of the 
salient requiring the British to attack from each flank. The GSO 2 of 3rd British 
Division identified the flaw in the plan as “the attack was fitted to the mines and 
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not the mines to the attack.”81 The 9th British Brigade was to advance with one 
battalion from each flank to capture and consolidate a line 200 metres south of 
the craters. Haldane after his experiences at Hooge in 1915 was adamant that 
craters were shell traps and should not be defended.82 
The 3rd British Division attack on 27 March was a partial success. The right 
battalion quickly reached its objectives, but heavy machine-gun and artillery fire 
stopped the left battalion. The division reported “Great difficulty has been 
experienced in obtaining knowledge of the exact situation from those on the 
spot.”83 Heavy losses from artillery fire and exhaustion necessitated battalion 
reliefs every one to two days. Haldane had to commit first the 8th British Brigade 
and then the 76th British Brigade in relief. The division did not realise, until 30 
March, that the Germans had infiltrated through a gap in the line and recaptured 
Crater 5. Once discovered, it took another four days before the division retook 
it.84 It is evident from the results of post-battle enquiries that units were unable to 
ascertain what they held or even to advance in a planned direction.85  
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Figure 7 St. Eloi Aerial Photograph, 31 March 1916 
 
Grid 28, 157WW1AIR.sid, http://lt1.mcmaster.ca/ww1/wrz4mp.php?grid=28&photo_id=157, McMaster 
University Library 
 
The 3rd British Division was rapidly becoming debilitated, so Plumer 
ordered the planned relief to be accelerated by three days to the night of 3/4 
April. Haldane and Fanshawe asserted that every effort was made to facilitate the 
handover, including leaving behind Haldane’s GSO 1, twenty-four Lewis Guns, 
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trench mortars, and three communication trenches complete to the front lines.86 
The reality was far different, as only one communication trench existed and it 
was one metre deep and filled with water. The 27th Battalion found only four of 
the twelve expected Lewis Guns and these were not fully functional.87 The 
information handed over was inaccurate, incomplete, or entirely absent, 
because of the state of the ground and the exhausted state of the division.88 What 
is more, the ground had changed so much that Haldane’s GSO 1 twice lost his 
way in guiding the Canadians into position.89 Turner accused the 3rd British 
Division of making no efforts to consolidate.90 The British had tried, but the 
Germans kept destroying the defences. The British were so exhausted that the 
Canadians had to evacuate the British wounded and dead. This was almost 
unheard of and was an indication of just how shattered and fatigued was the 
British division. 
Haldane also left recommendations on how to hold the line, with the key 
notion to avoid the craters.91 As Leppard states “Incredibly, Turner had received 
no orders or instructions from 2nd Army, V Corps, or Canadian Corps.”92 
Unfortunately, Turner implemented the flawed advice of Haldane – the ‘expert’ 
on crater warfare. Plumer’s principles of defence agreed with Haldane, so Turner 
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was also executing the Army commander’s intent.93 On 3 April, Haig criticised 
this policy, and called for units to hold craters, but this was not communicated 
to Turner.94 Subsequently, the BEF doctrine for consolidating craters changed to 
a fundamentally different policy than that recommended by Haldane.95 
The 2nd Division took over a sector where the terrain shaped the course of 
the battle. The battlefield lay on a band of impermeable clay that meant rain 
remained where it fell, if not drained off.96 The mines and shelling destroyed the 
complex German drainage system, so the heavy rain during the battle pooled 
creating a virtually impassable sea of mud.97 There are repeated references to 
men having to move through water and mud up to their waists and even 
armpits.98 The salient was the scene of incessant mine warfare, with thirty-three 
mines fired and seventeen large craters in the immediate vicinity of Craters 2 to 
5, making orientation and movement difficult.99 The Germans on Wytschaete 
Ridge, 1500 meters south and southeast of St. Eloi, and 40 meters higher than St. 
Eloi, dominated the battlefield. The Germans had an observation advantage 
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throughout the battle, especially as overcast skies kept the Royal Flying Corps 
grounded through most of the engagement. The Germans could fire from an arc 
of 270˚ into the salient. In addition, the salient was compact; measuring 
approximately 250 meters deep with a width of 600 meters. As a result, the 
Germans were able to concentrate observed artillery and mortar fire into the 
contested zone. 
The most crucial factor was the six mines exploded on 27 March, their 
craters, and the resulting disorientation of the British and Canadians in the battle. 
The mines fundamentally changed the landscape, such that the officers of the 9th 
British Brigade, who had occupied the sector for months, were unable to 
recognise it.100 The lips of the resulting craters were five to six metres high, 
which blocked observation of the forward positions from the Canadian lines. 
The four mine craters in the centre, Craters 2 to 5, were so close together that 
they created an impenetrable barrier to movement.101 The craters themselves 
were a formidable obstacle with a width of forty-five to fifty-five metres and a 
depth of eighteen metres.102 In addition, the mines badly damaged the British 
front line trenches, which diverted resources from the consolidation of the front 
line positions to repair the damage. As late as 14 May, the defensive line was not 
continuous in the St. Eloi sector, because of the damage.103 
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The 6th Brigade officially took over the line at 4:15 a.m. on 4 April, with 
the 27th Battalion on the right covering the majority of the salient and the 31st the 
right from Point 77 to the Yser Canal. The units were using the iconic steel 
helmets, for the first time, with fifty issued per company.104 The 2nd Division 
report characterised the front as little more than a line on the map.105 The 
conditions were so bad that carrying parties had to be roped together to prevent 
them vanishing in shell holes.106 The ubiquitous mud and water meant 
movement was slow, arduous, and exhausting. There was little to no cover 
available, and the rain filled depressions with mud and water.  
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Map 6 St. Eloi Craters, 4 and 6 April 1916 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Map 3, St. Eloi Craters, 4 and 6 April 1916, page 140 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011. Scans by Richard V. Laughton, http://www.censol.ca/research/greatwar/nicholson/maps/Map%203.jpg. 
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Both Turner and a staff officer claimed the British did not allow a daylight 
reconnaissance of the positions, so the troops took over their positions in the 
desolation without proper preparation.107 There was confusion about the number 
of craters in the battle area.108 In addition, the division ordered the two front-line 
battalions to swap positions at the last minute, thus negating any preparations 
they had made.109 The 6th Brigade’s Brigade-Major toured the front line and 
reported the “line was in very bad condition being waist deep in water and very 
much choked with both enemy dead and our own.”110  
Turner, worried about the dire reports from the 6th Brigade, toured the 
entire front line. He was probably the only senior officer to do so during the 
battle. During his tour, he encountered a private of the 27th Battalion who 
recounted Turner “telling us what good cover we had in compared to the other 
boys down further in the trench. He did the front line troops, he did the front 
line.”111 Turner’s biggest concern was the poor state of communications through 
the centre of the line, as all movement had to pass through the flanks around the 
craters. Given enough time, he thought the division could develop a ‘pretty good 
line,’ but it would require a lot of work and it was an ‘ideal target’ for German 
artillery fire.112 Turner was all too accurate in this last assessment. 
During the daylight hours on 4 and 5 April, the Germans methodically 
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destroyed any progress the Canadians made in constructing defences. The 
shelling was so severe that one company of the 27th had to be relieved after 
suffering fifty per cent losses. In reaction, Snider of the 27th thinned out his front 
line to minimise losses, because of the lack of cover. Rather than remain in his 
battalion headquarters, Snider moved to the front line to share the misery of his 
troops.113 
Ketchen tried touring his line on 5 April, but German shelling pinned him 
and his party, so that he was unable to proceed.114 Ketchen was concerned 
about the situation, and recommended pulling the line back to the craters, in 
expectation of a German counterattack.115 Turner did not believe, however, it 
was feasible to shift the men and resources from the existing plan. The Germans 
continued to pound the 27th and 31st Battalions on 5 April, and this weakened 
them. In reaction, Turner ordered small parties to the four central craters to make 
obvious efforts at work to force the Germans to expend shells on the craters.116  
The Germans started a drumfire bombardment of Canadian lines between 
2:45 and 3 a.m. on 6 April causing heavy losses and damage. Two battalions, 
I/214th Reserve Regiment and I/216th Reserve Regiment of the 46th Reserve 
Division, attacked at 3:30 a.m.117 The defenders were caught in a vulnerable 
position. A delayed exchange of two companies of the 29th Battalion for two 
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companies of the 27th Battalion was not progressing well, so the defenders were 
not set.118 As a result only isolated detachments defended the central sector of 
the salient and they were not in contact with the 31st Battalion on their left. The 
defenders had to rely on hand grenades, as mud jammed most of their machine 
guns and rifles.119 The Canadians called down a SOS barrage, but it was ragged, 
and the Germans were able to work their way through it to overwhelm the 
defenders.120 The Germans were slowed down by resistance from the 31st 
Battalion, but were able to retake Craters 2 to 5.  
Communications with the battalions, already intermittent, were quickly 
severed, so the situation was obscure. Initial information from the 6th Brigade 
was misleading, such that the 2nd Division optimistically reported conditions to 
the corps at 6:25 a.m. as “not quite clear at present but is considered quite 
favourable.” This was another example of Turner’s tendency to accept initial 
reports uncritically. Ketchen, after communicating with both forward battalions, 
had to admit the craters were lost, but stated the battalions were launching 
counterattacks with bombers to retake them. Turner had to amend his earlier 
situation report to Canadian Corps, which would have further affected his 
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credibility with Alderson.121  
Ketchen ordered all four of his battalions to counterattack. They made 
weak attacks based primarily on bombers in improvised units. The abundance of 
specialists, such as bombers, scouts, and snipers, broke up the battalion 
structure, such that the platoon was little more than an administrative 
convenience.122 The post battle accounts are replete with commanders assigning 
men to ad hoc units to conduct counterattacks, rather than fighting in an 
established platoon structure. The pernicious effects of specialists withdrawn 
from the company robbed it of much of its firepower and ability to conduct 
operations on its own. This was not a problem unique to the 2nd Division, but 
was one that affected the British army of 1916.123 
The 27th and 29th Battalions were to retake Craters 2 and 3, while the 28th 
and 31st Battalions were to recapture Craters 4 and 5. Heavy German artillery 
fire stopped the attack on Craters 2 and 3 before the bombers could close with 
the enemy. On the left, the 31st Battalion, reinforced with bombers from the 28th 
Battalion, captured what they thought was Craters 4 and 5, but were actually 
Craters 6 and 7.124 They made the same mistake as the 3rd British Division. The 
brigade and division accepted this faulty positioning and it became the baseline 
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for orientation for all subsequent units. It also meant that the Germans were able 
to consolidate their hold on Craters 4 and 5 without interference from shellfire. 
The difficulty of moving in the daylight, the unfamiliarity with the size of the 
craters, their misidentification, destruction of front-line trenches, lack of maps, 
and the desolation of the battlefield made it extremely challenging to navigate 
and made errors inevitable.125  
Once the scope of the problem emerged, Turner released two reserve 
battalions to Ketchen at 7:55 to support his counterattacks. Turner then met with 
Ketchen at 8:50, once communications with the two forward battalions were 
restored and the initial results of the counterattacks known.126 Ketchen and 
Turner decided to launch a more prepared counterattack supported by artillery 
on Craters 2 and 3 for 1:30 p.m. Turner subsequently postponed the attack to the 
night in reaction to the losses already suffered from German shelling.127 A report 
from Major Parsons at the front-line of “very heavy casualties and men very 
much shaken by bombardment,” undoubtedly influenced this decision.128 The 
postponement did not reach all the attackers in time, and more men were lost. 
Turner learned that it was impossible to attack the craters in daylight because of 
the German observation and artillery advantage.  
Leppard has criticised Turner regarding the supposed lack of preparations 
for a German counterattack and for not taking a more active role on the day of 
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the attack.129 It is difficult to sustain these charges, in all but one instance. Turner 
was chided over not anticipating a German attack. This is a perplexing criticism, 
as all the elements of a proper defensive scheme were in place and operated, 
albeit not as effectively as expected. The front-line forces did call for the SOS 
barrage, which responded, and the front line units made prompt counterattacks. 
An earlier order had stressed the importance of immediate counter-strikes and 
“situations will arise when local counter-attacks may have to be organised 
without waiting for superior orders.”130 In the early stages of the German attack, 
the information received by Turner was positive but inaccurate, so it did not 
indicate the need for a major intervention. Once the situation was clarified, 
Turner took appropriate measures. 
The primary cause of the failure was the weak state of defences in the 
salient’s central sector. This was a combination of too few defenders in position 
armed with little more than bombs to repel the Germans. Snider’s decision to 
thin out his lines meant fewer casualties but also fewer defenders. The Germans 
adopted a better policy of fully manning their positions at night and reducing 
them during the daylight hours.131 Reports of survivors indicate the Germans 
advanced in a mass, so a stronger defensive line would have forced the Germans 
to deploy to deal with the defenders and allowed more time for the artillery to 
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intervene.132 Snider subsequently paid the price for his decision with his 
dismissal.  
Turner decided and Alderson agreed that the 6th Brigade was exhausted 
and Rennie’s 4th Brigade replaced it, at noon on 7 April. A factor in the 
accelerated relief was Turner’s dissatisfaction with Ketchen’s ‘methods,’ as 
Turner complained to Watson.133 Turner was under a great deal of pressure, and 
he uncharacteristically and inappropriately complained to one officer about 
another. 
Turner, realising the futility of the current operations, proposed two 
alternatives to Alderson to negate the overwhelming German artillery advantage. 
One was to evacuate the craters and pound the Germans with shells. The 
second was to double the attack frontage to dilute the German artillery 
concentration.134 Alderson, in turn, proposed to the Second Army to widen the 
attack front even more. Plumer, after briefly considering Turner’s second option, 
visited 2nd Division’s headquarters on 8 April and rejected all three alternatives, 
in part believing the Canadians held Craters 4 and 5.135 While there, Plumer 
dictated how the battalions in the 4th Brigade were to hold the trenches.136 
Plumer’s intervention into details four levels below his own indicates the duress 
Plumer was under to succeed, his lack of confidence in the command echelons 
of the 2nd Division, and an unwarranted interference into command 
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prerogatives.137 
Map 7 St. Eloi Craters, 10 April 1916 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Map 3, St. Eloi Craters, 10 April 1916, page 143 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011 
 
With the rejection of the alternatives, Turner instructed Rennie to retake 
Craters 2 and 3. On successive nights, the 4th Brigade launched attacks with 
small parties that reported reaching the northern lips of Craters 2 and 3. These 
attacks consisted of fifty or fewer men for each crater, indicating the restricted 
scope of the terrain and the limited scale of the attacks.138 It was not until the 
morning of 11 April that engineering work parties discovered the truth that the 
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4th Brigade had captured two of the ubiquitous pre-existing craters, and not 
Craters 2 and 3.139 
Originally, Watson’s 5th Brigade was to replace the 4th Brigade that 
evening, but Turner ordered Rennie to capture the two craters. Rennie and his 
battalion commanders protested that the men were in ‘no fit state’ to attack 
successfully. Demonstrating moral courage, especially given the pressure he was 
under, Turner agreed and persuaded Alderson and Plumer to cancel the attack. 
The relief proceeded, as planned.140 
Alderson now had to explain the situation to Plumer, and Alderson 
claimed the 2nd Division was solely responsible for the inaccurate information. 
Alderson chose to ignore any responsibility of the 3rd British Division for its poor 
information hand-over. Plumer was angry and made his dissatisfaction apparent 
to Alderson.141 No longer trusting the 2nd Division’s reports, Alderson tasked 
Lieutenant S.A. Vernon, a Canadian Corps intelligence and British Regular Army 
officer, to tour the front. Vernon, making the same mistakes in orientation, as did 
everyone else, confirmed Craters 2 and 3 were lost, but reported Craters 4 and 5 
held.142 Alderson would later claim Vernon was misled by his guides, but 
Vernon, as an intelligence officer, should not have had to rely on guides to 
discern the location of forces. 
Alderson, undoubtedly frustrated with his least favourite divisional 
commander, sent his BGGS, Brigadier-General ’Tim’ Harington to rectify the 
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situation. Harington met with Turner, his staff, and the brigade commanders. At 
the conference, Turner, again, proposed two options of a counterattack 
supported by trench mortars or to withdraw and shell the German positions. 
Reports from the field, such as from Lieutenant-Colonel E. Hilliam of the 25th 
Battalion, of the abysmal field conditions made a successful attack ‘an 
impossibility.’143 There was also a fear of a German attack to retake the 
purportedly held Craters 4 and 5. All during the battle, the Germans launched 
small-scale attacks that the 2nd Division invariably repulsed inflicting heavy 
losses, so the fear of a further German attack was legitimate. Plumer visiting the 
division again next day, rejected both alternatives, in part because of shell 
shortages, and the British penchant for holding on meaningless strips of territory, 
and ordered the existing positions be consolidated.144 
Alderson visited the divisional headquarters in the afternoon of 12 April to 
emphasise his vexation. In an order that captured his lack of confidence in 
Turner and his commanders, Alderson demanded, “that all work must be 
supervised and constantly visited by the Staff Officers of the Division and 
Brigade, and that reports were to be rendered daily as to the progress made.”145 
Alderson’s continued distrust of Turner and his staff is evident with another visit 
Alderson made to the trenches on 14 April, without first stopping at the 
divisional headquarters as was proper protocol.146 
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During the battle, Turner had Ker issue an order to address the problems 
encountered during the battle. Turner wanted subordinates to be “prepared to 
act on their own initiative. The one unforgivable sin when in difficulties is to do 
nothing and wait for orders.”147 Units were not to withdraw from positions 
without reference to superior authorities, in reaction to the 27th Battalion’s 
actions before and during the battle. In addition, there were multiple references 
to passing information, including negative information, back early and often. 
Clearly, Turner wanted to address the problem of poor communications to the 
rear. Interestingly, Turner’s demand for more initiative was at odds with Haig’s 
requirement that superiors impose tighter control over subordinates, because of 
the untrained nature of the army and officer corps.148 
The Royal Flying Corps was finally able to take photographs of the battle 
area on 16 April showing the Germans holding Craters 2 to 5 and having done 
so from 6 April. The discovery that the 2nd Division had not known its own 
positions for ten days kicked off a bitter battle over responsibility. Both Alderson 
and Harington wrote notes to Turner on 16 April to commiserate with him and 
to set his mind at rest. Both notes mentioned that Plumer and his chief staff 
officer had accepted the news in the ‘right spirit.’149 Alderson and Harington’s 
letters, however, were quickly overtaken by events, as Haig ordered Plumer to 
investigate the reasons for the failure. Haig wrote in his diary, “I fear that 
Canadian officers are not only indifferent leaders, but many of them have strange 
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ideas of what is honest and straightforward. Turner is not quite fit for his 
work.”150 
Figure 8  St. Eloi Aerial Photograph, 16 April 1916 
 
Grid 28, 158WW1AIR.sid, http://lt1.mcmaster.ca/ww1/wrz4mp.php?grid=28&photo_id=158, McMaster 
University Library 
 
Analysis 
Owing to the loss of ground and the casualties, the battle of St. Eloi Craters 
has been called the “first and the worst Canadian setback of the war.”151 How 
valid is that characterisation? The division suffered 1,372 casualties versus only 
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483 for the Germans.152 Over the thirteen days of the battle from 4 to 16 April, 
the 2nd Division’s loss rate was 101 men per day. By the standards of the First 
World War, this was low. In month of April 1916, the 2nd Division suffered 
1,953 casualties and in June, during the Mount Sorrel battle, it suffered almost 
the same total of 1,949 men.153 As a percentage of forces engaged, the 2nd 
Division suffered a loss rate of 8%, which was markedly lower than even the 
most successful engagements at Amiens at 13% and Vimy 16%.154 
Figure 9  Canadian Battle Loss Percentage 1915-1918155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If compared to the first major engagements of the 1st and 3rd Canadian and 
the 5th Australian Divisions, the 2nd Division’s first action, while a failure, was 
not markedly worse than the others. At Second Ypres, despite the performance 
of the regimental officers and men, the 1st Division was driven from its positions 
and suffered 37% casualties, 6,036 men, or roughly 1,200 men per day over the 
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Battle Loss Percentage 
2nd Ypres 37% 
St. Eloi 8% 
Somme 31% 
Vimy 16% 
Passchendaele 20% 
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Arras 15% 
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five days the Canadians fought.156 At Mount Sorrel, the 3rd Division was surprised 
and forced from its positions. In the immediate and unsuccessful counterattack 
after the Germans captured the front line positions, the Canadians suffered 1,700 
casualties; more than were lost during the entire St. Eloi battle.157  
The 5th Australian Division, whose commander, Major-General James 
McCay, followed a similar career trajectory to Turner’s, suffered a severe defeat 
in its first engagement at Fromelles in July 1916.158 It lost 5,500 men in a two-
day battle and required nine months of recuperation. Unlike Turner, McCay lost 
the confidence of his division.159 By these measures, the 2nd Division’s first action 
was not the unparalleled disaster portrayed in many histories. 
Both Tim Cook and Thomas Leppard in their works on St. Eloi, amongst 
other historians, sharply criticised Turner for failure to accurately determine the 
position of the 2nd Division.160 This has become the dominant complaint 
regarding Turner’s performance in the battle. These scholars base their critique 
on contraindications of the division’s claims that should have triggered doubts 
and further investigation. A close examination of the information available to 
Turner, however, suggests the critics are taking advantage of hindsight. As David 
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Campbell phrased it, “A scan of references in the Divisional war diary and daily 
intelligence summaries turns up over twenty reports between April 7 and 15 that 
claim Canadian possession of Craters 4 and 5, with no clear reports to the 
contrary.”161 With the vast preponderance of information supporting the claims 
of holding these craters, Turner had no good reason to doubt their veracity. 
Vernon’s report on the night 11/12 April would have further reinforced the 
confidence that the division held Craters 4 and 5. The evidence from the 
engineering parties on 11 April was sufficient for Turner to recognise the division 
did not hold Craters 2 and 3, which indicates Turner did not ignore all contrary 
evidence. 
Critics refer to three reports, which should have initiated an investigation: 
Captain D.E. Macintyre’s reports from the field, prisoner statements, and air 
photographs taken on 8 April. Macintyre, the 6th Brigade’s Intelligence officer, 
stationed in a church steeple overlooking the battlefield, reported the Germans 
capturing and holding Craters 2 to 5 on 6 April. In a post-war statement, 
Macintyre claimed he informed the division that the German still held all four 
craters after the 6th Brigade supposedly recaptured Craters 4 and 5.162 
Macintyre’s 9 April 1916 report to Turner, however, does not support this claim, 
as it suggests the 6th Brigade had retaken Craters 4 and 5.163  
Statements of prisoners taken on 6 April clearly indicate the Germans 
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holding all four craters. The Canadian Corps intelligence summary for the 7 
April, however, assumed they were referring to the period before the craters 
were retaken by the 6th Brigade counterattacks.164 
The most powerful complaint used to assail Turner was the failure to 
properly interpret aerial photographs taken on 8 April.165 The photographs show 
Craters 2 to 5 are dry with trenches on the north lip of Craters 2 and 3, while 
most of the other craters were filled with water. This is the basis for critics to 
claim Turner should have realized the division did not hold the craters. There 
are three problems with this argument. First, the art of photo interpretation was 
still evolving and the division did not have a manual on how to analyse 
photos.166 Second, the corps passed the photographs to the 2nd Division and it is 
likely they would have analysed them first. As the corps did not raise any 
concerns, this would have influenced the division’s view, and suggests the corps 
shares in the culpability.167 Finally and most importantly, the 8 April photographs 
were not in themselves sufficient evidence to overturn the prevailing view. An 
officer needed to scout the craters held to see if they were dry as shown in the 
photographs. The trenches shown on the north lip of Craters 2 and 3 
corresponded to the positions reportedly captured by the 4th Brigade. Even 
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Lieutenant Vernon, who would have undoubtedly seen the photographs, did not 
recognise the discrepancy. The 16 April photographs were fundamentally 
different; as it was self-evident that the trenches at the crater edges were 
German, as they led back to German lines. This was not the case for the 8 April 
photographs. 
The problems with intelligence at St. Eloi are best understood in the 
context of the concepts of signal to noise ratio, confirmation bias, and irrational 
primacy effect. Roberta Wohlstetter first introduced the notion from the physical 
sciences of the signal to noise ratio, where a signal hides within the background 
noise of a system and is only explicable with the wisdom of hindsight.168 At St. 
Eloi, the flow of contradictory, incomplete, and inaccurate information made the 
true situation far less evident than it is to critics after the event. Confirmation 
bias, the human tendency to interpret ambiguous data to support a previously 
held belief and to dismiss or discount contradictory information, exacerbated the 
problem. Further, the irrational primacy effect places greater credence on 
information received initially. All this reinforced the comfortable illusion that the 
division was holding more ground than it actually was. It required unambiguous 
information, such as the reports from the engineering parties or the 16 April 
photographs, to overcome these biases. 
Where Turner, his staff, and the Canadian Corps can be censured is in not 
making extra-ordinary efforts to confirm reports from the field in light of the 
conditions and the earlier difficulties experienced by the 3rd British Division. The 
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staff needed to treat all reports with a degree of scepticism, especially positive 
ones. The division and corps staff were too inexperienced to realise how 
perverse and pervasive was the fog of war at St. Eloi. 
The factors of the ground conditions, intelligence failures, and 
consolidation and communication difficulties all played significant roles in the 
defeat at St. Eloi. The major reason 2nd Division failed at St. Eloi, however, were 
the Germans. As General George Pickett quipped when asked why his 
eponymous charge at Gettysburg failed, “I’ve always thought the Yankees had 
something to do with it.”169  
The German artillery dominated the battlespace. It is instructive to 
compare St. Eloi with the British offensive at the Somme on 1 July. At the 
Somme, the British massed 1,413 artillery pieces to bombard a 20,000 metre 
front to a depth of 2,500 metres.170 At St. Eloi, the 3rd British Division reported 
engaging forty German batteries or 160 guns on the first day of the battle. This is 
probably a conservative estimate of the guns available, as it does not include the 
very effective German Minenwerfers.171 Doubling the width and depth of the 
salient to account for the German interdiction fire, still meant the Germans 
concentrated over nine times the firepower available to the British at the 
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Somme.172 This, also, does not account for the German observation advantage, 
as Graham and Bidwell phrased it “effective fire was observed fire.”173 
There was apparently no shell shortage limiting the German fire. Snider of 
the 27th Battalion claimed the Germans pounded an area of 60 metres by 15 
metres with 900 High Explosive and 2000 other shells during the attack on 6 
April.174 A British artillery officer claimed he had not seen such heavy artillery 
fire, in a year in the Ypres Salient.175  
In contrast to the forty batteries supporting the Germans, the 2nd Division 
had twenty-three and half batteries on call and they were limited by restrictive 
daily shell allowances.176 Army commanders needed permission from GHQ to 
fire more than their per diem allotment. Given Plumer’s situation, he would not 
risk raising Haig’s ire by requesting more shells.177 During the battle, Plumer 
instructed the corps to curtail shell consumption and to only use one of the most 
effective pieces, the 6” Howitzer, in special circumstances.178 Aitken reported to 
Borden that the Canadian artillery daily allotment was three and half rounds per 
gun, while the Germans had an unlimited supply.179 The result was the German 
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artillery advantage was insurmountable.  
The German artillery destroyed the defences faster than the Canadians 
could build them. The 2nd Division assigned large working parties of up to 1,000 
men to consolidate the defences, but their efforts were stymied by three factors. 
First, the universal confusion of location and the impediments of mud and water 
slowed down the working parties, so they had to expend most of their energy 
and time in getting to their work location.180 This problem of transit time was 
exacerbated by the distance the reserve units were located from the front. The 
corps rebuffed attempts by the division to obtain more transportation.181 Finally, 
Canadian officers and NCOs were unable to get the same amount of work out of 
their troops, as did the Germans. Alderson’s replacement as GOC, Canadian 
Corps, Byng, claimed Canadians “will fight, and die, if necessary, in the last 
ditch, but by God, gentlemen, I cannot get them to dig that ditch.”182 Watson 
also complained that the Germans were able to get more work out of their 
troops.183 The Canadian Corps lamented in July 1916 that the Germans had done 
more work in their ten-day occupation of Mount Sorrel, despite Canadian 
artillery fire, than had the Canadians in two months of holding the position.184  
The German artillery’s constant interruption of communications 
contributed to the difficulty in managing the battle. The 6th Brigade Signal 
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Officer reported, on taking over the line, only a single line to the 27th Battalion 
and the division functioned. During the German counterattack, these lines were 
knocked out.185 Effectively, there were no links forward of the battalion 
headquarters. In order to provide some semblance of communications, 
commanders used runners, with many falling victim to German fire. Ketchen 
reported losing eighteen runners killed during the German counterattack.186 
Battalion scouts provided most of the runners, which prevented them from 
reconnoitring enemy positions, which further contributed to the intelligence 
failure.187  
Plumer’s plan was ill conceived and mismanagement compounded this. 
The fundamental flaw of Plumer’s plan was the Germans could bombard the 
attackers out of any position at St. Eloi, unless Plumer was able to commit far 
more artillery resources than were available to him. The German observation, 
artillery, and shell advantages meant overwhelming firepower superiority. No 
manner of brilliant leadership on the part of Haldane or Turner could overcome 
such a profound disadvantage.  
Plumer’s selection of the 3rd British Division could only be justified on the 
assumption that the Germans would accept the loss of the St. Eloi salient and not 
make strenuous efforts to recover the ground. Launching a division reduced to 
one effective brigade into a narrow salient, down a slope, and exposed to 
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observation and fire from three sides, in the extreme mud conditions was an 
imprudent decision. In addition, the placement of the mines was an error. All of 
which suggests that the Second Army leadership had not learned much from 
their experiences in 1915 and continued to make the same mistakes.188 
It is facile for historians to suggest a better general would have found a way 
to win without presenting a plausible alternative course of action. Turner took all 
the steps that could reasonably be expected in the situation. He presented, on 
three separate occasions, alternatives that Plumer rejected.189 Turner was denied 
necessary additional artillery and shell support. It is instructive to compare the 
situation at Mount Sorrel, only six weeks later, where there was an unlimited 
supply of artillery and shells for the battle, which played a material role in the 
Canadian success.190  
An intriguing notion is how committed was Turner to recapturing the 
strategically unimportant craters, once lost. From the start of the battle, Turner 
had serious reservations regarding the plan. The limited scope of the 
counterattacks and their frequent postponements and cancellations also points to 
a disinclination to fully commit to the craters’ recapture. This, and the relatively 
low loss rate of the division, suggests Turner was going through the motions to 
satisfy Alderson and Plumer without risking significant casualties. He may have 
been carrying out a senior officer version of the system described by Tony 
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Ashworth in Live and Let Live, also termed ‘consent and evade’ by Professor 
Gary Sheffield.191 This was the type of action that would leave no evidence and 
Turner could not admit to it during or after the war, but it is strongly suggestive 
that Turner was pulling his punches. 
Two contemporary witnesses support the notion that Turner was not fully 
dedicated to the recapture of the craters. Lieutenant Bradley, from Aitken’s 
Canadian War Records Office, who interviewed all of the participants 
immediately after the battle and was a perceptive observer, asked did “the 
Brigade and Divisional Commanders really grip the situation firmly, or were they 
halfhearted and unwilling to make great sacrifices to hold a line they thought, as 
Brig-Gen Ketchen did, untenable. I do not profess to answer these questions but 
I have doubts.”192 Alderson in his later adverse report on Turner indicated Turner 
did not have “‘the thing had got to be done’ spirit,” which strongly suggests 
Alderson recognised Turner’s efforts to retake the craters were a sham.193 
Hunt for Scapegoats 
What is extraordinary about the battle of St. Eloi Craters is that while a 
failure, it had no strategic or operational ramifications, but resulted in a 
remarkable number of officers being threatened with or losing their positions.194 
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Haig was still a relatively recent appointee and needed to demonstrate he was 
running a tight ship. In addition, he was concerned about the state of the army, 
as evidenced by his order to strengthen control, and he undoubtedly wanted to 
send a message that he would not tolerate failure. Haig proved to be ruthless in 
sacking commanders, with reportedly one hundred brigadiers removed during 
the war.195 Plumer was under even greater pressure, as he had to show Haig that 
if he could not win a battle, he could demonstrate a strong grip in the aftermath. 
As a result, there was a strong impetus to find scapegoats.196 
Even before the inquiry, the battle claimed its first commander with 
Ketchen’s relief of Snider. Snider’s error to thin out the front line positions, the 
withdrawal of a post without permission during the battle, and a breakdown in 
Snider’s health led to his relief on 14 April, along with his second in command, 
and all the company commanders.197 This indicates considerable dissatisfaction 
with the battalion and its command structure. Snider’s removal was unpopular 
with his troops but was necessary.198 Major G. Daly of the 31st Battalion, who 
had performed well during the battle, was tasked with rebuilding the battalion.199 
Alderson’s inquiry response, on 18 April, attributed the failure to the 
dreadful conditions and explained all the steps he took to ensure accurate 
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reporting. He also censured Turner’s method of consolidation, but demonstrating 
his passivity during the battle, he did not intervene and order a different 
approach. Alderson deeply regretted the failures and concluded, “I am of the 
opinion that it should not have taken 10 days for the division concerned to have 
ascertained the exact situation of its troops.”200 Clearly, Alderson was attempting 
to avoid blame for the failure. 
Turner had earlier voiced his dissatisfaction about Ketchen to Alderson and 
Watson. Alderson met Turner in the morning of 18 April and demanded Turner 
put these doubts into writing, which Alderson claimed he should have done 
earlier. Turner requested time to consider the matter. In the afternoon, when 
confronted again by Alderson, Turner admitted that he could not get as much 
out of the 6th Brigade as other units, but it did not justify Ketchen’s dismissal.201 
This took considerable courage on Turner’s part, as he would know his actions 
would likely lead to his dismissal.  
Alderson responded with a letter to the Second Army requesting Ketchen’s 
relief. Alderson claimed he had nothing against Ketchen, but he thought the 
brigade should have done more and it had generated the initial mistaken 
locations.202 Turner, when shown Alderson’s letter, wanted Alderson to rephrase 
a statement attributed to him. When Alderson refused, Turner replied, “I wish to 
protest most strongly against misrepresentations of my views in the matter.”203  
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Alderson also wrote an adverse report on Turner.204 Most historians suggest 
it resulted from Turner’s reaction to the Ketchen report. From its reference 
number, it appears Alderson sent or at least wrote this letter before Ketchen’s, 
indicating he was already planning to remove Turner.205 The language Alderson 
used in Turner’s letter was indirect and the charges vague. He made no specific 
complaints about Turner’s conduct of St. Eloi and in fact claimed it was 
insufficient grounds for Turner’s dismissal. Alderson based his request on his 
earlier adverse report on Turner in 1915 and that he would not be satisfied to 
place the 2nd Division in a difficult situation, unlike the 1st or 3rd Divisions. 
Plumer agreed and requested Haig dismiss Turner.206 
The next day, Turner, learning Plumer was to meet with him in the 
morning and knowing it meant his sacking, requested permission from the corps 
to visit Haig before any decision was rendered.207 He was refused, but moves by 
Aitken derailed Turner’s relief. News of the inquiry quickly reached Aitken. On 
17 April, Aitken’s representative at GHQ informed him that that blame may fall 
on ‘Brigadiers or higher.’208 Aitken’s contact at GHQ kept him fully informed of 
developments, and he reported to Hughes that Turner was at risk. He asked for 
directions from Hughes and Borden, so that he could make the appropriate 
                                            
204  Alderson to Second Army G271, 18 April 1916, WO 158/296, TNA. 
205  The Ketchen report is numbered G.284 and the Turner report is numbered G.271. Typically, 
the reference numbers are in sequential order. 
206 Haig Diary Entry, 21 April 1916, Part 1 No. 96, Part 1: Haig's Autograph Great War Diary, 
Haig Papers; National Library of Scotland. 
207  Turner to Canadian Corps, 19 April 1916, RG 9 III C1 v3842, LAC. 
208  The letter is unsigned but was most likely from Lieutenant-Colonel Manley Sims, Aitken’s 
representative at GHQ. Sims is discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7. Unknown to Aitken, 17 
April 1916, RG 9 III, D1 v4676, LAC. 
3 We Are in Desolate Places 
 135 
representations to the British authorities.209 
Knowing Hughes’ loathing of Alderson and Hughes’ appreciation of 
Turner, Aitken, who moved freely in the highest circles of British society, 
contacted members of the British Army Council to plead Turner’s case. Aitken 
counselled Borden, as early as December 1915 that trouble was brewing 
between Alderson and Turner.210 The repeated clashes of Hughes and Alderson 
over Alderson’s conduct of Second Ypres, the appointments of British officers to 
staff positions, and the battle over the Ross Rifle convinced Aitken that as he 
admitted to a subordinate “I fear Alderson must lose his command.”211 
Aitken positioned Turner’s removal to the Army Council members as 
exacerbating tensions between the Canadians and the British and was not 
favoured by the Canadian government. He may have also argued that Alderson 
was prejudiced against Turner. The Army Council passed these concerns to 
Haig, who being far more responsive to Dominion sensibilities than is generally 
credited, decided to retain Turner and reserve his decision on Ketchen. Haig 
wrote in his diary, on 21 April, that the two officers were ‘not very efficient;’ in 
fact he called them incompetent. His reasoning, nonetheless, was that there was 
no Canadian officer with sufficient experience and knowledge to replace Turner, 
and he did not want to upset the Canadians.212 One interesting aspect of this 
analysis is Haig’s implicit assumption that only a Canadian officer would 
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command a Canadian division.213 
Both Turner and Ketchen continued to work their contacts to save their 
careers. Ketchen protested Alderson’s adverse report and refuted its claims to 
Turner. Alderson’s disparagement of his men particularly incensed him.214 
Ketchen contacted his political protector, Robert Rogers, to ask for the 4th 
Division or the command of the Canadian Training Division at Shorncliffe.215 He 
knew of the manoeuvres to displace the incumbent at Shorncliffe.216 
Turner wrote Aitken explaining that St. Eloi was the result of the “ill advised 
operation of exploding the mines on a narrow front; pulling out the Vth Corps 
before the line had been consolidated, and establishing such an acute salient, on 
which the enemy could concentrate all his artillery fire.”217 He had also passed 
Alderson and Harington’s commiseration letters to Aitken, which angered both, as 
they regarded the letters as private and probably because it exposed Alderson’s 
hypocrisy in calling for Turner’s removal.218 Turner pointed out that Alderson 
made no direct charges and had not showed Turner his earlier adverse report, as 
required. Turner was enraged by Alderson’s attack on his men; calling it a ‘base 
charge.’  
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Turner also instigated one and possibly two additional actions to save his 
career. In a letter shortly after the armistice, William Hughes, Sam Hughes’ 
brother and commander of the 21st Battalion at St. Eloi, referred to a political 
mission he carried out for Turner during the engagement. He claimed, “I fixed 
the matter very effectively.”219 Turner possibly sent Hughes to Aitken to arm him 
with the information on the battle needed to defend Turner’s position. The 
second possible instance was Colonel E.W.B. Morrison, the 2nd Division CRA, 
sending a trusted staff officer to England to discuss ‘current events’ that Morrison 
did not want to put into writing.220  
Aitken travelled to Haig’s headquarters on 23 April to save Turner – he was 
unaware of Haig’s early decision to retain Turner.221 Aitken informed Haig that 
Borden would consider it a personal favour to keep Turner, but would accept 
Haig’s decision. Haig agreed to save Turner, but it was apparent that Alderson 
and Turner could not both remain in the Canadian Corps. Haig demanded the 
Canadian authorities find a way of disposing of Alderson that was not demeaning. 
Haig was not prepared to sack Alderson, but neither was he willing to employ 
Alderson elsewhere in France. Haig’s actions demonstrate Haig’s lack of 
confidence in Alderson dating back to the clashes at Festubert. If Haig had 
respected Alderson’s abilities, he would have found him a command. One of 
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Haig’s concerns throughout the war was the supply of competent divisional and 
corps commanders, so bypassing Alderson was clear evidence of Haig’s opinion 
of him.222  
Aitken’s solution was to appoint Alderson the Inspector-General of 
Canadian forces in England.223 It had the merit of appearing to be a meaningful 
position and a lateral move. It would also seemingly, address problems in the 
administration and organisation of Canadian forces in England.224 Haig 
recommended Alderson accept the offer, and Alderson interpreted it as an 
order.225 Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, who would have a positive effect on 
the corps and Turner’s relationship with the Canadian Corps, replaced Alderson 
on 28 May.226 Byng and his impact will be introduced in more detail in Chapter 
4.  
Alderson treated his role as Inspector-General seriously and diligently 
identified myriad problems with the Canadian training organisation in England. 
He did not realise that the position was a sinecure and that the Canadian 
authorities in England, who all owed their positions to Sam Hughes, were hostile 
to Alderson’s findings.227 As a result, Alderson transferred back to the British 
Army in September 1916 and continued to serve in England, as an Inspector-
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General.228 
Turner learned from Aitken on 27 April that he was safe.229 Turner, 
however, was not convinced and was still expressing concern in early May that 
“action is being delayed too long as regard Alderson.”230 Turner unfairly blamed 
Alderson for a lack of support during the battle.231 Alderson had tried to arrange 
for extra resources and presented Turner’s alternatives to the high command, but 
Alderson’s lack of credibility meant his requests were denied. Turner’s anger was 
misplaced, and he continued to carry a grudge against Alderson for the rest of 
his life.232 Regarding Alderson, Turner claimed, “I am not easily made angry, but 
I am slow to forget.”233 He refused to shake Alderson’s hand in the presence of 
Perley during a later attempted reconciliation.234 Alderson, on the other hand, 
remained a gentleman and wrote a note congratulating Turner on receiving his 
knighthood in 1917.235 Turner did not acknowledge it. 
Alderson provided useful service in preparing the 1st Division for its initial 
battle but was miscast in his dual responsibilities as a combat commander and 
head of a national contingent. Whether because of age or incapacity, Alderson 
was not a success as a divisional or corps commander, as demonstrated by the 
lack of trust placed in him by his superiors. He lacked the political sense or 
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sagacity to deal with the mercurial Sam Hughes, unlike Byng. Alderson faced the 
challenges of satisfying two different masters – GHQ and Sam Hughes – and he 
failed at both. He was also at times unfair and underhanded in his treatment of 
Turner, such as not showing the earlier adverse report. 
If Turner could not be touched, Ker his GSO 1 could, and Lieutenant-
Colonel Norman ‘Ox’ Webber replaced Ker on 24 May.236 Ker said of Turner, “I 
am more sorry than I can say, to leave the Canadians, and particularly General 
Turner.”237 Turner, in his typical way of looking out for his subordinates, later 
requested Carson help out Ker by moving Ker’s effects to England from Canada. 
Webber was a thirty-five year old British psc officer, who greatly improved 
the 2nd Division and must receive some of the credit for its increased 
effectiveness at the Somme. Unlike Ker, who at times micro-managed the 
brigades, Webber was efficient, organised, and struck the right balance between 
control and initiative.238 Webber did so well that he became the Canadian Corps 
BGGS in April 1918.239 
Turner later claimed he replaced the battalion commanders of the 18th, 
19th, 26th, and 27th Battalions, because of St. Eloi.240 This is somewhat 
disingenuous, as Alderson was responsible for writing the adverse report on 
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Lieutenant-Colonel J. McAvity of the 26th Battalion on 6 May that resulted in 
McAvity’s return to Canada.241 Lieutenant-Colonel E. Wigle of the 18th Battalion 
returned to Canada after his wife was diagnosed with cancer, leaving him to 
care for a young family.242 Hughes recalled Lieutenant-Colonel J. McLaren of the 
19th Battalion to Canada for instructional duties, but this was probably a cover 
for his relief.243 It is likely Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. Tobin, of the 29th Battalion, 
was relieved at the same time as McLaren, as Tobin transferred to England and 
held no important position there.244 
The search for scapegoats was not restricted to just Canadians. Haig was 
already dissatisfied with Fanshawe and Haldane, and he pressured Fanshawe to 
dismiss Haldane. Fanshawe refused, and Haig removed Fanshawe instead.245 
Haig explained, as he could not remove Turner, someone else needed to pay the 
price.246 This speaks to Tim Travers’ notion of the ‘almost ritualistic quality’ of 
dismissals.247  
Haig decided to retain Plumer, but he was not satisfied with the operations 
of the Second Army and removed Plumer’s chief staff officer, Major-General 
H.B. Williams. Williams’ replacement was Harington, the Canadian Corps’ 
BGGS, who “was probably the biggest single factor in creating its [Second 
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Army’s] particular ethos and widespread reputation for operational efficiency.”248 
A combination of Sam Hughes’ faith in Turner, Hughes’ loathing of 
Alderson, the lack of an obvious replacement, and Turner’s own marshalling of 
Canadian political support, saved his career.249 Turner demonstrated he was an 
accomplished military politician in his campaign to retain his division. Turner’s 
actions were consistent with the contemporary ethos of leveraging political 
contacts in the Canadian Militia. 
Should Turner have been removed? If Turner and Ketchen had been in a 
British division, Haig would have undoubtedly sacked them. Their removal, 
however, would be as scapegoats and not because of their failures. As Alderson 
put it, the St. Eloi operations were not a sufficient reason to remove Turner.250 
Turner was responsible but not culpable for the failure at St. Eloi. As the 
divisional commander, Turner bears responsibility for the battle, but he took all 
the reasonable steps available to salvage an unwinnable engagement. The errors 
in the reported position of the division were unfortunate but explicable given the 
conditions. It is difficult to plausibly argue that any other divisional commander 
given the conditions and the relatively raw state of the 2nd Division would have 
done much better. The failure lies with Plumer and his staff in launching such an 
ill-considered action. 
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Ross Rifle 
There was one last clash with Alderson over Turner’s support of the Ross 
Rifle. The fundamental problem of the Ross Rifle was that it had a tendency to 
jam, especially in bad conditions or if fired rapidly. The British standard rifle, the 
Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE), was more resistant to jamming in poor 
conditions or with low-tolerance ammunition than was the Ross Rifle.251 Sam 
Hughes headed the committee that selected the Ross, and he continued to play a 
central role in its evolution.252 As a result, Hughes believed in its superiority, and 
its success at the Bisley rifle matches further reinforced Hughes’ belief.253  
Turner was a staunch defender of the Ross, unlike the other divisional 
commanders. Turner worked hard to convince the division of its efficacy 
through trials, training by the divisional Armourer officer, and banning the SMLE, 
but his efforts were insufficient to change the prevailing view.254 Turner’s support 
was a combination of reaction to Alderson’s disdain for the weapon, a belief that 
British officers had a bias against Canadian products, the desire to loyally 
support the Government’s policy, and the need to sustain the Minister, who 
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supported him.255 This last factor became especially important after St. Eloi. 
Sir John French ordered the 1st Division to convert to the SMLE in June 
1915, because of the problems at Second Ypres. The 2nd Division crossed to 
France with the Ross, because the British could not provide sufficient SMLEs 
without delaying the division’s crossing.256 Alderson wanted the Ross replaced 
and he and Hughes engaged in a bitter battle over it.257 In the aftermath of St. 
Eloi, Alderson astutely arranged to get the unfettered opinion of the commanding 
officers for indisputable evidence of the dissatisfaction with the Ross.258 The 2nd 
Division’s response gave at best an equivocal reaction to the questions, with the 
company commanders more opposed than the senior ones.259 There is, however, 
strong evidence that Turner, after viewing the initial opinions, placed pressure 
on his commanders to make the results more favourable.260 With Alderson’s 
removal, the file passed to Haig, who ordered the SMLE replace the Ross, 
because of the troops’ lack of confidence in it.261 
Turner was in a difficult situation between the need for the Minister’s 
unqualified support to retain his position and the evident loss of faith in the Ross 
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Rifle. It was, however, at this point that Turner’s actions are no longer defensible 
in the guise of defending the Government’s policy. Regardless of the relative 
merits or demerits of the Ross, the fact that the majority of the men had lost 
confidence in it, meant it had to be replaced. Turner’s continued attempts to 
sway the results were a serious lapse of judgement and a failure of character. 
Turner’s career was saved but blighted. Under a far more effective and 
sympathetic Canadian Corps commander, in Byng, and with a superior GSO 1, in 
Ox Webber, Turner would significantly improve the effectiveness of the 2nd 
Division. This increased efficiency would culminate in Turner’s greatest victory as 
a commander, the Battle of Courcelette, on the Somme. Turner’s actions leading 
up to Courcelette, the battle, and follow-on engagements are the subject of the 
next chapter. 
 4  
‘WON BY MY INFANTRY:’ 
TURNER’S SOMME CAMPAIGN 
 
Too much credit must not be placed on to the tanks yet. Courcelette 
was won by my infantry. 
R.E.W. Turner, 17 September 19161 
 
 
Turner and the 2nd Division won the principal Canadian victory in the 
Somme campaign at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September 1916. 
Showing marked prowess, efficiency, and fieldcraft, the division repelled a 
German attack, captured all of its objectives, and then successfully launched 
an ordered follow-on assault that same day capturing the village of 
Courcelette. This was in a campaign where orders for successful assaults 
normally required a minimum of twelve to twenty-four hours to pass from a 
corps to the front-line forces.2 Courcelette, a ‘forgotten victory,’ demonstrated 
Turner’s maturation as a combat commander, ability to prepare his division 
for the Somme, and improved battle management.3 Turner’s development of 
the division is why the Germans rated the 2nd Division, prior to the Somme, as 
one of the top eight divisions in the British Army.4 This chapter will examine 
the training leading to the battle, the victory, and the two less successful 
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attacks on 26 September and 1 October. It will also analyse Turner’s 
decisions, the factors leading to the victory, and the reasons for the successful 
operations. 
Command Changes 
In the aftermath of St. Eloi, Turner was in a difficult position, as he had 
little recourse if confronted with a duty to make the right choices versus his 
obligation to Sam Hughes. The peculiar case of the thwarted promotion of 
William Hughes, Sam Hughes’ brother and commander of the 21st Battalion, 
highlights this problem.5 On 19 or 20 April, Turner discovered Lieutenant-
Colonel Hughes had withdrawn the 21st Battalion from Crater 1 and the 
nearby trenches, believing them indefensible. Turner immediately ordered 
Hughes to re-occupy the positions, and Turner wrote an adverse report on 
Hughes. Turner did not need any further failures to tarnish his reputation.6 
Subsequently, Haig rejected Hughes’ June nomination to command the 10th 
Brigade, because of Turner’s adverse report.7 Turner’s volte-face incensed 
Carson, as earlier; Turner had confirmed Hughes was the best battalion 
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(Stephen J. Nichol, 2008), 70. 
6  Sims to Aitken, 16 June 1916, A1765, MG 27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds; LAC. A senior British 
officer had complained to the Corps about the 2nd Division’s discipline and appearance in the 
camps after St. Eloi. Maj-Gen Chichester DA & QMG to Cdn Corps, 28 April 1916, Folder 
1/File 8, RG 9 III C3 v4118, LAC. In addition, Harington sent a scathing letter to the 2nd 
Division about the poor performance of the 6th Brigade in its counterattacks on 19 and 20 
April. Harington to 2nd Canadian Division, G.305, 20 April 1916, RG 24 v6992, LAC. 
7  Francis Davie Military Secretary to Carson, 8 June 1916, 8-5-8F, RG 9 III A1 v44, LAC. 
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commander in the 4th Brigade.8 Carson complained Turner had “certainly 
burned his boats behind him with that statement.”9  
Carson asked Turner in a veiled threat why he had changed his mind.10 
Turner reversed his opinion again; claiming that while he was displeased with 
Hughes over the incident, Hughes’s subsequent performance was significantly 
better, and Hughes now deserved the appointment.11 Hughes received the 
10th Brigade in July 1916.12 Turner’s explanation of his reversal was somewhat 
plausible, but more likely Carson’s pressure changed Turner’s attitude. It is 
unlikely Hughes’ ensuing performance was so noteworthy that it was 
sufficient to overcome his earlier failure. This illustrates one of Turner’s flaws 
in buckling under political pressure. 
On 17 April, Watson left the division to take command of the 4th 
Division in England.13 In Watson’s place, Alderson selected Archibald Hayes 
Macdonell, nicknamed ‘Long Archie’ to distinguish him from his cousin, 
Archibald Cameron Macdonell, later commander of the 1st Division. What 
was intriguing was that Alderson did not believe any battalion commander in 
                                            
8  Turner rated Hughes second after Lieutenant-Colonel J. Embury of the 28th Battalion in the 6th 
Brigade for promotion to Brigade GOC. Turner to Carson, 23 March 1916, 8 8-1-70, RG 9 III 
A1 v31, LAC. 
9  Carson to Aitken, 9 June 1916, 8-5-8F, RG 9 III A1 v44, LAC. 
10  Carson to Turner, 12 June 1916, 8-5-8F, RG 9 III A1 v44, LAC. 
11  Turner to Carson, 15 June 1916, RG 9 III A1 v154, LAC. 
12  Watson, then the 4th Division commander, sacked Hughes shortly after Sam Hughes resigned 
as the Minister of Militia in November 1916. 2nd Division A&Q War Diary, 14 July 1916, RG 
9 III D3 v4848, LAC; Watson to Perley, 26 November 1916, v7/File 3, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, 
Perley Fonds; LAC. William Hughes was bitter about the removal, but was unable to secure 
another position, and the Canadian authorities returned him to Canada. W. Hughes to Turner, 
24 January 1919, MG 30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds; LAC; Return of Officers Who Have Served 
Overseas with No Employment Available, AG 1a 7-3-18, 0-76-33 v1, RG 9 III B1 v2885, LAC. 
13  2nd Division A&Q War Diary, 17 April 1916, RG 9 III D3 v4848, LAC. 
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the 2nd Division was suitable for promotion.14 Long Archie was a PF officer 
with twenty-seven years experience in the Canadian military. He served in 
South Africa and later West Africa – earning a DSO. He was a Camberley 
trained staff officer and was the GSO 2 in Military District 1, at the start of the 
war.15 He took over command of the RCR in England and took them to 
France, as part of the 3rd Division.16 He later earned Currie’s ire, with Currie 
removing him in July 1917, ostensibly because of exhaustion.17 
The division went to the Somme five months later with a significantly 
different command structure than at St. Eloi. Six of the twelve battalion 
commanders were new, as was a brigade commander and the GSO 1. The 4th 
Brigade experienced the greatest turnover, with three of the four battalion 
commanders replaced after St. Eloi, and Turner wanted the one holdover, 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Rogers of the 20th Battalion, transferred as well. Turner 
tried having him replaced in April 1916, because of Roger’s repeated leaves 
during operations, including during St. Eloi.18 In August, Turner again 
complained to Carson about Rogers’ incessant solicitation for a promotion and 
asked if there were a training brigade in England for Rogers. If Ketchen were 
sacked, Turner wanted Lieutenant-Colonel J. Embury of the 28th Battalion 
                                            
14  Subsequently, four of the battalion commanders in the 2nd Division at that time – Bell, 
Embury, Hughes, and Tremblay – commanded brigades in the Canadian Corps. 
15  Defence, The Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to June 30, 1914): 
11, 413. 
16  Biography AH Macdonell, Folder 144/File 10, RG 9 III D1 v4734, LAC. 
17  Currie complained about the 5th Brigade not knowing its position at Arleux on 28 April 1917. 
Currie’s comment was “Long Archie wrong as usual.” Currie Diary Entry, 28 April 1917, MG 
30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds; LAC. Macdonell’s removal caused a minor stir as Turner asked that 
Macdonell received a position in Canada, in consideration of his long service. There were no 
positions available, and he retired. Macdonell Correspondence File, 10-MC-37, RG 9 III A1 
v306, LAC. 
18  Turner to Carson, 15 April 1916, 6-R-13, RG 9 III A1 v205, LAC. 
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promoted and not Rogers.19 Turner tried to complete the task of cleaning out the 
dead wood in the division, but there was no position in England for Rogers.20 
Figure 10 2nd Division Command Changes – September 1915/November 1916 
Position Officer Fate 
GSO 1 Lieutenant-Colonel H. De Pree Transferred 
GSO 1 Lieutenant-Colonel C. Ker Transferred* 
4th Brigade GOC Brigadier-General Lord Brooke Transferred* 
5th Brigade GOC Brigadier-General D. Watson Promoted 
18th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel E. Wigle Compassionate 
– Lieutenant-Colonel H. Milligan Compassionate 
19th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel J. McLaren Removed 
20th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel C. Rogers Transferred* 
21st Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hughes Promoted 
22nd Battalion Colonel F. Gaudet Removed 
– Lieutenant-Colonel T. Tremblay Injured 
24th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel J. Gunn Transferred* 
25th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel G. LeCain Removed 
26th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel J. McAvity Removed 
27th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel J. Snider Removed 
28th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel J. Embury Wounded21 
29th Battalion Lieutenant-Colonel H. Tobin Transferred* 
– Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tait Injured22 
*Indicates a case where the transfer was a removal but in a politically expedient fashion. 
 
The 2nd Division was indirectly involved in the engagement at Mount 
Sorrel in June 1916 that so battered the 3rd Division. This action could be 
used to criticise Turner for the loss of more ground. To free up units for a 
planned counterattack, Byng assigned the 6th Brigade to the 3rd Division, and 
                                            
19  Turner to Carson, 21 August 1916, 6-E-45, RG 9 III A1 v142, LAC. 
20  Turner had Rogers transferred to England in November 1916. 
21  Calder, The History of the 28th (Northwest) Battalion, C. E. F. (October 1914-June 1919) from 
the Memoirs of Brigadier General Alexander Ross: 89. 
22  H.R.N. Clynne, Vancouver's 29th  (Tobin's Tigers Association, 1964), 17. 
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it replaced the 7th Brigade in line on the night of 5/6 June.23 At 2:00 p.m. on 6 
June, the Germans fired four mines under the front-line of the 28th Battalion, 
annihilating the defenders.24 The Germans seized 60 metres of the Canadian 
front-line with a mass-formation attack supported by a powerful barrage. Rifle 
and machine gun fire from the few survivors in the front-line and from reserve 
positions stopped the Germans and inflicted heavy casualties. The attack on 
the 31st Battalion failed entirely, but the two front-line battalions, the 28th and 
31st, suffered sizeable losses.25 Byng, who was more pragmatic than Alderson, 
decided against retaking the position.26 What is sometimes overlooked in the 
description of this engagement was that the 6th Brigade was under the 
command of the 3rd Division and not Turner. 
Preparing for the Onslaught 
Turner and the division spent the summer preparing for the likely 
commitment of the Canadian Corps to the Somme campaign. Turner ordered 
a rigorous training program, instituted an aggressive raiding policy, and the 
division received supernumerary officer reinforcements.  
All units in reserve conducted training, with the 24th Battalion spending 
                                            
23  The two battalions of the 6th Brigade, the 28th and 31st Battalions, replaced four battalions of 
the 7th Brigade. 
24  Calder, The History of the 28th (Northwest) Battalion, C. E. F. (October 1914-June 1919) from 
the Memoirs of Brigadier General Alexander Ross: 68. 
25  The 6th Brigade reported suffering losses of 10 officers and 307 men. The 28th Battalion’s 
regimental history reported losses of 300 men in the battle. 6th Brigade War Diary, 6 June 
1916, RG 9 III D3 v4888, LAC; Calder, The History of the 28th (Northwest) Battalion, C. E. F. 
(October 1914-June 1919) from the Memoirs of Brigadier General Alexander Ross: 72. 
26  Campbell, "The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.: A Social and Operational History of the 
2nd Canadian Division, 1915-1918," 158-159. 
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nine days in July undergoing intense instruction.27 The division ordered each 
brigade to send 200 men for a Lewis Gun course and 8 NCOs and 32 other 
ranks for a Trench Mortar course.28 In expectation of heavy officer losses, 
each battalion received fourteen supernumerary subalterns in July and 
August.29 Turner also held two conferences with his principal staff officers, 
advisors, and brigadiers on 2 and 8 August to further preparation and training 
for the offensive.30 
As always, Turner continued his early morning inspections of the trenches, 
and he was systematic and organised while doing so. He took down reminders 
in a notebook during these tours, and he or his staff would follow up on the 
resulting tasks, orders, and observations.31 
The new corps commander, Byng, was an ideal fit for the Canadian 
Corps and played a critical role in its development. Born the seventh son of 
the second Earl of Strafford in 1862, Byng joined the Militia in 1879, because 
a shortage of funds did not allow him to join the Regular Army.32 An offer 
from the Prince of Wales resulted in Byng’s transfer to the prestigious 10th 
Royal Hussars, in 1883. He served in India, the Sudan, and in South Africa; 
                                            
27  R. C. (Robert Collier) Fetherstonhaugh, 1892-1949., The 24th Battalion, C.E.F., Victoria Rifles of 
Canada, 1914-1919  (Montreal: Gazette Print. Co.,, 1930), 70. 
28  2nd Canadian Division, RO 2642, 10 August 1916, RG 9 III B3 v3789, LAC. 
29  This was a policy for all the divisions in the Canadian Corps. Supernumerary officers were an 
addition to the normal officer complement of a battalion. Carson to Major-General R.W. 
Wigham, July 31 1916, 8-1-87c, RG 9 III A1 v34, LAC. The division received reinforcements of 
ninety-nine officers in July and ninety-eight in August, when it averaged only twenty-eight per 
month in the previous two months. 2nd Division A&Q War Diary, July and August 1916, RG 9 
III D3 v4848, LAC. 
30  2nd Division GS War Diary, 2 and 8 August 1916, RG 9 III D3 v4844, LAC. 
31  F. F. Montague Comments, 19710147-015/DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.14, Turner Fonds; CWM. 
32  Byng’s father while wealthy believed himself unable to support another son in the military. 
Jeffery Williams, Byng of Vimy, General and Governor General  (Secker & Warburg, 1983), 4-
6. 
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where he raised and successfully commanded a regiment of colonial 
irregulars. He graduated from the staff college in 1894. After the Boer War, he 
commanded a cavalry regiment, cavalry brigade, and a Territorial division. 
He led the 3rd Cavalry Division in the opening stages of the war and later the 
Cavalry Corps, the IX Corps at Gallipoli, and the XVII Corps on the Western 
Front. He enjoyed considerable success in all of his positions, including the 
casualty-free evacuation from Gallipoli. His experiences with the colonial 
irregulars, the Territorial division, and command on the Western Front 
resulted in a uniquely qualified officer to deal with the special circumstances 
of the Canadian Corps.33  
Byng did not fit the stereotype of a conventional blue-blood British 
officer, with his rumpled appearance, hands in his pockets, and a casual 
demeanour that suited Canadian sensibilities.34 Photographs, however, show 
the intensity that was behind the façade of affability. He had an incisive mind, 
self-confidence, strong political skills, and ruthlessness when necessary. He 
placed his stamp on the Canadian Corps and worked effectively to rid it of 
political influence, the divisional cliques, and infighting that Alderson had 
been unable to correct.35 Byng played a decisive role in the increasing 
capability and effectiveness of the Canadian Corps.36 
He was successful in navigating the intricacies of a national contingent 
                                            
33  For Byng’s only biography, see ibid; "Sir Julian Byng,"  in Oxford Dictionary Of National 
Biography : In Association With The British Academy: From The Earliest Times To The Year 
2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
34  Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916: 345. 
35  Radley, We Lead, Others Follow : First Canadian Division 1914-1918: 160. 
36  For more see, Brennan, "Julian Byng and Leadership in the Canadian Corps." 
4 Won By My Infantry 
 154 
and dealing with GHQ and Sam Hughes. Byng was able to exploit Sam 
Hughes’s soft spot for aristocrats to win him over and thus avoid the conflict 
with Canadian authorities that characterised Alderson’s regime.37 One of 
Byng’s first actions was to declare that he was not going to respond to any of 
Carson’s letters, unless they came through official channels.38 He also 
affirmed that he was going to be responsible for recommendations for 
appointments and promotions.39 These steps significantly reduced Hughes’ 
ability to interfere in the corps.  
In response to Haig’s demands for forces outside of the Somme front to 
maintain pressure on the Germans, Turner ordered each battalion to plan and 
conduct one raid during each front-line rotation. Each battalion was 
responsible for developing the plan and presenting it to the brigade for 
approval.40 This decision is of interest because of its consequences and 
nature. According to David Campbell, the units of the 2nd Division planned 
twenty-five raids, with twenty-two attempted and eleven rated as completely 
or partially successful. The losses suffered were approximately fifty-seven with 
only three dead and two missing, so the loss rate was not prohibitive.41 Raids 
were controversial as to their utility.42 Raids could be costly, and the losses 
                                            
37  Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 154. 
38  Carson wrote the Corps commanders repeatedly with demands and requests from Hughes and 
others. See RG 9 III A1 v109-240 
39  Sims to Aitken, 8 June 1916, A1765, MG 27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds; LAC. 
40  Raids, GS 1096, 6 August 1916, Folder 43 File 1, RG 9 III C3 v4098, LAC. 
41  Campbell, "The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.: A Social and Operational History of the 
2nd Canadian Division, 1915-1918," 168-169. 
42  Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918: 61. For a favourable 
assessment of raiding, see Garnett, "Butcher and Bolt: Canadian Trench Raiding During the 
Great War, 1915-1918." 
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disproportionally fell upon the most aggressive elements in a battalion. 
Constant raiding would increase German alertness levels, resulting in higher 
losses and exhausted units. On the other hand, raids inflicted casualties on 
the Germans and captured prisoners. Most importantly, they helped train 
units in battle preparation, all-arms coordination, and conducting 
operations.43 In the case of the 2nd Division, these raids were beneficial in 
developing the combat readiness of the battalions with minimal losses. 
The other aspect of the raiding policy was Turner’s determination to 
push down the planning responsibility to the battalion, which ran counter to 
Haig’s strictures of tighter control over subordinates. There was a tension in 
the British Army at this point in the war, between the instructions of the FSR 
and the reality of a ‘top down’ prescriptive command policy in some 
formations.44 FSR stipulated superiors were to dictate the objective, but 
subordinates determined the means to achieving it. The rapid expansion of 
the BEF and CEF resulted in unqualified commanders and staff – a problem 
especially prevalent in the Canadian Corps. Some superiors, as a result, were 
loath to give subordinates too much responsibility.45 Some senior 
commanders, such as General Sir Hubert Gough, commander of the Reserve 
Army at the Somme, were prone to dictate and micro-manage subordinates, 
                                            
43  Turner’s view in his notes for preparing for the Somme was consolidation was the most 
challenging aspect of the attack, but raids taught little about consolidation. Notes on Fighting 
in Somme, 21 August 1916, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
44  Gary Sheffield, "An Army Commander on the Somme: Hubert Gough," in Gary Sheffield and 
Daniel Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army's 
Experience, 1914-1918 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), 84; Ian F.W. Beckett, "Hubert Gough, 
Neil Malcolm and Command on the Western Front," in Brian Bond (ed.), Look to Your Front : 
Studies in the First World War (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), 7-8. 
45  Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory: 34. 
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because of this lack of confidence.46  
The division pulled out of the line starting 24 August and moved to 
training areas to ready for the Somme offensive. The 2nd Division had the 
opportunity to prepare thoroughly for its first battle at the Somme, unlike the 
unfortunate divisions that attacked on 1 July and that did not have sufficient 
training time.47  
Turner assembled notes on preparation for the Somme that Webber, the 
new GSO 1, converted into an eight-page set of instructions for company 
commanders showing Turner’s intelligent steps to prepare his division.48 
Turner’s handwritten notes were based on a visit to the Somme, after-action 
reports and lessons learned from brigades, divisions, and corps engaged at the 
Somme.49 Turner also visited the Australian Corps to learn of their experiences 
on 26 August.50 Turner’s instructions emphasised the need for initiative and 
bold leadership, as the battle was now a mix of trench and semi-open 
warfare. The critical factor was getting troops to the enemy lines before the 
German artillery intervened. Troops were to reach the German lines just as 
the barrage jumped. Units were to plan for a maximum of three waves in an 
attack, with the first wave going to the final objective. The instructions 
reflected Turner’s pragmatic and practical orientation and bias to 
                                            
46  Sheffield, "An Army Commander on the Somme: Hubert Gough," 82-83. 
47  Major-General Ivor Maxse, GOC 18th Division, complained that his unit was unable to train 
before 1 July 1916, because of the time spent on labour details. Byrson, "The Once and Future 
Army," 48. 
48  Notes on Fighting in Somme, 21 August 1916, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
49  The notes show the source of the information in the margins. Handwritten Notes on Lessons 
from Somme, Undated, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
50  Turner Diary Entry, 26 August 1916, 19710147-001/ DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.1, Turner Fonds; 
CWM. 
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decentralisation. Webber issued further instructions on 25 August that training 
was to build progressively from section to company with attention to 
musketry, route marching, and training of Lewis Gun teams. In recognition of 
the limitations of signalling technology, each battalion was to train additional 
runners.51 A critical aspect of this training was the opportunity for all levels of 
the organisation to train under the officers that would lead them into battle.52  
Byng was more involved in lower-level training than was Alderson. He 
met with all the brigade and battalion commanders on 29 August and 
manoeuvred ‘B’ Company of the 28th Battalion to demonstrate what he 
expected.53 The training was advanced in several respects. The exercises 
simulated losses amongst officers and NCOs to engender initiative and give 
leadership experience to junior NCOs and even privates. The training 
emphasised troops advancing to their objective and fighting on regardless of 
officer and NCOs losses.54 Another noteworthy change was as one soldier 
later remembered  
This was the first time that the rank and file had been fully briefed as to what 
was expected, so we felt encouraged as senior divisional officers took part in 
the exercise and gave confidence that the preparations were so thorough that 
the prospect of the attack a few days hence did not seem at all frightening.55 
 
Tactics were simplified and reduced to an advance in waves following 
as close as possible to the creeping barrage. Some senior British commanders, 
                                            
51  2nd Canadian Division G.930, 25 August 1916, Folder 46/File 1, RG 9 III C3 v4114, LAC. 
52  Hew Strachan, "Training, Morale and Modern War," Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2 
(2006): 216. 
53  Calder, The History of the 28th (Northwest) Battalion, C. E. F. (October 1914-June 1919) from 
the Memoirs of Brigadier General Alexander Ross: 85. 
54  Campbell, "A Forgotten Victory: Courcelette, 15 September 1916," 28. 
55  Mcintrye Hood Interview, Transcript 76/169/1, IWM, 8. 
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especially in the Reserve Army, thought ‘Fire and Movement’ tactics were 
beyond the capabilities of the Kitchener divisions and mandated linear tactics 
– which would apply to the Canadian divisions, as well.56 The attack was 
subordinated to the artillery plan, whose primary objective was to destroy the 
enemy.57 As Bidwell and Graham put it, fire effect was achieved through 
“quantity not quality of fire.”58 The creeping barrage regulated the infantry 
advance, so the infantry could progress only as fast and as far as the barrage 
could take it. Losing the barrage was usually fatal to an attack.  
Mark Humphries questions the notion of a significant difference in the 
training for the Somme or Vimy Ridge. He argues the training prior to the 
Somme demonstrated many of the characteristics of the instruction prior to 
Vimy Ridge, such as progressive training, informing troops of their objectives, 
and simulating losses of leaders.59 In one crucial aspect – platoons – the pre-
Somme instruction differed fundamentally from Vimy. At the Somme, the 
company was the primary fighting formation, while at Vimy, the fundamental 
combat unit was the all-arms platoon. At the Somme, specialists were still a 
significant portion of the fighting strength of the battalion and did not slot into 
the platoon structure. For instance, a sample attack formation for training 
                                            
56  John A. English, "Perspectives on Infantry" (Masters, Royal Military College of Canada, 1981). 
For an example of the Reserve Army’s views on tactics, see Handwritten Notes on Lessons from 
Somme, Undated, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
57  William Sanders Marble, "The Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less: The Place of the Artillery in 
the BEF, 1914-1918" (PhD, King's College, London, 1998), 45. 
58  Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of 
War, 1904-1945  (London ; Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 114. 
59  Mark Osborne Humphries, "Myth of the Learning Curve: Tactics and Training in the 12th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, 1916-1918," Canadian Military History 14, no. 4 (2005). See also 
Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-18  
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 26, 62. 
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shows company and battalion bombers as separate from the normal 
organisation.60  
Overall, despite the simple tactics taught, Turner and the division were 
far better prepared for the challenges at the Somme than for St. Eloi, and their 
performance at Courcelette demonstrated the progress. 
Apotheosis: Courcelette 15 September  
The 2nd Division attack was part of a much larger assault, known as the 
Flers-Courcelette offensive, stretching across a sixteen kilometre front and 
involving both the Reserve and Fourth Armies.61 Since the initial attack on 1 
July, the British had ground through, at great cost, the German First and 
Second Positions, with each position a complex of trenches and strongpoints 
deployed in depth. Haig intended the offensive to be decisive with General 
Sir Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army breaking through the German Third 
Position, and Gough’s Reserve Army protecting the Fourth Army’s left flank. 
Rawlinson had reservations about the likelihood of a great success, but Haig 
over-ruled him.62 Haig was counting in part on a greater concentration of 
artillery and a secret weapon – tanks.63 
                                            
60  Notes on Fighting in Somme, 21 August 1916, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
61  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: 167. 
62  Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army. 189; Prior and Wilson, Command on 
the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1914-18: 217-219. 
63  Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of 
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Figure 11 2nd Division Organisation Chart – Courcelette, 15 September 1916  
 
 
The Canadian Corps anchored the juncture of the Reserve and Fourth 
Armies, where the British line-running east bent south. As a result, Canadian 
Corps’ attacks would be on diverging lines. The corps was to attack with the 
3rd Division on the left and the 2nd Division on the right. The selection of the 
2nd Division to make the primary attack at Courcelette signalled Byng’s 
estimation of the 2nd Division. The 2nd Division had the more difficult task and 
Byng could have just as readily chosen the 3rd Division to make the main 
thrust. Byng’s decision, therefore, to rely on Turner and the 2nd Division 
suggests Byng had confidence in the division’s abilities. 
The battle took place on the reverse slope of the Pozières Ridge, won at 
such high cost by the Australians.64 The Ridge ran gently down slope to the 
village of Courcelette that in turn overlooked a valley curving around it to the 
                                            
64  The Australian Corps suffered 23,000 casualties at the Somme and the majority were lost in 
taking and holding Pozières Ridge. Millar, "A Study in the Limitations of Command: General Sir 
William Birdwood and the A.I.F., 1914-1918," 141. 
4 Won By My Infantry 
 161 
north and east. The battle zone extended across a kilometre and half front and 
reached to a depth of two kilometres to encompass Courcelette. 
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Map 8 Courcelette, 15 September 1916 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Map 6 Courcelette, 15 September 1916, Page 170 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011. Scans by Richard V. Laughton, http://www.censol.ca/research/greatwar/nicholson/maps/Map%206.jpg 
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The German defences consisted of a front-line trench, another 
intermediary trench running diagonally across the left front of the attack, and 
second line trenches, named Sugar and Candy. Sugar Trench, on the left, 
slanted across the front, such that the advance on the division’s left was 400 
metres, while Candy Trench, on the right, ran parallel with the front-line and 
was approximately 1,000 metres from the Canadian forward position. Located 
in front of Candy Trench was the strongpoint and battalion headquarters, the 
Sugar Refinery.65 The Refinery was a sugar beet processing facility built of 
cement and brick that was critical in three respects.66 The Germans had 
heavily fortified it, like the village of Courcelette, with deep dugouts 
impervious to all but the heaviest shells. It commanded the entire zone of the 
attack and was the sector’s key defensive position. Finally, it was a valuable 
water source. The Somme generally had a shortage of surface water, so it was 
necessary to rely on water pipes or deep wells.67 Water supply was repeatedly 
referred to in preparation for the battle and in after battle reviews.68 The 
refinery was located over a deep well with an abundant water supply, 
because sugar beet processing required copious amounts of water. Local 
stories suggest the Germans piped water from the well, as far away as 
                                            
65  It was also referred to as the Sugar Factory. 
66  Canadian Corps War Diary, Summary of Intelligence, 13 September 1916, RG 9 III D3 v4813, 
LAC. 
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Mouquet Farm, over two kilometres distant.69 As a result, the refinery was 
critical to the German’s hold on the sector, as its loss would appreciably 
increase the logistical burden of supplying water.70  
Figure 12 Courcelette Sugar Refinery Intelligence Diagram71 
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The 45th Reserve Division, the sister division to the 2nd Division’s 
nemesis at St. Eloi the 46th Reserve Division, defended the sector. The division 
was formed in August 1914, and it was rushed to the front in October to take 
part in the First Battle of Ypres, where it suffered heavy losses. It remained in 
the Messines area afterwards, but moved to the Somme, in early September, 
with elements entering the line on 7 September. The 6th Brigade, the left 
formation of the 2nd Division, attacked the II/210th Reserve Regiment and the 
4th Brigade on the right assaulted the II/211th Reserve Regiment, with the 
III/211th Reserve defending the Sugar Refinery. Garrisoning Courcelette was 
the remainder of the 210th Reserve Regiment, plus elements of the 133rd 
Reserve Regiment sent during the day to reinforce the badly battered 45th 
Reserve Division. Trench strength of the four companies in each battalion was 
approximately 200 men. A later report rated the division’s morale as 
indifferent, although further in the war it was more highly regarded.72 
The 2nd Division was to protect the shoulder of the Fourth Army and 
gain observation over the German Third Position and German artillery 
batteries in the valley running, to the south, behind Courcelette to 
Martinpuich.73 Turner’s objectives were to capture the German second line 
trenches Sugar and Candy, and the Sugar Refinery. The Reserve Army also 
wanted the Canadian Corps to probe Courcelette and capture it if possible.74 
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Turner ordered his brigadiers to submit plans on 10 September with the 
suggestion that the 6th Brigade attack with two battalions and the 4th Brigade 
with three battalions because of its greater attack frontage and depth of 
advance.75 Turner’s initial plan, submitted on 11 September, was noteworthy 
in three respects.76 First, he planned to dig jump-off trenches 100 to 200 
metres closer to the German front-line before the attack to reduce the assault 
distance – this was by now a standard policy in the British Army on the 
Somme. Second, Turner resisted corps’ wishes to probe Courcelette. Turner’s 
reluctance stemmed from his concerns about German counterattacks from the 
village. Probing the village meant stopping the protective barrage, which 
would weaken the defences against a counterattack. Turner preferred making 
a prepared assault rather than counting on a German collapse. 
Finally, Turner’s planned use of tanks differed from that of the Fourth 
Army. The 2nd Division received all six tanks assigned to the Reserve Army 
owing to the importance of its attack, and one group of three was assigned to 
each of the attacking brigades. The tanks were slower than infantry, 
vulnerable to shellfire, awkward, and prone to breakdowns and bogging 
down. The Fourth Army planned to use their tanks in the battle for the front-
line. To accommodate their slow speed, the Fourth Army had the tanks 
advance before the infantry left their trenches, so the tanks reached the 
German front-line five minutes before the infantry. In a poor decision, each 
tank or group of tanks was protected by a 100-metre gap in the barrage, 
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resulting in those portions of the German line escaping shelling. This was 
particularly fatal in those many cases when the tanks were incapacitated. 
Turner’s plan called for the tanks to assist mopping up, so the tanks left at 
zero hour. This meant they would trail the infantry and could not intervene in 
the initial stages of the attack, but would not interfere in the infantry advance. 
There was a gap in the barrage on the front of the 4th Brigade but not the 6th 
Brigade, possibly because of the shallowness of the advance.77  
In reaction to Turner’s proposed plan, the corps’ final operational order 
explicitly ordered the 2nd Division to send patrols into Courcelette and that, 
thirty minutes after reaching the final objective, the protective barrage before 
Courcelette would lift to allow patrols to enter the village.78 As the corps 
controlled the heavy artillery – critical for success – the corps tended to 
control the battle with the divisions having to accommodate themselves to the 
corps’ plan.79  
The Canadian Corps also provided detailed orders for the tanks that 
were wildly at variance with their actual capabilities. No one from the 
Reserve Army, including the Canadian Corps, attended the meetings with the 
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tank representatives to understand the tanks’ actual capabilities, and the 
orders highlight this lack of experience.80 There was no possibility for training 
with the tanks and select officers only saw the tanks on 10 September, 
described as a ‘surreal August Bank Holiday.’81 
The final version of the 2nd Division’s operational order on 14 
September reflected the corps’ demands. It specified that seventy-three 
minutes after zero hour the barrage in front of Courcelette would lift and three 
patrols of one officer and thirty men from the 6th Brigade would probe the 
village’s defences.82 Further, in the final conference at the Army headquarters, 
Gough agreed there was to be no organised attack on Courcelette until the 
Fourth Army was in position on the right, but he wanted the Canadians to 
push into Courcelette if they could do so without assistance.83 Turner 
accurately anticipated the battle to be costly, as he warned the medical staff 
to plan for 3,000 wounded per day – the divisional medical units handled 
3,250 men in the first thirty hours of the battle.84 
Nine field artillery brigades supported the division’s attack, with sixty-
four heavy artillery pieces supporting the overall Canadian assault.85 The 
resulting concentration was double that of the 1 July attack and, once the 
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attack depth is factored in, the concentration was five times.86 Further, the 
artillery was firing on relatively less well-developed defences, with limited 
barbed wire in place, and the entire position was visible from Pozières Ridge. 
The artillery pounded German positions for three days before the attack and 
the constant pummelling degraded the German defences and defenders’ 
morale and strength, as the battle’s result demonstrates. 
A creeping artillery barrage, a new tactic for the Canadians but the 
standard artillery tactic by this stage on the Somme, was the crucial element of 
the artillery support. The corps planned the barrage to lift at a relatively brisk 
rate of 100 metres every three minutes.87 The creeping barrage was a response to 
the German practice of stationing machine guns and snipers in shell holes in the 
intervals between trenches.88 The previous tactic of standing barrages on trench 
lines meant these forces were not hit.  
As stipulated in Turner’s initial plan, both brigades dug jump off trenches 
closer to the German lines. Despite heavy German artillery fire to disrupt the 
work, the brigades completed the trenches in time, albeit with losses. This 
ensured the first waves of the attack could reach the German front line in one to 
three minutes.89 
The 6th Brigade on the left attacked with the 28th Battalion and the 27th 
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Battalion on the right and the 31st Battalion responsible for mopping up. The 
4th Brigade on the right attacked with the 21st Battalion, 20th Battalion, and the 
18th Battalion on the right, and the 19th Battalion tasked with mopping up. The 
attack formation was deep, consisting of five or six waves.90 This attack 
formation was potentially hazardous. It provided sufficient depth to supply 
considerable power to the attack, but it risked exposing the attackers to 
German artillery fire. If German resistance held up the initial waves, the 
German artillery would inflict heavy losses on the latter waves. 
Before the Canadian assault, the Germans launched a surprise attack on 
the front of the 18th and 20th Battalions at 3:00 a.m. and again at 4:00 a.m. 
The 1st Division had captured sections of the German front-line in this sector, 
and the Germans were determined to retake them.91 The trenches were quite 
close, so the Germans were able to enter at one point and capture a trench 
section. The two battalions quickly rallied, drove out the Germans, then 
attacked on schedule, and took all their objectives. As the Germans had 
planned to reinforce a successful attack, they packed the forward line with 
men, and these suffered severely from the Canadian bombardment.92 It was, 
nevertheless, an impressive performance to recover from the attack and 
assault as planned. Turner’s pride in his men shows in his later comment that 
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the attack “nearly upset the applecart and it was only the men’s determination 
and high spirits that saved the situation.”93 
15 September dawned brightly with a light breeze blowing dust and 
debris in the face of the Germans.94 Promptly at 6:20 a.m., the barrage 
commenced and the infantry advanced at 6:24. Within minutes, the first 
objectives fell, as the artillery had shattered the German defenders and their 
morale. The infantry pressed on in the face of heavy machine gun and rifle 
fire and overwhelmed the defenders.95 Although the German protective 
artillery barrage came down within three minutes of the attack, the Canadians 
advanced so quickly they escaped the worst of the shelling.96 By 6:55 a.m., 
the 4th Brigade reached the Sugar Refinery and the 21st Battalion skilfully 
launched an attack from three directions that captured the position, 125 
prisoners, and a battalion commander.97  
An hour after the start of the attack, the 4th Brigade had captured all of 
its objectives. The 6th Brigade’s 27th Battalion suffered heavily from machine 
gun fire from a strong point outside of its sector, but an officer, showing 
commendable initiative, led an attack from an unengaged side and knocked it 
out. Another company commander realising the advantage of a dominating 
position outside of his sector seized it.98 Turner’s insistence on inculcating 
initiative was paying off.  
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The losses in the attack were primarily from rifle and machine gun fire, 
as the rapidity of the Canadian advance disrupted the German defensive 
arrangements. It is possible the swift Canadian advance forced the German 
field artillery batteries stationed between Courcelette and Martinpuich to 
retreat, thus interrupting the German artillery support. The situation was so 
dire that the German Army Group commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht, 
worried the whole sector would rupture.99 
With the capture of all the objectives, the division needed to 
consolidate its gains and potentially exploit the weakened German defences. 
At 8:05, Turner learned the 15th Scottish Division had closed up to the 4th 
Brigade’s right flank, and at 8:20 the 6th Brigade finally reported all of its 
objectives gained.100 With this information and the knowledge the Germans 
were in considerable disarray, Turner made three critical decisions. At 8:35, 
he ordered the 4th Brigade to capture Gunpit Trench, 300 metres further east. 
The corps heavy artillery would support the attack. At the same time, he 
issued a warning order to the 5th Brigade to prepare to capture Courcelette 
later that day.101 Finally, he refused a request from the 6th Brigade to attack 
Courcelette. The 31st Battalion had pushed three patrols towards Courcelette 
and Ketchen was convinced he could capture the village. However, the 
standing barrage that was supposed to have lifted remained blocking the entry 
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into the village.102 Turner refused Ketchen’s request and this decision will be 
analysed later.103  
The 4th Brigade attack was aided by gaining contact with the front-line 
via visual communications, so messages did not have to be sent by runner. 
The hastily prepared attack with depleted forces was successful, because of 
the indomitable spirit of the 4th Brigade, and the broken state of the defences. 
The German front-line, support, and reserve forces for the sector were 
destroyed and only remnants were left to defend Gunpit Trench.104 
In what William Philpott described as “an impressive display of 
fieldcraft and small-unit leadership” the 5th Brigade seized Courcelette that 
same day.105 At 11:10 a.m., the Canadian Corps, responding to Gough’s 
wishes to take Courcelette, ordered Turner to capture the village. Gough was 
so anxious about the attack that he visited the 2nd Division headquarters in the 
afternoon for assurance that the division would succeed.106 The corps did not 
confirm the attack and timing until 1:25 p.m., and the 2nd Division only issued 
its operation order at 2:45. This left the brigade with limited time to conduct 
reconnaissance, prepare plans, and move into position before the planned 
attack at 6:00. The brigade had to start its advance at 5:00 p.m. down the 
Pozières Ridge to reach the start line in time for the attack, which required a 
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forty-five degree change of front from the division’s earlier line of advance. It 
was a superb performance to attack on time and take its objectives. 
The 25th Battalion attacked on the left, with the 22nd Battalion on the 
right and the 26th Battalion to mop up the village. The two battalions punched 
through the German defences, advanced through the ruins in bitter hand-to-
hand fighting, and pushed on to a line on the other side of the village.107 The 
26th Battalion had the difficult task of rooting out the German survivors from 
their underground defences – a task that took the night and most of the next 
day to complete.108  
Once in position, the 5th Brigade had to repel repeated, fiercely pressed 
counterattacks over the next three nights. The Germans were determined to 
retake the village and the Sugar Refinery. Their loss meant the Germans would 
have to abandon a considerable swath of territory, because of the observation 
advantages holding the village conveyed. The 25th Battalion was attacked four 
times on the night of 15/16 September and the 22nd seven times. The 22nd had to 
face another six counterattacks on the next two nights, as well.109 Lieutenant-
Colonel T. Tremblay of the 22nd Battalion wrote in his diary “if hell is as bad as 
what I have seen at Courcelette, I would not wish my worst enemy to go 
there.”110 
The hard fighting for Courcelette was costly, with the 5th Brigade 
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reporting losses of 57 officers and 1,267 men. In compensation, the Germans 
lost more severely with the capture of 1,055 prisoners, including a battalion 
and regimental commander by the 22nd Battalion. The brigade also captured 
three artillery pieces, seven machine guns, and seven trench mortars.111 
Essentially, the brigade had destroyed the 210th Reserve Regiment, which had 
a loss rate of nearly 70%, and punished the 133rd Reserve Regiment.112 The 
211th Reserve Regiment, which faced the 4th Brigade, suffered 2,162 casualties 
or 72% of its strength. The German high command had to pull the 45th 
Reserve Division out of the line because of these losses.113  
Overall, the division had paid a high price for its success. Casualties 
reported for the period 10-19 September amounted to 163 officers and 3,790 
men.114 The division would only receive a handful of replacements before it 
was committed again, and these replacements received inadequate training in 
England for their coming ordeal. 
While the weather was excellent for the attack, the shelling so smashed 
the battlefield that pack animals could not traverse the wasteland on the night 
of 15/16 September. It was not until the pioneers built a road the next night 
that the animals could bring supplies forward of Pozières Ridge. Rations, 
water, and, most importantly, ammunition had to be brought by carrying 
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parties and the wounded evacuated by stretcher-bearers. As a result, there 
was no opportunity for exploitation of the gains of 15 September with such a 
tenuous supply line.115 
The 2nd Division had a score to settle with the Germans, and it attacked 
with verve, skill, and a degree of brutality. The Canadians killed prisoners and 
Germans attempting to surrender, contributing further to their reputation for 
committing atrocities.116 Turner admitted in a letter home to his wife “It was 
bayonet work - and some [battalions] took no prisoners.”117 Even official 
reports suggested prisoners were not taken. The 4th Brigade reporting “where 
the occupants promptly surrendered they were allowed to become prisoners.” 
In another incident on the front of the 4th Brigade, an officer was killed 
attempting to accept the surrender of a party of Germans resulting in the 
death of the entire party in retaliation.118 Another consideration contributing 
to the deaths was a concern that surrendered Germans, if unguarded, might 
pick up discarded weapons and resume fighting. Units typically did not have 
sufficient men to provide escorts for German prisoners. Lance Cattermole, a 
private in the 21st Battalion, recounted later that the battalion ordered no 
prisoners taken until the final objective was consolidated.119 
The main factor was revenge. Paul Hodges in his thesis on atrocities 
wrote “In soldiers’ diaries and letters by far the most frequently-expressed 
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motivations for perpetrating atrocity were feelings of retaliation and revenge. 
These powerful feelings seem to have been endemic during the war.”120 The 
Germans had subjected the division to a year of misery, mining, sniping, and 
the wretchedness of St. Eloi, and now the division had a chance for 
revenge.121 This combined with the heavy losses made the Canadians 
reluctant to take German prisoners, which makes the prisoner totals for the 
day all the more impressive.122 Revenge was an understood and accepted 
mechanism on the Western Front, and the need to strike back would be that 
much greater because it was long delayed.123 The division took full advantage 
of its opportunity, and it appears there was little to no attempt by 
commanders, including Turner, to restrain the troops – this would have 
carried the risk of inhibiting their offensive spirit.124  
The Battle of Flers-Courcelette is famous for the first use of tanks in 
battle. Of the six tanks assigned to the 2nd Division, two were able to 
contribute to the battle, and they only assisted with the later stages of taking 
of the Sugar Refinery.125 The division later recommended employing tanks for 
mopping up to free men for other duties, but Turner was cautious about their 
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value. Turner also suggested that a sufficient number of tanks be used to 
exploit success, as he believed the division could have captured Courcelette 
and Gunpit Trench by 10 a.m.126 The tanks encouraged the infantry, 
discouraged the Germans, attracted German fire, and assisted in the later 
stages of the capture of the Sugar Refinery.127 Of the four effects, the combat 
one was the least important. Turner’s tank comments were based on the 
different tactical use of tanks on the 2nd Division’s front and were more in 
keeping with the actual capabilities of the tanks on the Somme. Turner was 
adamant that “Too much credit must not be placed on to the tanks yet. 
Courcelette was won by my infantry.”128 
Turner’s responsibility for the attack consisted of the pre-battle 
preparation, the plan, and the conduct of the battle. The division’s success 
illustrated the effectiveness of the training before the assault. A central thread 
running through all the training was initiative. There were ample examples of 
initiative and officers and men demonstrating flexibility and responsiveness to 
changing conditions. The division could not have achieved its victory without 
thorough preparation. Turner has to share the credit for the preparation with 
Byng and Webber, as well as having the opportunity to conduct two weeks of 
intense training.  
The principal features of the attack plan – timing, objectives, and 
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artillery support – were determined at the army and corps level, leaving 
divisions with limited scope for planning. Turner pushed much of the 
responsibility for the attack planning down to the brigades, including the 
selection of battalions and attack formation. Turner’s primary contributions to 
the plan were ordering the digging of the jump-off trenches, assigning tanks to 
mopping up, and his thwarted attempt to avoid having to probe Courcelette.  
Turner’s three morning decisions demonstrated a balance between 
caution and aggressiveness. He showed wariness in not unleashing the 4th 
Brigade, until he knew all the objectives were taken and the British were up 
on the right. The attack of the 4th Brigade was aggressive considering its 
casualties and disruption after an assault. The attack was only justified if 
Turner were confident the Germans were badly disordered – which they 
were. This is an indication of Turner’s improved sense of the battle. 
He was also cautious in refusing the request from the 6th Brigade to capture 
Courcelette. Both Ketchen and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bell of the 31st Battalion, 
who were closest to the situation, believed the village was ripe for seizure.129 
The issue, however, is whether the 31st Battalion could have taken the objective 
and retained it. Turner was concerned about a German counterattack from 
Courcelette and so was loath to risk advancing even further with only minimal 
artillery support. Courcelette was a difficult objective – heavily fortified, the 
headquarters of the 210th Reserve Regiment, and garrisoned by at least portions 
of an unengaged battalion. The 31st Battalion would have attacked with limited 
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artillery support, so the odds were against it. Even if the Alberta battalion had 
managed to take the village, it would have experienced considerable difficulties 
in consolidating its hold. It took the efforts of three battalions to capture and 
hold Courcelette later in the day, albeit after the village was reinforced. The 
many dugouts and cellars made consolidation a costly and time-consuming 
challenge. It is unlikely the 31st Battalion could have held Courcelette, even if 
reinforced by units from the 6th Brigade. On balance, therefore, Turner’s 
decision, while cautious, was correct, especially given the later success of the 5th 
Brigade.  
Communications improved significantly in the battle, but there were still 
the same problems with getting accurate and timely information from the 
forward battalions. The 2nd Division ‘Lessons Learned’ document lamented 
“Battalion reports seemed to be invariably unreliable.”130 This was a problem 
that was universal and not unique to the 2nd Division.131 What was different at 
Courcelette versus St. Eloi was the additional means of gathering intelligence. 
Aircraft contact patrols, visual communications, reports from Forward 
Observation Officers (FOO), and messages sent by pigeon that all provided 
useful data to Turner. For instance, a contact patrol dropped a message at 
7:30 a.m. at the forward division headquarters regarding positions it had 
identified at 7:00 to 7:20.132 Turner could now make decisions based on the 
                                            
130  Lessons from Somme 2nd CID 2.C.D.-G.S.1254, 25 November 1916, Folder 20/File 5, RG 9 III 
C3 v4089, LAC. 
131  Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 
1914-18: 182. 
132  2nd Division GS War Diary, 15 September 1916, RG 9 III D3 v4844, LAC. 
4 Won By My Infantry 
 181 
actual situation at the front and keep the corps accurately informed. Turner 
was still looking for improvements and ordered an enhancement in 
information transmission.133 
Turner and his brigadiers were understandably jubilant at the division’s 
success.134 Turner wrote “For 12 months I have waited with the Division for 
this opportunity. God knows they [his men] acted in a magnificent way, 
nothing losses or anything else could stop them. They were out to even old 
scores of the Ypres Salient.”135 Congratulations poured in and included a 
warm letter from the former BGGS Harington.136 Gough reported the 5th 
Brigade attack “across the open without any jumping-off place in the nature 
of trenches is without parallel in the history of the present campaign.”137 Haig 
was pleased as well, writing in his diary “The two Canadian [Brigades] which 
took the Sugar Factory and joining trenches were those which were to have 
failed at St. Eloi in the spring. Sent a word of thanks and congratulations to 
them.”138 Rennie, writing to Turner well after the war, commented the attitude 
towards the division and its commanders improved because of the success.139 
                                            
133  He wanted a reduction in verbiage, use of pre-printed sketch maps, and elimination of ‘panic’ 
messages that inevitably proved false. Information Improvements Needed, 2nd Canadian 
Division, G.379, 21 September 1916, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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Fonds; CWM. 
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138  ibid. 
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Futility: 28 September and 1 October 
The division left the line on 18 September to rest and recover. However, 
it received only 594 replacements up to 22 September, against a total loss in 
the weeks ending 15 and 22 September of 3,589.140 The officer situation was 
particularly dire as it only received 4 officers to replace 177 lost.141 It received 
a further 1,174 essentially untrained other ranks the week ending 29 
September, and the battalions would have had little opportunity to remedy 
their training deficiencies before their next battle. The reasons for the 
inadequate training are discussed in Chapter 5. The chart below shows the 
disastrous reinforcement state of the 2nd Division.  
                                            
140  These losses differ from those quoted for Courcelette because of the different reporting 
timeframe. 
141 This probably understates the problems as the total losses include only killed and evacuated 
wounded but not the lightly wounded, who might not be ready to return in time for the next 
engagement. The total wounded in this two-week period were 3,047 versus 2,036 evacuated 
and the evacuated figure would include the ill or injured in an accident. Casualties and 
Reinforcements, Appendix 493, 2nd Division GS War Diary, October 1916, RG 9 III D3 
v4844, LAC. 
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Figure 13 Losses, Reinforcements, and Cumulative Deficiency 2nd Division for 
Weeks Ending 15 September to 13 October 1916142 
 
 
 
The 6th Brigade returned to the line on 25 September just in time to 
participate in the Battle of Thiepval Ridge on 26 September. The 2nd Division 
was to anchor the shoulder of the Reserve Army’s attack to the north. Unlike 
Courcelette, there was limited preparation time, as the Canadian Corps only 
issued its operational order on 24 September giving the division and brigade 
only two days to make arrangements.143 Time was so short that the division 
could not prepare the jump-off trenches in time, and reported that it was 
experiencing problems in fitting troops into the forming up areas.144 The 
German interdiction fire was troublesome, with the 31st Battalion suffering 
twenty-five casualties just moving into line.145  
                                            
142  ibid. 
143  Operation Order No. 55, Canadian Corps War Diary, Appendix II/18, September 1916 RG 9 III 
D3 v4813, LAC. 
144  Canadian Corps War Diary, 26 September 1916, RG 9 III D3 v4813, LAC. 
145  Hewgill Diary Entry, 25 September 1916, MG 30 E16 v1, Hewgill Fonds; LAC. 
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Map 9 Battle of Thiepval Ridge, 26 September 1916 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Sketch 29 Battle of Thiepval Ridge, 26 September 1916, Page 175 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011 
The 6th Brigade would attack, supported by two tanks, with the 29th 
Battalion attacking a short distance on the right and the 31st Battalion 
attacking on a longer advance of 400 metres on the right. The objective was 
to protect the right flank of the 1st Division, which was responsible for the 
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main Canadian attack.146 
The attack was launched at 12:35 p.m., but the Canadian barrage did not 
hit the German front-line, and German artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire 
stopped the 31st Battalion, while the 29th captured their objective.147 The German 
barrage isolated the Canadian front-line, indicating the ineffectiveness of the 
counter-battery fire. Captain D.E. Macintyre’s award of a Military Cross for 
passing through the German barrage to reach the 31st Battalion headquarters and 
return is an indication of the severity of the German artillery fire. The two tanks 
were singularly ineffective, with one knocked out when it attacked an hour 
early, because the commander forgot about a time change.148 
The 31st Battalion made a second attack at 11:00 p.m., but only took the 
right half of its objective.149 The situation was so confused that the next day, the 
battalion still did not have a clear idea of what it held.150 This confusion travelled 
up the chain of command, so commanders had no firm notion of the situation, 
but the corps was insistent that the gap between the 1st Division and the 2nd 
Division be closed.151 The Canadian artillery, despite repeated shoots, was 
unable to suppress the German defences, and the 31st Battalion, even reinforced, 
was too weak to capture the entire objective.  
The situation changed, as the success of the British II Corps and the 1st 
                                            
146  Operational Order No. 83, 2nd Division GS War Diary, Appendix 433, 24 September 1916, 
RG 9 III D3 v4844, LAC. 
147  Singer, History of Thirty-First Battalion C.E.F.: 163. 
148  H.D.B. Ketchen Comments BOH, DHS 3-17 (vol 5), RG 24 v1739, LAC. 
149  6th Brigade Report, C.241, 30 September 1916, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
150  Hewgill Diary Entry, 27 September 1916, MG 30 E16 v1, Hewgill Fonds; LAC. 
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Canadian Corps War Diary, 26 September 1916, RG 9 III D3 v4813, LAC; Canadian Corps 
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Division on the left unhinged the German line, compelling the Germans to 
fall back to the Regina Trench line. The 6th Brigade notified Turner of the 
withdrawal in the late afternoon of 27 September. Turner ordered Ketchen to 
push out patrols and requested two reserve battalions from Byng to help add 
force to the follow-up.152 Turner was, however, again wary and would not 
allow the 6th Brigade to advance until the two battalions had closed up to the 
front-line early the next morning.153 There was considerable uncertainty as to 
how far the Germans were withdrawing, with reports suggesting the German 
infantry had panicked and abandoned Regina Trench. At one point, the 31st 
Battalion incorrectly claimed to occupy Regina Trench.154 Turner believed the 
Germans botched a formation relief and had left the line effectively empty.155 
But, by the time the brigade launched a more substantial effort, the Germans 
had re-occupied the trench. The division received conflicting reports over the 
next two days about the exact position of the Canadian and German 
positions. Probably this period provoked Turner’s later criticism that battalion 
reports were invariably wrong.156  
Complicating Turner’s task was the Reserve Army’s repeated orders to 
keep in touch with the 23rd British Division on its right flank.157 The 23rd 
British Division was advancing east along the Albert-Bapaume road and was 
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the left flank of the Fourth Army. The 6th Brigade’s main attack axis was to the 
north, so it had to advance across a front of 120 degrees. This diverging axis 
of advance meant the brigade had to be vigilant to prevent gaps opening in 
the line. 
During this period, Turner continued his policy of visiting the frontlines 
to see the conditions and be seen. Captain D.E. Macintyre wrote in his diary 
“Met Gen’l Turner in SUGAR trench. One was nearly always sure of seeing 
him up in the line somewhere.”158 Turner also worked long hours. He 
reported he laboured to 4 a.m. on 28 September and was back at work at 
6:30 a.m. indicating his stamina and capacity for hard work was 
undiminished.159 Indolence was not one of Turner’s flaws. 
The Canadian Corps ordered the 2nd Division to attack again on 1 
October at 3:15 p.m., as part of another Reserve Army offensive. The order 
provoked Turner’s reaction of “We have to attack again!!”160 The two 
exclamation marks indicate Turner’s frustration with the continued hasty 
attacks and destruction of his division. The ongoing probing attacks meant it 
took time for the division to locate the German front-line, with a resulting 
decrease in artillery fire accuracy and ability to suppress the defences.161 The 
division was again hurried into an under-prepared assault.  
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The attack was part of a larger engagement, the Battle of Ancre Heights, 
and was a component of a series of assaults designed to position the Reserve 
Army for a major offensive by mid-October.162 The 2nd Division had the 4th 
and 5th Brigades in line, with the 5th Brigade responsible for the primary attack 
to the north, and the 4th Brigade on the right to advance east to keep in touch 
with the 23rd British Division.163  
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Map 10 Battle of Ancre Heights, 1 October 1916 
 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. (1964) Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 
Sketch 30 Battle of Ancre Heights, 1 October 1916, Page 181 
National Defence. Reproduced with permission of the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2011 
 
Regina Trench was a much more challenging defensive position than 
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that attacked on 15 September. Hidden on a reverse slope of a small ridge 
and protected by a three metre wide belt of wire, Regina Trench was a 
formidable obstacle. In addition, the Germans deployed troops and machine 
guns in front and behind the trench, which widened the zone the artillery had 
to suppress.164 Without direct observation of the trench, the artillery 
bombardment was far less accurate and thus less effective than at Courcelette. 
The Marine Division, a higher quality unit than the 45th Reserve Division, 
defended Regina Trench.165 The Marine Division, formed from the Naval 
Corps defending the Belgium coast, had not seen much action, so it had a 
high percentage of pre-war active troops and NCOs that contributed to its 
élan.166 
The exertions at Courcelette severely weakened the 5th Brigade, and it 
entered the line with a trench strength of just 1,717 men.167 The 22nd Battalion 
was so attenuated that it consisted of only three weak companies all of which 
had to attack.168 As a further burden, the assault distances ranged from 300 
meters on the left to 800 metres on the brigade’s right.  
The exhaustion and weakened state of the brigade prompted protests by 
the battalion and brigade commander, on 30 September. Hilliam of the 25th 
Battalion, in a carefully reasoned complaint, argued success was ‘highly 
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problematical.’ In language seldom seen in official reports, Hilliam claimed 
the 
Very serious gruelling and ghastly experience of the last two days particularly 
have produced the inevitable reaction of physical and moral lassitude. If 
ordered out they will of course obey orders but the spirit of 15th will not be 
there.169 
 
Macdonell, the brigade commander, concurred and claimed the brigade’s 
trench strength was reduced to less than 1,200 men.170  
Turner agreed and escalated the matter to Byng on 1 October. Rather 
than basing the remonstrance on the weakness of the brigade, he did it on 
evidence of uncut wire. At 7:50 a.m., Turner, on receipt of air photos taken 
the previous day, complained to the corps that he “did not consider that 
artillery preparation on REGINA TRENCH and KENORA TRENCH as shown 
... is sufficient.”171 Turner then called Brigadier-General H. Burstall, the corps 
artillery commander, again shortly after to emphasise the importance of the 
artillery preparation. Burstall assured Turner that the preponderance of the 
artillery fire was to take place that morning. Turner’s complaints resulted in 
Byng agreeing at 9:10 a.m. to give the artillery more time to cut the wire, but 
added the admonition that the division was to remain in the line until it 
attained all of its objectives.172 The Reserve Army was not so understanding 
and pressured Byng to make the attack, and so at 1:15 p.m., the 5th Brigade 
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received the unwelcome news that it was to attack as planned.173  
Once again, Turner demonstrated his moral courage in protesting an 
attack destined to fail, but the scenario is perplexing in two respects. Turner 
did not base his concerns on the weak state of the 5th Brigade, but on the 
uncut wire. Possibly, he realised that no objection grounded on numerical 
weakness would be sustained, as witnessed by the 14th Battalion, having to 
attack when it could only muster seventy-five men.174 Aerial photographs, 
however, were irrefutable. Byng’s willingness to grant Turner additional time 
is puzzling, as the 2nd Division’s attack was part of a larger offensive and even 
a corps commander had limited scope to derail a larger attack, so it is not 
surprising that Gough would impose the original plan.  
Why did Byng keep the sorely weakened 2nd Division in the line for the 
1 October attack? Four factors probably contributed to Byng’s decision – the 
previous success of the 2nd Division, the uncertainty of what positions the 
Germans were holding, intelligence reports suggesting the Germans were 
faltering, and Gough’s longer-range plans. The 2nd Division had won a signal 
victory at Courcelette, and Byng likely overestimated its remaining combat 
power. The several days of confusion after the German 27 September 
withdrawal, meant it was not until 29 September that the requirement for an 
all-out attack was apparent. There was likely then insufficient time to replace 
the 2nd Division and attack on time.  
Reports from Haig’s chief intelligence officer, Brigadier-General John 
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Charteris at this time showed his belief that the Germans were failing. 
Charteris, writing to his counterpart at the War Office, on 1 October, claimed 
We are getting very optimistic here with regard to the fighting. There is no 
doubt that the German is a changed man ... His tail is down, he surrenders 
freely, and on several occasions he has thrown down his rifle and ran away, 
and altogether there is hope that a really bad rot may set in any day.175 
 
Further, the purported abandonment of Regina Trench suggested a German 
panic, leading Byng to suppose the Germans were not that formidable. Turner 
was less sanguine and more accurate in a letter to his wife that “I do not 
believe the statements current – the bosche is Not [sic] half beaten yet.”176 
The final and likely most critical factor was Gough’s planned series of 
attacks. The Reserve Army issued an order on 28 September for a set of 
objective lines for attacks on 1, 4, and 10 October.177 The plan was useful to 
provide advance notice of Gough’s intent. What was objectionable was the 
unrealistic tempo of the attacks expected given the nexus of ground 
conditions, unit combat power, German defences, and time required to 
prepare attacks. As Gary Sheffield has argued “In his eagerness to push 
forward, Gough forced subordinate commanders to attack before they were 
ready with little allowance made for preparation time.”178 The aggressive 
schedule meant Byng had to use the 2nd Division in the 1 October attack if he 
were to have sufficient fresh troops to make the later attacks.  
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The two brigades attacked on time, and the 4th Brigade, with the easier 
mission, reached its objectives after hard fighting.179 The 5th Brigade was 
repulsed and shattered, losing nearly 50% of its men. Hit indiscriminately by 
both German and Canadian artillery, German machine gun and rifle fire, the 
Brigade’s three attacking battalions were only able to penetrate the German 
wire and reach Regina Trench in isolated sectors. The Germans promptly 
ejected or overwhelmed the scattered detachments. The 22nd Battalion was 
especially battered and Macdonell characterised it as destroyed in his 
report.180  
The 22nd Battalion subsequently suffered serious discipline and morale 
problems, because of the injuring of its inspiring commanding officer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel T. Tremblay, and the poor quality and training of 
replacements.181 Only Tremblay’s return and a tightening of discipline 
returned the battalion to full discipline – three members of the 22nd Battalion 
were executed from April to July 1917.182  
These executions illustrate that discipline was one of the major 
differences between Turner, Currie, and Major-General H. Burstall, Turner’s 
replacement as GOC 2nd Division. Turner did pay attention to discipline, 
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dress, and deportment, as the multiple references in the routine orders attest, 
but he was not as zealous as Currie. Turner was less likely to take umbrage if 
a soldier had a button undone in the line than Currie. In comparison to 
Currie’s and Burstall’s commands, fewer men were executed in the 2nd 
Division under Turner. In Currie’s 1st Division, during the same period Turner 
commanded the 2nd Division, seven men were shot versus only one in 
Turner’s division. Similarly, under Burstall seven men were executed in the 
2nd Division.183    
The 2nd Division was clearly played out and, after the 6th Brigade did 
another tour of duty, the corps relieved the division on 4 October. It did not 
have to serve another tour at the Somme and departed for the Vimy sector on 
10 October. The division lost another 42 officers and 975 men in the Battle of 
Thiepval Ridge and 56 officers and 1,368 men in the Battle of Ancre 
Heights.184 It was a husk of the former division after the loss of 6,817 officers 
and men between 10 September and 10 October, more than four times the 
losses at St. Eloi.185 Turner wrote that it was difficult in preparing 
recommendations for awards, as all the witnesses died in the battle.186  
Surprisingly, the 2nd Division did not produce an operations report for 
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the latter two operations and the one for Courcelette was perfunctory.187 
Turner’s response to the corps’ questionnaire on lessons from the Somme was 
restricted to conventional matters and was not as searching as Currie’s 
answers. For instance, his reaction to the question of troop density was to 
recommend two and half men per yard, as this was the figure at Courcelette 
and the later failures had a lower concentration. This analysis did not 
consider the other factors contributing to victory or defeat. Turner’s comments 
existed within the context of the current doctrine, as practiced at the Somme, 
in part because of the nature of the questions posed by Byng.188 
Analysis 
The discrepancy in performance between Courcelette and the latter two 
attacks was a function of an under-strength division attacking with exiguous 
preparation time, over too great a distance, and with inadequate, insufficient, 
and uncoordinated artillery support. The division had not replaced its losses 
before its recommitment, so it went into the line in an enfeebled state. What 
is more, the replacements received were little more than raw levies. For 
instance, the 4th Battalion in Currie’s division received a draft of 154 men, 
who had no experience with the SMLE and were unfamiliar with the standard 
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grenade.189 As a result, the Reserve Army’s inexorable demands forced Turner 
to task units with missions that exceeded their strength. 
The Canadian Corps and the 2nd Division performed best in a structured 
combat environment where preparation time was crucial. Time to gather 
intelligence, to integrate the findings into plans, to coordinate with the 
artillery, and disseminate the results was imperative for success. Gough’s 
tempo denied this time, and the results were costly failures.190 At Courcelette, 
the division had seven days for this preparation cycle but only two days each 
for the latter two battles. The division could be likened to an archer that, if not 
given time to draw the bow and aim, will fire an arrow with insufficient 
energy or accuracy to strike and kill the target.  
A significant factor in the length of the planning cycle was the relative 
inexperience of the staff and command structures of the division. At 
Courcelette, the 6th Brigade’s operational order was five foolscap pages.191 
Orders to this level of detail took time to create and assimilate, which 
contributed to the interval needed to ready a successful attack. Andy Simpson 
argues in his thesis on the operational role of British corps that the FSR 
manual was a useful doctrinal guide throughout the war, but states it was 
intended for ‘trained and experienced officers’.192 It was of scant value, 
however, for the Canadians on the Somme, as it did not provide any insight 
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into the practical details of attack frontages, troop density, artillery 
preparation, and logistics.193 The Australian, but Canadian born, Major-
General W.T. Bridges captured the utility of the FSR when he described them 
“as useful to most Australian militia officers as cuneiform inscriptions on 
Babylonian brick.”194 What is more, Gough’s command style did not follow 
the FSR doctrine regarding subordinate authority, but as Gary Sheffield 
described “He was a practitioner of the opposite: prescriptive, ‘top-down’ 
command.”195  
The distances the troops had to cover to reach the German front-line 
were excessive. Rather than the recommended 200 metres, the attacks were 
to cover 300 to 800 metres to reach the German front-line. The 2nd Division 
did not have the spare manpower or time to dig closer jump-off trenches – 
another negative consequence of Gough’s accelerated tempo. Later, during 
the Passchendaele campaign, Currie would refuse to serve under Gough, 
because of the Canadian experiences at the Somme.196 
The crucial factor was the artillery failure. In the days following the 
battle for Thiepval Ridge, the artillery continuously shelled the Regina Trench 
position and, at times, Canadian positions. The 5th Brigade reported, rather 
acidly, that on the 29th and 30th its forward positions underwent prolonged 
                                            
193  GHQ was producing increasing number of manuals, the SS series that provided more concrete 
and practical proposals on how to conduct actions. Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power: British 
Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945: 19. For a different persepective of ethos 
versus doctrine, see Albert Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front : The British Army 
and Chemical Warfare in World War I  (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 11-
17.  
194  Mallett, "The Interplay between Technology, Tactics and Organisation in the First AIF," 3. 
195  Sheffield, "An Army Commander on the Somme: Hubert Gough," 84. 
196 Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 206-207. 
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shelling by the Canadian heavy artillery.197 The heavy artillery needed 
observers to correct their fire, but Regina Trench was on a reverse slope, and 
thus unobservable. The German artillery received, at best, only a cursory 
treatment by the corps artillery. The British V Corps was developing methods 
of successful counter-battery work, but these had not yet reached the 
Canadian Corps. 
The inexperience of its personnel and defective shells further hampered 
the artillery. The artillery was the most technical of the combat arms, and it 
took much longer to train, than the infantry.198 A large percentage of the 
shells, so laboriously dragged forward, burst either prematurely or not at all. 
The rapid expansion of the munitions factories had lowered quality standards 
to the point that too many of the shells produced were defective. A more 
lethal aspect of the situation was the propensity of the 4.5” howitzer shell to 
explode prematurely, resulting in the nickname of suicide clubs for 4.5” 
howitzer batteries.199 
There were also serious shortcomings in the cooperation between the 
infantry and the artillery. It appeared the two arms fought two separate battles 
                                            
197  5th CIB Operations Report, Night of September 26/27 to Night of October 1/2, B.M.L. 330, 7 
October 1916, MG 30 E46 v2, Turner Fonds; LAC; Report on Operations - 24th Canadian 
Battalion Victoria Rifles of Canada, October 1st 1916, Folder 53/File 8, RG 9 III D1 v4693, 
LAC. 
198  It was no accident that the divisional artillery of both the 3rd and 4th Divisions were British 
formations for a year after the divisions arrived at the front.  
199  Batteries deployed in front of 4.5” pieces added a parados to their emplacements to cut down 
casualties from prematures. James Edward Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium, 
1916, vol. 1, History of the Great War, Based on Official Documents by Direction of the 
Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence (London: Macmillan, 1932), 265; J.S. 
Stewart Interview, RG 41 v21, LAC; John Smith Stewart, Memoirs of a Soldier  (Lethbridge, 
Alta: Robins Southern Printing), 124. 
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that coincided in time and place.200 At a Senior Officers’ Conference in 
December 1916, the infantry complained of the lack of the personal touch 
between the infantry and artillery. The infantry was dissatisfied with the time 
needed to get heavy artillery support, the poor wire-cutting of the field 
artillery, and artillery inaccuracy. 
The gunners responded to the infantry complaints by pointing out their 
difficulties. There were so few experienced officers available that they could 
not be spared from the guns. Therefore, new officers had to act as FOOs or 
LOs. Communications were slow and intermittent, so it was not surprising 
that the heavy artillery was unable to respond promptly. Burstall commented 
that the infantry often reported the barbed wire as cut, so the artillery was not 
at fault. The gunners also explained they were not given enough time to 
register their guns and that this affected accuracy.201 As a result, the artillery 
was far less effective than at Courcelette. 
Conclusion 
Turner’s division performed admirably at Courcelette and won the most 
striking Canadian victory at the Somme. It also experienced the same frustrations 
that afflicted the other Canadian divisions at the Somme. Even Currie’s vaunted 1st 
Division stumbled to the extent that Gough ordered a court of inquiry into the 
                                            
200 A problem the British encountered on the Somme, as well. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the 
Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916-18: 66-67. 
201  Reply to Corps Questionnaire - 3rd Division, November 1916, Folder 45/File 6, RG 9 III C1 
v3843, LAC; Lessons from Somme Lahore Artillery, November 1916, Folder 20/File 5, RG 9 III 
C3 v4089, LAC; Senior Officer's Conference, 19 December 1916, Folder 1/File 10, RG 9 III C2 
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division’s failure at Regina Trench on 8 October.202 Turner’s own performance 
indicated he developed into a competent and effective divisional commander, 
and his reputation partially recovered. His further development as a combat 
commander ended in late November 1916, when the Canadian authorities 
selected him to address the administrative and training debacle in England. The 
factors contributing to this catastrophic situation and the oft-misunderstood 
process of Turner’s selection are the subject of the next chapter. 
  
                                            
202  The unexpurgated version of the inquiry included a crossed out statement that one officer had 
to shoot several men who would not counterattack. Thanks to Aaron Miedema for identifying 
this version of the report. Unredacted Version, Finding of Court of Inquiry at Bouzincourt, 
Folder 17/File 4, RG 9 III C3 v4011, LAC. 
 5  
CHAOS IN ENGLAND: UNWISE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
For armies can signify but little abroad unless there be counsel and 
wise management at home.  
Cicero1 
 
Before delineating the changes Turner implemented as GOC Canadian 
Forces in the British Isles, it is necessary to understand the chaotic state of the 
Canadian administration in England before Turner took over. Every facet of the 
Canadian military administration in England was flawed from the Quartermaster 
Department to the Chaplain Service to most importantly, the training of the 
combat arms and officers. This chapter analyses these flaws and their causes to 
explain the situation that faced Turner. The chapter then examines the 
organisation that replaced Hughes’ chaos and Turner’s selection to command it. 
Military administration’s purpose is to “provide the necessities that allow 
fighting soldiers to achieve full efficiency. There must be clear jurisdictions, open 
communications, and willing co-operation between soldiers of the bureaucracy 
and those of the line.”2 Hughes’ regime represents the antithesis of this definition, 
as there were no clear lines of authority, limited communications, and a lack of 
co-operation between the authorities in Canada, England, and in the field. This 
                                            
1  Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis, trans. Walter Miller, Loeb ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press), B1 xxii 76. 
2  Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916: 258. 
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failure had drastic deleterious consequences, as it seriously compromised the 
ability of the Canadian Corps to sustain its combat edge, and cost Canada lives, 
treasure, and reputation.  
 In the next two chapters, the performance of the administration is assessed 
on two dimensions – effectiveness and efficiency.3 Effectiveness describes the 
degree to which replacements met the requirements of the fighting forces in 
numbers and combat performance. An effective organisation produced sufficient 
numbers of disciplined replacements with high morale, who were able to 
efficaciously employ the tactics, weapons, and techniques required to carry out 
their mission. Efficiency refers to the extent to which resources of personnel, time, 
and money were utilised to produce trained replacements. An efficient 
organisation minimised the use of resources to achieve the required outcome. 
Structure 
The structure of Canadian forces in England was a confusing mess of feuding 
officers, civilians, and ministerial representatives. At one point, there were six 
separate authorities in England that claimed they spoke for Canada. They included 
Perley the acting High Commissioner; Max Aitken, Hughes’ ‘personal 
representative;’ Lord Brooke and later David Watson, the GOC Bramshott 
Canadian Training Division; J. C. MacDougall the original GOC Canadians in 
charge of the Shorncliffe Canadian Training Division; John Wallace Carson the 
                                            
3  Definitions of effectiveness and efficiency are the author’s. For a different perspective, see 
Allan Reed Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, vol. 1, Mershon Center Series 
on International Security and Foreign Policy (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 1-27. 
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Minister’s special representative; and Sam Steele, the GOC Southeastern Area and 
another GOC Canadians. This naturally confused the War Office, who at one 
point plaintively, asked who was in charge.4 The answer was ultimately Sam 
Hughes was in charge. 
Figure 14 Canadian Forces in England 1916 Simplified Organisation Chart   
 
 
This confused structure developed rapidly once the 1st Division left for 
France in February 1915. As new units arrived, more training areas were added 
reporting to different British commands. By late 1916, the Canadian training 
system and organisation consisted of fifty-seven reserve battalions scattered across 
six major training centres, split into two Training Divisions at Shorncliffe and 
Bramshott, reporting separately to the British Aldershot and Eastern Commands.  
                                            
4  Haycock, Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916: 267. 
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John Wallace Carson, a stout mining stock promoter, adroitly manoeuvred a 
poorly defined set of responsibilities into a position of being the de facto authority 
for the feuding Canadian Major-Generals in the training commands and the 
British. Carson impressed Borden in his initial foray as a special representative in 
1914 and he extended his mandate to be the communications nexus between the 
British, the Canadian authorities in France and England, and Hughes. Carson was 
entirely dependent on Hughes’ favour and so was certain to satisfy Hughes even 
when he disapproved of Hughes’ demands.5 
The front complained, the British complained, and even Borden complained 
about the disorganisation and misrule. Fundamentally, the problem was there was 
no single authority in charge of Canadian forces. From early on in the conflict, 
there was constant criticism of the administration in England. An example of the 
complaints sent to Borden from an officer in the 5th Brigade that ”Canadian 
soldiering arrangements in England are in a deplorable state… that the senior 
officers … are all working at cross purposes.”6  
The criticisms resolved to three core complaints about the effectiveness of 
the Canadian forces in England; their efficiency; and the always contentious and 
conspicuous issue of promotions.7 Effectiveness regarded the poor quality and 
                                            
5  Connaught, the Governor-General, characterised Carson as quite ‘undependable’ and 
Macphail thought one of Carson’s business ventures a ‘pure swindle.’ Biography, J.W. Carson, 
RG 24 v6930, LAC; Connaught to Kitchener, 31 May 1915, WG/41, PRO 30/57/56, Kitchener 
Papers; TNA; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 32-33,71; Macphail Diary Entry, 9 February 
1916, MG 30 D150 v4, Macphail Fonds; LAC. Carson told Brigadier-General Meighen "He 
was obliged to do things, by order of the Minster, of which he did not approve." Meighen to 
Duguid, 23 November 1936, HQ 683-1-30-5, RG 24 v1503, LAC. 
6  Borden to Perley, 17 March 1916, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, LAC. 
7  Sources Note. The evidence for this chapter comes from a variety of sources including reports 
written under the aegis of the administration that replaced Hughes’ regime. These later reports 
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lack of replacements produced by the Canadian administration in England, while, 
efficiency referred to the excessive resources used to produce the deficient 
replacements. Promotions, appointments, commissions, decorations, and awards 
were always a topic close to the heart of officers and men and subject to the 
closest scrutiny.8 Promotions generated ill will, complaint, and controversy, as it 
was apparent that factors, other than military competence, were decisive 
considerations for promotions.  
Effectiveness 
The Canadian Corps’s 24,000 casualties at the Somme threw an 
insupportable burden on the Canadian training establishment, and it collapsed. By 
mid-October, the demand for replacements was 18,000 men and with an 
estimated 7,000 more needed by the end of the month.9 However, there were 
only 13,000 replacements available. Hughes refused to break up surplus 
battalions in England, cabling, “Stand firm. Let our divisions rest. We will get all 
six divisions in shape. Surely Byng cannot repeat June 3rd every month.”10 By 8 
November, the corps was short of 296 officers, with only 65 replacements ready. 
The infantry needed 9,368 replacements, but only 2,923 were ready, leaving a 
                                                                                                                                
were unlikely to minimise the extent of the problems but nor would they completely 
manufacture them. They provide useful details of the extent and nature of the issues. The 
majority of the sources used in the chapter come from the Hughes period and include 
criticisms from the Canadian Corps, from within the administration in England, from friends 
and associates of Hughes, and from Canada. They clearly indicate profound problems in the 
administration in England and are not later inventions. 
8  Promotions, appointments, commissions, decorations, and awards are hereafter referred to as 
promotions. 
9  Twenty-five thousand men were needed to replace losses in the corps and bring the 
replacement pool in France back to strength. 
10  Hughes was referring to the first day of the Battle of Mount Sorrel. Cable Hughes to Carson, 14 
October 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, RG 9 III A1 v52, LAC. 
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shortfall of 6,445 men.11 
Not only were there insufficient men, those few arriving were unprepared 
for battle. The training syllabus was only ten weeks, which was insufficient time to 
properly instruct the recruits.12 Further, Hughes mandated training be conducted 
with the Ross Rifle. Currie complained that the failure of the 8 October attack was 
due to fighting with drafts untrained on the SMLE rifle and unfamiliar with the 
Mills grenade.13 The staggering losses at the Somme also caused problems for the 
British and Australians. During the battle, men were reaching British units with 
only six weeks training making them a ‘danger to themselves and others.’14 
Three separate reports clearly identify myriad training inadequacies.15 There 
was little or no coordination with Canada so much of the training in Canada was 
wasted. Training staff assessed battalions embodied in Canada for six to eighteen 
months arriving in England as having completed only the first three weeks of the 
training syllabus. The training in England was sub-standard and inefficient. 
Alderson set an unfortunate precedent by agreeing to accept a portion of partially-
                                            
11  Maj. Macfarland A/DAG to Carson, 17 October 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, RG 9 III A1 v52, LAC; 
Outstanding Reinforcements, 8 November 1916, 8-1-7b, 9/52, RG 9 III A1 v52, LAC. 
12  Steele to Carson, 4 May 1916, 8-5-10d RG 9 III A1 v45, LAC; Visit to France of Dep. Min. 
ASMC, 3 November 1916, RG 9 III A1 v107, LAC. 
13  Evidence of Court of Inquiry Held at Bouzincourt on 11 October 1916, MG 30 E100 v35, 
Currie Fonds; LAC; Response to Cdn Corps G.837, 12 October 1916, MG 30 E100 v35, Currie 
Fonds; LAC. 
14  Pugsley, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War: 
171, 253; Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918: 381; Hodges, 
"The British Infantry and Atrocities on the Western Front, 1914-1918," 83. 
15  The three reports were an inspection of training facilities in England by Major-General Lessard 
in May 1916, a report of training deficiencies in the Shorncliffe base from June 1916, and a 
summary of conditions during the Hughes period written in February 1917. Lessard Report, 
May 1916, GAQ 10-39, RG 24 v1840, LAC; Notes on Canadian Training Division, Shorncliffe, 
6 June 1916, 8-5-10e, RG 9 III A1 v45, LAC; Summary of General Conditions Which Existed 
Prior to Assumption of Command by Major-General R.E.W.Turner, 23 February 1917, MG 30 
E46 v6, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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trained replacements, and “since that time a very small percentage of fully-trained 
Drafts have been despatched overseas.”16 One report includes this damning 
critique “The conception and tone of the Canadian Training Division is on a 
wrong basis from its foundation.”17  
Another recurrent complaint was men were proceeding overseas without 
proper clothing and equipment. Part of the problem stemmed from men arriving 
in England and training in Canadian Oliver equipment, Canadian tunics and 
boots, and with the Ross Rifle. Before departing for France, they had to be re-
equipped with Imperial pattern equipment, including the SMLE.18 This added an 
additional complication to the rush to get replacements to France.19  
The abysmal state of the training organisation did not escape the notice of 
the British War Office or Haig. Both tried to influence the Canadians to effect 
reforms. In June 1916, the CIGS requested Aitken to approach the Canadian 
Government with an offer to replace MacDougall with a British regular officer. If 
the Canadians did so, the War Office would abolish Alderson’s Inspector-General 
position, as an incentive, but nothing came of the request.20 In July, Haig wrote 
King George V asking the King if he could say a word to help the situation, 
meaning pass on to the Canadian Government the concerns with the state of 
                                            
16  Notes on Canadian Training Division, Shorncliffe, 6 June 1916, 8-5-10e, RG 9 III A1 v45, LAC. 
17  Lessard Report, May 1916, GAQ 10-39, RG 24 v1840, LAC; Summary of General Conditions 
Which Existed Prior to Assumption of Command by Major-General R.E.W.Turner, 23 February 
1917, MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
18  Canadian tunics were too restrictive, Canadian boots dissolved in wet conditions, and the 
Oliver harness was uncomfortable and could carry less equipment and ammunition than the 
standard British web harness. See Report on Canadian Clothing, Equipment & Supplies for 
Canadian Overseas Forces, 20 February 1917, Q-3, MG 27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds; LAC; 
Appleton to OC 11 Cdn Training Reserve Brigade, 31 December 1915, E-60-1, RG 9 III B1 
v418, LAC. 
19  H.N. Anley to Carson, 25 February 1916, RG 9 III B1 v622, LAC. 
20  Whigham to Aitken, 25 June 1916, A1765, MG 27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds; LAC. 
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training.21 Again, nothing resulted from this intervention.  
The quantity and quality of replacement officers was another problem.22 In 
early 1916, Shorncliffe had only 7% of its officers immediately available for drafts 
and another 8% after completing courses.23 The corps complained officers 
received from England did not have sufficient practical training to be effective. 
They lacked the ‘habit of command,’ did not understand their responsibilities, or 
the technical aspects of their role.24 Steele issued an order that all officers were to 
know their men – it was extraordinary that officers were unaware of their basic 
responsibilities.25 The situation was so dire that Byng established a corps Officer 
school because the officers coming from England were so incapable.26  
 The technical arms, so essential for combat success, including signals, 
engineers, artillery, and machine guns, were in especially poor condition. In 
August 1916, the commander of the 1st Division Signal Company commented 
“that after two years of war, the drafts we are receiving could not be worse than 
they are.”  A later report indicated that each base had its own syllabus based on 
an obsolete training manual.27 
The engineering service was facing severe shortages of trained personnel, 
while demands escalated. Like the signal service, the engineering service had to 
                                            
21  Williams, Byng of Vimy, General and Governor General: 130. 
22  Steele to MacDougall, 30 December 1915, RG 9 III B1 v622, LAC; Carson to MacDougall, 21 
January 1916, 8-5-10c, RG 9 III A1 v45, LAC. 
23  MacDougall to Carson, 21 January 1916, 8-1-87a, RG 9 III A1 v34, LAC. 
24  Alderson to Carson, August 29 1916, 8-5-8H, RG 9 III A1 v44, LAC; Summary of General 
Conditions Which Existed Prior to Assumption of Command by Major-General R.E.W.Turner, 
23 February 1917, MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds; LAC; Canadian Military School, Undated, S-
7-36 v2, RG 9 III B1 v3101, LAC. 
25  Steele to MacDougall, 4 Sept 1916, 8-5-10f, RG 9 III A1 v45, LAC. 
26  Campbell, "The Divisional Experience in the C.E.F.: A Social and Operational History of the 
2nd Canadian Division, 1915-1918," 165. 
27  Canadian Signalling School, 1 December 1918, 113/5, RG 9 III D1 v4718, LAC. 
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depend on obtaining skilled tradesmen already trained for technical roles, as the 
training period would be too long. The corps complained they could only get 
reinforcements by transferring infantry to the engineers, which disrupted the 
infantry units and delayed engineer training. The Canadian Corps CRE, Brigadier-
General Lindsay, complained in May 1916, that of the 700 sappers in training at 
the Canadian Engineer Training Depot (CETD) only 60 could be charitably 
classified as partially trained. Lindsay’s conclusion was “there is something 
radically wrong with the organisation and administration, and there must an entire 
lack of co-ordination.”28 The War Office suggested many of the sappers “do not 
appear to have carried out any sapper training at all.”29 
The artillery underwent probably the most significant change of all the arms. 
Wartime experience drove the recognition that artillery had to focus on accurate 
indirect fire.30 The artillery had to adopt the principles of scientific gunnery of the 
Royal Garrison Artillery, such as calculating adjustments for barometer, air 
temperature, wind, shell lots, gun calibration, charge propellant temperature, and 
muzzle velocity.31 All of which placed a greater strain on the training organisation 
to produce more and better-trained gunners. 
Unfortunately, it was apparent early on that the Reserve Artillery 
                                            
28  Major Macfarlane to Sec. Dept. Militia and Defence, 24 June 1916, 8-5-8G, RG 9 III A1 v44, 
LAC; Summary of General Conditions Which Existed Prior to Assumption of Command by 
Major-General R.E.W.Turner, 23 February 1917, MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds; LAC; Maunsell 
to a/CGS, 10 December 1916, M-29-33 v13, RG 9 III B1 v3092, LAC; Lindsay Report, 16 May 
1916, 8-5-8E, RG 9 III A1 v44, LAC; Steele to Carson, 17 July 1916, 8-5-10e, RG 9 III A1 v45, 
LAC. 
29  121/Overseas/2047. (S.D.3), DCIGS to Carson, 27 May 1916, Folder 11, 74/672 Box 3, DHH. 
30  Bailey, "British Artillery in the Great War," 26. 
31  "British Artillery Fire Control,  World War 1 - 1914-18,"  http://nigelef.tripod.com/fc_1914-
18.htm. 
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establishment was unequal to the challenge. In December 1915, Currie 
complained the artillery training was “d-d rotten and the men responsible for the 
training of these men should be told so in no unmistakable terms.”32 Steele in 
response had to emphasise to MacDougall to send only trained men, especially 
artillery, to France.33 The harshest complaints came from Morrison, the 2nd 
Division CRA. In December 1915, he reported to MacDougall about his 
inspection of the Canadian Reserve Brigade at Shorncliffe. He found it in poor 
condition and unable to supply the replacements needed for the 1916 
campaign.34  
The Machine Gun (MG) service in England was another branch that failed. 
The training of MG officers and men in England was the responsibility of the 
Canadian Machine Gun Depot. The depot originated as a Machine Gun battalion 
from Canada that had neither completed infantry training nor undertaken machine 
gun instruction. The depot’s organisation as a Reserve battalion was unsuitable for 
supplying the twelve brigade MG companies and other MG units in the corps. 
Infantry battalions supplied the depot with recruits, and as to be expected, the 
battalions foisted the unwilling and unfit on the depot. It often had difficulty 
rejecting even the obviously unsuited. Pressure for infantry replacements also 
resulted in authorities in England sending trained MG officers and men as infantry, 
thus wasting their MG training. Even recovered wounded machine gunners were 
not immune to this pernicious practice. In addition, the depot lacked the 
                                            
32  Currie to Carson, December 1915, 8-7-1, RG 9 III A1 v52, LAC. 
33  Steele to MacDougall, 30 December 1915, RG 9 III B1 v622, LAC. 
34  Report to GOC Cdn. Training Division, Shorncliffe, 9 December 1915, MG 30 E81 v4, 
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necessary training materials and the type of machine guns used at the front. The 
situation was so chaotic that in November 1916 the commander of the depot was 
unable to estimate how many trained men the depot could produce in the next 
months.35 Byng was especially unhappy with the state of the brigade MG 
companies stating the “supply of personnel, condition of service and promotion is 
highly unsatisfactory and has resulted in extravagance, inefficiency and 
discontent.”36 
Efficiency 
The efficiency of the forces in England was abysmal. The treatment of 
casualties was so poorly organised that at one point 6,000 men were lost in the 
system. Contrary to good practice, recovered-wounded personnel were not 
returned to their units. A senior officer claimed the Canadians returned only 6% of 
their wounded to the front versus 60% for the British. There were also issues with 
authorities not repatriating permanently unfit men.37 
The Medical Service had too few officers to inspect arriving and departing 
drafts, a lack of Medical Officers assigned to reserve battalions, poor training, and 
a lack of coordination of standards between authorities in England and France. 
                                            
35  The Depot had only seventeen Vickers MG, the type used at the front and these had only 
arrived in November. “Report on Canadian Machine Gun Depot,” 17 November 1916, 34/2, 
RG 9 III C1 v3937, LAC. 
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The Service roiled with the controversy of the Bruce Report. Hughes appointed 
Colonel H.A. Bruce to investigate the Canadian Medical Service. Bruce, with no 
military experience but extensive surgical knowledge, made a one month 
whirlwind tour of the medical facilities and delivered a report in September 1916 
recommending a number of significant changes. The Surgeon-General G.C. Jones 
disagreed with the recommended reorganisation and resigned. The fallout from 
Bruce’s Report would bedevil Perley as Minister well into 1917.38 
Hughes saddled the Chaplain Service with another of his poor 
administrative appointments. The Director, Colonel Richard Steacy, was 
characterised by Borden as a “self-centred, useless, inefficient creature, heedless 
of duty and bent solely on gaining higher rank and increased pay.”39 A report on 
the service described a litany of problems including no discipline for chaplains 
returned for misconduct, administrative irregularities, important letters 
unanswered, lack of supervision, no understanding of the needs of the service in 
France, Roman Catholic complaints ignored, and promotion ‘left to caprice.’40 
The relations between the British and Canadian service deteriorated to the point 
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the British Deputy Chaplain-General refused to deal with Steacy.41  
The situation in the Quartermaster’s department was no better. The 
department unnecessarily used the highest medical category men in its Canadian 
Army Service Corps (CASC). Training units had their own ordnance supplies and 
transportation resulting in considerable duplication and waste. The Government 
paid for rented accommodations and hospital stores, even though the British were 
supposed to provide these gratis. There were 400 personnel working on repairing 
Ross Rifles at a cost of $5 per rifle for a weapon not used at the front.42  
Another complaint was that Canadian equipment was inadequate for active 
service and ended up condemned, sold at a loss, or cast off. These problems 
stemmed from Sam Hughes’ desire to promote Canadian industry and his firm 
conviction of the superiority of Canadian material. Unfortunately, while Hughes’ 
motives were well intended the results were not.43  
Promotions 
An exceedingly sore point with the forces in France was the unshakeable 
belief that commissions, promotions, appointments, and awards were at the 
                                            
41  “The Canadian Chaplain Service in the Field was constantly humiliated owing to the lack of 
even ordinary courtesy with the British Service, finally the Deputy Chaplain-General refused to 
have anything to do with the Canadian service except through the Assistant Director of 
Chaplain Services, Canadian Corps.” Confidential Report on Chaplain Service, 31 March 1917, 
RG 9 III A1 v104, LAC; John Simms Principal Chaplain to Perley, 30 April 1917, File 10, MG 
27 II D9 v118, Kemp Fonds; LAC. The British service had its own problems with the Chaplain 
Service, see Alison M. Brown, "Army Chaplains in the First World War" (PhD, University St. 
Andrews, 1996), 27. 
42  First Progress Report Quartermaster-General's Branch Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 20 
February 1917, Q-3, MG 27 II D9 v157, Kemp Fonds; LAC; McRae QMG to Perley, 12 March 
1917, 10-8-20, RG 9 III A1 v74, LAC; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 64. 
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mercy of political influence.44 Perley shared this belief as well writing in March 
1917 that “a great many of our troubles in the past have been caused by the 
feeling that promotion and leave could only be obtained through influence of 
some kind.”45 As a result, there was the apprehension that the staff, sycophants, 
and the connected received rewards over more deserving recipients.46 This belief 
is not surprising given the politicised nature of the pre-war Canadian Militia and 
the ample evidence of political influence affecting promotions.47 What was 
especially frustrating to the officers at the front were examples of officers who 
Hughes recalled to Canada as junior Captains or Majors, returning to England as 
Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels having leapt over serving officers.48  
The issue of promotions and awards was one that plagues all institutions and 
even if the system is objectively equitable, the perception will remain that it is 
unfair.49 As Kang in his thesis on British officers phrased it “honours and awards 
were in fact a highly contentious issue during the Great War that provoked 
                                            
44  For an example of the perennial Canadian complaint of regional inequality and influence see 
Steele to Carson, 28 August 1915, 8 8-5-10a, RG 9 III A1 v45, LAC; Willson, From Quebec to 
Piccadilly and Other Places: Some Anglo-Canadian Memories: 202. 
45  Harrington Letter, 3 August 1918, 10-T-158, RG 9 III A1 v339, LAC. 
46  This was not a wholly Canadian problem see Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the 
Western Front, 1914-1918: 587. 
47  For an example of the problem over commissioning NCOs, see Odlum to Carson, 29 March 
1916, 8 8-1-70, RG 9 III A1 v31, LAC. For an example of political influence see Carson to 
Dodds, 24 August  1915, 8-5-8, RG 9 III A1 v44, LAC. For a particularly egregious example of 
interference see Galbraith File, File 6-G-17, RG 9 III A1 v148, LAC. Hughes ordered Carson to 
commission a friend’s son, who turned out to be incapable. His commanding officer in France 
characterised him as “… absolutely unsuitable and unfitted to be an Officer. He is not fit to be 
a Bombardier.” 
48  See Lieutenant-Colonel Rogers’ complaint that two captains sent home because of inefficiency 
were promoted to Majors and made second in command of new battalions. Lt.-Col. C.H. 
Rogers to Carson, 16 March 1916, 8-1-71, RG 9 III A1 v31, LAC. 
49  For an account of the difficulties the British had see Chapter 15 of Messenger, Call to Arms: 
The British Army 1914-18: 474. 
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ceaseless suspicion and friction.”50 
Early in the war, Aitken arranged it so Hughes would be the sole arbiter of 
all promotions and honours not under Alderson’s control.51 This gave Hughes a 
powerful tool to control the forces in England, as he was the fountainhead for all 
advancement. As a result, Hughes was able to satisfy his friends, families, and 
colleagues. Hughes was especially diligent in advancing family members to 
positions above their probable merits.52 This obvious bias alienated in the officers 
in France and helped exacerbate the estrangement between Hughes and the 
corps.53  
Hughes, contrary to regulations, encouraged officers to contact him 
directly.54 Hence, it became common practice to work outside the normal and 
expected communication channels to get advancement.55 This extended to when 
Hughes visited England the various commanders were anxious to pay court to 
maintain favour.56  
Another cause of endless squabbling was officer gradation, as the Canadian 
Militia List did not apply. This resulted in deeply anguished disputes about the 
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52  Examples include Hughes’ brother, W. St. P. Hughes, Carson to Aitken, 9 June 1916, 8-5-8F, 
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relative ranking of different officers. There was no single source that could 
definitively determine who had seniority, so the Minister had to settle these 
disputes.57 
The promotion system failed. By late 1916, the authorities had not 
forwarded over 2,000 names from Shorncliffe to the War Office for 
promulgation.58 In addition, the War Office could not follow the changes in 
Canadian policy. The War Office responding to a request that the Canadian 
Minister approve all Canadian promotions in France before gazetting responded it 
was following a 1915 Privy Council order.59 In fact, this order was superseded, 
then further amended in 1916. This illustrates both the problem the War Office 
had in following Canadian rules but also that no one on the Canadian side caught 
the failure of the War Office to follow the agreed to procedure.60 
The war placed unprecedented demands on the Canadian military, so it is 
not surprising there were failures in the initial stages of the war. These errors are 
understandable given the conflict’s scope, scale, duration, and nature. After two 
years, however, the Canadian system in England was not improving and 
inexperience was no longer an excuse. The Canadian administration was not 
addressing the problems of inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and promotions. This was 
in stark contrast to the increasing professionalism and effectiveness of the 
Canadian forces in the field. If the field forces could demonstrate a steep ‘learning 
                                            
57  Perley to GG in Council, 3 January 1917, RG 9 III A1 v90, LAC. 
58  Report on the Work of Assistant Military Secretary's Branch since Organisation, 4 May 1917, 
MG 30 E46 v7, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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curve,’ so should have the Canadian administration in England. 
The proximate causes of this chaos were five-fold: Hughes’ need for control; 
Hughes’ drive to create a six division army; mediocrities in command and on 
instruction staff; the Government’s dependence on a volunteer recruiting system; 
and the limited communications between Canadian authorities in France, 
England, and Canada.  
As other authors have commented, Hughes was pugnacious, partisan, 
grandiose, frenetic, and unfettered by self-doubt. Hughes was supremely 
confident in his judgement of people and situations.61 This attitude contributed to 
Hughes’ desire for personal control over ‘his boys.’ To achieve this end Hughes 
established a confused and overlapping set of authorities that reflected his desire 
to centralise all decision-making under his aegis.62 
Hughes represented an older tradition of personal management of a 
government department.63 Before the First World War, the Canadian Federal 
Government was small enough that it was possible for an engaged minister to be 
personally involved in all major and many minor decisions.64 The ministries were 
as much an opportunity to reward the party faithful, as to run government 
operations. 
Hughes’ domination resulted in a tragic misalignment of priorities between 
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the dictates coming from Canada and the needs of the front. The authorities in 
England, when presented with a choice between satisfying Hughes or the front, 
chose expediency and satisfied Hughes, despite the resulting cost in blood and 
treasure. A particularly egregious example was Carson’s response to a request in 
November 1916 to supply men with the personal equipment used in France “If 
the authorities in France choose to change that equipment once our men reach 
France, that is their own funeral and their own responsibility.”65 
Hughes was convinced that if the Australians could raise five divisions for 
service on the Western Front from a smaller population Canada should be able to 
raise as much as eight to ten divisions.66 Hughes’ drive to create a larger army and 
the dependence on a volunteer force had a deleterious effect on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the training machine. The fundamental problem was the 
policy of raising new battalions rather than providing drafts for the front. Without 
a rational manpower policy or even an understanding of the available manpower 
resources, the Government relied on local worthies using their contacts and 
influence to raise battalions. The consequence was Canada formed 272 infantry 
or mounted rifle battalions, almost all of which were sent to England.67 This 
resulted in an excess of units clogging the administration in England and diverting 
resources from the proper mission of training men. It created a serious political 
issue of excess senior officers and NCOs, as the Canadian Corps would not accept 
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them as replacements at their rank. Consequently, there were 499 surplus senior 
officers and 6,000 NCOs in England.68  
In a long tradition, units proceeding to the front left behind the halt, the 
lame, and the inefficient, as commanders and instructors. These tended to have 
limited knowledge of modern conditions and equally limited abilities to prepare 
men for battle. The absence of effective communications between England and 
France further exacerbated the problem of poor instruction, so recruits trained in 
outdated techniques. One remarkable example of how out of touch was the 
training staff was a Canadian staff officer’s statement in the fall of 1916 that “the 
Lewis Machine Gun is apparently being used in the Canadian Corps”; this a year 
after its introduction at the front.69 
The problem of mediocrities in England started at the top with weak 
commanders, such as Steele, MacDougall, and the first commander of Bramshott, 
Lord Brooke. Steele was old, tired, unfit, and prone to intrigue.70 MacDougall was 
better suited for a staff position than commanding a training division, as he lacked 
the strength of character, health, backbone, or knowledge for such a responsible 
position. In addition, all PF officers knew they commanded on the sufferance of 
Hughes, who despised the PF.71  
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The training brigade commanders had little to no experience at the front and 
tended to be former battalion commanders who were skilled politicians. Alderson 
was concerned about officers, such as Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Smart and 
Maynard Rogers, selected for training brigades.72 Carson knew there were 
problems and admitted to Hughes he was not happy with the results from 
Shorncliffe and thought many of the brigade commanders incapable.73 
Commanders, such as Steele and MacDougall, did not react well to the 
deluge of complaints from the front. They either denied there was a problem or 
they shifted the blame.74 They seldom regarded any criticism as valid or at least 
deserving of investigation. This attitude was intensely frustrating and led to 
comments from senior officers like Currie “I almost feel as if it is no further use 
making complaints, because the position is almost hopeless.”75  
Units languished in Canada spending months in ineffective training before 
approaching a full complement. In many cases, to reach their full strength, units 
enlisted overage, underage, and unfit men who would be culled in England at 
great cost to the country.76 In late 1916, medical inspections assessed an average 
16% of all men arriving in England as unfit, with one unit with 45% of its men 
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medically unfit.77 
A further issue was the General Staff, which in theory was responsible for 
training, was ‘unduly subordinated’ to the administrative side and in one officer’s 
opinion practically subject to it.78 The technical reserve units, such as artillery and 
engineers, were subject to the local commanders, who in many cases were 
wholly ignorant of and unsympathetic to their special requirements. 
Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada Formed 
Hughes was under pressure from Borden, colleagues, and his minions in 
England to reorganise the forces overseas.79 For instance, Watson wrote to Carson 
suggesting “the whole slate must be cleaned from top to bottom. Things are 
radically wrong there General and you should insist, for the honour of Canada 
and the vital interests here at the front to have a drastic change effected.”80 In 
March 1916 in response, Hughes first set up an informal council with four 
members including Carson, Aitken, and Watson, the GOC 4th Division.81 The 
Council held only two meetings before Aitken undermined it, and Watson, 
                                            
77  Inefficient and Medically Unfit Soldiers Arriving from Canada, 3 July 1916, I-24-1, RG 9 III B1 
v447, LAC; Statement of Medical Fitness of Troops Who Arrive in England During October 
1916, 10-12-15, RG 9 III A1 v90, LAC; Minutes ASMC, 27 October 1916, RG 9 III A1 v107, 
LAC. 
78  Proposed Training Reorganisation, Col Reid to Carson 24 July 1916, 8-5-10f, RG 9 III A1 v45, 
LAC.; Summary of General Conditions Which Existed Prior to Assumption of Command by 
Major-General R.E.W.Turner, 23 February 1917, MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
79  Proposed Training Reorganisation, Col Reid to Carson 24 July 1916, 8-5-10f, RG 9 III A1 v45, 
LAC; Carson to Hughes, 15 December 1915, RG 9 III A1 v30, LAC; Gwatkin Notes, 11 March 
1916, 31737-37138, MG 26 H v62, Borden Fonds; LAC. 
80  Watson to Carson, 16 February 1916, 6-W-4, RG 9 III A1 v231, LAC. 
81  Hughes to Aitken, 31 March 1916, A1764, MG 27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds; LAC. 
5 Unwise Management 
 223 
realising the extent of the disorganisation, decided to focus on his division.82 In 
the fall, Hughes formed an Acting Sub-Militia Overseas Council to act as an 
advisory body. However, its utility was constrained by the Minister having to 
approve all its decisions, its size (twelve members), and its staffing with Hughes’ 
cronies.83 Hughes in his grandiose style claimed that the British Adjutant-General 
wished they could model their system on Hughes’ structure.84 The Council did not 
accomplish much in its short existence before it was wound up in November.85  
Borden had a terrible dilemma. It was obvious that there were serious 
problems with the overseas forces, and Hughes could not rectify them.86 Hughes, 
however, had a powerful constituency in Canada believing his claims of his 
prowess and accomplishments.87 In addition, Borden was non-confrontational and 
feared the damage the truculent Hughes could do if ousted. While Hughes was in 
England establishing his council, Perley was in Canada lobbying Borden for a 
civilian head of a smaller military council in England. From early in the war, 
Hughes and his regime concerned Perley. Already in May 1915, Perley was 
raising warnings that British did not know who was in charge. He had to deal with 
the consequences of Hughes’ intemperate outbursts and Perley wanted to mitigate 
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or avoid the damage by being more involved in military matters. Perley was 
convinced Hughes was a menace and was ‘damaging Canada’s reputation.’88 
Perley was a survivor and was not one to bow to Hughes’ bullying.89  
Borden decided to establish a separate ministry for overseas forces. This 
approach would solve the problems of Hughes’ control over the CEF while 
keeping Hughes in the Government. Recognising Borden’s manoeuvre would 
effectively end his power Hughes reacted strongly. Hughes’ health was suffering, 
and Morton suggests a serious car accident involving Hughes’ family further 
unbalanced his already unsteady personality. Hughes’ outrageous behaviour 
forced Borden to ask for his resignation. After much anguish, plotting, and pleas, 
Hughes finally resigned.90 What is surprising is the limited reaction from Hughes. 
It suggests that there was an undocumented quid pro quo of ensuring Garnet 
Hughes would get a division. Certainly, there were instructions to Conservatives 
not to attack Hughes unless he attacked the government.91 
In place of a single Department of Militia, Borden established two separate 
but equal ministries. Perley, who retained his position as acting High 
Commissioner, would head the new Ministry of Overseas Forces of Canada. 
Perley’s appointment was well received – it was obvious a change was needed.92 
Perley was from a wealthy lumber family from Ottawa, who was first elected from 
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the Quebec riding of Arteneuil in 1904.93 Perley was Borden’s closest confidant 
while the Conservatives were in opposition and when elected, Borden tasked 
Perley with overhauling the government machinery.94 Borden admired successful 
businessmen in an age where business attracted the best and brightest.95 Borden 
sent Perley to England in 1914 to evaluate the situation of the Canadian High 
Commission in England.96 Perley was an astute politician, an anglophile, a 
millionaire, and almost wholly ignorant of military matters.97 Borden warned 
Perley indirectly about his perceived predilection for the British with “a cry may 
be raised on this side that Canadian rights will not be strongly asserted under your 
administration and that Canadian direction and control will not be properly 
maintained.”98 
Borden appointed A.E. Kemp Minister of Militia in place of Hughes. Kemp 
was born into humble circumstances in Quebec and had parlayed his acumen 
and hard work into a successful business career in Toronto. He first entered 
politics in 1900 and was serving as a Minister without Portfolio at the start of the 
war. He acted as Borden’s trouble-shooter investigating operations of various 
departments and then serving as the first Chairman of the War Purchasing 
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Committee in 1915. Morton described Kemp as “bustling, aggressive, and 
sometimes pompous.”99 
ANZAC Comparison 
The new structure was significantly at variance with the approach of New 
Zealand and Australia. They both appointed British officers as GOC of all of their 
overseas forces, and these officers retained this post even after receiving 
appointments to command other units.100 This meant the GOC had responsibility 
for both the combat arms and administrative forces overseas. The advantages of 
this approach over the Canadian OMFC should have been better coordination 
with and support for the front. The same officer responsible for both functions 
should have mitigated the bickering between the front and rear services. In 
addition, a British GOC would minimise the intrusion of political influence.101 
These advantages, however, were not always realised, and there were 
disadvantages. The GOC’s focused on their combat command with the result that 
certainly the Australian GOC, Birdwood, spent little time on the forces in 
England.102 There was still bickering and intriguing in the Australian case, 
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especially when Major-General J.W. McCay, who was too politically dangerous 
to be returned to Australia, took over command of the depots in England.103 
Repeatedly, McCay lobbied to command all forces in England with a role similar 
to Turner’s. At other times, he angled for command of the Australian Corps, 
Birdwood’s position, or command of the 5th Division, again.104 Jeffrey Grey 
contrasts the Australian Imperial Force Headquarters (AIF) “whereas the Canadian 
and New Zealand administrations in London were to be become large and 
effective with some initiative, the AIF Headquarters in London remained purely an 
administrative body, with all policy decisions referred to Melbourne.”105  
 One advantage to the Canadian approach was the political heft of a cabinet 
minister residing in England. This may have been a factor in the lower capitation 
rates Canada paid for its forces versus the Australians.106 This lack of political 
influence later caused the Australian Government to send a cabinet minister to 
England during demobilisation to assert Australian interests.107  
A disadvantage of a British GOC was, in Birdwood’s case, his reluctance to 
replace British staff officers with Australians. Birdwood, also, did not encourage 
the assignment of Australians as Staff Learners. This contrasts with the Canadian 
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Faraday, "Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918," 
94; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 117. 
107  Faraday, "Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918," 
281. 
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policy of developing Canadians to replace British staff officers for all but the most 
senior positions.108 
One of the drawbacks of the two ministries was Perley was unable to defend 
his ministry in the House, leaving that responsibility to Kemp. As Morton suggests, 
Perley could be above politics leaving Kemp with the dirty work.109 Perley was of 
the cabinet but not really in the cabinet, given his remote location in England.110  
From the available records, there is no indication that Borden ever 
considered an overall GOC of overseas forces. Hughes would not have tolerated a 
GOC limiting his power and the GOC would undoubtedly have been a British 
officer, which would have been anathema to Hughes and the Canadian 
cabinet.111 When established, Borden’s purpose for the OMFC was to retain 
Hughes while stripping him of his power over the CEF. 
Turner is Selected 
Perley, assisted by William White, the Finance Minister in England on 
                                            
108  Grey, The Australian Army: 57; Andrews, The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations 
During World War I: 113. 
109  Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 112-113. 
110  In the Second World War, the Canadians adopted a different approach with a headquarters 
responsible for routine matters and command of the static training and administration units in 
England. This headquarters was subordinate to the Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army 
Overseas. There was a conscious effort to avoid what Crerar, the Chief of the General Staff, 
considered the ills of the system in the First World War and while the new system had 
advantages, there were still tensions between the front and base. It is also questionable if it was 
that more efficient than the organisation in the First World War, as the Canadian HQ in 
London at the end of the First World War consisted of 760 personnel versus the 2,073 at the 
Second World War. C. P. Stacey, Six Years of War, Official History of the Canadian Army in the 
Second World War (Ottawa,: E. Cloutier, Queen's printer, 1955), 215; Canada. Ministry 
Overseas Military Forces of Canada., Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of 
Canada, 1918  (London: Printed by authority of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of 
Canada, 1919), 55. 
111  In late 1916, when Borden was determining the organisation, no Canadian officer, including 
Currie, had the experience, credibility, or success to be selected GOC. 
5 Unwise Management 
 229 
business, had the daunting task of determining the structure of his new ministry. 
Initially, all the parties worked on the assumption that Perley’s new Ministry 
would mimic the organisation in Canada with an Overseas Militia Council. 
Borden offered to send the Chief of General Staff, Major-General Willoughby 
Gwatkin, and Eugene Fiset, the Deputy Minister of Militia, to help staff the 
Council. Borden made the Gwatkin offer in part, because Gwatkin was planning 
to resign due to conflict with Hughes.112 Perley was fully aware of the 
inadequacies of the existing senior commanders in England and knew he needed 
a stronger team. He realised he needed a respected leader with front experience 
and the confidence of the corps.113 Parachuting in Gwatkin, an Englishman, 
would be a serious misstep, undermine Perley’s credibility with the corps, and 
would open Perley to further accusations of subordinating Canadian interests to 
British ones.114  
Perley astutely met with Byng and his senior commanders down to brigade 
level to get their advice on the organisation and staff. Perley received universal 
advice that rather than a Council there should be a front-experienced officer as 
GOC. He should be assisted by an Adjutant-General, Quartermaster General, and 
Director of Training, with a Deputy Minister under Perley for civil affairs. They 
could act as an informal council if the right men were selected.115  
Perley now had his organisation, but he needed the front-experienced GOC. 
                                            
112  Cable Borden to Perley, 8 November 1916, v7, File 1, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; LAC; 
Acting Sub-Militia Council E.P. 3.7.39, RG 24 v6930, LAC. 
113  Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 96. 
114  Perley to Borden, 27 November 1916, v7, File 1, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
115  Cable Perley to Borden. Undated, v7, File 2, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
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This officer needed to have the confidence of the corps but also have the breadth 
of experience and expertise to deal with the multitude of issues in England that 
involved military and civil matters. Perley had effectively two choices, Currie or 
Turner. Of the other two divisional commanders, Lipsett of the 3rd Division was 
British and thus was disqualified, and Watson was too junior and had already 
passed on the opportunity to be GOC in England. Perley interviewed both Currie 
and Turner without revealing his purpose and sought Byng’s advice. Byng 
recommended Currie without any qualifications and offered to release him to 
England.116 Perley cabled Borden that “Currie is generally preferred by officers at 
the front,” but his Liberal affiliations may cause objections, however, Currie 
claimed he no longer took a political interest. Perley described Turner as “much 
beloved by everyone but perhaps not quite so firm or forceful as others.”117 Both 
White and Perley thought “Currie most capable for position but Turner would 
probably be more popular with our following.”118 
As a result, Perley first offered the position to Currie, which Currie rejected. 
Currie smouldered with resentment over the treatment of the corps by the 
politicians and he was convinced that the offer was a manoeuvre to displace him. 
Currie demanded that he would only accept the position if it were free of political 
interference. This was not an unreasonable demand given the previous history of 
overt intrusion. Perley, however, was probably offended by the inference that he 
was no different from Hughes. Currie believed that Perley was cool to him 
                                            
116  GHP Memorandum, File 3, MG 4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives. 
117  Cable Perley to Borden, 22 November 1916, v7, File 2, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; 
LAC. 
118  ibid. 
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afterwards because of this. Currie also wanted to remain at the front, as that was 
where the opportunities and honour lay.119 
Perley then offered the position to Turner on 24 November 1916. Turner at 
first resisted – recognising, as did Currie, the supremacy of the active front. He did 
not want to leave his division. Perley however positioned it as Turner’s duty and 
presented an excerpt of a cable from Borden that read whomever Perley selected 
“will regard it as his duty in the public interest and for the national welfare to 
undertake the ever more important duty which you propose to entrust to him.”120 
Perley had requested Borden send the telegram as a further inducement to 
convince Turner. Additional pressure from Byng and Turner’s innate sense of 
responsibility led him formally to accept the offer on 30 November. He did so 
with the proviso that his seniority be respected and that he be considered for 
Corps command if the opportunity arose.121 Perley’s original note was 
accompanied by an unsigned and undated note asking Turner to cross over 
quickly and that the “post will not foreclude him from again getting to the fighting 
line at some future time after he has got everything in shape here and when the 
suitable opportunity arises.”122  
One aspect of this decision process that some historians have 
                                            
119  Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939: 130; Urquhart, Arthur 
Currie, the Biography of a Great Canadian: 116, 140; Currie to Mother, 24 January 1917, File 
34, MG 4027 C3, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives. 
120  Cable Perley to Borden. Undated, v7, File 2, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
121  Turner to Perley, 30 November 1916, MG 30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
122  The note is undoubtedly from Perley. Perley to Turner, 24 November 1916, v7, File 2, MG 27 
II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
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misrepresented is the notion that Byng was eager to sack Turner.123 Given the 2nd 
Division’s considerable success at Courcelette it is difficult to understand why 
Byng would want to unstick Turner, and there is no evidence existing to support 
this claim. Clearly, Byng regarded Currie as more capable than Turner but it does 
not follow that he wanted to remove Turner. If Byng wanted to replace Turner, 
why did he not recommend Turner initially? It is more plausible that Byng wanted 
the desperate situation in England to be resolved and if Currie would not do it 
then Turner would have to.  
Turner was reluctant to take the position but writing Garnet Hughes, he put 
an interesting spin on his situation that “When the two ministers were here no 
intimation was given that I was likely to be selected, and I honestly say the 
prospect did not appeal to me. I know there will be a bag of trouble, and that is a 
feature which rather pleases me.”124 
Turner was on his way to England with the unwieldy title of General Officer 
Commanding Canadian Forces in the British Isles.125 As one battalion history put it 
“It may be assumed that, though duty permitted him no alternative, he 
surrendered command of the 2nd Canadian Division with regret; it is certain that 
the units of the division regretted his departure profoundly.”126 A contemporary 
                                            
123  For example “Byng, delighted to be rid of an inadequate commander…” Granatstein, Canada's 
Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace: 86; Greenhous, Canada and the Battle of Vimy 
Ridge, 9-12 April 1917: 54. 
124 Turner to Hughes, 26 November 1916, File 5, MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds; LAC. 
125  Turner’s wife and two daughters were staying in London, so Turner’s letters to his wife cease, 
with his transfer to England. The remaining entries of his ‘diary’ are sparse references to 
inspections he made in 1918. Turner’s son, Harold, attended school in Canada at Bishop’s 
College in Sherbrooke, Quebec. Turner was later granted an honourary Doctor of Laws from 
Bishops. 
126 Fetherstonhaugh, The 24th Battalion, C.E.F., Victoria Rifles of Canada, 1914-1919: 109. 
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perspective from a staff officer D. E. Macintyre believed Turner “certainly is the 
right man in the right place. Unfortunately it is a great loss for us, everyone was 
his friend out here. He is not only a capable solider but an absolutely honest and 
fearless man and should go far.”127 How far Turner went and what he 
accomplished is the subject of the next chapter. 
                                            
127  Macintryre Diary Entry, 26 November 1916, MG 30 E241 v1, D.E. Macintyre Fonds; LAC. 
 6  
‘A WISE CHOICE:’ 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
General Turner is a great strength and was a wise choice. 
Sir George Perley, Minister of OMFC1  
 
Turner and his staff were under severe time constraints to build up a supply 
of effectively trained replacements before the start of the 1917 spring offensive.2 It 
was, therefore, apparent to Turner that virtually every aspect of the Canadian 
training and administration organisation needed rapid reform, revision, 
replacement, rearrangement, or renewal. Turner implemented wide sweeping 
reforms that increased the effectiveness and improved the efficiency of the 
organisation and refashioned the promotion system. What is remarkable is how 
swiftly Turner and his staff implemented these changes, with most in place within 
four months of Turner’s selection. 
This chapter describes this remarkable transformation over the first seven 
months of Turner’s command, during which Byng commanded the Canadian 
Corps. The chapter also reviews the extent to which this metamorphosis was 
successful and the factors that explain the success.  
                                            
1  Perley to Borden, 27 January 1917, 13656, MG 26 H1 v33, Borden Fonds; LAC. 
2  Throughout the chapter and the rest of the thesis, it is difficult at this remote remove to 
distinguish the responsibility between Turner and his staff. Staffs, in this period, were 
considered an extension of the commander and were to remain in the background. As a result, 
in most instances it a reference to Turner should be assumed to encompass his staff, as well. 
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Figure 15 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Turner, GOC Canadian Forces in the 
British Isles 
 
General Turner Photograph, Office, Canadian War Records, 19940003-682, CWM. 
 
After a short leave and meetings with Perley, Turner’s first actions were to 
deal with the old guard by relieving the acting Chief of Staff, Adjutant-General, 
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and Quartermaster-General.3 Turner thanked them for their services and suggested 
a position commensurate with their qualifications would be found; none, 
however, was identified and all returned to Canada.4 Initially, Perley considered 
keeping MacDougall as the Adjutant-General and finding a place for Carson, but 
Turner rejected this plan, as he did not want to be encumbered with those 
responsible for the chaos.5 MacDougall’s appointment was by Order in Council, 
so Perley assumed it was necessary to recall MacDougall to Canada for Turner to 
replace him.6 Canadian authorities recalled MacDougall, where he resumed 
revising the King’s Regulations and Orders – a task more in keeping with his 
capabilities.7  
The two most influential officers, Steele and Carson, were also relieved of 
their duties. On Perley’s appointment, Steele promptly sent Perley 
recommendations that he become the Inspector-General or even the GOC.8 
Perley did not however see any role for Steele, and Steele lost his Canadian 
command but retained the British Southeastern District.9 Carson was relieved 7 
December, and while Perley considered him briefly as chairman of a 
                                            
3  Turner essentially sent the same letter to the acting Chief of the General Staff Brigadier-General 
R.G.E. Leckie, the Adjutant-General, Colonel F.A. Reid, and the Quartermaster-General 
Colonel W.J. Neill. 
4  Turner to Leckie, 4 December 1916, MG 30 E46 v11, Turner Fonds; LAC. Leckie briefly 
commanded the forming 5th Division before being superseded by Garnet Hughes in February 
1917. 
5  Cable Perley to Borden, 22 November 1916, v7, File 2, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; 
LAC. 
6  Cable Perley to Borden, 28 November 1916, v7, File 2, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; 
LAC. 
7  ibid; Biography of J.C. MacDougall During War, G.A.Q. 4-40, RG 24 v1815 LAC. 
8  Steele's Recommendations for Organisation of OMFC, RG 9 III A1 v74, LAC; Steele to Perley, 
18 November 1916, RG 9 III A1 v74, LAC. 
9  Steele remained in command until 1918. Cable Perley to Borden, Undated, v7, File 3, MG 27 
II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
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Demobilisation Committee, Carson returned to Canada in June 1917.10 
Turner’s next challenge was staff selection. Contrary to what some historians 
have claimed, Turner was responsible for choosing his senior staff officers, which 
Perley approved.11 Turner had three critical positions to fill, which corresponded 
to the British staff model. In the British system, there were three supposedly co-
equal staff branches – the General Staff, Adjutant-General, and Quartermaster-
General. In reality, the General Staff managed coordination of staff duties, so it 
was more equal than were the others. The primary duties of the General Staff in 
the OMFC were training and counter-intelligence.12 The Adjutant-General branch 
was responsible for personnel matters, discipline, draft finding, Medical, and 
Chaplain Services. The Quartermaster-General was accountable for supplies, 
transportation, and accommodations.13 
Turner had a predilection for selecting officers he knew, and this applied to 
two of this three key staff officer appointments.14 For the critical role of GSO 1, he 
selected Major H. F. McDonald, a burly Militia officer aged thirty-two, who had 
served with Turner as the Orderly Officer in the 3rd Brigade and later served in 
Garnet Hughes’ 1st Brigade as a Brigade-Major. McDonald was wounded at the 
                                            
10  J.W. Carson Service Jacket, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1534 - 50, LAC; Cable 
Perley to Borden, 4 December 1916, 45435, MG 26 H v88, LAC. Carson hung around long 
enough to either start or be the subject of a rumour that he would fill in as the Deputy Minister, 
Carson to Be Appointed Deputy Minister, Ross Diary Entry 16 January 1917, MG 30 E392 v1, 
Ross Fonds; LAC. 
11  Cable Perley to Borden, 5 December 1916, 45449, MG 26 H v88, LAC; Swettenham, To Seize 
the Victory: The Canadian Corps in World War I: 142; Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 99. 
12  On active service, the General Staff responsibilities also included operations and intelligence. 
13  Messenger, Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-18: 17; Canada. Ministry Overseas Military 
Forces of Canada., Report of the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 1918: 9-97. 
14  He also brought over his CRE Colonel H.T. Hughes, the Deputy Director of Medical services 
for the Corps, Surgeon General G. Foster, and his DA&QMG, as the Director Ordnance 
Services. 
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Somme and lost his left arm.15 No longer fit for active service but with extensive 
front-line experience, McDonald was an excellent choice for the training role. 
Byng thought him a good selection agreeing, “Nothing could be better from my 
point of view.”16  
For his Adjutant-General, Turner selected another familiar face, his chief 
administrative officer from the 2nd Division, Colonel P.E. Thacker. Thacker was a 
forty-one year old PF officer and RMC graduate. He had attended Camberley Staff 
College, and so was one of the few formally trained staff officers in the Canadian 
military. In 1912, he was seconded to the Central Section of the Imperial General 
Staff in London, where he was serving at the start of the war. This strongly 
suggests that he was highly regarded by British and Canadian authorities. Serving 
in London was an invaluable introduction to many of the British officers he would 
deal with later. Thacker joined the 2nd Division as its chief administrative officer 
when the division arrived in England.17  
Finding an effective Quartermaster-General with the appropriate experience 
in both the military and civilian spheres was a greater challenge. Initially, Turner 
asked to retain A.D. McRae, the forty-three year old Deputy Minister of Hughes’ 
Sub-Militia Council, as a temporary Quartermaster-General until he could find a 
suitable officer. Perley planned to use McRae as his Deputy Minister. Turner, 
                                            
15  2nd Canadian Division, RO 1313, 21 October 1915, RG 9 III B3 v3789, LAC; 2nd Division 
A&Q War Diary, 19 June 1916, RG 9 III D3 v4848, LAC; McDonald, Harold French Service 
Record, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 6726 - 40, LAC.  
16  Byng to Turner, 17 December 1916, DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.6, 19710147-007, Turner Fonds; 
CWM. 
17  Defence, The Quarterly Militia List of the Dominion of Canada (Corrected to June 30, 1914); 
P.E. Thacker Service Jacket, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9580 - 41, LAC; Biography 
P.E. Thacker, Folder 144/File 10, RG 9 III D1 v4734, LAC. 
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however, requested McRae be made the permanent Quartermaster-General as he 
could not find a replacement “with a wide experience of business affairs as well 
as a knowledge of Military matters.”18  
McRae was an interesting choice. First, he was the only senior officer 
retained from Hughes’ Sub-Militia Council. He had no pre-war military 
experience but was able to leverage his considerable business acumen and 
success to bring dramatic improvements to the quartermaster service in England.19 
Finally, Turner selected him over the objections of influential Western politicians, 
who were still angry about McRae’s reformation of the remount service in the 
West in 1915.20 This is an example of both Perley and Turner refusing to allow the 
political interference that characterised Hughes’ regime.  
With McRae’s loss, Perley had to find a Deputy Minister. After discussing 
the matter with Borden, Perley selected Walter Gow, a railroad lawyer from the 
prestigious Toronto law firm of Blake and Cassels. Gow had up to that point an 
undistinguished military career, so it was probably not a difficult decision to 
return to a civilian role.21 Gow worked effectively with Turner and Perley but 
relations with Turner broke down later in 1918 and will be discussed in Chapter 
                                            
18  Cable Perley to Borden, 16 December 1916, 45462, MG 26 H v88, LAC; Turner to Perley, 27 
January 1917, MG 30 E46 v7, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
19  McRae was a wealthy and very successful developer from Vancouver. For a laudatory 
biography, see Betty O'Keefe, Macdonald, Ian, Merchant Prince: The Story of Alexander 
Duncan McRae, 1st ed. (Surrey, B.C.: Heritage House, 2001). 
20  Cable Borden to Perley, 8 November 1916, v7, File 1, MG 27 II D12 v4-7, Perley Fonds; LAC; 
O'Keefe, Merchant Prince: The Story of Alexander Duncan McRae: 88; Steele to Shaungnessy, 
19 November 1916, RG 9 III A1 v74, LAC. 
21  His Brigade Commander recommended that he not retain his position as a Brigade-Major in a 
Training Brigade in England. Confidential Report on W Gow, 27 December 1916, R-161-2, RG 
9 III B1 v806, LAC. 
6 ‘A Wise Choice’ 
 240 
8.22 
Turner’s policy of choosing familiar officers carried a risk of selecting them 
more for their compatibility than their capability. An example of this was his 
selection and retention of Garnet Hughes as his Brigade-Major. Generally, 
Turner’s choices, however, did work out. Garnet Hughes defended Turner’s 
selections to his father characterising them as “Thacker is not quite up to his job 
but they might have done a great deal worse. There is a first class man in 
McDonald who used to be my Brigade-Major and who is now chief of the general 
staff. … McRae is the best possible.”23 
                                            
22  Cable Perley to Borden, 16 January 1917, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC; Cable 
Borden to Perley, 20 January 1917, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC; Morton, A 
Peculiar Kind of Politics: 99. 
23  Garnet Hughes to Sam Hughes, 25 March 1917, File 4, MG 27 II D23 v14, Hughes Fonds; 
LAC. 
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Figure 16 Canadian Forces in England 1917 Simplified Organisation Chart   
 
 
Underlying all the problems with replacements was the inherent inefficiency 
of the training system because the manpower supply and replacement demands 
were decoupled from each other and were unpredictable. Monthly replacement 
demands could fluctuate by a factor of four between the months of holding the 
line to a peak resulting from a major offensive. For example, the OMFC 
despatched 3,241 replacements in January 1917 and 13,710 in May.24 Manpower 
supply also varied, although steadily declining in 1917, because of recruiting 
issues. Further complicating matters was the threat of U-Boats that forced 
Canadian authorities to rush drafts to England in March and April before the long 
                                            
24  Reinforcements Despatched January 1917, File 19, MG 30 E46 v3, Turner Fonds; LAC; 
Reinforcements Despatched May 1917, File 23, MG 30 E46 v3, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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daylight hours of May, June and July.25  
This variability meant the new system had to be flexible to handle a large 
influx of men from Canada or rush recruits through a compressed training 
schedule. For instance, in the aftermath of Vimy, the General Staff condensed the 
newly introduced fourteen-week training course to nine weeks.26 In addition, the 
training state of units arriving from Canada ranged from having completed only 
one to five weeks of the syllabus despite being embodied in some cases for over a 
year.27 
The recruiting system in Canada collapsed with the average number of new 
recruits arriving in England dropping dramatically over the course of 1917 from 
15,197 in April to the low point of 261 in July 1917.28 Thus, the system had to 
deal with this fundamental problem outside of Turner’s control. The chart below 
graphically illustrates the catastrophic imbalance between replacements received 
versus despatched and this understates the problem, as it does not account for 
losses in England owing to illness, accidents, debility, and transfers.  
                                            
25  Cable Perley to Kemp, 3 March 1917, RG 9 III A1 v104, LAC. 
26  Memo to GOC, Lt.Col. McDonald, 19 June 1917, MG 30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds; LAC; Report 
on the Work of the General Staff Branch During the Month of June 1917, MG 30 E46 v6, 
Turner Fonds; LAC. 
27  State of Training in Canada of Battalions Arriving in England in April/May 1917, MG 30 E46 
v6, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
28  Report to Kemp, 18 May 1918, MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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Figure 17 Replacements Received and Despatched29 
 
 
A further complication was the increasing demands for Rail and Forestry 
Troops. Turner estimated in July 1917 that the Rail and Forestry Troops would 
require an additional 12,700 men to expand and replace losses from disease, 
accident, and enemy fire.30 Further, hard experience showed the Rail troops 
needed to be a high medical category given the heavy work of building and 
maintaining light rail lines.31 A final short-term distortion to the manpower supply 
was a bizarre error made by Kemp’s staff in mistakenly decoding a cable 
requesting 500 artillery replacements as 5,000, resulting in Canada sending 
excess artillery personnel.32 
                                            
29  ibid. 
30  Some rail troops worked close to the front building and maintaining light rail links and were 
subject to heavy German artillery interdiction fire. Rail and Forestry Reinforcements Needed, 
RG 9 III A1 v104, LAC. 
31  Report Captain Ker, Senior Medical Officer, CRT, 1 December 1917, RG 9 III B1 v2939, LAC. 
32  This resulted in gunners arriving from Canada transferring to the infantry to the deep frustration 
of those involved. Artillery Transfers, 10-8-21 pt1, RG 9 III A1 v74, LAC. 
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Effectiveness 
Turner and his staff’s first step to improve training effectiveness was 
publishing a daily set of Routine Orders commencing 5 December 1916. 
Previously, there was no central repository or authority for routine or standard 
orders and the British equivalent Army Council Instructions applied automatically, 
regardless of their applicability. As of 16 January, the Headquarters, OMFC 
determined which British instructions applied.33 
McDonald strongly recommended that the General Staff take over full 
responsibility for training from the British to centralise control. That same day, the 
War Office announced that Canadians control training.34 Turner’s staff also 
streamlined staff work by getting British approval to communicate directly with 
the Adjutant-General Department of the Canadian Section at GHQ.35  
 Turner wanted also to reform the way Canada supplied replacements. He 
wanted depots in Canada to provide drafts to affiliated training units in England. 
Using drafts meant no longer having to wait for battalions to recruit to full strength 
before sending them to England. It would also eliminate the many problems of 
having to break up units when they arrived with the attendant evils of unhappy 
men, surplus senior officers, and the ‘residue of the regimental organisation.’ 
Perley agreed and lobbied Kemp to change the policy.36  
                                            
33  RO 244, 16 January 1917, RG 9 III B3 v3780, LAC. 
34  Memo McDonald to Turner, 21 December 1916, RG 9 III B1 v3098, LAC; Order War Office 
121/Overseas.3157 (S.D. 2), 21 December 1916, RG 9 III B1 v3098, LAC. 
35  Previously, all personnel matters such as leave and furlough had first to pass through the War 
Office and GHQ with the attendant delays. War Office A Matters. 121/Overseas/3289 (D.R.2), 
7 February 1917, RG 9 III B1 v2738, LAC. 
36  Memo Turner to Perley, 16 December 1916, RG 9 III A1 v90, LAC. 
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Perley and Kemp decided that existing infantry battalions in Canada with 
over 700 men would ship to England as a unit, with the understanding it would 
disband on arrival.37 All officers above the rank of Lieutenant would return to 
Canada if they could not find a position or were unwilling to revert to Lieutenant. 
Canada would send any battalions under 700 men as drafts. Kemp anticipated 
sending men in batches of 250 for a particular battalion in England.38 Kemp, 
because of the compromise, avoided facing the consequence of the Government 
having authorised too many battalions. Instead, Perley, Turner, and the OMFC 
had to face the obloquy of breaking up battalions.39 The authorisation of 
additional battalions continued to June 1917.40  
On 28 December, Headquarters announced a new training organisation to 
improve draft finding and to better maintain the territorial affiliation of units.41 
Turner’s staff reduced the existing fifty-seven Training Battalions to twenty-six 
Reserve Battalions and the twelve Training Brigades to six. Each reserve battalion 
reinforced one or two battalions at the front.42 Previously reserve battalions would 
supply men to as many as eleven line battalions.43 
In May, frustrated by the poor results of training in Canada, McDonald 
recommended instruction in Canada be limited to just inculcating essential 
discipline before despatching drafts. This memo became the basis of a letter from 
                                            
37  An understanding that was not always communicated or was not comprehended. 
38  A/AG Cdn Militia to HQ, CEF, 19 January 1917, 10-12-11, RG 9 III A1 v90, LAC. 
39  For a particularly vitriolic view of the break up, see Leslie M Frost, Fighting Men  (Toronto: 
Clarke, Irwin, 1967), 90. 
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Perley to Kemp who agreed that this would be policy from June 1917.44  
The next crucial step was to convert the infantry to a full territorial 
regimental system to ‘simplify the system of records and facilitating dealing with 
casualties.’45 Battalions from the same province or area formed regiments, 
consisting of a Regimental Depot for handling convalescents and new recruits, 
one or more battalions in the field, and one or more reserve battalions. This 
organisation would help ensure wounded men would return, if not to their 
battalion, at least to a battalion from their province, and aid in administering 
recruits and returning wounded.46  
Another important step was the adoption of the War Office’s fourteen-week 
training syllabus modified by the General Staff to suit Canadian needs. One 
difference was 50% of all Canadian troops were to receive Lewis Gun training, 
unlike the British who did this instruction in France.47 The General Staff issued the 
syllabus as a training pamphlet in January 1917, with a revision issued 1 October. 
Turner instructed reserve units to focus on the training of men for the front, which 
did not appear to be always a priority under Carson. As an example, the General 
Staff ordered training commands to assign no fatigues to instructors or trainees, 
unlike previously where much training time was taken up in these duties. The 
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syllabus placed considerable attention on physical and bayonet training as a way 
of fostering fighting spirit. Paul Hodges, a modern critic of the bayonet, considers 
the bayonet a ‘fetish.’ Not all historians agree, however, as a recent thesis and 
Paddy Griffith argue the bayonet was useful and so the training not wasted. 48 
Over half of the time was spent on physical training, fieldwork, marching, 
and drill, which was a reaction to Byng’s preference for men with fundamental 
military discipline rather than a smattering of higher level instruction. Turner, as a 
result of Byng’s demands, wanted attention paid to neatness and smartness in 
drill, saluting, personal appearance, and care of arms. It was also a recognition 
that the lethality of modern weapons increased the need for attention on drill as 
the cornerstone for discipline. It was a conceit of the British and Canadian senior 
commanders that drill was essential to develop discipline and discipline was 
foundational for success in the conditions on the Western Front – a belief that had 
some merit. The British view of Canadian recruits reinforced the apparent need for 
additional drill, as the British Inspector of Infantry believed “The Canadian learns 
bayonet fighting, bombing and wiring quicker than the average Englishman, but 
he is slower at picking up subjects which necessitate exactness, snap and 
discipline.”49  
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Figure 18 Training Syllabus50 
Tasks Hours Percentage 
PT, Field Work, and Marching 171 33% 
Bayonet 54 10% 
Musketry 153 29% 
Inspection/Lecture 51 10% 
Anti-Gas 12 2% 
Bombing  12 2% 
Night Work 15 3% 
Entrenching 15 3% 
Drill 111 21% 
Rifle Bomb/Lewis Gun 24 5% 
Total 526 100% 
 
Not only was the nature of the instruction changed but also so were the 
instructors and their training. Turner made it a priority to replace fully fit 
instructors, with lower category combat veterans. This replacement had the 
double benefit of releasing NCOs to the front and bringing in instructors with 
front-line experience. However, not all the NCOs were interested in leaving the 
comfort of England for the hardships of the front. In May, Turner demanded the 
area commanders be more aggressive in replacing Category ‘A’ instructors.51  
Further, Turner wanted all officers in training positions, and especially 
company commanders in reserve units, to be overseas veterans. Ideally, they 
should be officers fit only for home service, and, if not, the area commanders had 
to get permission to retain them.52 By October 1917, Turner had tightened the 
requirements so that all the Permanent Cadre of the training units were to be 
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overseas veterans and any that were not were to be replaced immediately.53 
Turner’s demand for combat veterans had three benefits. First, it helped 
ensure the training was practical and in line with the front’s needs. Secondly, 
combat veterans would have more impact on trainees. Finally, it helped defuse 
the constant complaints that Argyll House (the short-hand term used to describe 
Headquarters, OMFC) and the training command had too many non-veteran 
officers hiding from the front.54 
One of the innovative steps taken was the General Staff’s establishment of a 
Trench Warfare School to help improve the quality and consistency of training. 
The School trained instructors in entrenching, bombing, rifle-bombing, anti-gas, 
and Stokes mortars, and qualified 509 Officers and 3508 Other Ranks as 
instructors.55 Canadian authorities also took advantage of the courses offered by 
the British, such that the number of Canadian personnel at British courses almost 
doubled from December 1916 to February 1917.56 Men now trained using the 
weapons and equipment they would use at the front, unlike under Carson. This 
had the obvious advantage of making the training more realistic and useful. It also 
eliminated the trouble caused by having to re-equip men being drafted.57 All 
recruits were required to pass standard War Office tests and have their 
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qualifications recorded in their pay books when sent to the front.58 This allowed 
the General Staff to trace any deficiencies and this resulted in improved 
commitment to results from training officers.59 
Comparisons with Other Dominions 
The New Zealand military had probably the most efficient and effective 
drafting and training system of all the Dominions. New Zealand benefited from a 
compulsory military training program, so was able to provide a predictable supply 
of replacements. Regional units in New Zealand drafted and trained men that 
reinforced an affiliated unit at the front.60 In addition, New Zealand understood its 
manpower resources, so did not over-expand its forces, as much as did Canada 
and Australia.61 The Australians relied more on British instructors and courses for 
much of their training.62  
Ironically, while Canada was adopting a regimental system for its forces, the 
British moved to a more centralised system to make the most efficient use of 
available personnel. The severe losses at the Somme meant the authorities 
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despatched drafts to where needed, regardless of regimental distinctions.63 
The Germans relied on more training near the front with eight weeks at a 
depot in Germany and four more weeks of intense training at the front manned by 
combat veterans.64 At least one British division commander believed the German 
training to be ‘harder and sterner’ than British training.65 
Addressing the numerous problems with the technical arms was another 
high priority for Turner. The first step was to have these Depots report directly to 
the General Staff rather than through the local training command.66 The Artillery 
Depot was reorganised with a new commander responsible for all the branches of 
the artillery. At the same time, the artillery service had to deal with a major 
reorganisation at the front. Haig wanted a more flexible field artillery structure 
with more army-level Field Artillery Brigades. To create these additional units, the 
War Office reduced divisional artillery to two Field Artillery Brigades and 
increased batteries to six guns. In the process, three Canadian Army Field Artillery 
Brigades were formed. It meant a considerable shuffling of Canadian artillery units 
in France and England, with the 4th Division’s artillery supplying gun sections to 
increase battery size.67  
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The General Staff established a new Signal School for training signallers in 
the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, while the Engineers continued to be 
responsible for training signallers for brigade, division, and corps units. Signalling 
was in a transition period as new communications technologies, such as Buzzer 
sets, Fullerphones, and wireless were increasingly used and, confusingly, 
responsibility was split between the Signalling Service and the Engineers. Signal 
training quality and quantity, especially for the divisional and corps units, was a 
source of considerable dissatisfaction throughout the war.68 The lack of civilian-
trained recruits for the most advanced technical positions and equipment 
shortages handicapped training. Some positions, such as wireless operator, 
required months of training and practice. As early as May, the commander of the 
CETD was pointing out that the Depot, in the first quarter of 1917, had supplied 
2,004 replacements but had only received 997 men from Canada and 620 of 
these arrived at the end of April.69 
The Machine Gun service was in particular need of immediate reform. 
Typical of Turner, the solution was to follow the British lead and establish a 
separate Machine Gun Corps (MGC). The British had formed their MGC in 
October 1915 to more effectively train, administer, and draft these critical 
personnel.70 Byng, in February 1917, responded to Turner’s initial 
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recommendations for a MGC with a detailed proposal from Lieutenant-Colonel 
Raymond Brutinel, the Canadian Corps Machine Gun Officer. To further assist, 
Byng also sent over an experienced Machine Gun officer, Major Balfour. Byng 
expected Balfour to replace the existing commander of the Machine Gun Depot, 
whom Byng thought an egregious failure. When this did not transpire, Byng 
complained to Turner. Turner responded immediately, by writing on Byng’s letter, 
“Major Balfour is to take command of MG Corps permanently!”71 The Canadian 
MGC (CMGC) came into effect in April with the transfer of all officers and men in 
Machine Gun units to the CMGC.72  
From early in the war, the Canadian Corps wanted only subalterns from 
Canada and England.73 The corps adopted this position in part to prevent Hughes 
saddling the corps with excessive numbers of unqualified but politically 
connected senior officers. Turner was demanding subalterns be commissioned 
from the ranks in December 1915.74 Once in command in England, Turner was 
able to institute this policy over the objections of the authorities in Canada, who 
had to deal with hundreds of now surplus junior officers in Canada. Turner did 
bend to allow a small number of officers conducting drafts to England to be 
considered for retention. Other than this exception, only RMC graduates and 
                                            
71  Byng to Turner, 27 February 1917, MG 30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
72  Grafton, The Canadian "Emma Gees": A History of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps: 73; RO 
558 Organisation - Cdn MGC, 20 February 1917, P-81-33, RG 9 III B1 v2910, LAC; Sims to 
Montague, 25 February 1917, MG 30 E46 v10, Turner Fonds; LAC; Byng to Turner, 18 January 
1917, 99/10, RG 9 III C1 v3864, LAC. 
73  Carson to Hughes, 13 January 1916, 8-1-87a, RG 9 III A1 v34, LAC. 
74  Turner to Carson, 7 December 1915, 8-1-87, RG 9 III A1 v34, LAC. 
6 ‘A Wise Choice’ 
 254 
technical officers, such as doctors, were to come from Canada.75 
The British and Dominions moved to a policy of relying on commissioning 
NCOs and men to supply subalterns. The British increasingly adopted this 
approach after exhausting the traditional supply of junior officers from Public 
Schools and Universities, so that roughly 80% of officer commissions in 1917-
1918 were from the ranks.76 However, British policy was typically to have the 
newly commissioned officer assigned to a different formation, whereas Canadian 
officers returned to their original unit.77 The result was British commanders were 
known on occasion to recommend NCOs to dispense with them.78 Canadian 
commanders were more likely to recommend a superior candidate knowing they 
would return, than would a British commander.79  
New Zealand adopted a different approach where roughly half of the 
commissions were from the ranks and half from New Zealand. The New Zealand 
divisional commander was concerned about depleting the supply of future 
Company and Regimental Sergeant-Majors. The view being they were of far 
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greater value than a mere subaltern.80 The Germans rarely commissioned from the 
ranks preferring to maintain the social exclusivity of the officer class.81 The 
Germans also did not have the same needs for junior officers as they relied far 
more on their NCOs for command. British and Canadian battalions had on 
average three times the number of officers as did a German battalion.82  
The previous officer training courses were harshly criticised by the Canadian 
Corps. In one of his best selections, Turner appointed Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. 
Critchley to command the school, based on Byng’s recommendation. Critchley 
raised the quality of instruction, improved the syllabus, and made the program far 
more practical and pragmatic – recognising the purpose of the school was just to 
develop effective platoon commanders. The school was a model and was so 
successful that the Royal Air Force (RAF) recruited Critchley to command their 
cadet program.83 
Turner was a nationalist and wanted to ensure a steady supply of Canadian 
staff officers to replace British officers.84 Turner believed only the most senior staff 
positions of BGGS and GSO 1 in the corps required British officers.85 Acting on 
this belief, Turner almost immediately instituted a program of Staff Learners in 
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England to develop the supply of Canadian staff officers.86 Staff Learners were 
officers who would understudy existing staff to learn their duties. They might also 
attend a course to learn the rudiments of staff work. The British and Dominion 
forces faced severe shortages of staff given the army’s rapid expansion. Traditional 
staff training courses took too long to develop the numbers required, so Staff 
Learners were a way of accelerating staff development, albeit not as well trained 
or rounded as the pre-war ones. Turner also worked with the Canadian Corps and 
Haig to assign more Canadian Staff Learners in France.87 The agreement was to 
assign Canadians as Staff Learners to British units to expand their experiences. 
Haig preferred that the Canadians not replace their British staff but rather have 
Canadian staff assigned to British units.88 Both Turner and Currie agreed, however, 
that they wanted Canadian staff officers in the corps. Birdwood, the Australian 
GOC, was not as active in promoting Australian officers and had to be forced by 
the Australian Government, so that it was not until 1917 that the Australians 
began replacing British staff in large numbers.89 
Efficiency 
Under Turner, the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General were 
responsible for the improved efficiencies in the OMFC. The primary focus of the 
Adjutant-General department was to find drafts for the front by ferreting out 
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surpluses in the employment of officers and men. One of the most important steps 
was to assess the fitness for duty of the men in England using the War Office 
categorisation system. Category ‘A’ men were fit for general service, Category ‘B’ 
for duty abroad but not general service, Category ‘C’ for service in England, 
Category ‘D’ were temporarily unfit but were likely to become fit in six months, 
and Category ‘E’ not likely to be fit in six months. Each category divided into sub-
categories, so ‘Ai’ meant fully fit and trained for active service, while ‘Aii’ meant 
fit but not fully trained. It took considerable time to educate the medical boards 
making the assessments to be consistent in their findings.90 Unlike in the Second 
World War, the categorisation system did not make any allowance for the mental 
or psychological capabilities of the soldier.91 It was enough to be able to march, 
shoot, salute, and wear a gas mask. 
Once the assessment was complete, the Adjutant-General department could 
determine who was available for the front and who would return to Canada. The 
intent was to replace Category ‘A’ men wherever possible with Category ‘B’ or ‘C’ 
men, so the Category ‘A’ would be available for the front. The results of the 
combing out process were impressive. In February 1917, there were 6,379 ‘A’ 
category men on duties other than training and by July, this dropped to 3,550. 
This included Service and Ordnance Corps men who were not part of the original 
total. In their place, the authorities substituted lower category men. In three 
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months, 2,709 men were raised from a lower category to Category ‘A’ making 
them available for the front. The number of men in the Command Depot for 
convalescent wounded dropped from 10,000 in January 1917 to 5,600 men in 
June 1917.92  
Another aspect of the categorisation was identifying men to return to 
Canada. All ‘Ciii’ men who were not likely to be reclassified to a higher category 
in six months were to be discharged in Canada, as it was not economical to keep 
them. This was another slow process. In May, Turner expressed dissatisfaction 
with the number of men unsuitable for military employment remaining in the 
areas. He wanted all ‘Ciii’ men discharged and wanted each area commander to 
make it a priority to return them. The Adjutant-General Branch made some 
progress as it returned 5,000 men from 1 December 1916 to 20 February 1917.93 
The administrative treatment of the wounded was reformed. The previous 
system lost men or allowed them to languish in depots. The new system relied on 
the new regimental system so when wounded arrived in England they were 
assigned to a regimental depot for tracking. Once discharged from the 
Convalescent Hospital, the Medical Board assessed the men and assigned to one 
of four alternatives depending on their category.94 
An additional step was the official disbanding of ninety-six battalions over 
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the course of the year.95 Each disbanded battalion represented tens, and in some 
cases, hundreds of hours of effort in auditing regimental books and disposing of 
regimental funds, equipment, and surplus officers.  
A constantly recurring complaint about Argyll House was the excess 
personnel on staff. Turner was always quick to respond to this complaint by 
providing statistics showing reductions. The table below demonstrates a 
considerable decline in staffing levels. One of the ways to achieve these 
reductions was to reduce the number of headquarters, such as closing 
MacDougall’s headquarters at Brighton, which released the equivalent of a 
divisional staff.96 As there were fewer units to control, these headquarters became 
superfluous. 
Figure 19 Reduction in Staff December 1916 to September 191797 
Staff Size Officers Other Ranks Total 
1 December 1916 134 566 700 
1 August 1917 139 486 625 
15 September 1917 109 436 545 
 
The Chaplain Service desperately needed reformation but had to wait until 
the most critical issues were resolved. Based on Turner’s strong recommendation, 
Perley replaced Steacey, the Director of the Chaplain Service, with John Almond, 
the Assistant Director in France. Almond transferred experienced chaplains from 
the front to England, replaced ineffective chaplains, sent surplus ones home, and 
placated aggrieved denominations – especially the Roman Catholics. The British 
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service noticed the difference, and John Simms, the British Principal Chaplain, 
commented, “the outlook is much brighter.”98 
The Quartermaster-General department also underwent significant changes. 
With Turner’s active support, McRae started implementing much needed reforms 
that he had advocated for months. The objective of these changes was to free up 
men for the front and to reduce costs, and McRae was successful. Overall, McRae 
reduced the branch personnel by 15%, replaced Category ‘A’ men, so that by 
April 1917, 85% of the CASC personnel were Category ‘C’ men, and through 
centralising transport released 500 Category ‘A’ men for the front.99 
McRae’s approach for cost savings was four fold. First, the branch found all 
instances where Canada was paying for services that the British were to supply at 
no cost. This was not a case of the British reneging on promises, but one of the 
Canadian authorities not following up. The British had offered to provide 
accommodations for all offices and billets for officers at no charge. Under the old 
regime, however, Canada paid for rented office space and hundreds of officers 
billeted at Canada’s expense. By August, McRae had sent one bill to the War 
Office for £98,000 for billeting with more to come. The British agreed to supply 
hospital stores and McRae found further savings of £90,000 per year. McRae also 
negotiated a share of the profits from Imperial Canteens for Soldier Relief Funds. 
This would later grow into an amount worth millions of dollars and play a key 
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role in encouraging the feuding post-war veterans’ organisations to merge.100 
McRae also persuaded the British to grant an exception for custom duties for a 
saving of another $466,000 a year.101  
The second initiative was to centralise purchasing, rations, stores, and 
transport. Under Carson, each unit had its own transport, stores, and made its 
own ration purchases. While appropriate for active service units, this approach 
was grossly inefficient for static units. McRae established a central purchasing 
organisation but could not even estimate the savings because of the wretched 
state of prior documentation. Food provision changed to a centralised system. 
This move saved a further $2,000,000 a year, delivered better meals, once cooks 
received training, and reduced food waste, which was crucial given food 
shortages and complaints from British inspectors. To address criticisms about meal 
quality, the Quartermaster-General branch established a School of Cookery.102 
Turner also got involved by attending a meeting of commanders from Bramshott 
and Shorncliffe to make it clear that the new system was there to stay.103 This is an 
example of Turner’s support for his immediate staff. 
McRae centralised quartermaster and ordnance stores to reduce the excess 
supplies at the unit level. In reaction to a complaint from Borden about excessive 
red tape, McRae responded that there were not enough controls on items, such as 
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quartermaster stores, and as a result, there were serious discrepancies. McRae had 
a board working for four months to adjust the quartermaster stores in 300 units.104 
McRae also imposed better controls that resulted in further savings. 
Purchases in France had to have the corps commander’s approval with a resulting 
drop in purchases by 90%. Under Carson, no one was responsible for monitoring 
damages done to barracks, with the result the British wanted to charge 6 shillings 
per month per soldier as damages and no one on the Canadian side had any 
documentation to dispute this claim. McRae made units responsible and the 
problem diminished.105 
Cost cutting was the fourth key initiative. McRae slashed the use of 
stationery, typewriters, closed the Ross Rifle facility to save $250,000 per year, 
and reduced the number of motor vehicles. McRae was also able to dispose of 
$7.5 million of surplus, obsolete, redundant, or inadequate goods, such as 
Canadian greatcoats, ‘Savage’ Lewis Guns, and Ross Rifles at no cost to the 
Government.106 
Despite these changes, Kemp in Canada was displeased with the pace of 
dealing with surplus equipment. In response to this complaint, McRae patiently 
explained: 
Appreciating that it is quite impossible for the Hon. The Minister to have a true 
appreciation of the result of two years of bad administration and the problems 
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it has left for us to clear up, the desired results cannot be obtained without 
much patience.107 
 Promotions 
The next challenge was to establish a credible promotion and gradation 
system. In January 1917, Borden informed Perley that “Irrespective of rank 
promotions of officers serving in France are made by you” after Perley had 
proposed that he consult with Borden on all brigade and divisional command 
decisions.108 There was, however, no effective mechanism for monitoring and 
managing officer promotions, which was essential to mitigate the perceptions of 
favouritism. To address this deficiency, Turner established an Assistant Military 
Secretary (AMS) Branch in March 1917, similar in function to the British Military 
Secretary.109 To head this extremely sensitive position, Turner selected another 
familiar officer, Captain F.F. Montague, his former ADC from the 2nd Division. 
While holding a relatively junior rank, the AMS was a critical position for 
changing the perception that political influence dominated promotions.110 One of 
the toxic aspects of the Hughes regime was the bitter suspicion that officer 
promotions were as much a matter of politics as capability.  
A case in the Canadian Railway Troops (CRT) illustrates the deleterious 
                                            
107  McRae QMG to Perley, 12 March 1917, 10-8-20, RG 9 III A1 v74, LAC. 
108  Cable Perley to Borden, 28 December 1916, 31655, MG 26 H v62, Borden Fonds; LAC; Cable 
Borden to Perley, 12 January 1917, 31656, MG 26 H v62, Borden Fonds; LAC. 
109  Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918: 192; Messenger, Call to 
Arms: The British Army 1914-18: 17. 
110 In the British Army, the Military Secretary was usually a Lieutenant-General and outranked the 
Quartermaster-General, who was a Major-General. There was no equivalent of the AMS in the 
Canadian Militia. The King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1917; F.F. 
Montague Service Jacket, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 6297 - 5, LAC; RO 306, 25 
January 1917, RG 9 III B3 v3780, LAC. 
6 ‘A Wise Choice’ 
 264 
effects of a flawed promotion process. The commander of the CRT in France was 
a full Colonel with a Lieutenant-Colonel as a Deputy and one Lieutenant-Colonel 
assigned to each army. One of these army level officers, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ramsay, was an excellent officer but a difficult personality. Ramsay received a 
promotion to full Colonel, in part because of his previous command of the 
Canadian Overseas Railway Construction Corps, but was then unwilling to take 
direction from the Deputy. In addition, Ramsay’s peers, on learning of his 
promotion, wanted to be elevated as well. This is an example that a promotion 
could have implications beyond a specific officer and cause dissension.111  
The AMS was responsible for dealing with surplus officers; honours and 
awards; appointments, promotions, resignations, and reversions; commissioning; 
gradation lists; and promulgation of changes in the London Gazette. Part of the 
role of the AMS was to track officers, enforce policies, and ensure promotions 
were merited before submitting them to Turner and Perley for approval.112 
Promotions in the corps were a sore point with Currie and were a source of 
considerable conflict. Eventually the policy evolved that Currie, as Canadian 
Corps commander, approved all promotions for officers and other ranks in the 
corps.113  
To resolve disputes over seniority amongst officers of the same rank, Turner 
tasked Montague with creating a gradation list. Unlike the Australian Army that 
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had created a list at the AIF’s inception, the CEF operated without one.114 The 
challenge was how to determine seniority. Turner persuaded Perley it should be 
the date officers sailed for England.115 The AMS worked on this basis and 
developed the list, but Byng objected strenuously to the sailing date, arguing it 
would mean officers in England, in some cases, would have seniority over ones at 
the front. Turner responded there was but a single CEF. Turner also contended 
that the corps commander was poorly positioned to make decisions for the units 
outside of the corps. In this case, Turner won out, and the sailing date was the 
basis.116 
Even more contentious was the problem of surplus officers. The breakup of 
battalions was a painful event for the men and junior officers, much like a ‘death 
in the family,’ but it was far worse for the senior officers.117 The Canadian Corps 
would only accept officers above Lieutenant with overseas experience. As a 
result, the senior officers had a stark choice of reverting to Lieutenant with the 
resulting loss of prestige and pay, scramble for a position in England, while staff 
positions were disappearing, or return to Canada with the resulting ignominy. 
Understandably, after the money, energy, and prestige expended in raising units, 
these officers were outraged at their treatment, especially given they were for the 
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most part Conservative party stalwarts.118  
The problem of surplus officers emerged early in the Hughes regime with 
Carson raising it as an issue to Hughes in March 1915.119 All through 1915 and 
1916, Carson made ineffectual efforts to address the problem, including sending 
senior officers as replacements for subalterns. Haig complained to the War Office 
that a request for six subalterns for the 25th Battalion was filled with two 
Lieutenants, two Captains and a Lieutenant-Colonel who was senior to the 
battalion’s commanding officer.120  
Perley was aware of the problems and the political consequences. He 
instructed that every surplus officer be told individually that their service was 
appreciated, and their return was not due to inefficiency on their part, but was on 
the ‘grounds of military expediency and economy.’121  
Turner’s initial approach was to assess all surplus officers and arrange a two-
week instructional tour in France, so they could return to Canada having served at 
the front.122 Byng appreciating the pressure on Turner allowed these instructional 
tours even though they were disruptive. The War Office stopped the tours in 
March but allowed one more in June.123 
The next plan was to allow select officers to serve as supernumeraries with 
units in the field, with the opportunity to be taken on strength if the unit 
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commander agreed. This program lasted until after the 1917 election.124 One 
other approach was to supply officers for Line of Communications duties in 
France, such as Town Majors. Initially the British accepted 150 officers, and in 
April 1918, 162 were serving in these roles.125  
Eventually, the problem became too large to manage with tours or other 
subterfuges, and Turner adopted a more hard-nosed approach of giving surplus 
officers the stark choice of reverting to Lieutenant to serve at the front or return to 
Canada.126 Through these means by July 1917, the OMFC despatched 196 officers 
to Canada, including 3 Generals, 1 Colonel, 48 Lieutenant-Colonels, and 107 
Majors. By the end of the year, the OMFC returned 665 surplus officers.127 Some 
officers were willing to drop in rank to get to the front. In April, one Lieutenant-
Colonel, who reverted to Major, and four Majors and twenty-five Captains who 
reverted to Lieutenant, were sent to the front.128 Despite these results, there were 
still 416 surplus officers as late as November 1917.129 
Presenting surplus officers with the choice of reversion or return required 
tact and diplomacy, which at times was missing. Turner had to chastise one area 
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commander for the poor treatment of officers from broken up battalions.130 
Thacker wrote another commander that senior officers were to be asked to sign 
reversion letters by that commander or his senior staff and not a mere 
Lieutenant.131  
Later in 1918, Turner personally interviewed most of the returning officers 
once and all Lieutenant-Colonels at least three times to try to limit the damage 
they would do back in Canada. At the peak of sending the aggrieved back, 
Turner, as a further step to mollify them, had Montague interview every surplus 
officer when they received their embarkation orders, and pass on to Turner those 
cases Montague thought worthy of a further interview. Montague had to see up to 
forty officers a day plus all of his usual duties. Naturally, when the majority of 
these officers did not get a chance to see Turner they would turn their ire on 
Montague. Kemp received numerous complaints about Montague’s brusque 
treatment.132 Turner attempted to defend Montague explaining the process and 
that two of the cases Kemp highlighted were for an officer dismissed for 
inefficiency and another too old and not qualified for his rank of Major but not 
willing to revert. Turner’s view was “Major Montague has served under my 
Command for a period of thirty months, ... I have the greatest confidence in this 
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Officer.”133 In the end, however, it appears Turner had to sacrifice Montague to 
assuage the anger. Montague was seconded to the War Office on 1 April 1918 to 
work with the Ministry of Information under Aitken.134  
Political Interference 
To demonstrate the new regime’s commitment to eliminating political 
influence, Turner’s headquarters issued two Routine Orders in December 1916 
strictly prohibiting irregular communications about appointments and promotions. 
Turner’s headquarters repeated the prohibitions again in January of 1917 and 
1918. Perley wrote Borden in January, “A very large part of the letters and cables 
which come to the Overseas Department are from soldiers or their friends with 
requests of a personal nature.”135 The habits of the Canadian Militia of political 
interference were hard to break.  
An example of Perley’s commitment to trying to drive out both the reality 
and appearance of political influence was his reaction to the discovery that Sam 
Steele had tried sending a cable to Canada to lobby for a division for his protégé 
Brigadier-General Ketchen. Perley wrote Borden,   
As you know, we are trying to manage the Overseas Department as a military 
organization, and to make all appointments and promotions entirely on the 
grounds of efficiency, It would not only be unwise but absolutely inexcusable 
to have political pressure used in regard to the appointment of a Divisional 
Commander.136    
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 To reinforce the message, Turner made an example of an officer who 
violated these policies. Lieutenant-Colonel Preston of the 39th Battalion lost his 
position with the reorganisation of training units. Preston reacted by sending 
cables to two Members of Parliament, who in turn strongly endorsed Preston and 
requested he be found a position. Turner responded by hustling Preston back to 
Canada with a recommendation that the authorities there discipline him.137  
An early test of the political independence of the OMFC was the selection of 
Turner’s replacement as commander of the 2nd Division. Byng recommended the 
GOCRA, Major-General Henry Burstall, a PF officer, take command. Borden was 
unhappy with the selection and wanted Garnet Hughes appointed to placate Sam 
Hughes. Perley, impressed with Byng, acceded to Byng’s recommendation and 
Burstall was selected.138 
 A further issue was the status of the 5th Division, which was fraught with 
political implications. In September, Sam Hughes promised Robertson, the CIGS, 
two more divisions and the British were eager to get these units to the front.139 
Haig asked Robertson in January when he could expect the 5th Division.140 Both 
Perley and Kemp had serious doubts about the feasibility of maintaining a fifth 
division in action. Perley met Robertson in November to provide the evidence 
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that Canada could only keep four divisions at the front and Robertson grudgingly 
agreed.141  
Given Perley and Kemp’s qualms regarding the 5th Division, why was it still 
raised?142 A clue may be who received the divisional command – Garnet Hughes. 
Borden was most anxious about who was to get the division, cabling Perley 
“Please consult me before final decision. This very important.”143 Typically, 
Borden only intervened in politically sensitive matters. Borden had earlier 
explicitly granted Perley complete authority over promotions, so this suggests a 
strong political implication. On learning of Hughes’ appointment, Borden 
responded that he ‘quite approved.’ Hughes, furthermore, was junior to the 
incumbent divisional commander, Brigadier-General R.G.E. Leckie.144 To appease 
Leckie, Perley had to apply considerable pressure on Kemp to get Leckie a 
command of a district in Canada and a promotion to Major-General.145 All of this 
indicates the Government procured Sam Hughes’ relative silence by giving his 
son the 5th Division. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Manley Sims, the Canadian 
Representative at GHQ, Garnet Hughes accepted the position knowing that the 
authorities did not intend to send the division to France. Sims who made the offer 
claimed Hughes was not in good health and Turner should recall him as soon as 
possible, which Turner promptly did.146 
The British were relentless in their demands for the 5th Division. Turner and 
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Perley met with the Secretary of State for War, the CIGS, and Deputy CIGS to 
demonstrate yet again there were insufficient resources to maintain another 
division.147 The War Office sent three requests alone in February for the 5th 
Division.148 Robertson raised the topic again at the Imperial War Cabinet in 
March, but Borden evaded the issue.149 
In May, Robertson cabled the Governor-General of Canada “It is very 
important that this Division should eventually be sent to France.”150 Gow, Perley’s 
Deputy Minister, finally ended the British pleas by making it clear that “it is 
estimated that we shall be able to keep our four Divisions in the Field reinforced 
until about the end of the year, but in order to do this we shall have to use the 5th 
Division for the purpose.”151 The 5th Division remained in England for the 
remainder of 1917 and became a subject of further controversy in early 1918. 
Assessment 
Were the changes effective? Most of the data in this chapter are derived 
from internal OMFC documents.152 These reports, as any in a bureaucracy, will 
tend to trumpet successes and ignore, minimise, or explain away failures. 
Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms, it is necessary to look at 
three separate metrics: objective results described in the reports; contemporary 
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statements by officers in the Canadian Corps, Byng, Perley, and the British; and 
the opinions of historians. 
By these measures, the answer is Turner’s reforms were broadly effective. 
The OMFC was a far more efficient organisation than its predecessor. Under 
Turner’s leadership, it used far fewer personnel, Category ‘A’ men, resources, and 
cost less than before. The considerable costs savings found by McRae, the 
combing out process of replacing Category ‘A’ men, and the reduction in staffs are 
all evidence of this greater efficiency. The best illustration of the increased 
efficiency is the OMFC sending to France 70% more men than it received from 
Canada in 1917.153 
One measure of the increased effectiveness of Turner’s regime was the 
significant improvement in musketry tests. Every soldier had to complete standard 
War Office musketry tests before going to the front. Over the course of the first 
eight months of Turner’s command the percentage of 3rd Class shots, the worst 
rating, dropped significantly in almost every training area, while the number of 
Marksman, the highest rating, more than doubled from 2.8% to 6.8% of men. For 
example, at Bramshott the percentage of 3rd Class shots fell from 26% to 2% by 
August.154  
The contemporary records show a favourable view of the changes. The 
Deputy-Minister paid a visit to the corps in June and found, 
                                            
153  In 1917, the OMFC received 67,467 men from Canada but despatched 114,222 to France. The 
extra men were returned wounded and men combed out of units in England. Memorandum to 
GOC, 7 January 1918, RG 9 III A1 v74, LAC. 
154  Report on the Work of the General Staff Branch During the Month of June 1917, MG 30 E46 
v6, Turner Fonds; LAC; Report on the Work of the General Staff Branch During the Month of 
August 1917, MG 30 E46 v6, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
6 ‘A Wise Choice’ 
 274 
Speaking generally I found a very much better feeling existing on all hands as 
to the relations between London and the front than existed when I was in 
France last year. Every where the statement was “Things are so much better 
than they were. The drafts which come over from England are much better 
trained and the relations between the field and the forces in England seem to 
be much closer and better in every way.” That is I think a fair epitome of the 
many statements made to me on the subject.155 
  
Officers at the front also thought there was an improvement. Brigadier-
General W. Griesbach commenting, after inspecting the training facilities in 
England “I was ...impressed with the system of training that prevails and with the 
willingness of these officers to maintain touch with the Battalions at the front and 
in all respects to render the greatest possible service to the front line people.”156 
The 25th Battalion’ commander wrote to McDonald to express his appreciation for 
the quality of recruits the battalion received.157 A First Army request for the state of 
replacements received in October and November 1917, the height of the 
Canadian attacks at Passchendaele, elicited a broadly favourable response from 
all the divisions, with the 4th Division commenting the replacements ‘showed a 
marked improvement in training.”158 
Even Currie was willing to pass on plaudits about the improvement in the 
Machine Gun Depot. Brutinel claimed the success of the machine guns at 
Passchendaele was “rendered possible chiefly by the very high standard of 
training attained in the Canadian Machine Gun Depot in England, and the 
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discipline, and Esprit de Corps with which the fresh drafts are imbued.”159 
Byng’s recommendation that Turner receive the Légion d’honneur illustrates 
Byng’s attitude to Turner.160 A second indication of Turner’s contribution was his 
appointment as a Knight Companion to the Order of St Michael and St. George on 
4 June 1917.161 With this appointment, he became Sir Richard Turner. 
Perley was appreciative of Turner’s efforts from the beginning writing 
positively of the changes to Borden in January and April 1917.162 Perley upon 
relinquishing the Ministry wrote Turner “I cannot express to you strongly enough 
my earnest appreciation of the active and sustained assistance which you and 
your whole staff have given me in every way.”163  
The British thought the reforms were a success. The Commander in Chief of 
Home Forces, Field Marshal Sir John French noted the improvements and wrote 
Perley that “General Turner may look with satisfaction on the results achieved 
generally.”164 McDonald claimed when visiting France a consensus of both British 
and Canadian officers at the base depots agreed that on average Canadian infantry 
were better trained than were the British with the exception of drill.165 Inspectors 
of Infantry for different commands also commented on improvements in training 
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results.166  
Historians almost universally acknowledge that the new regime 
accomplished much in the reformation of the administration and training.167 Even 
historians normally hostile to Turner, such as Daniel Dancocks, wrote that ”He 
did a good job. It took several months to sort out the mess, but there would be no 
further complaints about the standard of training of the replacement troops 
reaching the Canadian Corps.”168 The British Official History attributed the 
success of the Canadian Corps in the Arras campaign to,  
the high standard of the Canadian infantry reinforcements. … The Canadian 
drafts had not only as a rule undergone more training but were also rather 
older men and often of better physique. Thus, a Canadian division appeared to 
deteriorate very little after taking part in several engagements at short intervals 
of time.”169  
 
Where historians differ is the degree to which Perley is primarily responsible 
for the improvement. Most historians will grant Turner was a ‘first class staff 
officer,’ but noted historians like Hyatt, Currie’s biographer, consider Perley the 
‘architect of the new system.’170 This chapter has demonstrated that while Perley 
was a key figure, Turner and his staff were the real architects of the system and 
were responsible for most of the changes. 
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Not all of Turner’s initiatives, however, were successful. The anti-gas, signal, 
engineer, and artillery branches continued to experience problems. These 
problems were due to a set of factors only partially under Turner’s control. For 
example, shortages of equipment and a supply of civilian-trained men limited 
signals’ training. Neither Turner nor his staff had any experience in the technical 
branches, and their relative ignorance showed as they replaced their initial 
choices for command of the various depots. Turner relied on the corps to send the 
right man to command the depots. In the case of the artillery, the first officer sent 
by the corps failed, and a second had to be sent.171  
One area that Turner’s organisation never properly addressed was anti-gas 
training. The technology and tactics of gas warfare evolved rapidly at the front, 
and the OMFC was never able to catch up. The authorities were still sending men 
to France in July 1917 without training them in a gas chamber. There was no 
proper exchange of information with the front, so the training was inadequate, 
outmoded, and the instructors in England were unimpressive. As Tim Cook 
phrased it “The problem remained unsolved, and soldiers were required to learn 
much of their gas training in France for the rest of the war.”172 
Currie complained about the high percentage of men received after Vimy 
classified as partially trained. In May, Byng wrote a mild letter to ‘My dear Turner’ 
asking that the 5th Division be used for replacements if there was a shortage of 
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trained men.173 Part of the problem was a matter of terminology, in that the 
replacements had not completed the full fourteen-week syllabus but had finished 
a compressed program to meet the needs of the corps. For example, the 1st 
Battalion reported receiving a draft rated as untrained. The draft came from a 
reserve battalion that provided pioneer replacements and as it was over-strength, 
the men were despatched to the 1st Battalion having completed their nine weeks 
of infantry training but not pioneer training and so were classified as untrained.174 
Later in the war, McDonald asked the Adjutant-General department not to classify 
men who had passed through a compressed training cycle as partially trained to 
reduce these complaints.175 
In periods of intense fighting or in expectation of high losses, Turner would 
compress the training syllabus to as little as nine weeks to maintain the strength of 
the corps. The vagaries of manpower supply from Canada handicapped what 
Turner could provide. Both Byng and Currie were informed of this decision to 
condense training, but Currie typically still demanded fully trained men regardless 
of the resources available to Turner.176  
Another partial failure was the regimental organisation. There was an 
imbalance in battalions from regions based on population and available 
replacements. British Columbia had four more battalions, Quebec two more, and 
Ontario ten fewer than their populations warranted. The Quebec situation was 
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especially dire, as a significant portion of the population were French-speaking 
who volunteered in limited numbers.177 This meant the battalions from British 
Columbia and Quebec lacked replacements, so required men from other 
provinces to maintain strength.178 In March, Turner reported that the seven British 
Columbia battalions had requested 1,406 replacements but he was only able to 
supply 81 men. There were a further 1,038 in training, but this was before the 
losses of Vimy, so it is clear there was a looming replacement problem.179 Turner, 
working closely with Byng, replaced two Montreal battalions with one each from 
Ontario and Nova Scotia.180 They also decided to disband two pioneer battalions 
from British Columbia rather than infantry units. Byng was disappointed to have to 
break up battalions but understood the necessity and was pragmatic about it.181 
The breaking up of these combat formations just before Vimy was disruptive and 
caused multiple protests from the unit and divisional commanders, including two 
who travelled to London to complain to Turner.182  
The replacement situation for British Columbia and Quebec after Vimy 
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continued to deteriorate. Turner had to warn Sims that in discussing the 
replacement supply problems with the Canadian Corps that it was not “an 
opportune time to question the soundness of the territorial basis.”183 To solve the 
ongoing crisis, Turner recommended to Perley in July 1917 to disband two more 
British Columbia battalions. Currie, however, resisted the notion of breaking up 
two more combat-experienced units. Turner then suggested reinforcing the two 
battalions from Ontario regiments, with the result they would gradually convert 
into Ontario units. This was more acceptable to Currie and that while it would 
cause much hand wringing; it was a far better policy than disbanding units. It 
became the policy, thereafter, as multiple battalions needed to change.184 
Another problem with the affiliation of battalions in the field with a single 
reserve battalion was real or perceived unfairness of the distribution of personnel. 
Twice the 38th Battalion, with the support of the brigade, divisional, and corps 
commanders, claimed that the 7th Reserve Battalion which supplied the 38th and 
the PPCLI was sending its best quality men to the PPCLI, because the 7th Reserve 
was dominated by PPCLI officers. The 7th Reserve Battalion denied any 
favouritism and explained the greater number of PPCLI officers as a function of 
the PPCLI being at the front longer than the 38th Battalion.185 However, the fact 
that the 38th complained twice with endorsements from the chain of command 
suggests there was something to their concerns. 
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Not only Canada had to face the difficult situation of having to disband units 
because of replacement shortages. The British had to shift to three battalions per 
brigade, which meant roughly one quarter of the infantry battalions at the front, 
had to be disbanded in early 1918.186 The Australians, in May 1918, had to start 
disbanding battalions because of a lack of replacements. By September, Monash 
reluctantly broke up seven battalions. Six of these refused to disband and the 
situation was not resolved when the Australians left the line.187  
Reasons for Success 
The reasons for Turner’s success fall into three broad categories of 
situational factors; support from superiors, peers, and subordinates; and personal 
factors. Turner had powerful situational advantages that contributed significantly 
to the success, including the benefit of ample political will behind the 
transformation. Perley and Borden were aware there were problems, although 
Perley admitted, “If I had known how difficult the situation is here I doubt if I 
should have complied with your request.”188 Both knew the system needed to be 
rectified and so were committed to reform.  
Turner had the further advantage of not being beholden to the previous 
regime, so there was no need to retain or defend the existing organisation, 
policies, procedures, or personnel. Turner in essence had an unfettered mandate 
to make reforms. There was a broad recognition in not only France but in Canada 
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and England that matters were not as they should be, so there was little need to 
justify the need for changes. Turner and most of his staff also had the advantage of 
unassailable experience. This meant they knew what was needed but also had the 
credibility to institute changes based on this experience.  
Finally, Turner and his staff had the advantage of adapting proven British 
policies, organisations, and structures to Canadian circumstances. These changes 
were not in themselves revolutionary departures from British Army practices. 
Turner was at heart conservative and systematic, so utilising the British model was 
an obvious step. Given the time constraints and the absolute necessity of working 
within the strictures of the British system, there was no opportunity or the need for 
radical steps.  
The second set of advantages was the support Turner received from Perley, 
Byng, and Turner’s subordinates. George Perley had very little knowledge of 
military matters, and he was fully cognisant of this, so he was reliant on Turner 
and his staff. As a result, Turner had a free rein as long as he delivered results. 
Perley was an ideal superior in giving Turner the latitude to make the necessary 
changes but willing to supply the necessary political muscle when dealing with 
British or Canadian authorities.189 Perley’s involvement undoubtedly facilitated 
rapid decisions, such as receiving training control from the British.  
Turner was always careful not to transgress on Perley’s prerogatives and to 
never overstep boundaries. He kept Perley informed and requested Perley’s 
approval before taking action. Turner and his staff were wholly responsible for 
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analysing, planning, proposing and executing the changes. Perley provided the 
political support in dealing with Borden, the Cabinet, the Ministry of Militia in 
Canada, and the British, and ensuring Turner had the resources to carry out his 
reforms. Perley was also an arbitrator and mediator between Currie and Turner. 
Turner and Perley worked well together, and their only major disagreement was 
over a separate Canadian Air Service, to be discussed later. 
Turner also had a good relationship with Byng. Byng was determined to 
improve the training system in England and recognised that supporting Turner was 
the best method to achieve this goal; as a result, Byng was accommodating. An 
example of this attitude was Byng’s pragmatic reaction to the news that two 
battalions would disband before Vimy.190 Byng was willing and even eager to 
send first class officers like Major Balfour and Lieutenant-Colonel Critchley to 
command Depots and Schools in England. Byng could be frank when displeased, 
but there was mutual respect and they had a good working relationship.191 The 
fact Turner was a former subordinate and was outranked by Byng ensured there 
was a clear demarcation of command and no tussling for control.192 Additionally, 
Byng’s considerable experience in both command and administrative functions 
and in cutting the political strings from Canada gave him an appreciation of the 
challenges facing Turner and how he could assist. 
Turner and his staff regularly visited the corps, and there was generally an 
open and frank line of communications. Having recent front experience also 
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meant they had a common and shared experience with the staff and commanders 
of the corps. The exchange of officers and the visits helped ensure training was up 
to date. Guy Turner (no relation), a Chief Instructor at the CETD, when asked if 
the training was excellent, remarked in a post-war interview,  
Yes, I can assure you it was because we were kept in close touch with what 
was going on. I know that during the time I was the chief instructor in field 
works at the engineer training centre I made two or three trips back to France 
to get first-hand information.193  
 
While Turner endeavoured to provide the Canadian Corps with what it 
needed, he was not a mere ‘cypher.’194 Turner had to walk a fine line of ensuring 
he met the corps’ requirements without sacrificing long-term efficiency or 
effectiveness. Turner was more than willing to stand up for what he regarded as 
the correct policy, as example his defence of the gradation basis. He also was 
determined that England not become a dumping ground for failures from the 
corps.195 He had his staff closely monitor the corps, as illustrated by the query 
about the excess strength of two battalions.196 
Another overlooked factor in Turner’s success was Sims’ role as a go-
between the Canadian Corps and Argyll House. Sims, an ex-British Army Major 
and a business associate of one of Hughes’ representatives, replaced Aitken as the 
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Canadian Representative at GHQ in early 1917.197 One of Sims’ roles was to act 
as the intermediary between the corps and Argyll House and, according to Perley, 
Sims was liked by Byng, other commanders, and the authorities at GHQ.198 There 
are numerous letters from Sims to Turner, staff, and corps providing insight into 
the views of the other side to help explain their position. For example, Sims in 
February 1917 warned Turner about the ill will felt by the corps to the 
commander of the Machine Gun Depot.199 Sims provided a useful back channel 
to help vent and explain matters that could not go through official lines of 
communication.  
Other than the possible exception of Montague, all of Turner’s key staff 
officer selections were successful. McDonald, Thacker, and McRae turned in 
superlative performances and were critical to the success of the OMFC. Turner 
well appreciated their contribution and recommended Thacker to be the Adjutant-
General in Canada.200 Turner wrote of McDonald in a confidential report that a 
long list of achievements “bear evidence of his ability in organisation and 
amicable relations between ourselves and the Imperial Authorities at present are 
largely due to his tactful connections with them.”201 
Finally, there were Turner’s own characteristics. He worked hard in making 
the changes including holding meetings on New Year’s Day 1917.202 Another 
hallmark was professionalism; one of the critical differences between the old 
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regime and Turner’s was the focus on follow through and proper procedures. For 
instance, under Carson every unit interpreted how to fill out returns in its own 
idiosyncratic fashion with the result that returns were incomplete and inaccurate. 
It was, therefore, impossible to gain an accurate notion of strengths and available 
drafts.203 Turner did not tolerate this. In addition, Turner was constantly striving for 
increased efficiency, such as requesting Thacker to report on the number of orders 
issued, their frequency, and whether all were necessary.204  
There was a palpable difference in the paper work generated under Carson 
versus Turner. Far more entertaining and useful to the historian, Carson’s 
correspondence is chatty, informative, and revelatory. It exposes the dirty deeds, 
the hypocrisy, the frantic manoeuvring for position and power, the almost abject 
obeisance to Sam Hughes, and drive for authority.205 Turner’s correspondence is 
far more bureaucratic, structured, professional, bloodless, and effective.  
Turner instilled a willingness in his staff to accept criticism, unlike under 
Carson. The typical reaction to a complaint was to ask for details, investigate 
them, and if justified, make changes. For instance, in response to a biting critique 
from the British Inspector of Infantry, Turner instructed McDonald to thank the 
Inspector for bringing these deficiencies to light. There was a short explanation of 
what went wrong and was being done to address the problems. It closed with a 
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request to call on the Inspector to discuss these issues.206 The Commander-in-
Chief of Home Forces commented that he was pleased Canadian officers now 
accepted critiques from Inspectors and acted upon them.207 
A more detailed example of the response to criticism was McDonald’s 
reaction to complaints about artillery drafts. McDonald asserted the only 
significant complaint coming from France during a one-week visit was the state of 
artillery replacements. When asked about this, the commander of the Artillery 
Depot claimed the drafts did not come from his establishment, but McDonald 
investigated further and found the replacements were his responsibility. He was 
promptly removed.208 
Turner delegated much responsibility to his subordinates, which worked 
well with strong officers. Turner’s approach was a modern method of appointing 
the right people for each position and enabling them to do their job. In this case, 
Turner’s business experience probably helped influence his management style. 
From the evidence, Turner set policies and then allowed the responsible officer to 
implement them, but closely monitored their execution. His pencilled comments 
can be found on a wide range of documents probing, requesting further 
information, and making decisions.209 He closely monitored the regular reports 
from his staff. An example was his questioning of a Quartermaster-General report 
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that, after further investigation and discussions with the War Office, revealed that 
the Canadians were being double billed for freight costs for rations.210 
He would solicit the opinion of his staff officers before making a decision. 
For instance, Thacker recommended that reserve unit commanders have the 
discretion to select officer reinforcements. Turner redirected the memo to 
McDonald for his remarks. McDonald agreed and Turner approved the policy.211  
To an outside observer, this approach can be easily mistaken for a relegation 
or abandonment of responsibility. There were complaints later in 1918 that 
Turner’s staff dominated him; however, the complainants were not particularly 
unbiased or trustworthy.212 Those closer to Turner, such as Kemp and Currie, 
never made this complaint, so on balance this criticism can be discounted. 
A final factor was Turner had a solid reputation for treating officers fairly. An 
example was Major Bill Hewgill who wrote Turner “understands conditions and 
as he is in supreme command of the Canadian Forces I know I shall have fair 
treatment.”213 Turner’s regard even extended to the newly married; asking that the 
Canadian Corps allow a newly married officer an extension for his marriage 
leave, writing in the margin of a note “Have a Heart.”214 This attitude was sure to 
foster good will. 
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Turner and his staff accomplished a major transformation of the Canadian 
administration and training organisation in England. As a result, the Canadian 
Corps was able to sustain its combat effectiveness from the storming of Vimy 
Ridge through the remaining actions of the Arras Offensive. Owing to the 
superlative performance of the Canadian Corps, Byng was promoted to command 
of the Third Army. With Byng’s promotion, the nature of Turner’s command 
changed, and this is the topic of the next chapter. 
 7  
FIGHTING THE AUTHORITIES: 
THE TURNER-CURRIE 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
General Currie must not try to convince himself that there is anyone here 
after him with a view of destroying the good reputation which he has 
built up for himself in military matters.1 
Kemp to Borden, 5 March 1919 
 
 
On 9 June 1917, Currie replaced his red brassard with a new red, white, and 
red one indicating he was now the commander of the Canadian Corps. Currie’s 
selection meant a dramatic change for Turner and his command, as Currie 
brought a fundamentally different and more adversarial attitude to the relationship 
of the corps to Argyll House. Currie famously responded when asked if he had 
problems with the British answered “My fight was not with regular officers at all. It 
was with Canadian authorities in London.”2 This chapter explores the sometimes 
contentious relationship between Currie and Turner through the prism of their 
correspondence. Unlike previous studies, this work examines their interactions 
using evidence from both sides to determine the nature and extent of the ‘fight.’ 
The chapter extends from the selection of Currie in June 1917 to the final clashes 
in the post-armistice period and is focused on the Turner-Currie dynamic.  
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Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur William Currie was born in 1875 and grew up 
in rural Ontario. Currie at age 18 moved across the continent to Vancouver Island 
to make his fortune. He was a successful teacher, insurance salesman, and real 
estate broker. Whether because of over-involvement in his militia career or just 
poor judgement, Currie was on the verge of bankruptcy at the start of the war as 
result of the local real-estate market collapsing in 1912/1913, a matter that will be 
discussed later.3 
Currie’s pre-war military career was an unbroken success. He first enlisted 
in the 5th Regiment, an artillery unit based in Victoria, in 1897 and commanded it 
from 1909 to 1913, when he retired. He was an effective commander and his unit 
won numerous awards.4 Senior officers of the newly raised 50th Regiment, 
including the junior Major Garnet Hughes, persuaded the then retired Currie to 
accept command of the 50th when its first commander resigned at the end of 
1913. Currie’s pre-war service record was outstanding, but he gained no 
administrative experience outside of his regiment and he had had no active 
service. Unlike many other senior officers, such as Turner, A.H. Macdonell, and 
J.H. Elmsley, Currie did not serve in the Boer War.5 
Physically, Currie was tall and portly, and lacked a strong presence.6 Shy 
                                            
3  See Urquhart, Arthur Currie, the Biography of a Great Canadian: 18; Hyatt, General Sir Arthur 
Currie: A Military Biography: 5-7; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 193-194. 
4  Urquhart, Arthur Currie, the Biography of a Great Canadian: 24. 
5  When the Boer War first broke out Currie had wanted to enlist but stomach problems in late 
1899 and early 1900 prevented him joining. It is unclear why he did not join one of the later 
contingents. Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography: 14. Both Macdonell and Elmsley would 
rise to the rank of Brigadier-General in the First World War, with Macdonell commanding a 
brigade in Turner’s 2nd Division. 
6  Currie stands out in any group photo in late 1918 for his height, heavy-set figure, and his lack 
of facial hair. For instance, in a photo with Prince Arthur of Connaught (the Governor-
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and somewhat awkward outside of small groups or his inner circle, with a cold 
and aloof demeanour, Currie never connected with the rank and file as corps 
commander.7 In part, this was because Currie was a strict disciplinarian, 
especially in matters of dress and appearance. He was maladroit when he 
interacted with his men.8 Currie lacked the man-management skills needed to 
inspire Canadian soldiers.9 It was, however, quite difficult for a corps commander 
on the Western Front to make a positive impression given the scale of the 
formation and the nature of the war. 
Despite these limitations, Currie was one of the finest corps commanders on 
the Western Front and probably the best field commander Canada has produced. 
Beneath his bulk was an incisive mind, careful, deliberate, and perhaps not 
particularly imaginative but decisive. His considerable strengths aligned well with 
the circumstances of the Western Front. Currie believed in thorough pre-battle 
preparation and ample firepower to reduce losses.10 One of his principal strengths 
was his great willingness to learn and master his trade.  
Currie had an inestimable advantage in possessing Haig’s confidence, who 
overlooked Currie’s lack of ‘soldierly deportment’ because of Currie’s ability to 
instil discipline and his continued success.11 An important factor in the victories of 
                                                                                                                                
General’s son) Currie is one of only eight out of 32 officers in the picture without a moustache. 
S. J. (Samuel John) Duncan-Clark, b. 1875, Plewman W. R. (William Rothwell) 1880-, and 
Wallace W. Stewart (William Stewart) 1884-1970, Pictorial History of the Great War  (The John 
A. Hertel Co, c1919), 322. 
7  Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography: 97. 
8  Isabella Diane Losinger, "Officer-Man Relations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-
1919" (Masters, Carleton University, 1990), 18. 
9  Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 240. 
10  Burstall Comments, 7j, MG 4027 Acc. No 391 Ref 1-2, Urquhart Fonds; McGill. 
11  Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography: 22-23. 
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the Canadian Corps was Currie’s willingness to confront his superiors over poor 
plans, and demand additional guns, shells, and time if he thought it necessary. 
Examples abound of Currie’s taxing nature that would have resulted in his 
dismissal were he a British corps commander. Two examples from the 
Passchendaele offensive illustrate this point. First, Haig had to persuade Currie of 
the necessity of the Canadian commitment to the offensive. Second, Haig agreed 
to Currie’s demand that the corps serve under Plumer rather than the hated 
Gough.12  
The Canadian Corps staff officers were initially concerned when Currie was 
appointed. As Lieutenant-Colonel A. McNaughton, the Canadian Corps Counter-
Battery Staff Officer at the time put it “We as staff officers, didn’t have too high an 
opinion of General Currie at that time. As a divisional commander he was a very 
difficult person to deal with. He was very determined that he was going to get the 
best – for his particular division.”13 He soon won over the corps staff, as he was 
willing to listen and learn from his staff and subordinates.14 Currie could be a 
vexing subordinate and challenging peer but was an excellent superior to his 
immediate subordinates.  
Garnet Hughes wrote to Currie on 11 May that there were reports 
circulating in England that Byng was being promoted.15 Currie, also, met with a 
British ADC or liaison officer, who discussed the views of the commander of the 
                                            
12  Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 206-207. 
13  John Alexander Swettenham, McNaughton Volume 1 1887-1939  (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 
1968), 94. 
14  Horn and Harris, Warrior Chiefs, 50-51. 
15  Garnet Hughes to Currie, 11 May 1917, File 9, MG 4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds; McGill 
Archives. 
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First Army and Haig on Turner and the corps, suggesting manoeuvres by GHQ 
were already taking place to ensure Currie’s promotion.16  
Haig was unhappy with the performance of the Third Army in the Arras 
offensive and he relieved its commander, General Sir Edmund Allenby. Ironically, 
Allenby went on to greater success in Palestine.17 In his place, Haig appointed 
Byng. Next was who was to replace Byng. Byng lobbied Haig that it was time for 
a Canadian to command the corps and that Currie was ready.18 Haig was 
surprised and worried about the complications of political influence. He, 
however, respected Currie.19 Haig was convinced and to forestall any potential 
interference he quickly appointed Currie to command the corps, again without 
permission. Later, to mollify the Canadians, the British apologised that Currie’s 
appointment announcement inadvertently omitted the term ‘temporary.’20  
It is apparent that Currie was well aware that there would be resistance to 
his elevation.21 Urquhart, Currie’s first biographer, made the case that a cabal led 
by Aitken applied considerable pressure to appoint Turner instead.22 This lobbying 
was without Turner’s support or encouragement.23 Turner, because of his seniority 
and Perley’s pledge could have caused the Government considerable 
                                            
16  The identity of the officer is difficult to determine but from internal evidence, the officer was 
probably from either the First Army or GHQ. Currie Diary Entry, 3 May 1917, MG 30 E100 
v43, Currie Fonds; LAC. 
17  Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army. 221. 
18  Urquhart, Arthur Currie, the Biography of a Great Canadian: 160-162. 
19  ibid., 157; Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 191. 
20  Perley to Lord Derby, 15 June 1917, RG 9 III A1 v107, LAC. 
21  Currie had had previous run-ins with Aitken. See Cook, "Documenting War and Forging 
Reputations: Sir Max Aitken and the Canadian War Records Office in the First World War." 
22  Urquhart, Arthur Currie, the Biography of a Great Canadian: 160. 
23  Gow, the Deputy Minister of the OMFC later had a fierce battle with Turner that resulted in 
Gow’s resignation, so it is especially telling that he denied Turner participated in the plot. Gow 
to Urquhart, 15 October 1934, File 13, MG 4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives. 
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embarrassment by demanding the earlier promise be fulfilled. Turner’s stance, 
however, was that he would not lobby for the position but expected the 
Government to honour its commitments. Turner’s refusal was a combination of 
his honourable and dutiful nature and probable realisation that Haig would not 
accept him as the corps commander. 
Perley reported to Borden that Turner was anxious for command as “he is by 
temperament a fighting soldier, but he will acquiesce cheerfully in our decision.” 
Perley also wanted to retain Turner as ’his work invaluable here‘ and while Turner 
was senior, Currie was more acceptable to the British.24 Perley then met with Haig 
who made it clear that the only Canadian he would appoint was Currie. Currie’s 
combat record was stronger than Turner’s, and Turner had been out of the line for 
six months and so was out of touch. Perley agreed to Currie’s appointment but 
asked that as a sop to Turner that both Currie and Turner be promoted to 
Lieutenant-General, so that Turner would retain his seniority.25 
Perley then met with both Turner and Currie on 15 June to determine the 
channels of communication and boundaries of responsibility.26 Perley reported 
that there was a ‘pleasant understanding’ with Currie and Turner, but the reality 
was there would be considerable conflict between the two before a modus 
vivendi was achieved.27 According to the standard narrative, the underlying cause 
of the resulting conflict was Perley’s granting of additional powers to Turner that 
                                            
24  Cable Perley to Borden, 9 June 1917, v9 File 1, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
25  Perley to Lord Derby, 15 June 1917, RG 9 III A1 v107, LAC. 
26  GHP Memorandum, File 3, MG 4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives. 
27  Perley to Borden, 15 June 1917, RG 9 III A1 v107, LAC. 
7 Fighting the Authorities 
 296 
encroached on Currie’s authority within the corps.28 This belief stems from a 
Perley memorandum that delineated the relationship of the various Canadian 
formations and headquarters with each other and the British. Perley specified 
Turner was the Minister’s ‘Chief Military Advisor,’ and all policy and 
administrative matters were to continue to pass through him for his 
recommendations. Perley concluded with “It follows from the above that the 
appointment of GOC Canadian Forces in the British Isles is the senior military 
appointment in the OMFC.”29 There is, however, nothing in the memorandum 
that indicated Turner gained any additional powers over the corps in comparison 
to the situation under Byng.  
Two issues arose in the aftermath of Currie’s selection that affected the 
Turner-Currie relationship. The first involved who would replace Currie in the 1st 
Division. Borden was most concerned to ensure Garnet Hughes received the 
command.30 Again, the matter of what to do with Hughes loomed large. Sims met 
Currie on 10 June and Currie claimed had tried to negotiate with him regarding 
the position. Currie rejected any interference, and this may be the genesis of 
Currie’s dislike of Sims, which will be discussed further in Chapter 8.31 While 
Currie did not rule out giving Hughes a division, he thought the PF officer 
                                            
28  "His solution was to give Currie the corps, while placating Turner with a promotion and 
increased power, at the expense of the Corps Commander, in France." Hyatt, General Sir 
Arthur Currie: A Military Biography: 152; Biography of Currie, John Alexander Swettenham, 
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29  Memorandum, 14 June 1917, T-7, MG 27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
30  Cable Borden to Perley 13 June 1917, v9 File 1, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
31  Currie Diary Entry, 10 June 1917, MG 30 E100 v43, Currie Fonds; LAC. 
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Brigadier-General A.C. Macdonell a better choice.32 It was unlikely, though, 
Currie had any intention of giving Hughes a division, as demonstrated later in 
1918 when Currie refused Hughes again. Currie claimed he had to resist 
tremendous pressure from the politicians to select Hughes. Hyatt and Morton both 
suggest Currie probably exaggerated the pressure placed on him.33  
Currie later had a heated three-hour meeting with Hughes who pleaded for 
the division but Currie adamantly refused. According to Currie, Hughes stormed 
out vowing vengeance.34 He believed Garnet was now an implacable enemy and 
that Garnet and his father were sure to undermine and attempt to replace him. 
However, Currie continued to correspond with Garnet and meet with him in 
England when on leave, which tends to belie Currie’s claim.35 As Turner was 
closely associated with Garnet, it was an easy leap to assume that Turner was also 
an inveterate enemy, especially as Currie had thwarted Turner’s ambition to 
command the corps.  
The second issue was a terrible secret that had loomed over Currie – he was 
a thief. He had embezzled $10,000 from the 50th’s regimental funds to stave off 
bankruptcy.36 Throughout the war, Currie the strict disciplinarian had lived with 
the fear that his peculation would be uncovered and if found, the best he could 
hope for was cashiering. Surprisingly, Sam Hughes knew of this serious breach of 
ethics but never revealed it despite his conflicts with Currie. In 1915, Hughes sent 
                                            
32  Perley to Borden, 15 June 1917, RG 9 III A1 v107, LAC. 
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his aide Harold Daly to assure Currie that his financial situation was under 
control.37 
Shortly after Currie’s appointment to corps command, Perley through the 
Militia Council learned of Currie’s theft. Initially, Perley proposed he and Kemp 
pay off the debt but two of Currie’s subordinates, David Watson, and Victor 
Odlum, GOC 11th Brigade, settled it.38 
Saving Currie’s career from his financial turpitude was correct given Currie’s 
success in commanding the Canadian Corps. However, it does place Currie in an 
unfavourable light given his lack of effort to repay the debt before its discovery. 
This was at a time when the authorities regularly cashiered junior officers for 
passing bad cheques of £20.39 Secondly, it was a poor decision to allow two of 
Currie’s subordinates to repay the debt, as at a minimum it raised the issue of a 
potential conflict of interest.40 Finally, it conditioned the Currie and Turner 
relationship. There is no evidence that Turner knew of the problem, but Currie 
had to suspect that Turner was aware and, so Currie would be concerned that 
Turner could use the information against him.  
Currie as corps commander was in an anomalous position as he owed duty 
to two different masters and had to negotiate the nebulous boundaries between 
responsibilities owed to the British chain of command and the Canadian 
                                            
37  This was around the time of Festubert. Harold Daly Comments, MG 4027 Acc. No 391 Ref 1-
2, Urquhart Fonds; McGill. 
38  Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography: 9-13. 
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authorities. Operations were wholly under British control but administrative 
matters, such as promotions and appointments, involved both British and 
Canadian control. The boundary evolved over the course of the war, as the 
Canadians wrested greater control from the British. The Canadian Corps had a 
similar organisation to a British corps, other than having its divisions effectively 
permanently attached.41 It was fully integrated into the BEF’s command, 
discipline, and logistics infrastructure. However, in matters of promotion, 
commissioning, and appointments it also reported to Canadian authorities. In a 
British corps, the commander did not have control over appointments to the 
senior command, administrative, and staff positions.42 The commander of the 
Canadian Corps had not only combat responsibilities, but was also the head of a 
national contingent, which carried political implications. A British corps 
commander on the Western Front was far enough down the chain of command 
that his role was entirely military.  
The formation of the OMFC and Perley’s memorandum regularised 
responsibilities between the forces in the field and the command structure in 
England. Currie, however, was vigilant in defending what he regarded as his 
prerogatives. Many historians view the Turner-Currie relationship through the lens 
of Currie’s voluminous correspondence and diary. As a result, an image surfaces 
in some accounts of a jealous and refractory Turner interfering in Currie’s 
                                            
41  It was not until early in 1918 that the organisation of Canadian Divisions differed significantly 
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42  In the British service, the corps commander had little control over staff appointments other than 
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responsibilities. However, a careful review of the documentation reveals an 
asymmetric dynamic: Currie was at war with the administration, but Turner and 
Perley were not fighting Currie.  
Two issues, initially, roiled the Turner-Currie relationship. First was the issue 
of artillery officer promotion. Currie wrote to Turner on 29 July to complain that 
the gazetting of officer promotions in the artillery was in chaos with some 
promotions not gazetted for over a year. Currie then made an impassioned plea to 
promote officers who fought with their batteries at the Somme and Vimy, and died 
without receiving their due promotions. He closed with “This you know is not 
right, and the matter should receive prompt attention.”43 Turner swiftly replied 
agreeing and he followed up to report there were no outstanding promotions at 
the War Office or at GHQ.44 Turner did Sims no favour by stating “The delay 
therefore must be at Corps Headquarters and Colonel Sims tells me he has 
pointed this out to you.”45 Turner then sent his AMS Major Montague to help the 
corps to accelerate the promotions transit through the War Office machinery. 
Montague reported, “General Currie advised us that he had been under a 
misapprehension at the time he wrote the letter of July 29th.”46 Currie had 
neglected to ask Brigadier-General G.J. Farmar, his chief administrative officer, 
before writing in high dudgeon to Turner. According to Farmar, the artillery 
officers had received acting promotions which did not require gazetting, and so 
they had received their due pay and allowances.  There is no record of Currie 
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apologising to Turner after his faux pas. This would be a pattern of Currie 
automatically assuming problems or obstacles were Turner’s fault.  
In August, Currie wrote a strident letter complaining about Turner’s 
interference in the appointments in the corps. The specific case was the 
appointment of the Canadian Corps Ordnance and Veterinary Officers without 
first getting Currie’s approval. Currie argued Turner should have asked him for 
recommendations or better yet that Currie make the recommendation, as “This 
puts me in a false position and I maintain is most unfair. If I am to command this 
Corps, surely it is for me to say who should be recommended to fill the 
appointments.” He then drew a comparison with Sam Hughes’ approach to 
promotion that was sure to rankle Perley and Turner.47  
Turner’s stance was that the British Army support organisations, such as the 
Army Veterinary Corps, made all administrative appointments without reference 
to the corps commander, so it was within his prerogative to appoint the two 
officers. Turner’s view was all combat promotion and appointment 
recommendations emanated from Currie, but that administrative ones were in the 
purview of the services involved.48 Turner, Currie, and Sims worked out a 
compromise that Turner would unofficially consult Currie to solicit his views 
before deciding on appointments. This was not a case of Turner interfering but 
one of Currie overstepping his bounds and Turner subsequently retreating from 
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standard British policy.49 Turner in most cases backed down and granted Currie 
what he demanded. 
Another example of this process of negotiating the boundaries was the corps 
demand starting with Byng that Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Brutinel be 
promoted to a full Colonel, with the pay and allowances of a GSO 1, and to be 
responsible for the CMGC. Turner rejected the promotion but did allow Brutinel 
to receive the pay and allowances of a GSO 1.50 The argument was that while the 
Machine Gun Officer had a powerful influence on the Machine Gun Depot he 
did not command it, so was not truly the head of the CMGC.51 Currie had to 
acquiesce. 
Turner and the Abortive Birth of a Canadian Air Force52 
One of the paradoxes of Canadian participation in the First World War was 
why there was no separate Canadian air service at the front.53 Canada asserted the 
right for Canadians to serve in distinct Canadian units from the war’s beginning. 
The British accepted this claim of sovereignty well before Canadians had 
demonstrated any martial prowess. The British authorities furthermore indicated a 
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willingness to accept separate Canadian squadrons.54 In late 1915, the Army 
Council suggested the Dominions raise complete squadrons; an offer the 
Australians accepted.55 The War Office welcomed Hughes’ offer of squadrons in 
September 1916 and as late as March 1917 was trying to arrange a meeting with 
Perley to discuss the proposal – a proposal unknown to Turner, Thacker, and 
Perley.56 Canada made a major contribution to the British air effort with 20,000 
men trained or roughly one quarter of the total British pilot strength. The nature of 
the contribution was also notable, as four of the top ten British air aces were 
Canadian.57 Finally, there was Australia’s success in raising and maintaining four 
squadrons at the front by late 1917 despite Canada sending twenty times the 
number of pilots to the front in comparison to Australia.58  
Turner had a full appreciation of airpower from his experiences at Second 
Ypres, St. Eloi, and the Somme. As a result, Turner was a strong proponent of a 
separate air service for Canada. As early as January 1917, Turner was advocating 
a separate service.59 Turner launched a campaign to convince the Government to 
establish a Canadian flying service by writing a strong letter to Perley on 13 July. 
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He followed up with a second letter on 22 September stating it was ‘humiliating’ 
that Canada had no air service when it was contributing so many men to the 
British service.60 The second letter was probably the most pointed letter Turner 
sent to Perley. 
Turner recommended Canada form squadrons ‘as rapidly as conditions 
allow’ with the objective of establishing a Royal Flying Corps Brigade.61 Turner 
believed that this formation would cover all the branches of the air service. The 
British would supply the equipment and Canada the flying and ground personnel. 
His rationale was a Canadian airforce would provide better service, increase 
Canadian recognition, enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities to its 
citizens in the British flying services, and afford valuable experience. The majority 
of Canadians entered the flying service via direct recruitment or transfer where 
they were lost to Canadian authorities.62 The OMFC could only track officers 
seconded to the flying services.63 The rationale is a clear demonstration of 
Turner’s nationalist orientation and his political sensitivity. 
Perley’s response was to argue to Borden that he sympathised with the 
feeling for a Canadian air service, but there were practical arguments against it. 
His most telling point arose from discussions with Commander Redford Mulock, 
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the senior Canadian pilot. The issue was how to ensure a separate Canadian 
service would get a fair proportion of modern aircraft. Technology advances 
quickly rendered aircraft obsolescent and flying these aircraft was akin to a death 
sentence, as witnessed by the terrible losses of the Royal Flying Corps in April 
1917.64 Perley’s concern was any real or perceived inequitable aircraft 
distribution would rebound on the Government. There are, however, no reports to 
suggest the Australian Flying Corps had any difficulty in this respect. At its heart, 
Perley’s argument was the political risks of a separate service far outweighed any 
potential benefits.65   
All of these points had some validity but other than the issue of modern 
equipment, all applied equally to forming separate Canadian ground units. 
Hughes, however, brushed these objections aside and aggressively asserted 
Canada’s sovereignty to the benefit of Canada and the overall war effort.  
In the midst of the Passchendaele offensive, Currie wrote to Turner about his 
desire for a Canadian squadron to support the Canadian Corps. He revealed he 
did not know Turner’s stance on a separate airforce.66 Currie’s comment 
demonstrates a critical error made by Turner in not enrolling Currie and the senior 
Canadian pilots in lobbying Perley. It highlights the costs of the estrangement 
between Currie and Turner. A strong position from Currie and the senior 
Canadian pilots orchestrated by Turner may have been sufficient to change 
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Perley’s mind.   
With Kemp replacing Perley in January 1918, Turner reopened the file by 
sending a series of letters in January, February, and April reiterating the case for a 
separate service and adding Currie agreed with him.67 Billy Bishop VC, Canada’s 
most famous pilot, supplied additional ammunition claiming all Canadian officers 
in the RAF, formed from the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service in 
April 1918, wanted their own service.68 Turner was quick to pass on Bishop’s 
views to Kemp.  
The formation of the RAF gave Turner another opportunity to push for a 
separate airforce. Turner wrote a further pointed letter to Kemp at the end of April 
strongly recommending that Canada secure representation on the Air Board 
commensurate with Canada’s contribution, and begin the formation of a 
Canadian Air Force. Turner’s strongest point was Canadians were not 
proportionally represented at the higher ranks.69 Turner had considerable grounds 
for his complaints. Figures gathered on seconded officers by the OMFC showed 
Canadians made up 9.5% of the pilots but only 2 to 3% of the Flight Commanders 
and above.70  
Turner’s dogged persistence with support from Currie and leading Canadian 
pilots, increased public scrutiny, and a less anglophile Minister convinced the 
Government to change its policy by mid-1918. The result was much less than 
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Turner wanted – just two squadrons.71 Despite the promising start, neither 
squadron reached the front before the armistice.72  
Throughout the war, Canadian authorities struggled to supply sufficient 
numbers of competent NCOs and junior officers to maintain the combat 
effectiveness of the Canadian Corps. Yet, Canada allowed approximately 20,000 
men who were or could have been NCOs and junior officers in the CEF to serve 
in the British flying services, with limited direct benefit to Canada. Given the 
extent and nature of Canada’s contribution to the air war, why was there no 
separate service? Important factors were the Government’s indifference to 
airpower, fears of the political risks, and that the weak information exchange 
between the front and Canada meant an underestimation of air power’s 
importance. Finally, while Turner was persistent in his efforts to promote a 
separate service, his failure to recruit Currie and the most influential Canadian 
pilots frustrated his objective.  
 Further Deterioration 
Currie and Turner had reached a cool but correct relationship after the 
initial clashes, but persistent rumours of Currie’s imminent dismissal after the 
Passchendaele campaign upset the balance.73 The purported reasons for Currie’s 
dismissal included the Passchendaele high casualties, his ill health, or a poor 
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working relationship with GHQ. Today it is difficult to imagine how Currie’s 
tenure was in peril given his performance. However, the extent of the rumours 
suggests that Currie had reason for concern, and this situation would have 
intensified his negative view of the administration in England.  
A possible trigger to these rumours were two cables Perley sent to Borden in 
reaction to Borden’s desire to include a senior general in the Cabinet in the lead 
up to the Federal election of 1917. Perley considered Currie the better choice 
politically as Currie was a Liberal, and with Currie ailing in October, Perley 
thought he might be willing to accept a cabinet post. Perley would then make the 
case to Haig that only a Canadian could command the corps, meaning Turner.74 It 
is unlikely that Perley queried Haig, but Kemp did visit Haig in January 1918. 
Haig’s diary entry records Kemp “asked my opinion about General Turner and 
agreed that he must keep him in charge of the Canadian organisation in England 
and that General Currie (now Commander Canadian Corps) should command in 
the field.” This rather odd entry suggests Kemp was at least willing to discuss 
some combination of replacing Currie and Turner.75 This is consistent with 
Kemp’s dissatisfaction with both officers when he first took over the OMFC, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The heavy losses at Passchendaele in the midst of the election campaign 
and Currie’s lack of public support of the Government did not endear him to the 
politicians and probably helped contribute to the whispering campaign. The 
                                            
74  Cable Perley to Borden, 7 September 1917, v9 File 3, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
Cable Perley to Borden, 4 October 1917, v9 File 3, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
75  Haig Diary, 18 January 1918 in Bourne, Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 1914-1918, 
372. 
7 Fighting the Authorities 
 309 
rumours were prevalent and credible enough that they reached Canada and 
caused the Liberal party to cable a party organiser in England enquiring if Currie 
had been relieved.76 The final straw was a telegram sent to Currie from a 
newspaper editor addressed ‘General Sir Arthur Currie, or to the Acting 
Commander of the Canadian Corps.’ Currie was outraged and demanded Perley 
issue an official statement that he was not being replaced.77 Perley never made 
such a statement.  
Currie also lamented the atmosphere in London, complaining to Brigadier-
General F.O.W. Loomis in January “I also learned that I had become very 
unpopular with the Commander-in-Chief and the Army. I was told that the 
Canadian Corps was not working harmoniously with the higher authorities at 
all.”78 This complaint stemmed in part from Currie’s resistance to participating in 
the Passchendaele Offensive. It may, also, relate to the campaign Urquhart 
claimed certain British generals and Lipsett were waging to displace Currie with 
Lipsett.79 
Currie’s reaction to these threats indicates he was not a political naïf. He 
wrote Harold Daly, the former aide of Hughes, who was politically well 
connected, to contact select journalists to release Currie’s side of the story. Currie 
was not happy with the support he was getting and claimed ‘some people are not 
playing the game as they should.’80 Currie was probably alluding to Perley and 
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Turner, however Currie’s complaints were unfair to Turner, as there is no 
evidence that Turner played any part in this campaign. 
Challenges of 1918 
Turner’s training organisation faced four principal challenges in 1918 in 
responding to the significant expansion of the Canadian Corps due to a major 
reorganisation; supplying replacements in expectation of the German spring 
offensive; keeping the corps up to strength because of severe casualties during the 
Hundred Days campaign; and simultaneously coping with effects of the Spanish 
Influenza. The degree to which it responded to these challenges would affect the 
corps’ combat effectiveness. 
While the election, to be discussed in the next chapter, ensured 
conscription’s implementation, there was a lag before the conscripts arrived. In 
the interim, the main source of manpower in December and January were 
recovered wounded and boys who reached the age of 19.81 How to deal with 
conscripts was a matter of great importance. Turner, of because his strong man-
management skills, rejected Thacker’s proposal for a special numbering system for 
conscripts as he did not want them to be specially distinguished.82 Turner also 
issued an order to the area commanders to ensure they treated conscripts with the 
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‘same goodwill and respect as volunteers.’83 When the conscripts started arriving, 
McDonald reported “The men throughout are an excellent type, easy to handle, 
have nothing to un-learn, and are exceedingly keen in their work.”84 
The imposition of the Military Service Act also meant the OMFC had large 
numbers of French-Canadians to train and send to the corps for the first time. In 
response to Turner’s query on how to distribute the additional French-Canadians, 
Currie’s division commanders were only willing to receive them in units of 
platoon size.85 Both Turner and Kemp agreed to this policy. Turner did take steps 
to procure French-Canadian cadets from the corps and directed Thacker to ensure 
a French-Canadian officer accompanied drafts of fifty French Canadians 
despatched to an English speaking battalion.86  
Canadian Corps Reorganisation 
The reorganisation of the Canadian Corps in early 1918 was the most 
notable instance of Turner being clearly misguided in an administrative matter. 
The British losses of the 1916/1917 campaigns and the resulting manpower 
shortage compelled the War Office to mandate a crucial reorganisation.87 Over 
Haig’s objections, the War Office ordered the disbandment of one battalion per 
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brigade.88 The War Office approached Canadian authorities in early 1918 to effect 
a similar change and use the released battalions to raise a sixth division. The War 
Office also requested the Australians follow suit, but they rejected the idea.89 
Under this scheme with the 5th Division brought over to France, Canada could 
form a second corps and possibly a small army. This was an attractive proposition 
to the Government, Turner, and the many surplus officers remaining in England. 
For the Government it meant the surplus officers would have a position, Garnet 
Hughes would serve at the front, and Canada would gain more influence from a 
second corps.90 For Turner, it meant the opportunity for possibly command of the 
second corps and a realisation of his desire for a combat command. Not 
surprisingly, both Kemp and Turner endorsed the plan but without first consulting 
Currie. They probably assumed Currie would jump at the opportunity of possibly 
commanding a Canadian army, but it was an error not to confer with him.  
Currie’s reaction, however, was strong disapprobation when he learned of 
the plan from Turner.91 Currie hastened to London and met with Turner and Kemp 
to object. Contrary to the usual narrative that Currie had to fight tooth and nail to 
derail the plan, his objections were convincing, and his view prevailed without 
much resistance.92 Currie thought the proposal inefficient and ineffective. He 
argued circumstances compelled the British to adopt this structure not that it was 
inherently superior. Changing the organisation would mean breaking up battle-
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tested formations and replacing them with less effective ones. It was inefficient in 
overhead, as the requirements for additional support units far outweighed the 
increase in combat power. A particularly compelling argument to Turner and 
Kemp was that the staff needed for a sixth division, a second corps, and 
potentially an army would not be Canadian, so it meant a retreat from 
Canadianisation, as there were not enough trained and qualified Canadian officers 
to staff the new formations.93 
Currie’s objections were convincing but what made the difference was an 
alternative plan Currie advanced to increase combat power. He wanted to expand 
the engineers in each division to brigade strength to reduce the strain on the 
infantry by freeing them from providing working parties. He viewed the increase 
in engineers so vital that he preferred “to do without infantry than to go without 
Engineers.”94 He also wanted to increase the number of machine guns per 
division, signallers, motor transport capacity, and add one hundred 
supernumeraries to each battalion. Kemp and Turner accepted Currie’s scheme. 
Currie in this instance was correct, and historians have rightly praised him for his 
principled stance for advocating a plan that meant he waived a potential 
promotion.   
After the change in establishments received GHQ’s approval, Turner now 
had to deliver the additional personnel for the corps. The infantry were not a 
serious problem, as the 5th Division was disbanded to free sufficient trained men 
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to provide the supernumeraries required. The expansion of the technical arms, 
however, was a different matter. These troops took the longest time to instruct, 
required specialised training equipment and supplies, and often depended on 
civilian-trained manpower. Turner’s organisation had to immediately supply the 
equivalent of four battalions of engineers, four companies of machine gunners, 
additional signallers, and 700 motor transport personnel. Argyll House was able 
to satisfy these initial demands, except for drivers, but they emptied the 
replacement pools.95 Turner wrote Currie in February patiently explaining why it 
was difficult to supply the needed replacements. The increase in the engineers’ 
establishment required an expansion to the depot, and procuring additional 
training supplies, which was always a challenge. Currie did not grasp that an 
expansion in the establishment in France required a similar one in England and 
that there would necessarily be a lag in the supply of trained men.96 
The staggering success of the German March offensive caused Currie to 
increase the firepower of his divisions by adding a third Machine Gun Company 
to each division’s Machine Gun Battalion on 10 April. To obtain the extra 
personnel he drafted fifty men per battalion and gave them a crash course in 
machine guns. He did not inform Turner of his decision until 16 April, but Turner 
had the new establishment rapidly approved by 1 May.97 
Even before the expansion, Currie complained vociferously about the poor 
state of Machine Gun replacements. He could not understand why given the lack 
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of combat since Passchendaele there were so few replacements available. Of 
course, Currie ignored that he had demanded an increase in the size of the CMGC 
and the Machine Gun Depot needed time to expand. In addition, originally Argyll 
House assumed they could use the 5th Division’s Machine Gun Companies as 
replacements but instead they were used to increase the establishment in 
France.98 In a typical fashion, Thacker and Turner scrambled to satisfy Currie by 
rescinding an order to retain recovered Machine Gunners in England, and 
accelerated training of machine gunners. Thacker pointed out that he had met all 
the demands for replacements, other than twenty-five specialist NCOs, contrary to 
Currie’s assertion.99 
Currie’s increasing demands placed a tremendous strain on Turner’s ability 
to respond. An example was Currie’s request that Turner supply engineer 
replacements at a rate of 10% per month because he expected heavier losses with 
open warfare. Previously, the monthly wastage rate was 4% per month for 
engineers and 5% for pioneers. In effect, Currie was insisting Turner’s organisation 
treble the number of engineer replacements.100 Turner agreed to the demand 
when there were sufficient replacements from Canada, and the plan was put into 
effect 22 August.101 Argyll House also struggled to satisfy the increased 
establishment for engineer officers. The situation was so dire that Turner requested 
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engineering officers from Canada contrary to the previous policy of not accepting 
officers from Canada. As late as 20 July there was still an outstanding demand for 
129 officers from Canada.102 
Currie continued to complain about the number and state of training for 
signallers. Signal training was a continuing issue throughout 1918, especially 
given the increased establishment and use of wireless equipment that put an even 
greater strain on the limited training capabilities of Argyll House. McDonald 
explained Argyll House was expanding its training establishments, combing out 
already experienced signallers from infantry units, raising instructors’ pay, and 
attempting to secure the necessary equipment.103 McDonald confessed to the 
Canadian Corps BGGS, that it was almost impossible to get wireless equipment 
for training as all the sets manufactured were sent to the front.104  
In May, Currie claimed his units were short of 540 battalion signallers but 
only 60 were available, and that men did not train on the equipment used in the 
corps. This is another instance where Currie seemed oblivious to the situation in 
England and the impossibility of meeting his demands.105 Turner’s response was a 
quite sharply worded rejoinder that there were no outstanding demands for 
signallers and if the deficiency had reached that alarming total “is not due to any 
lack of provision of this personnel on the part of Reserve Units in England.” He 
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also blasted back about the training state that “the training of Signal personnel 
depends entirely upon the quality of the instructional personnel returned from the 
corps for that purpose.”106  
Overall, Turner’s organisation struggled to supply the corps’ increased 
establishments in specialist troops. Equipment and training supply shortages and 
limitations in the supply of already trained technical personnel from the civilian 
sector severely limited the training capacity.107 Turner and his staff despite their 
best efforts failed to source the necessary materials and did not respond 
aggressively enough to address these problems. Once again, the lack of 
experience on Turner’s staff in these specialist branches showed. 
The other source of manpower was the 5th Division. After the election, the 
political necessity of keeping Garnet Hughes employed diminished and keeping 
10,000 trained infantry tied up in England was indefensible.108 In October 1917, 
the Canadian War Committee was considering breaking up the 5th Division given 
the replacement shortages and asked for Perley and Turner’s opinion.109 Based on 
a detailed analysis, Thacker recommended the 5th Division be broken up; 
otherwise, there would be no infantry replacements after 1 May 1918.110 Perley 
responded to a further cable from Borden ordering the disbandment of the 5th 
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Division recommending to keep the organisation but use it for reinforcements.111 
This was just before the election and the implication was it was not politically 
expedient to break up the division, yet.  
The continued presence of the 5th Division in England while wounded men 
were returned to the front was a cause of public criticism.112 As part of Currie’s 
plan, the 5th Division disbanded and its infantry arrived in France as drafts, the 
MG companies to supplement the newly formed MG battalions, and the engineers 
to reinforce the engineer brigades. The 5th Division artillery had already been 
serving in France since August 1917. 
The breakup created a problem of what to do with the surplus infantry 
captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels; Garnet Hughes; and Sam Hughes’ son-
in-law, Byron Green.113 After some initial reluctance and a plea from Kemp, 
Currie agreed to accept more surplus officers with most having to revert only a 
single rank. Any officer with experience overseas could return at their previous 
rank.114 Currie also agreed to the policy that NCOs returning as commissioned 
officers would be despatched first and then in equal portions returning wounded 
officers and officers without overseas experience, such as those from the 5th 
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Division.115  
A further indication of the political significance of Garnet Hughes was 
Borden’s concern with Hughes returning to Canada. Garnet Hughes demanded 
the War Office recall the British Regular Major-General L. Lipsett in command of 
the 3rd Division, but Kemp refused to intervene. Currie did not want Hughes, as he 
had been away from the front for a year and Hughes rejected Turner’s offer of a 
training area at Hughes’ current rank.116 Eventually, Hughes accepted an unpaid 
position in the British Munitions Ministry and Green returned to Canada.117 
Contrary to the views of some historians, the breakup of the 5th Division did not 
solve the manpower crisis but did provide a vital buffer to supply the corps with 
well-trained reinforcements before the conscripts could be instructed and 
available.118 
Responding to the German March Offensive 
The second major challenge was responding to the German March 
offensive. The German attack on 21 March was an immense shock. It was not 
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unexpected, but the extent of the success was. The Germans advanced further in a 
day than in any previous offensive, and it severely upset Haig’s defensive 
arrangements. Currie was convinced that the British were fighting poorly, and his 
grave concerns were communicated to the OMFC, to Borden, and the British.119 
Turner immediately ordered training compressed to nine weeks and preparations 
made to send men with as little as six weeks training to ensure there were 
adequate manpower reserves.120 Turner also directed Thacker to provide a list of 
officers suitable for senior positions should the corps suffer heavy losses.121 
Instead of an attack, the corps had to stretch to cover more ground, as Haig 
rushed reinforcements to stem the German advance. On 26 March, Haig ordered 
three Canadian divisions to move south to Byng’s Third Army and the Canadian 
Corps headquarters to go into reserve. Currie immediately protested the breakup 
of the corps to GHQ and to Kemp. Kemp promptly intervened with the Secretary 
of State for War. All but the 2nd Division was restored to Currie, but it led to Haig 
complaining to the visiting Minister of Militia later “the British Army alone and 
unaided by Canadian troops withstood the first terrific blow made by 80 German 
Divisions on March 21st until May 27th.”122  It was during this period of intense 
stress that Currie’s chauffeur reported, “For the first time in my experience he 
appeared to be perturbed. He was very excited and seemed to lose control of his 
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temper.”123 
The stress also touched Turner, as he wrote an unusually brusque letter to 
Kemp complaining that the War Office was requiring Currie’s concurrence for all 
changes to establishments for Cavalry, Railway, and Forestry troops. Turner’s 
reaction was harsh: “This letter is directly contrary to any policy known to me to 
exist…. I cannot help but feel that the War Office has made a stupid blunder, as a 
result of General Currie’s letter.” Turner wanted to make it clear that Currie did 
not have any control over forces outside of the corps.124   
The Germans never attacked the Canadian Corps’ position even with the 
attenuated forces stretched paper-thin. Currie and the corps developed a very 
strong position that may have dissuaded the Germans from attacking. A more 
likely factor is the Canadian front did not lead to important operational objectives, 
unlike the other sectors the Germans did attack.125 
The impact of the German attack caused the new CIGS, General Sir Henry 
Wilson, to make a desperate request in June 1918. He asked the Canadians to 
replace one battalion per brigade with an American battalion thus freeing up 
forces to form a fifth division and to form another division out of its Forestry and 
Railway troops. Turner and Kemp refused to change the organisation of the corps. 
Kemp politely pointed out the short sightedness of Wilson’s Forestry and Rail 
request as it would cripple timber production and throttle essential railway 
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construction.126  
In England, the training organisation continued to work on producing 
replacements for the corps in case the Germans did attack the corps’ front. To 
prevent the spread of disease Argyll House in April established a segregation 
camp that would hold 10,000 men in quarantine for a month.127 While in the 
segregation camp men would receive elementary training and basic discipline, 
but this additional interruption disrupted training.128 As a further economy 
measure, Turner dissolved the remaining Reserve Brigades. By June, Turner 
restored the full 14-week training syllabus, and by July, the training could be 
extended as the corps left the line, as there was little demand for replacements.129 
With the corps in reserve, it was possible for McDonald to spend a week with the 
corps to review issues and for the corps’ training officers to visit England.130  
Commanding on the Western Front was arduous, both physically and 
psychologically, and Currie, fiercely loyal to his officers, closely monitored them 
for signs of an incipient breakdown. Currie’s view was that an officer who broke 
down was unfit for further front-line duty. To prevent this, Currie wanted to give 
commanders showing signs of breaking down a rest cure in England before they 
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collapsed.131 Turner and Currie worked out a scheme to transfer brigadier-generals 
and battalion commanders to command training units for four to six months. This 
step provided valuable front-line experience to the training areas and gave these 
officers a chance to recover from the rigours of the front.132 The corps and Turner 
had already established an officer exchange programme of up to six months for 
qualified officers. It was limited to six months to avoid officers falling out of touch 
with the changing conditions at the front.133 Turner’s concern with these programs 
was the corps using it as a mechanism to dump weak officers on England. The 
issue was the corps would send mediocre officers who were not so poor as to 
warrant an adverse report. The result would be a form of Gresham’s Law of ‘bad 
money drives good money out of circulation,’ as no competent officer would 
want to go to England if it earned a reputation as a holding tank for the weak, 
incompetent, or undesirable.134  
Protecting the integrity of the training system was vital to Turner and it was 
the cause of further conflict with Currie. Currie wrote Kemp complaining Turner 
had rejected Brigadier-General F. Hill for a training command, whom Currie had 
recommended.  Turner thought Hill an inebriate, which Currie denied. Currie’s 
comment was a characteristically petulant “If my recommendations are not to be 
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accepted what is the good of asking me to make them.” Kemp forced Turner to 
give Shorncliffe Area Command to Hill in place of Brigadier-General Smart, who 
had to return to Canada.135 Smart would later fiercely attack the OMFC when he 
returned to Canada in 1919. 
Hundred Days Campaign 
The third challenge of 1918 was responding to the 45,835 losses the corps 
suffered in the Hundred Days Campaign.136 Considering the Canadian Corps’ total 
establishment was approximately 105,000 men it meant replacing a substantial 
portion of the corps’ combat strength concentrated in the infantry, machine guns 
and engineers, and to a lesser degree in the signals and artillery. Turner responded 
by reducing the period of training to twelve weeks in August, ten weeks in 
September, and nine weeks in October and increasing the number of cadets 
under training from an average of 350 per month to 586 in September and 627 in 
October.137 By October, musketry training was running seven days a week from 
dawn and dusk to qualify men for the front and all advanced instruction other 
than anti-gas training stopped. The strain was starting to show in October such 
that McDonald was warning that the system could not long sustain the pace.138 
The rate had to be maintained, as it was not certain until close to the Armistice 
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that the Germans would acknowledge their defeat. Currie in early October was 
convinced the Germans were not on the verge of surrender. He characterised the 
Germans as fighting harder than he had known and expected they would fight 
even harder next year.139  
At the same time as the replacements demands were escalating, Argyll 
House had to deal with the worldwide influenza outbreak. Turner’s organisation 
responded by closing wet canteens, theatres, and cinemas and discontinuing 
Church parades to limit the spread. The medical authorities placed the entire 
Bramshott Camp under quarantine, which meant men who had completed their 
training were not available for drafts.140 Despite these challenges, the training 
organisation was able to satisfy the corps replacement demands but at the cost of 
compressing the training period. The main measure of the success of Turner’s 
training organisation was the corps’ combat power did not significantly degrade 
with the vast number of replacements provided, unlike the Somme Campaign 
where its combat effectiveness precipitously declined after the first engagements. 
Nadir: Post-Armistice Clashes 
The end of the war rather than diminishing the tension seemed to 
exacerbate Currie’s distrust. He was convinced that Turner and his staff were 
conducting a campaign to undermine him. Currie complained to Harold Daly “I 
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am afraid the old gang is still doing business.”141 Currie accused Turner and his 
staff of spending most of their time visiting hospitals where they “intimate that the 
Canadian Corps has suffered great and unnecessary casualties; going so far as to 
suggest that the leaders in the field have countenanced the men being 
sacrificed.”142 Currie carped to a former ADC that Turner was spreading these 
lies.143 Kemp responded to Currie’s accusations, denying there was any substance 
to them.144 
Currie also attacked Turner over manpower policies in the post-armistice 
period. Turner, as was often the case, was able to demonstrate to Kemp that 
Currie’s complaints were exaggerated and in some cases the result of Currie 
changing his mind.145 
Currie returned to his complaints in February 1919 denouncing Turner for 
attempting to turn Canadians in England against him. Currie railed, “I repeat these 
slanders are being encouraged.”146 Currie claimed he could provide the name of a 
British General who stated there was ‘a sustained but veiled attempt’ to 
undermine him.147 Currie also accused Turner and his staff of lying to officers that 
the corps did not want them. In at least one case when Turner investigated the 
case, the officer promptly repudiated his claim. Kemp once again tried to calm 
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down the increasingly excitable Currie by asserting there was no evidence of 
senior officers spreading rumours. He did suggest the problem originated with 
junior officers and other ranks. Kemp was trying gently to inform Currie that he 
did have a problem, but it was one of his own making. The rift between Currie 
and Turner was at risk of becoming public, so Kemp held a luncheon with 
Borden, Currie, and Turner, with statements afterwards to the Press denying any 
conflict. Currie did not care for the idea of the meeting.148  
Currie’s attacks finally raised Turner’s hackles and he complained to Kemp 
that “I think it fair to myself and these Headquarters that the attention of the Corps 
Commander should be drawn to the fact that we resent criticism when it is 
unwarranted, and nothing causes greater dissatisfaction than generalities.” He 
further stated if Currie complained he needed to provide details such as the 
officer’s name, so Turner could investigate.149 Currie’s letters tended to omit 
details so making it difficult to refute his sometime-exaggerated claims.  
Were Currie’s claims legitimate? It is impossible to rule out Turner and his 
staff encouraged the slander, but it is highly unlikely. Currie was intensely 
sensitive, quick to take offence, and apt to see enemies everywhere, especially so, 
when exhausted, as after the Hundred Days Campaign. It is more likely that 
Currie, as Kemp maintained, magnified the usual grumbling and dissatisfaction of 
the other ranks into a grand conspiracy, with his rival Turner at its centre. 
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Certainly, Sam Hughes was still an inveterate enemy but neither Turner nor Aitken 
were part of any conspiracy.150 Turner’s regular practice of visiting hospitals, 
something Currie did not often do, was possibly another contributing factor.151 
Currie’s claim was entirely at odds with Turner’s character. Another factor that 
argues against the Currie complaint was Kemp’s defence of Turner. Turner was no 
great favourite of Kemp’s and was the subject of repeated grievances to Borden, as 
will be seen in the next chapter. It is, therefore, difficult to believe Kemp would 
defend Turner as stoutly as he did, if there was any substance to Currie’s 
complaints. Furthermore, two of the leading experts on Currie and the OMFC, 
Hyatt and Morton, attribute Currie’s problems to his deep unpopularity with the 
other ranks rather than Turner’s machinations.152 
Conclusion 
The working relationship between Currie and Turner was not wholly 
dysfunctional but neither was it fully effective. The dynamic consisted of Currie 
demanding and Turner complying. Currie often couched his requirements in 
undiplomatic and at times intemperate language. Currie’s expectation was 
whatever he required was to be fulfilled by Turner, and, for the most part, Turner 
accepted this. Turner’s practice was to do all in his power to help the front. 
Turner, however, had a larger mandate than just Currie’s Corps, as he was also 
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responsible for 50,000 men outside of the corps in Europe and the 100,000 in 
England. Currie did not recognise that the factors of finance, politics, and civilian 
control that he regularly railed against were the sine qua non of Turner’s 
command. Currie could not distinguish between the necessary political, financial, 
and civilian constraints from the blatant political interference of Sam Hughes. His 
comment of “no freedom of action: financial considerations, personal 
considerations and all sorts of other things retarding what one considers progress” 
was Turner’s reality, but Currie did not appreciate this.153 
Five conclusions are evident from the Turner-Currie correspondence starting 
with Currie’s assumption of corps command to the end of demobilisation. First, 
Turner diligently worked to satisfy Currie’s requests. In case after case, Turner 
endeavoured to satisfy the requests coming from the corps. For instance in 
October 1918, Turner confirmed the promotion of two officers to Brigadier-
General at Currie’s request, at the cost of contributing to a bitter rift with the 
Deputy Minister.154 In small issues, such as returning or retaining officers in 
England, Turner made every effort to satisfy Currie.155 More importantly, on larger 
issues such as having half of the commanders of MG companies graded as Majors 
or changing the policy to give priority to returning wounded officers when filling 
officer vacancies, Turner satisfied the corps’ needs and requests.156 Another 
example was giving Currie authority to transfer men at the Infantry Depot in 
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France who had not served overseas between units reinforced by the reserve 
battalion.157 What these examples show is Turner’s absolute willingness to accede 
to Currie’s requests. As Tim Cook put it “Although Turner had an uneasy 
relationship with Currie, he had always done his best to assist the corps 
commander.”158 
Currie was getting his way so often that the Minister of Militia in Canada, 
Sydney Mewburn, complained to Borden in April 1918 that Currie was setting 
policy and forcing Turner and the Government to acquiesce. Mewburn wanted 
the Government to perform this function, but Currie was still able to fix the course 
of action, such as demobilisation.159 This was a matter of frustration to Kemp 
when he was the Minister of OMFC and contributed to his complaints that the 
military were not sufficiently under civilian control. 
Second, Turner’s general operating principle was to query the corps before 
making policy decisions that affected it. This is especially evident after the conflict 
over the appointment of administrative positions in the corps. Turner recognised 
that the Canadian Corps was a unique formation, so it was necessary to modify 
standard British policies. This was especially the case given Currie’s difficult 
personality and hair-trigger responsiveness to any perceived threat to his 
autonomy or authority. An example is Turner proposing a different approach to 
breaking up battalions at the front because of manpower shortages, in reaction to 
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Currie’s concerns.160 
Third, there is no evidence of the jealousy and obstruction that supposedly 
characterised Turner’s relationship with Currie. George Stanley in his standard 
treatment of Canadian military history claimed “That this appointment should of 
aroused personal jealousies was natural; that the jealousies should of led to 
personal animosities, bitter recriminations, and political intrigue was indicative of 
immaturity and a lack of a proper sense of military discipline.”161 Even the 
accomplished historian Charles Stacey describes the unhappiness with Argyll 
House as “Static headquarters in safe areas always are, but in this instance 
personalities certainly made things worse, the more so as Turner had hoped to be 
Corps Commander.”162 However, what is missing is any evidence that the conflict 
that did exist was the result of Turner’s jealousy.  
What is evident is Turner’s public appreciation of Currie, albeit it may have 
been just conventional politeness. For instance, his letter of congratulation to 
Currie for his success at Hill 70,  “I congratulate you, with all my heart, on the 
splendid success achieved with the Corps lately.”163 Turner was supportive such 
as his letter to Currie in early September 1918 stating “I think one of the gratifying 
results up to the present has been the success achieved with a comparative small 
loss.”164  
Fourth, constants of Currie’s correspondence with Turner were his persistent 
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vigilance for any possible infringement on his perceived prerogatives and the 
often-curt tone of his letters. A single letter from the period leading up to the 
German March offensive regarding officer supply illustrates both of these themes. 
First, Currie was incensed that a letter referred to Turner as GOC Overseas 
Military Forces of Canada, which was not an authorised title and Currie was 
prepared to escalate the issue to the Minister. Next, he complained the 5th 
Division was dumping officers on the corps, units were not getting their 
commissioned NCOs returned, and he wanted an officer exchange for a hard-hit 
battalion. Turner’s response also acts as an illustration of how Turner dealt with 
Currie’s sometimes brusque and accusatory letters. He first apologised for the 
typist’s oversight of omitting the term ‘in the British Isles’ in his title. Next, he 
ordered Thacker to satisfy Currie’s request for an officer exchange and finally 
asked for more specifics of Currie’s complaints so that he could investigate. This 
letter captures the dynamic of Turner satisfying Currie’s relentless requests and 
Turner trying to manage Currie’s suspicion and ill-tempered demands.165 Currie 
did not apologise even when he was clearly in the wrong while Turner was 
contrite.  
Another example of Currie’s at times unbridled language came from 
October 1918 “The seconding of an Officer of a Trench Mortar Battery in France 
cannot seriously affect the training of Canadian Troops in England, which it is 
understood is the sole function of the Chief of the General Staff in England.” 
Turner responded to this inflammatory letter soothingly that his involvement was 
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only to track establishments. He then offered to accept whatever course Currie 
thought appropriate.166 
Finally, what is striking is the banality of the majority of the exchanges 
between Turner and Currie and the lack of meaningful information exchange 
between the two. Currie was somewhat more forthcoming during the Hundred 
Days Campaign. Their letters relate to specific topics and do not deal with higher-
level issues. In contrast stands the correspondence between Haig and Robertson 
who regularly met and exchanged views via letters.167 Haig and Robertson were 
engaged in a fierce set of battles with their political masters, the ‘Frocks,’ so 
whatever centrifugal forces may have separated them were overborne by the 
central necessity of presenting an unified front, at least until late 1917. In the 
Canadian situation, Currie believed the enemy was the administration in England, 
meaning Perley and Turner. This made it difficult for Turner to develop a common 
front with Currie.168 A further obstacle was Currie’s assumption that Turner was 
still a competitor for command of the corps and this would have contributed to 
Currie’s wariness with Turner. 
Given the hostile and suspicious tone in some of Currie’s letters it is not 
unsurprising Turner would not want to share his views with Currie. As a result, 
there was a tendency for England and France to operate in isolation. Two 
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examples of this are Turner’s ready acceptance of the reorganised corps without 
first discussing the matter with Currie, and Turner’s failure to enrol Currie in 
advocating for a separate airforce.  
The nature of the Turner-Currie relationship was a function of fundamentally 
different personalities, backgrounds, characters, and the inevitable tension 
between the front-line commanders and administrators. Currie and Turner were 
near contemporaries in age but came from decidedly different circumstances. 
Turner was wealthy, worked at his family’s business, and lived in the city where 
he was born. Currie, on the other hand, moved across the country to make a new 
life. He switched careers twice and had the burden of knowing his business career 
had failed. Because he had none to start with, money was important to Currie. As 
evidence of this, Currie complained to Perley about not receiving the same pay 
and allowances as Byng, as well as requesting an increased separation allowance 
for his wife.169 There is no evidence that Turner raised any issues regarding pay or 
allowance. Related to wealth matters was Currie’s embezzlement secret that 
preyed on Currie’s equanimity and would affect his view of Turner, who had no 
such worries. Finally, Turner had earned a VC and DSO and was known for his 
visits to the front-line trenches, while Currie adopted a less heroic stance about 
touring the front and hospitals.170 Therefore, the very different circumstances and 
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financial conditions probably contributed to the poor relationship, as Currie may 
have had the envy of the self-made man for one who has had everything handed 
to him. 
Unlike the majority of senior British officers, they did not share a common 
educational background in attending the same types of schools and military 
academy.171 Turner attended a relatively prestigious urban high school in Quebec 
City while Currie attended a much more rustic school in his small town. Again, 
unlike the majority of senior British officers, Turner and Currie did not attend a 
higher staff college. Currie did pass the three-month Canadian Militia Staff Course, 
but it was a pale shadow of the two-year staff course at Camberley. In addition, 
the majority of Currie’s pre-war service was in the artillery while Turner’s was 
entirely in the mounted rifles and cavalry. As a result, there was not a common 
professional language, background, and culture, to the same extent as with senior 
British officers, to help mediate their interactions.  
Currie had little to no respect for Turner. Hyatt asserted “Currie had never 
been particularly fond of Sir Richard Turner, and he remained unimpressed with 
Turner’s ability as a commander or as a chief of staff.”172 Understandably bitter 
about Turner’s uncovering his flank at Second Ypres, Currie consistently made 
disparaging comments about Turner and his performance. At times, his comments 
were unfair or ill informed and appear animated by an animus towards Turner 
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unjustified by the circumstances.173 This attitude permeated and shaped Currie’s 
correspondence to his friends, associates, and to Turner.  
Further, Currie and Turner were rivals. While Turner was the senior officer, 
Currie had won the greatest prize. Some writers suggest jealousy or some other 
unworthy emotion drove Turner’s interactions with Currie, but there is no 
evidence to support this claim. Turner’s objections to Currie’s demands stemmed 
from a different perspective than Currie. In addition, because there was no clear 
superior and subordinate such as with Byng, the relationship would be more 
challenging than if one officer was at a different rank. 
Both Currie and Turner had no previous administrative experience before 
their promotions. Currie’s lack of administrative experience shaped this 
relationship. Currie had little appreciation of the challenges facing Turner and 
could not make allowances for them. Even his first academic biographer admitted 
“His correspondence with Sir George Perley showed little attempt to understand 
Perley’s problems and often seem ungenerous.”174 An apologist might claim that 
as a field commander it was not Currie’s responsibility to worry about Turner’s 
constraints. This is a false position, however, as field commanders have to take 
into account the realities of what the rear can provide. To plan and operate 
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divorced from the actual capabilities to support these operations risks failure.  
An example of Currie’s unrealistic demands was his request for ten 
supernumerary officers per battalion in October 1917. They would ‘soak up 
atmosphere,’ assist in training, enable exchange with officers in the battalion 
needing a rest, and allowed the commanding officers to get to know the 
replacement officers. This was an admirable plan but it meant Turner’s 
organisation needed to supply 480 infantry officers at once.175 
The final and most salient factor was the always-present strain between the 
front and rear. As E.L.M. Burns, a Second World War Canadian corps commander 
put it “In whatever echelon of the military machine the soldier happened to find 
himself he had a profound conviction that the man in the echelon behind had a 
pretty easy and safe time of it.”176 The British also experienced this conflict as 
witnessed by the struggles that the MGC at GHQ had with the training arm in 
England.177 An example of Currie’s feeling was his comment that Argyll House 
‘did themselves very well indeed’ when it came to foreign decorations while the 
front-line officers got nothing.178   
There is an inescapable tension between organisations with different time 
horizons, decision criteria, reporting structures, and success metrics. In business, 
government, and the military the interfaces between departments will always 
                                            
175  Ten officers per battalion times 48 battalions. G676/2-12, 11 October 1917, 103/6, RG 9 III C1 
v3866, LAC. 
176  E. L. M. Burns, General Mud; Memoirs of Two World Wars  (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970), 4. 
177  French, "The 51st (Highland) Division During the First World War.," 120. 
178  This was in response to a remarkably cheeky plea from Carson in February 1918 for a French 
decoration. Currie to Carson, 20 February 1918, MG 30 E100 v1, Currie Fonds; LAC. Currie 
also complained to Kemp about the decoration policy. Currie to Bristol, Private Secretary to 
Minister OMFC, 16 March 1918, File 9, MG 4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives. 
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generate stress and friction. Currie was wholly focused on the functional aspects 
of commanding a fighting force, while Turner had to bring into account the 
broader perspective of national goals and aspirations, financial matters, and 
political considerations, of which Currie was seemingly oblivious. Not 
surprisingly, the two had different agendas that did not coincide. For example, 
Turner claimed in March 1918 “it is safe to say that at least sixty 
recommendations in the past ten months have been put forward by the GOC 
Canadian Corps, which are not in accordance with the regulations and which are 
unsound from a view point of policy.”179 A matter that was beneficial for the corps 
might not be ideal for the larger context of the CEF. Another example of these 
different perspectives was the appointment of Brigadier-General Hill to 
Shorncliffe. Currie had legitimate reasons for wanting to give Hill a rest and 
Turner equally legitimate reasons for not wanting the encumbrance of an 
alcoholic. 
Too often, historians ascribe these tensions to personalities when they are 
innate to the system. As Dominick Graham phrased it, “friction at overlapping 
functional points is natural and not simply the result of mismanagement or 
misbehavior.”180 Personalities can ameliorate or magnify the tensions but not 
eliminate them. Officers with a common background, education, social position, 
training, and administrative experience are more likely to reduce these stresses. 
Operating against a common enemy will also minimise the strains, as with the 
                                            
179  Turner to Kemp, 12 March 1918, C-41a, MG 27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
180  Dominick Graham, "Stress Areas and Gray Areas: The Utility of the Historical Method to the 
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relationship between Haig and Robertson. None of these factors however applied 
to the Turner and Currie dynamic.  
Given all of these issues what is surprising is not that there was tension or 
that the interactions were not fully functional but that it worked at all. The fact 
that they did not wholly fail is in large part to Turner’s larger horizon and 
commitment to duty. Turner accepted a considerable amount of abuse from 
Currie with only an occasional outburst in return. Turner worked diligently and 
effectively to give Currie all he needed and much of what he wanted. What is 
remarkable is the degree of forbearance Turner demonstrated in the face of 
constant provocation. Currie was certainly at war with the administration, but the 
administration was not at war with Currie. A final factor was the efforts of Perley 
and later Kemp to mediate between the two. The tenor of their correspondence to 
Currie in answer to his attacks was usually conciliatory and they attempted to 
reason with him. They may have had similar discussions with Turner, but these 
have left no record. 
Post-war, Turner continued to try to reach out to and support Currie despite 
Currie’s continued disdain. In 1920, Currie was angry once again over a supposed 
faux pas at a memorial event for Second Ypres in Flanders relating to Currie’s 
brigade. It was a misunderstanding and Turner wrote Currie, “During the war 
period, I often thought there were outside influences that caused friction between 
you and me: Pray that it is all over.”181 Turner recruited Currie to participate in the 
creation of the Canadian Legion and sent a note of support prior to Currie’s 
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Coburg libel trial.182 Turner testified at the trial and according to a newspaper 
account, ‘When quizzed during the Currie trial Turner was enthusiastic in his 
praise of Currie,’ but it did not fundamentally change Currie’s view of Turner.183 
Turner was the president of the dinner in honour of Currie after the culmination of 
the Coburg trial. Turner rose to give the toast and “the troops cheered him to the 
echo.”184  
Late in 1917, Sir George Perley stepped down as the Minister of OMFC and 
Sir Edward Kemp, the Minister of Militia in Canada, replaced him. Kemp was a 
different type of superior, and he would make considerable changes to the 
structure and control mechanisms within the OMFC. This restructuring and a 
difficult relationship with Kemp meant a challenging period for Turner and is the 
focus of the next chapter. 
 
                                            
182  Turner to Currie, 31 March 1928, File 69, MG 30 E100 v19, Currie Fonds; LAC. 
183  Currie wrote Turner “I feel I owe you a special word of gratitude. I appreciated more than I can 
say your offer to testify and I was more than glad to take advantage of it." Currie to Turner, 8 
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FADE AWAY: TURNER 1918 - 
1961 
 
It is largely due to his untiring efforts that the Canadian Military 
Organization in England has reached its present high state of efficiency.1 
Kemp’s Press Release, 14 January 1918 
Besides there was an absolute lack of co-ordination between different 
important branches, which led to inefficiency, and perhaps what is of 
more importance, there was a lack of appreciation of what is understood 
by constitutional methods as against military control.2 
Kemp to Borden, 1 April 1918 
 
Sir Edward Kemp, the new Minister of the OMFC, arrived in England in 
December 1917 determined to reform the department, and this interventionist 
minister diminished Turner’s role and influence. This chapter discusses the 
remainder of Turner’s military career starting with the election of 1917 until his 
retirement in August 1919, concentrating on Turner’s dealings with Kemp. The 
chapter also covers the remainder of Turner’s life, with a focus on his final major 
contribution in helping unify veterans’ groups to establish what became the Royal 
Canadian Legion. As this is a military biography, only the bare contours of the 
remaining forty-three years of Turner’s life post-armistice will be sketched. 
Kemp became Minister, because Perley in September 1917 resigned to 
                                            
1  Press Release, 14 January 1918, P-16, MG 27 II D9 v155, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
2  Cable Kemp to Borden, 1 April 1918, 57572-57574, MG 26 H1 v105, Borden Fonds; LAC. 
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become the permanent High Commissioner.3 Perley’s workload resulting from 
holding two high-profile positions was exhausting. Perley, also, was disappointed 
when Borden refused to select Perley’s nominee for a vacant Senate seat.4 After 
the sacrifices Perley made and his contributions, Borden’s rejection was a bitter 
blow. It also contributed to Perley’s concern about his ability to retain his seat in 
Quebec in the coming federal election. With his apparent lack of political capital 
and the strong anti-conscription views of French-Canadians, Perley had legitimate 
concerns.5 He subsequently changed his mind and tried to withdraw his 
resignation, but Borden had already arranged for Kemp to replace Perley after the 
election. In Kemp’s place as the Minister of Militia, Borden selected a Liberal 
Militia Colonel, Sydney Mewburn.6  
Conscription and Election 
Before Kemp took over as Minister, the divisive election of 1917 was held to 
resolve the issue of conscription. Borden was well aware of the problems with 
recruiting but blanched at the prospect of bringing in the draft, especially after the 
negative results from two Australian referenda on conscription. Gwatkin sent 
Borden a memo in April 1917 that laid out in detail how serious was the shortfall 
                                            
3  Perley was an acting High Commissioner, as the High Commissioner could not sit in the 
Cabinet. 
4  The Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister appoints Senators. The Senate is the 
upper house of the Canadian Parliament. 
5  Perley to Borden, 14 September 1917, v9 File 3, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
6  Biography S.C. Mewburn, Folder 144/File 10, RG 9 III D1 v4734, LAC. Mewburn’s son died at 
Courcelette serving in the 18th Battalion. Mewburn's Burial File, 10-M-576, RG 9 III A1 v305, 
LAC. 
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in manpower, and pleaded that 50,000 men be compelled to serve.7 Borden, 
initially, wanted to give volunteer recruiting another six months.8 It was readily 
apparent, however, that this option was unrealistic.9 With the Government’s term 
about to expire and without an agreement from the opposition to extend it, an 
election was mandatory.10 After Laurier, the Liberal leader, rejected a coalition 
offer, Borden adroitly undercut him by suborning pro-conscription Liberals into a 
Union government.11 Not satisfied with this step, Borden also forced through 
changes to the Election Act that gave women who had family members in the 
military the vote, disenfranchised recent immigrants, and established conditions 
where soldiers’ votes could be switched to different constituencies.12 
Some historians have questioned why the Government took these drastic 
and fundamentally undemocratic steps.13 It is likely it was related to the Australian 
conscription failure. Australia experienced the same collapse of recruiting in 
1916, with the added problem of having to support the equivalent of seven 
divisions from a smaller population base.14 The two referenda were both narrowly 
defeated. Of great concern to the Canadian Government was the Australian 
                                            
7  Gwatkin estimated the CEF needed 20,000 to 30,000 men over the summer, but there were 
only 18,496 men in the CEF in Canada, and most of these were unsuitable or unavailable. 
Only 4,000 men were joining per month and some would be unfit for active service. 
Memorandum Relating to the Military Situation in Canada on the 1st of May 1917, GAQ 10-
47c, RG 24 v1843, LAC. 
8  Cable Borden to Perley, 23 June 1917, RG 9 III A1 v104, LAC. 
9  Robert Craig Brown, "Unrequited Faith: Recruiting in the CEF 1914-1919," Revue 
Internationale D' Historie Militaire 51(1982): 63. 
10  Granatstein, Broken Promises: The History of Conscription in Canada: 67. 
11  Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s: 62. 
12  Granatstein, Broken Promises: The History of Conscription in Canada: 63; Morton, A Peculiar 
Kind of Politics: 134. 
13  Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 141. 
14  Australia had a male population in 1911 of 2.3 million and Canada a male population of 3.8 
million. Perry, "Manpower and Organisational Problems in the Expansion of the British and 
Other Commonwealth Armies During the Two World Wars," 293. 
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military voted narrowly against conscription in both referenda, with the front-line 
forces voting three to one against in the first referendum.15  
The Government expected the senior overseas officers to promote 
conscription to Canadian voters and to ensure the soldiers voted for the Union 
Government. Turner fulfilled these expectations by delivering an endorsement of 
conscription when requested by the Government that included publishing a 
strident article in Canada in Khaki in support of more men.16 He also actively 
worked to get the military to vote for the Unionists. According to the King’s 
Regulations and Orders (KRO), military authorities were not to participate in 
active political campaigns and it constrained the types of activities allowed.17 
However, it is likely that Turner’s subordinates violated these regulations in their 
efforts to support conscription. The primary complainant in this matter was a 
Liberal organiser and scrutineer W.T. Preston.18 Preston would later gain infamy 
for being the author of the article that triggered Currie’s libel lawsuit in 1928. 
Preston made wild claims about the election campaign that the authorities 
ordered known Liberals to die in suicidal missions. More plausibly, he accused 
Major-General Garnet Hughes and Brigadier-General F.S. Meighen, a Training 
Brigade commander, of organising committees of officers to lobby their men to 
                                            
15  Faraday, "Half the Battle: The Administration and Higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918," 
115.; Robson, The First A.I.F.: A Study of Its Recruitment 1914-1918: 119. 
16  Richard Turner, "We Are Winning - But Send Us More Men,"  (ed.), Canada in Khaki No. 2 : A 
Tribute to the Officers and Men Now Serving in the Overseas Military Forces of Canada 
(London: The Pictorial Newspaper Co. Ltd., 1917). 
17  ”An officer or soldier is forbidden to institute or take part in, any meetings, demonstrations or 
processions for party or political purposes in barracks, quarters or camps.” The King's 
Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia 1917: 430. 
18  Chubby Power, later an important cabinet minister in Mackenzie-King’s Second World War 
government, in his unpublished memoirs, also suggested some officers allowed or tolerated 
violations. Memoir, Chapters I-VI, Loc 2150, Box 105, Power Fonds; QUA, 109. 
8 Fade Away 
 345 
vote Unionist. At one point, Preston was arrested when he tried to intervene at a 
polling station.19 He, subsequently, met Turner to complain about the purported 
violations, but Turner categorically denied the accusations.20 Ten years later, 
Turner continued to complain that Preston caused him ‘much annoyance’ during 
the election and that he was a ‘very slippery individual.’21 
Turner was also sensitive to possible political dimensions of administrative 
decisions, so he ordered Thacker not to return surplus officers to Canada until 
after the election. This meant fewer disappointed officers in Canada to 
complain.22 In another instance, Turner refused to order the transfer of French-
speaking soldiers from their existing units, until after the election.23 
Members of Turner’s staff and others in the OMFC worked diligently for the 
Government.24 After the election, Perley highlighted the election contributions of 
Aitken, Sims, and Donald Hogarth.25 Turner also received a warm letter of 
gratitude from W.P. Purney, who was responsible for carrying out the election 
overseas.26 It is likely that there were contraventions of the KRO, but not as dire as 
the untrustworthy Preston alleged. In the end, the military voted overwhelmingly 
for the Union government, and the margin of victory was such that the Unionist 
                                            
19  Preston’s account was he was arrested entering the camp, but the records of the 208th 
Battalion indicate differently. O.C. 208 Infantry Bn. To 13th Cdn. Inf. Brigade, 4 December 
1917, E-4-10, RG 9 III B1 v1644, LAC. 
20  William Thomas Rochester Preston, My Generation of Politics and Politicians  (Toronto: D. A. 
Rose, 1927), 365-370; Preston to Turner, 3 December 1917; Turner to Preston, MG 30 E46 
v12, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
21  Turner to Currie, 31 March 1928, File 69, MG 30 E100 v19, Currie Fonds; LAC. 
22  AG1 Pope to DAG, 23 November 1917, RG 9 III  B1 v2883, LAC. 
23  Turner to Thacker, 17 November 1917, R-97-33 v4, RG 9 III B1 v2939, LAC. 
24  Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 141. 
25  Perley to Borden, 10 December 1917, v10 File 3, MG 27 II D12 v8-12, Perley Fonds; LAC. 
26  Purney’s grandiloquent title was Overseas Clerk of the Crown in Chancery for Canada. Purney 
to Turner, 4 January 1918, MG 30 E46 v12, Turner Fonds; LAC. 
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government did not count the switchable overseas military votes. 
While Turner was bending the rules and publicly endorsing the need for 
conscription, Currie refused to support the draft publicly. When first appointed to 
the corps, Currie did issue a statement, but during the election, the Liberals used 
this statement to attack him. Currie reacted by withdrawing any public support 
and hiding behind his role as corps commander as being above politics, but he 
later invoked the political assistance of the Government during the German 
March Offensive, as discussed earlier.27 The Government’s subsequent shabby 
treatment of Currie may have stemmed from Currie’s refusal to assist the 
Government in achieving a goal he was demanding. 
Kemp Arrives 
Kemp arrived in England in December in poor health and with a strong 
conviction that the OMFC needed significant reform.28 He believed Perley had left 
a mess he needed to clean up, and this would give him a jaundiced view of the 
incumbents in command positions. He came to the post confident about the 
reforms required, but he admitted later that the situation was more complicated 
than he realised.29 His mood and dislike of England did not improve in the 
pessimistic atmosphere in London about the state of the war.30  
                                            
27  Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography: 286-287; Cook, The Madman and the 
Butcher: 213. 
28  Kemp was ill much of December 1917. Cable Kemp to Borden, 8 January 1918, 57514-57515, 
MG 26 H1 v105, Borden Fonds; LAC. 
29  Kemp to Borden, 24 February 1918, MG 27 II D9 v129, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
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Historical Journal 14, no. 2 (1971): 382. For more on the pessimistic state of the British 
leadership, see Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918. 
8 Fade Away 
 347 
His primary concern was control, or the lack of control, of the military in 
England and forces outside of the corps. He reported to Borden after consulting 
with Currie but not Turner “I find the organization here somewhat peculiar in 
many ways, as it does not follow along the lines, altogether, of any organization 
of similar character either here or in Canada.”31 He believed the military wielded 
too much power and were not sufficiently under civilian control. He viewed 
Turner and Currie as taking ‘little interest in public affairs in Canada,’ and after 
three years overseas had no appreciation of the importance of public opinion.32 
Kemp’s strictures did not take into account the ‘peculiar’ position of the CEF 
under the dual control of the Canadian Government and the War Office. Kemp’s 
reference to organisations of a similar character is misleading, as Canadian forces 
in Canada and British troops had a single reporting structure, unlike the 
convoluted one of the CEF. 
Kemp’s frustration stemmed in part from the power Currie wielded in setting 
policy. As discussed in Chapter 7, Mewburn complained about Currie’s 
establishing the direction and Turner and the Government having to follow.33 
Kemp, also, viewed the situation in England from his perspective as the former 
Minister of Militia having to defend the OMFC in the House of Commons, but 
lacking the necessary information to do so effectively. For example in August 
1917, Perley, at Turner’s behest, requested Kemp for relief from frivolous 
information demands from Canada. This was in response to a request in Question 
                                            
31  Cable Kemp to Borden, 4 January 1918, 51130A, MG 26 H1 v96, Borden Fonds; LAC. 
32  Kemp to Borden, 24 February 1918, MG 27 II D9 v129, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
33  Cable Mewburn to Borden, 28 April 1918, 75059-75060, MG 26 H1 v141, Borden Fonds; 
LAC. 
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Period for a list of officers working extra-regimentally and their costs. Thacker 
complained that this required a great deal of extra work for officers trying to win 
the war. Perley’s closing comment was “this is the kind of question that might 
very well be left in abeyance until after the war.”34 For Kemp, who had to face 
MPs in Question Period, this request demonstrated the military’s lack of political 
awareness, as these questions had to be answered. Turner and Thacker, however, 
had a legitimate point that many of the requests required far too much effort for 
the benefit provided. This was something Kemp, initially, did not appreciate. 
Kemp determined that he needed two structural changes to the OMFC to 
address these issues – a military council and a revised organisation representing 
Canadian interests at GHQ. Kemp’s first structural change was the creation of an 
Overseas Military Council (OMC), following British and Canadian practice. Kemp 
was intimately familiar with the council in Canada and viewed the situation in 
England as an aberration. Further, he thought Turner brought a too overtly military 
orientation to England when the situation was more akin to that in Canada than in 
France. Kemp, therefore, wanted greater civilian control and better coordination. 
He thought Turner and his staff made important policy decisions without factoring 
in civilian considerations and the impacts on various branches of the OMFC. He 
claimed Turner was averse to discussing policy matters with Currie as if they were 
his own views.35 Given their contentious relationship, it is understandable Turner 
wanted Currie to recognise these issues were emanating from the Minister, but it 
did suggest that Turner was not necessarily in agreement with them. 
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Kemp’s solution to these problems was an OMC to consist of the Minister, 
Deputy Minister, Turner, and the heads of the branches.36 Mewburn, the Minister 
of Militia and Defence, objected to the structure and wanted to make Turner an 
Inspector-General. Mewburn, in effect, wanted to sideline Turner much like what 
happened to Alderson.37 Mewburn’s attitude suggests there was a strain between 
the Canadian military in Canada and England. There is some evidence of tensions 
over issues such as delays in settling estates by Argyll House and the inadequate 
manner the Department in Canada investigated compassionate leave cases.38 The 
Deputy Minister for the Ministry of Militia, Eugene Fiset, complained that it was 
‘useless’ for him to write Argyll House officially as he would ‘not even get an 
answer.’39 The creation of the OMFC effectively sidelined the Ministry of Militia 
and there was bound to be bitterness over its relegation to little more than a draft 
finding organisation. Mewburn’s actions may have been an attempt to wrestle 
some control back from the OMFC.  
Contributing to this tension was the relative isolation of Canada, because of 
the limited information exchange between the front and England with the military 
in Canada. A notable flaw in the Canadian war effort was the absence of 
mechanisms to convey the war lessons to Canada. While there was a steady flow 
of political figures, such as Hughes, Perley, Kemp, and Borden between Canada 
                                            
36  Cable Kemp to Borden, 23 March 1918, 57542, MG 26 H1 v105, Borden Fonds; LAC. 
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and England, no senior officer from Turner’s or Currie’s command visited Canada 
until almost the end of the war.40 The only senior officers to visit England and 
France from Canada were the two Inspector-Generals for Eastern and Western 
Canada, who made relatively brief inspection tours in the spring of 1916 and 
1917.41 Only seven of the sixty-nine general officers who served in France 
returned to Canada during the war to take up appointments.42 Generally, returning 
officers were either wounded or regarded as failures. This lack of officer exchange 
meant Canada operated in isolation. 
Figure 20 Overseas Military Council Organisation Chart 
 
 
The council first met 14 May 1918, convened a further 26 times, and made 
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434 decisions.43 The council dealt with a wide variety of topics, including 
promotions, establishments, compassionate policy, officer exchanges, and cadet 
uniforms.44 It must have consumed a great deal of time of busy staff officers as the 
records for the OMC include hundreds of pages of submissions, which all the 
members had to read and approve. 
Figure 21 OMFC 1918 Organisation Chart   
 
 
To align the new OMC more closely with the structure in Canada, Kemp 
changed Turner’s title to Chief of the General Staff (CGS), as of 18 May.45 Turner 
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Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: 160. 
44  Overseas Militia Council Submissions, 6 August 1918, O-153-3 v4, RG 9 III B1 v2892, LAC; 
ibid; Overseas Militia Council Submissions, 13 July 1918, O-153-3 v4, RG 9 III B1 v2892, 
LAC; Overseas Militia Council Submissions, November 1918, O-153-3 v4, RG 9 III B1 v2892, 
LAC. 
45  Turner War Record, G.A.Q. 4-40, RG 24 v1815, LAC. 
8 Fade Away 
 352 
supplied Kemp with a letter to explain the new title and role to the War Office.46 
Kemp revised the letter and made one crucial addition by making Turner 
explicitly responsible for the administration of Canadian units in France outside of 
the Canadian Corps, as the responsibility was uncertain before.47  
In this reform, nominally, Turner continued as the Chief Military Advisor, 
was responsible for coordination of the General Staff, Adjutant-General and 
Quartermaster-General, and remained responsible for administration and training 
of forces in England, with the added explicit control over non-corps forces at the 
front. The OMC constrained his real authority, however, as the Council decided 
all matters of policy, senior officer promotions, issues concerning multiple 
branches, large expenditures, and establishments. As a result, effectively the new 
organisation meant a demotion for Turner, as the OMC subsumed some of his 
former authority. Despite this, Turner’s reaction in his correspondence with Kemp 
shows ready acceptance of this new title and role. 
Kemp’s second structural change was an attempt to improve control over 
and communications with Canadian forces outside of England and to pacify 
Currie. Sims continued as the Canadian Representative at GHQ and was the 
conduit for information between Canadian formations in France and Belgium, the 
OMFC, and GHQ. Kemp, however, was not satisfied that Sims could effectively 
represent Canadian interests to GHQ, because of his rank and origin as a Hughes’ 
appointee. Further, as there was no central Canadian authority in France over 
Canadian units outside of the corps, Canadian control over these formations was 
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nominal. Currie, furthermore, disliked Sims and regarded him as a meddler, a 
bottleneck, and lacking the power to make decisions. Currie wanted Sims 
removed.48  
As an interim step to mollify Currie, Kemp agreed that Turner and Currie 
could communicate directly on purely Canadian matters without passing through 
Sims.49 On several occasions, Argyll House routed correspondence on Canadian 
matters through Sims, which outraged Currie.50 After one such incident, Currie 
attacked Turner claiming, “In a well disciplined Corps, disciplinary action would 
be taken for such a violation of instructions.”51 Kemp placating Currie explained 
there was a difference of opinion of what was a Canadian domestic matter. Kemp 
did not want to disrupt the understanding that Perley had reached with GHQ, so 
his interpretation, shared by Turner and Gow, of what was a Canadian domestic 
matter was conservative. Kemp assured Currie that he was working on addressing 
Currie’s larger concerns with representation at GHQ.52  
Kemp’s solution was a Canadian Section at GHQ, which was similar to a 
proposal Thacker made to Turner in November 1917 regarding the administration 
of forces in France.53 The Canadian Section served the primary functions of 
representing Canadian interests at GHQ, acting as the primary conduit for 
communications between Argyll House, Canadian forces in the field, and 
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administration of the 47,000 Canadians outside of the Canadian Corps in France 
and Belgium.54 It paralleled most of the organisation of the OMFC with branches 
for the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Assistant Military Secretary, 
Medical, Pay, and Chaplain services. Kemp shrewdly appointed Brigadier-General 
J.F.L. Embury to head the Canadian Section. Embury had commanded the 28th 
Battalion in the 2nd Division, and served as a Brigadier-General in the Canadian 
Corps and the 5th Division in England, and was serving as a Judge of the Court of 
King’s Bench in Saskatchewan when selected.55 Embury, therefore, had the 
necessary seniority, experience, and gravitas to have influence at GHQ and was 
acceptable to Currie and Turner. The selection helped allay Currie’s fears that the 
section would act as a watchdog for the Minister.56 
Turner’s role in establishing the Canadian Section was two fold. First, he 
defeated an attempt by Currie to take over as the personal representative at GHQ. 
In February, Currie claimed GHQ desired that he act as the personal 
representative for at least corps matters.57 Turner did not approve, pointing out 
that, as a subordinate of Haig, the corps commander might be in an invidious 
position in presenting the Canadian point of view to GHQ; possibly without 
having the full information on issues, such as availability of reinforcements. 
Further, Currie’s desire to advance the interests of his officers and men meant his 
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recommendations could not ‘always be taken at their face value’ as they at times 
violated regulations or sound policy.58 Turner wanted a third-party at GHQ who 
could represent the views of the entire OMFC and not just the Canadian Corps. 
Second, Turner and Kemp negotiated the terms of reference for the new 
organisation with the War Office. The War Office was far more amenable to the 
changes than GHQ, which was concerned about any infringement on its 
operational control (and GHQ defined operational control broadly).59 This is 
understandable given the recent experience Haig had endured with the protests 
over the break up of the Canadian Corps during the German March Offensive. 
The negotiations with GHQ were a factor in delays in setting up the Canadian 
Section. 
Argyll House was the subject of attacks from the Canadian Corps and 
Canada. Beyond the complaints about the technical services to the corps, Morton 
has claimed, “Argyll House had become a symbol of insensitive, arrogant 
bureaucracy.”60 This is a common complaint about rear administrations, but there 
are few substantive and documented examples of grievances. One of the few was 
Sutherland Brown’s complaint in a confidential letter about the attitude of officers 
in Turner’s command in trying to save money at the expense of justice to front-
line officers.61 It is likely that after a year or more removed from the front some 
officers were more responsive to bureaucratic imperatives than the front. Despite 
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Turner’s oft-repeated statements about serving the front line, it is probable that the 
message did not reach everyone. It does not appear, however, that Argyll House 
was any more susceptible to these problems than other rear organisations. 
Some Canadian newspapers regularly assailed Argyll House about tensions 
with the corps in France, extravagant staff levels, and the cowardice of officers 
sheltering in England. In part, this was a means of attacking the government. 
There were tensions with France, but the preponderance of the blame for the 
dysfunctional relationship lay with Currie rather than Argyll House, as discussed 
in Chapter 7. The complaint about excess staffing levels started as early as January 
1917 with Hughes complaining about the number of officers at the 
headquarters.62 Newspapers and especially the Manitoba Free Press and Toronto 
Star attacked Argyll House for employing many more officers on commissions, 
boards, command, and staff positions than were necessary. Turner repeatedly 
provided statistics demonstrating the increasing efficiency of staffing levels.63 
Turner’s organisation was employing more officers than was strictly necessary in 
1917 and early 1918, as a consequence, of having to find places for politically 
powerful surplus officers. Turner’s further staff reductions in 1918 demonstrate 
there was some excess. After the election, however, it was no longer necessary to 
mollify these officers, as the political impact of their returning to Canada 
diminished. Given the steady decrease in staffing levels overall in the OMFC, it is 
difficult to sustain the charge that Argyll House was grossly over-staffed as 
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claimed. 
The other major charge hurled at Argyll House was that it was rife with 
shirkers. As the Manitoba Free Press phrased it,  
The control of the Canadian forces in England is in the hands of a clique whose 
chief activities are directed toward the evading the dangers of the front line 
trenches and capitalizing for their own benefit to the greatest possible extent 
the glory earned by the troops in the field.64  
 
This calumny was a fabrication. Of the sixty-seven officers employed at Argyll 
House on 11 June 1918, forty-nine or 73.3% had served overseas, and of those 
that had not served at the front, eleven were unfit or overage and seven or only 
10.4% were fit for General Service. This last category would include officers who 
had specialised qualifications.65 Another example is the Reserve Artillery Brigade 
in April 1918 with all 67 of its officers and all but 24 of its 394 other ranks having 
seen active service. The twenty-four who had not done so included underage 
soldiers and specialists with unique skills.66 To ensure there were no grounds for 
complaint in July 1918, Turner mandated the immediate replacement all officers 
fit for General Service and who had not seen active duty.67 
The source of these complaints was typically disgruntled officers, who anti-
government newspapers eagerly exploited to attack Argyll House and by 
extension the government. One of the strongest cases was that of Brigadier-
General C.A. Smart, who made a series of damning charges when he arrived in 
Canada after losing his command to an officer from the corps, as discussed in 
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Chapter 7. These attacks especially nettled Turner, who wrote Kemp twice in 
April 1919 to refute the claims and to disparage Smart.68 Another example was a 
long letter published in a newspaper from a draft conducting officer listing a litany 
of transgressions committed by Argyll House. Unfortunately, for the creditability 
of the report, Turner discovered the officer was a bigamist and coward.69 
Turner asked that the Government defend his staff from these unwarranted 
attacks, but he did not ask for protection for himself. Turner was always assiduous 
about safeguarding his people. McDonald earlier, in June 1918, asked that the 
Minister take steps to refute the attacks made on the honour and integrity of the 
officer corps in England.70 Turner agreed and presented a memorandum to Kemp 
contesting the newspaper charges.71 Kemp did make efforts to defend his officers 
through newspaper articles, but it was difficult to do so from England.72 His 
complaints did trigger tighter censorship regulations in Canada that Mewburn 
thought would “cause some consternation with the press.”73 
Typically, Turner was not the direct target of the attacks as his prestige and 
reputation made it difficult to challenge him directly. The approach adopted was 
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to denigrate him by claiming, as did Brigadier-General Smart, that Turner was 
“weak on administration and discipline and has surrounded himself with a lot of 
weak officers, and has listened too much to tittle-tattle and intrigue. He is a weak 
man.”74 As discussed earlier, it is difficult to justify this charge, as both Kemp and 
Currie, who were in the best position to judge Turner, did not make these claims 
when they cavilled about Turner.  
Aligned with the newspaper criticisms of the OMFC was an inflammatory 
reorganisation memo authored by McRae and sent to Currie and most likely 
Clifford Sifton, the prominent former Manitoba Liberal and now Unionist 
politician.75 The memo advocated an organisation similar to that of the Australians 
with the corps commander responsible for all the forces in England and France 
assisted by a chief administrative officer. The claim was that it would result in a 
great saving in duplicate staffs, better manpower utilisation, and elimination of 
delay.76 Currie worried Kemp would learn he possessed the memo, so he 
forwarded it to Kemp.77 Currie was careful to position that he had not initiated the 
memo, but was prepared to discuss it if requested.78  
Kemp’s reaction to the proposal was not positive. He characterised it as “if it 
was as easy for Canada to manage the problem of its citizen soldiers, ... as it is to 
                                            
74  Statements Made by General Smart, MG 27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
75  Historians have not previously identified the author of the memo. For instance see Morton, A 
Peculiar Kind of Politics: 158. However, a former subordinate of McRae’s Lieutenant-Colonel 
C.D.H. McAlpine and Hughes’ son-in-law claimed McRae was the author in a letter to Currie’s 
first biographer. Given he was a senior subordinate of McRae, it is likely he would know if 
McRae was the author. McAlpine to Urquhart, 12 November 1934, File 12, MG 4027 C1, 
Urquhart Fonds; McGill Archives.. 
76  Memo Canadian Overseas Military Organization, MG 27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
77  McAlpine to Urquhart, 12 November 1934, File 12, MG 4027 C1, Urquhart Fonds; McGill 
Archives. 
78  Currie to Kemp, 16 May 1918, MG 27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
8 Fade Away 
 360 
write anonymous documents, we would all be enjoying the rest and quietness of 
the most peaceful days in our lives.”79 Kemp also passed the memo to Turner for 
his comments. Turner argued the Canadian government received direct access to 
the Secretary of State for War on matters of policy, which would be unlikely in 
proposed reorganisation. He also indicated that he was already effectively 
fulfilling the role of Chief Administrative Officer. His strongest argument was the 
comparison with Australia was misleading because Australian training was 
essentially under British control. Also, the Australians had few units outside of the 
Australian Corps, unlike the Canadian situation, with the tens of thousands of 
personnel serving in the Canadian Railway and Forestry Troops, Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade, and medical establishments.80  
McRae’s second front was Sifton. McRae had made his first fortune as a land 
agent opening up Saskatchewan, while Sifton was the Minister of the Interior 
responsible for promoting western settlement.81 Sifton abandoned the Liberals in 
1911 over reciprocity (free trade) with the US and was instrumental in persuading 
key western Liberals to join the Union government on the issue of conscription, so 
he was a figure of considerable influence.82 Sifton visited England in April 1918, 
and McRae probably briefed him. As well, Rattray, a Liberal and a confidant of 
Currie’s in a staff position in England, took the opportunity to complain about 
Argyll House to Sifton.83 These complaints doubtless persuaded Sifton to take 
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action, as his newspaper, the Manitoba Free Press, published an article in May 
1918 strongly suggesting a fundamental reorganisation of the OMFC was 
imminent. It quoted at length an anonymous senior officer, who was familiar with 
the situation that lobbied, for an administration with an overall GOC in charge.84 
In all probability, the officer quoted was McRae.  
The article affected Kemp, as it was closely identified with Sifton, a leading 
member of the Union Government, so had the imprimatur of some authority.85 
Two cables from Gow and Mewburn reassured Kemp to ignore any reports of the 
abolition of the OMFC.86 The memo angered Kemp, and he attempted to find out 
who wrote it.87 He either was unsuccessful in identifying McRae or decided that 
McRae was out of reach because there were no official sanctions against him. 
McRae had transferred in February 1918 to Aitken’s new Ministry of 
Information as Deputy Minister, ostensibly because McRae impressed Aitken.88 
Turner did not readily replace his staff and especially competent ones, so the 
move is suspicious. McRae’s memo indicates significant dissatisfaction with the 
organisation of the OMFC and suggests a serious disagreement with Turner. As 
McRae wrote the memo after his transfer, it implies his move may not have been 
voluntary. 
                                            
84  "The Coming Reorganization of Argyle House," Manitoba Free Press, 23 May 1918. 
85  John Dafoe, the publisher of the Manitoba Free Press was close to Borden and Sifton and Sifton 
was the owner of the Free Press. Cook, The Politics of John W. Dafoe and the Free Press: 87. 
86  Gow was in Canada on sick leave. See below. Cable Gow to Kemp, 25 May 1918, C-39, MG 
27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds; LAC; Cable Mewburn to Kemp, 29 May 1918, C-39, MG 27 II D9 
v134, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
87  Kemp to Mewburn. 4 June 1918, C-39, MG 27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds; LAC; Cable Kemp to 
Currie, 1 June 1918, MG 27 II D9 v134, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
88  Beaverbrook to Kemp, 20 February 1918, MG 27 II G1 A1766, Beaverbrook Fonds; LAC; 
O'Keefe, Merchant Prince: The Story of Alexander Duncan McRae: 91. 
8 Fade Away 
 362 
McRae’s replacement was the politically connected Lieutenant-Colonel 
Donald Hogarth. Hogarth, aged thirty-nine, had no pre-war military experience 
but was a business associate of John Carrick, who was in turn close to Sam 
Hughes. Hogarth served in the CASC in the Canadian Corps, but bounced 
between France and England suggesting he had a less than stellar career.89 
Hughes paid close attention to Hogarth, and issued a number of instructions 
related to promotions and appointments for him.90 Hogarth was also a 
Conservative political operative, and Perley praised him for his contribution to the 
1917 election campaign.91 Turner brought him back to England as the Director of 
Supplies and Transport over more senior officers – a move that elicited a pointed 
query from Currie.92 Hogarth’s appointment was a logical step as he was in 
essence McRae’s deputy, but it does suggest political influence played a role. 
A significant clash with the OMFC Deputy Minister in October 1918 
coloured Turner’s reputation for poor civil-military relations. Before 1918, there 
was no evidence of tension between the two. Gow’s health broke down in late 
April 1918, and he took sick leave in Canada for an extended period.93 When he 
returned he was in a ‘somewhat petulant’ frame of mind.94 In October 1918, 
Kemp travelled to Canada to deal with political matters, and Gow attempted to 
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persuade Kemp to grant him carte blanche to run the department during Kemp’s 
absence. Kemp quite rightly refused by pointing out the constitutional irregularity 
of Gow’s demands.  
While Kemp was out of the country, Gow and Turner clashed over relatively 
minor matters but were indicative of Gow’s attempted usurpation of Kemp’s 
authority and Turner’s refusal to accept it. They clashed over delays in promotions 
of two Brigadier-Generals, assigning cars, kit allowances, and allowing McDonald 
and Billy Bishop to travel to Canada.95 The two exchanged telegraphs with a 
probably increasingly frustrated Kemp complaining about the other. Gow inflated 
the grievance into a claim that Turner’s actions were “a case of ‘The King and the 
Army against Parliament’ over again.”96 In a number of cases, Turner made 
decisions that would normally require the Minister’s approval, including the 
promotion of two Brigadier-Generals that Currie requested.97 Turner’s response 
was that his decisions were provisional until he received the Minister’s approval. 
Referring to Gow’s last memorandum, Turner stated “The last paragraph of this 
memorandum illustrates graphically Colonel Gow’s intent for mischief and 
endeavour during your absence to arrogate to himself supreme authority.”98  
The situation was so rancorous that Gow resigned on 25 October because of 
Turner’s “unfair, ungenerous, and unwarranted conduct.”99 Despite Turner’s 
stated regret at the incident, Gow claimed he only shook Turner’s hand when he 
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left because of the presence of a junior officer.100 This clash influenced Borden’s 
view of Turner, and contributed to the impression that he was difficult.101 A close 
reading of the evidence suggests that Gow returned too soon from sick leave and 
tried to take on responsibilities beyond his authority. While Turner is not 
blameless, he was on stronger constitutional grounds than Gow. Edwin Pye, a 
member of Duguid’s historical staff, claimed Gow’s actions while Kemp was away 
were the actual trigger for Gow’s resignation. Pye stated, “It seems to me that Sir 
R. [Robert Borden] had a finger in the pie and in his memoirs, has dragged a red 
herring across the trail.”102  
Demobilisation 
The Canadian demobilisation after the First World War was a failure. 
Thirteen riots tarnished the sterling reputation of the CEF and resulted in large 
property losses, the deaths of five Canadians and one British policeman, and 
many injuries.103 The Canadian authorities faced the insuperable challenge of 
balancing equity with the ability to process and transport 345,000 veterans and 
dependants, and the economy to absorb this multitude.104 Shortages in sea 
transport and the limited rail capacity from Canada’s only two ice-free ports of 
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Halifax and St. John severely constrained demobilisation. Shipping capacity was 
further restricted when higher standards were imposed after returning soldiers 
complained bitterly and publicly about terrible accommodations on the ships 
returning them to Canada.105  
The Demobilisation Committee initially planned to follow a similar British 
scheme of selectively releasing men based on economic factors – a plan the 
British had to abandon after protests and riots.106 The plan changed to a more 
obviously fair approach of first in first out, but Currie convinced Kemp and 
Borden for reasons of discipline and recognition for the corps to adopt his plan of 
returning the Canadian Corps by units.107 Unlike the more successful plan 
adopted by Monash of the Australians that shipped men home in 1,000 man 
batches chosen from units based on length of service, the Canadian plan was 
clearly inequitable.108 There were no Australian demobilisation riots, despite their 
reputation for poor discipline. The massive losses of the Hundred Days campaign 
resulted in the corps’ units consisting of a large number of conscripts. These 
conscripts were all of relatively short service in comparison to many serving in 
England. Currie’s plan resulted in the conscripts returning to Canada before long-
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service men stationed in England and this engendered discontent.109 In addition, 
the Canadians would know that the earlier riots of British troops at Calais, Dover, 
and Folkestone had resulted in accelerating demobilisation.110 This inequity set 
the stage for a calamity.  
In the febrile environment of British demobilisation riots, constant strikes 
that affected the pace of Canadian demobilisation, and the triumph of the Russian 
Bolsheviks, there was a real fear that control over the troops was slipping. 
Naturally, the men wanted to go home and their patience with the constant 
indignities, subordination, and petty annoyances of wartime service was fast 
disappearing.111 The proximate trigger for the riots were festering problems of lack 
of pay, poor food, cold weather, and constant and unexplained postponements 
overlaid by the anxiety to get home and clashes with British civilians.112 The 
sailing postponements were the result of strikes delaying the refitting of ships to 
meet the new higher Canadian accommodation standards and large liners being 
assigned to other countries, as Hogarth’s department mistakenly believed 
Canadian ports could not handle these vessels.113 The weak discipline and poor 
command in the segregation camps exacerbated the situation. Turner and his staff 
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were lamentably poor at communicating why there were delays, resulting in 
rumours, fears, and frustrations spiralling out of control into rioting.114  
This lack of communications was unfortunate as Turner’s speeches at the 
camps after riots resulted in the men readily returning to discipline upon hearing 
the explanation for the delays. It took considerable courage for Turner to enter 
into the charged atmosphere of these camps. Turner had sufficient credibility and 
respect that the men listened, obeyed, and even cheered him.115 After the 
particularly brutal riot at Epsom Police Station resulting in the death of a 
policeman, Turner issued a stern Order of the Day indicating there would be no 
tolerance for further problems and the riots finally ended.116 Certain segments of 
the British press extensively covered and exploited the riots to the point that 
Turner wrote the King to complain about the treatment.117  
Turner’s reputation for running a tight ship with his political masters 
suffered, as Kemp warned Turner to strengthen his staff, since it would be 
‘distressing’ if anything should mar his officer’s good records because of the 
demobilisation problems.118 Shipping shortages, delays, and strikes were out of 
Turner’s control, but he was not proactive in addressing the many problems with 
the camps and in communicating with the troops. Turner and his staff were 
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clearly tired, and it showed in their performance.119 
Analysis 
Turner’s command during the Kemp regime was less effective than under 
Perley. Kemp was the prime agent in the major initiatives and relegated Turner to 
the more passive role of their execution. Kemp was far more of a hands-on 
manager than Perley. He did not interfere with purely military matters, although 
he and Turner disagreed about what were purely military issues. Turner worked 
more effectively under Perley’s hands-off approach and did not mesh well with 
Kemp. Personalities undoubtedly played a role, as Kemp was a self-made man, 
with a great deal of confidence in his abilities. Turner, from a wealthy family, was 
more attuned to someone of a similar background, such as Perley. It is instructive 
to note that Turner’s greatest challenges as an administrator were with two men 
who rose from humble beginnings – Currie and Kemp. A further factor in the poor 
relationship was Kemp’s experience in Canada in dealing with PF officers in the 
Ministry. These officers were thoroughly conversant with and subservient to 
civilian authority having survived the Hughes regime and Hughes’ intense dislike 
of the PF. These officers would not push back, unlike Currie and Turner, who 
were not wholly dependent on the Minister for their position. As a result, the more 
military and self-assured attitudes of Currie and Turner would contribute to 
Kemp’s diatribes.  
The available correspondence between Turner and Kemp does not reveal 
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the context behind Kemp’s complaints to Borden. Turner’s communications with 
Kemp were respectful, and give no indication he challenged civilian control. 
Further, there were no signs of resistance to Kemp’s changes, and neither was 
there a tone or sub-text that suggests Turner was anything other than in perfect 
harmony with Kemp. Turner’s actions during the election, his taking on sons of 
important politicians as staff officers, and his communications with key figures in 
Canada indicate a politically aware individual and are at odds with Kemp’s claims 
that Turner was politically insensitive.120 What is also puzzling was that while 
Kemp was disparaging Turner he was also vigorously defending Turner and Argyll 
House to Mewburn, Borden, and Currie.  
Given the number of Kemp’s complaints it is apparent Kemp was convinced 
there were problems. It is likely that the conflicts occurred in meetings where no 
documentary evidence is available. These points of conflict probably revolved 
around the issues of the OMC curtailing Turner’s authority, the Canadian Section 
at GHQ, the relationship between Turner and Currie, and Turner’s repeated 
attempts to drive the Government to support a separate air force. In addition, 
Kemp may have reacted to the poor advice he received from Turner regarding the 
Canadian Corps’ reorganisation. It is apparent that the rift between Kemp and 
Turner existed throughout and was an important factor in the Government making 
no further use of him in a military role after the war. 
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Turner Post-war 
Turner’s post-war military career presented a conundrum to the 
Government, because his distinguished service, seniority, and relative youth 
(forty-seven in 1919), justified a major role in the post-war army. Currie, however, 
had an even greater claim, and it was apparent that it would be impossible for the 
two to work together effectively. In December 1918, the Finance Minister 
suggested appointing Turner Chairman of the Pension Board to sideline him. 
Borden scuttled the idea because he did not think Turner had the temperament for 
the position and referred to Gow’s resignation as an example.121 Ironically, Turner 
would later serve on the Pension Commission for many years with success.122  
Unlike Currie, Turner had a business to return to and was not dependent on 
government largesse, so Turner decided not to seek any military appointment.123 
Turner’s father had died in 1917 and so Turner was the sole owner of the family 
firm.124 In April 1919, Turner requested to be relieved of his responsibilities by 
July, but the exhausted Turner had to wait to August to return to Quebec City with 
his family.125 He was officially demobilised in November.126 His reception in 
Quebec City was far more muted than his return from the Boer War and, like 
Currie, he did not receive any formal recognition from the Government.127 
Turner returned to Quebec City to run his family business, but he did not 
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forget his old comrades. For instance, he followed up in 1920 with the Adjutant-
General regarding a medal he recommended for a soldier who brought up 
ammunition under intense fire during Second Ypres.128 Turner was a popular 
figure with veterans and attended reunions, commemorations, and unveilings 
across the country, including the tenth anniversary of the formation of the 15th 
Battalion, the unveiling of a memorial to the 28th Battalion in Regina in 1926, and 
the Ypres commemorative dinner in 1930.129 He attended the unveiling of the 
Canadian memorial at St. Julien in 1933 and the Vimy Pilgrimage of 1936.130 He 
represented the Duke of Connaught at the funeral of his former minister Sir 
George Perley in 1938.131 He also wrote forewards to the regimental histories of 
the 14th and 15th Battalions.132 
Last Service: Canadian Legion 
The establishment of what became the Royal Canadian Legion was Turner’s 
final major service to Canada by leading the unification of all the fragmented 
major veterans’ organisations, but two, into the Canadian Legion of the British 
Empire Service League and later the Royal Canadian Legion.  
By 1925, the veterans’ movement had split into multiple camps that ranged 
from broad-based organisations that aspired to universal representation to ones 
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with restrictive membership, such as blinded veterans. The result was a disjointed 
movement with little political power or influence, habitually strapped for funds, 
and that could not effectively represent veterans’ interests. Despite repeated 
attempts at unification and amalgamation, the Canadian veterans movement was 
on the brink of collapse and irrelevance because of the fragmentation of veterans’ 
organisations - a fate not unwelcome to the Government.133  
Before the war, other than a few regimental associations, the Army Navy 
Veterans (ANV) was the sole representative of veterans’ interests and any veteran 
of the British or Canadian forces could join. During the war, the first new 
veterans’ organisation formed in February 1916 in Montreal as the Canadian 
Association of Returned Soldiers.134 In April 1916, the Toronto regiment started 
their own Returned Soldier’s Association and in Winnipeg, another group 
launched The Great War Veterans Association (GWVA), with its first meeting on 
12 April 1917.135 Eventually by 1925, at least fifteen groups were formed, but the 
GWVA had the greatest success in recruiting, and as a result, had the greatest 
influence.136 During the war, the GWVA met with a special Parliamentary 
committee and the Prime Minister.137 
These groups had varied membership standards and different political 
objectives. Some organisations, such as the GWVA, were restricted to only 
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Canadians who had served in England and France, while others, like the ANV, 
were more broadly based. The GWVA was egalitarian, and officers were not 
welcome, in reaction to the regimentation and hierarchy of the Army.138 All 
members were called comrade rather than by their former rank. As Desmond 
Morton put it,  
The goals of these organizations were to maintain ties forged in war, preserve 
the memories of those who sacrificed and inculcate loyalty and ensure proper 
care of the sick, injured and wounded including care of dependents – homes 
pensions and other items that would make the hearts of the finance department 
grow cold.139  
 
In 1919, a demand for an immediate $2,000 gratuity for all veterans 
widened the rift between veterans’ organisations.140 Veterans were rightly 
suspicious that despite the Government’s frequent claims of unqualified support, 
that when it came time to collect, the rules, regulations, and red tape would result 
in little actual money. Rather, they preferred to receive a gratuity now, than rely 
on the uncertain generosity of future governments. However, the leadership of the 
GWVA and other veterans’ organisations were well aware that the Government 
would not entertain such a notion, and to advocate for it would imperil their 
influence with the Government. Not advocating resulted in the loss of support. 
All the veterans’ organisations relied exclusively on the limited financial 
support of the membership. This restricted their ability to hire staff, develop 
programs, and lobby for veterans’ interests. As wartime memories of comradeship 
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faded, with the veterans’ groups apparently powerless, the membership withered 
and with it the ability to raise money. Reduced funding and membership plus the 
bitterness of inter-veteran group politics meant less leverage with the 
Government, which rendered these organisations even less effective and the 
downward spiral accelerated.141 
Meanwhile, in the UK there was a similar problem of four main veterans 
groups competing for the allegiance of the returned soldier. By June 1921, all but 
the most radical of groups had agreed to amalgamate into the British Legion. In 
spite of his modern reputation, a key figure in this successful drive to unification 
was Field Marshal Haig. Immediately after the war, he established considerable 
credibility with the rank and file by refusing a title, until the condition of the 
returned serviceman was addressed. He first persuaded the officer organisations to 
merge into a single institution. He then built on this success to advocate for 
unification.142 To further the cause of the returned serviceman, Haig travelled to 
South Africa in 1921 to establish the British Empire Service League that was to act 
as an umbrella organisation for all the British, Dominion, and Indian veterans.143 
The president of the GWVA attended the meeting in an unofficial capacity. In the 
final minutes of the meeting, all of the participating nations nominated a 
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representative to the advisory committee except Canada.144  
Haig’s success was aided by the promise that the amalgamated organisation 
would get access to the British portion of the profits of the wartime Army and 
Navy Canteen fund. In Canada’s case, the share of the profits amounted to two 
million dollars. The Canadian Government had distributed a small amount but 
withheld most of it rather than dispensing the funds to multiple small and 
ineffective organisations that in some cases held inimical views to the 
Government.145   
It was clear that unification of the myriad groups was necessary, but it was 
difficult to find common grounds for unification. Smaller specialised groups, such 
as for the blind, worried their concerns would be lost in a larger organisation. 
Broader based groups could not resolve their fundamental philosophical 
differences over policy and membership rules. In 1921, the veterans’ groups made 
an abortive attempt at unification that resulted in a loose federation called the 
Dominion Veterans’ Alliance, but it was not a great success. All the groups were 
in favour of unification but only on their terms.146  
As early as 1921, the GWVA offered Currie the Presidency, but he turned it 
down on the grounds “the clouds which had enshrouded his name had not 
cleared away and that until they had he did not feel justified in allowing himself 
to accept the nomination as President of the G.W.V.A.”147 
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Haig’s proposed visit to Canada in 1925 was the catalyst for the drive for 
unification. Initially there was resistance to the visit because of the chaotic state of 
the veterans’ movement. Haig’s response was that was the reason he needed to 
visit.148 Haig’s trip was a triumph.149 He provided the needed impetus finally to 
drive the unification process to success, as he took a personal interest in fostering 
amalgamation.  
Haig first approached Currie to lead the process, but Currie would do so 
only if the board of the GWVA was replaced, which was not acceptable, as he 
well knew.150 In his place, the board, with Haig’s personal representative present, 
passed a resolution on 22 June 1925 asking Turner to lead the Association into 
unity. In a departure from previous practice, all the Dominion executives with 
their wartime ranks signed the telegram sent to Turner. Turner did not share 
Currie’s qualms about the board and accepted. Haig then appointed Turner as his 
representative in Canada. Turner’s selection was in part because of his stature 
with officers and his lack of formal links to the GWVA and other veterans’ 
organisations. As a result, he was a neutral in the negotiations leading to 
unification.151 In addition, his evident popularity with the rank and file, especially 
the veterans who served with the 2nd Division, was advantageous. Currie did not 
have the repute he was to have later in the decade with the men after the success 
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of the 1928 libel trial. According to Tim Cook, Currie’s “attitude towards veterans 
was at time ungenerous, bordering on callous.”152 This attitude clearly affected his 
relationship with the rank and file, who were the heart and soul and much of the 
leadership of the veterans’ organisations.  
With his customary energy and despatch, Turner held the first meeting in 
Ottawa eight days later. Turner urged conciliation with the other organisations 
and mandated that the attacks by GWVA publications of other organisations and 
Pension Board officials stop immediately.153 Clearly, Turner was in charge and 
driving the process. He appointed trustees for each province, who were usually 
former senior officers. Turner then spent the time between June and the Unity 
Conference in November arranging, negotiating, and applying pressure to ensure 
the conference was successful.  
The National Unity Conference was held in Winnipeg on 25 November 
1925 with forty-six delegates attending from all the veterans’ organisations. From 
the minutes, it was apparent that the majority of the delegates attended with the 
intention of accepting unification. The first step of the conference was to pass a 
unanimous resolution of gratitude to Turner for his leadership and painstaking 
care in assembling the convention. The conference generally was a success as all 
but two organisations, one being the ANV under the former Brigadier-General W. 
Griesbach, agreeing to amalgamate into a single organisation representing 
veterans. Turner also suggested “as they were Canadians it was essential to have 
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the word ”Canadian” included in the name.”154 The conference selected Turner 
and Currie as Honorary Presidents, Haig as the Grand President, and Sir Percy 
Lake as President. Lake was a Canadian, who served in the British Regular Army, 
was a former GOC Canada, and commander in Mesopotamia, who retired to 
Canada. Turner and Lake then travelled to convince the membership to join the 
new Legion and in this, they were successful.155 
Shortly after the Conference, Griesbach, replying to a plaintive letter from 
Currie about his Honorary Presidency, assured Currie that the position would not 
require any effort positive or negative from him. Griesbach also indicated that the 
ANV was not interested in amalgamation, in part, because he did not have a high 
opinion of the personnel in the GWVA. Further, he added  
Sir Richard Turner and Sir Percy Lake came on the scene with very little 
knowledge of the struggles which have taken place to get high standards. As 
they are entirely ignorant of all that has happened in the past, they are not 
likely to be able to grapple with the problems of the present and future.”156  
 
Griesbach proved to be a poor prognosticator as Turner, Lake, and the executive 
turned the Canadian Legion into a far more effective and successful organisation 
than he anticipated.157  
 Currie was unwilling to expend the effort or deal with the challenges of the 
veterans’ movement, unlike Turner. Even as late as 1928, Turner was importuning 
Currie, who was recovering from a stroke, to get involved promising that he 
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would receive unanimous support if he ran for the Presidency and that the detail 
work could be taken over by assistants to make the effort lighter. The response 
from those close to Currie was that if there were no question of competition he 
would accept the position.158 Eventually, Currie accepted the Presidency, 
especially with his increased popularity with the men.  
Other than serving two terms on the Quebec City Protestant School Board, 
Turner held no elected office and did not participate in politics. He, also, held the 
position of Honorary Colonel of the 13th Canadian Scottish Light Cavalry, 13th 
Brigade CFA, and the Royal Rifle Regiment of Canada.159 He also served on the 
Canadian Pension Commission retiring in 1941.160 
Turner retained his robust constitution until almost the end of his life; for 
instance, he marched in the parade of VC winners in London in 1956 at the age of 
eighty-four.161 His wife of fifty-eight years died in 1958 and Turner himself passed 
away on 21 June 1961 aged eighty-nine. Turner passed on full of years, 
distinguished deeds, impressive honours, and sterling service to his country, but 
he is little known or respected today. His obituary in the Montreal Gazette 
described him as cheerful and modest and “he always tried to do his part, and for 
him that was enough.”162  
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 CONCLUSION 
 
The General must know how to get his men their rations and every other 
kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate 
plans, practical sense, and energy to carry them through. He must be 
observant, untiring, shrewd; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy; 
rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and 
acquired, he must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his 
tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building 
materials is a home. 
Socrates1 
 
Turner was an atypical Canadian general of the first half of the 20th Century 
– charismatic, courageous, conscientious, capable, engaging, modest, and in the 
trenches. More typically, Canadian generals of this period were competent, but 
dour, cool, remote, and uncharismatic technocrats unable to inspire their troops.2 
Modern historiography, however, portrays a Richard Turner much at variance 
with this characterisation. In the absence of comprehensive personal records, 
Turner was a blank matrix, upon which historians pressed a misleading image.  
To present an accurate picture of Turner as a military figure, it is necessary 
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to analyze the validity of the principal critiques of Turner in light of the evidence 
presented in the thesis. It is then possible to provide an informed assessment of 
Turner. It is also obligatory to compare Turner and Currie, given Currie’s stature in 
Canadian historiography. 
Historiography 
The popular construct of Turner emanates, in part, from the drive to 
enhance Currie’s reputation.3 Currie and Turner’s esteem have had dramatically 
different trajectories since the 1920s, with Turner’s, like Haig’s, falling 
precipitously. Every compelling story requires the protagonist to struggle against a 
foil. In the first half of the war, Sam Hughes fulfils this role admirably in Currie’s 
story, but with Hughes’ removal in late 1916, another antihero is necessary and 
Turner is the best available candidate.  
The standard narrative on Turner is not wholly fallacious, but its focus is 
almost exclusively on his failures rather than a balanced view.4 The extent to 
which the criticisms of Turner are unjustified is illustrated by Turner’s treatment in 
Cassar’s Hell in Flander’s Fields. Cassar castigates Turner for not conducting 
reconnaissance for the attack on Kitcheners Wood on the night of April 22, but 
exonerates Brigadier-General Hull for not doing so, because it was dark when 
Hull received his orders for his morning attack on 25 April. Turner received his 
attack orders at 8:52 p.m. for an attack at midnight, while Hull received his orders 
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at 8:00 p.m. for an attack originally planned for 3:00 a.m. In other words, Hull is 
excused for not conducting a reconnaissance even though he received his orders 
almost an hour before Turner received his orders. What is missed in this narrative, 
is his moral courage in standing up to superiors, his successes, such as 
Courcelette, his troops and officers’ affection and respect, his rational Canadian 
nationalism, and his significant contributions to the Canadian war effort.  
This conventional portrayal includes five major critiques that are erroneous, 
exaggerated, or arguable. Historians consider Turner’s selection, appointments, 
and retention were the result of his close ties to the Conservative Party – he was a 
“Tory hack.” Scholars regard him as an incompetent field commander, who failed 
disastrously at Second Ypres, Festubert, St. Eloi, and the Somme. The dominant 
interpretation further claims Byng effectively sacked him after the Somme; the 
OMFC’s transformation was primarily attributable to Perley; and Turner 
obstructed Currie, while Currie was the corps commander.  
The thesis has demonstrated that the first critique is fallacious, as Hughes 
championed Turner because of his high regard for Turner’s courage and 
capability, as demonstrated by Turner’s record in the Boer War, his VC, and 
performance as a regimental and brigade commander after the Boer War – Turner 
was a model Militia officer in Hughes’ eyes. These same factors induced Hughes 
to appoint Currie and later protect him from the consequences of his felonious 
behaviour. Turner’s espousal of Hughes and his interests also contributed to 
Hughes’s support but was not the primary motivation.  
What much of the criticism of Turner’s combat record overlooks was the 
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limited scope for command in battle afforded to brigade and divisional 
commanders and conditions in which Turner fought. Sir Henry Karslake, a gunner 
and staff officer during the war, captured the reality of intermediary command on 
the Western Front “commanders were cogs in the machine. Whether they got 
decorated or degummed [sacked] largely depended, not on their plans, but on 
how the enemy on their sector behaved on a particular occasion.”5 
Turner’s performance at Second Ypres was poor, but explicable given the 
front, forces, and catastrophic situation he faced. He demonstrated he learned 
from his experiences and, while not as capable as Currie, Turner was still a far 
more effective combat commander than is acknowledged. His division’s 
performance at Courcelette was the outstanding Canadian victory at the Somme 
and illustrated what Turner could accomplish. He was not in the first rank of 
commanders because of his earlier failures and poor reputation with the British, 
but neither was he the worst.6 
Turner’s transfer to England was not a demotion or a dismissal, but Perley’s 
desire to appoint a capable combat general to fix a disastrous situation. There is 
no evidence that Byng wanted to dismiss Turner. The fact that Byng 
recommended Currie initially should be sufficient proof that Byng just wanted to 
                                            
5  Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier  (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 167. 
6  Mercer and Watson vie for that dubious honour. Mercer had a short career, and his death at 
Mount Sorrel has shielded him from criticism of the poor readiness of the 3rd Division in that 
battle. Watson’s 4th Division had a long run of poor fortune. In 1917 alone, it suffered ‘a 
proper slaughter’ in the gas raid of March 1917, it failed to initially capture all of its objectives 
at Vimy, unlike the other divisions, and it suffered heavy losses in the continuation of Hill 70. 
MacKinnon, "Major-General Malcolm Smith Mercer: The Highest Ranking Canadian Officer 
Killed in the Great War by Friendly Fire."; Tim Cook, ""A Proper Slaughter" the March 1917 
Gas Attack at Vimy," Canadian Military History 8, no. 2 (1999); Brennan, "Major-General 
David Watson: A Critical Appraisal of Canadian Generalship in the Great War." 
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address the lamentable training situation in England. Currie’s refusal to accept the 
position meant Turner was the logical candidate. 
Turner and his staff were instrumental in the transformation of the OMFC. It 
was Turner and his staff who initiated, executed, and supervised the 
metamorphosis. Perley was an important figure in providing the necessary support 
for the changes, but the primary credit for the military improvements belongs to 
Turner. 
The conflict with Currie was the inevitable outcome of institutional 
imperatives and Currie’s challenging personality and not the result of 
obstructionist jealousy by Turner. Turner demonstrated considerable forbearance 
in the face of Currie’s prickly and unsympathetic behaviour. Currie has to bear the 
predominant share of the blame for the conflict. Despite Currie’s provocations, 
Turner conscientiously met the majority of Currie’s demands.  
In summary, the five major critiques do not stand up to scrutiny. 
Assessment 
Turner was a strong leader who led by example, but he had limited success 
at extending his influence outside of his formation, the Hughes’ clique, and Sir 
George Perley.7 Turner’s perceived combat failures and clashes with Alderson 
impaired his image with Haig and eliminated any opportunity for influence. His 
                                            
7  This section is based in part on a framework provided by the US Army’s leadership manual FM 
6-22 modified to account for the different expectations and context of the First World War. 
Army Leadership Competent, Confident, and Agile FM 6-22; Jon J. Fallesen, Army Leader 
Characteristics for Full Range Operations: Comments on FM 6-22, Army Leadership, (Center for 
Army Leadership, 2006). 
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tendency to protest what he regarded as flawed orders would also have reduced 
his stature with the British. In this respect, Currie was far more effective. In 
England, Turner had considerable influence in matters under Perley, but Kemp 
limited his autonomy. Currie’s ability to dictate the demobilisation policy is an 
example of Currie’s influence and Turner’s relative impotence under Kemp. 
Turner was a proficient communicator for his time and place. His written 
work was not polished, but was competent and capable of transmitting his ideas, 
unlike Alderson’s circumlocutions.8 Turner was a persuasive speaker judging from 
the reaction during the camp disturbances during demobilisation and the 
connection to his troops. Turner was better at reaching the men than Currie.  
As John Bourne states “One of the main duties of a divisional commander 
was to identify, encourage and promote able subordinates.”9 Assessing Turner in 
this respect is challenging, so as a proxy, a comparison between Turner and 
Currie’s record of promotion of officers, who served under them and reached 
brigade and divisional command during the war, is used.10 Currie is the contrast, 
as he faced the same circumstances as Turner and is generally regarded as an 
effective developer of subordinates.11 The comparison is imperfect, as multiple 
considerations factored into promotions, but it provides an indication of the 
relative effectiveness of Turner and Currie.  
                                            
8  Beyond an almost indecipherable script, Alderson had a circuitous writing style. 
9  J.M. Bourne, "Major General W.C.G. Heneker: A Divisional Commander of the Great War," in 
Matthew Hughes and Matthew S. Seligmann (eds.), Leadership in Conflict 1914-1918 (Barnsley: 
Leo Cooper, 2000), 62. 
10  The comparison is restricted to battalion commanders and staff officers, who served under 
Turner and Currie from September 1914 to November 1916, to correspond with Turner’s 
period of combat command.  
11  Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 141; Horn and Harris, Warrior Chiefs, 50-51. 
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Figure 22 Promotion Comparison – Turner/Currie12 
Turner 
Name Origin Appointments 
G. B. Hughes§ 3rd Brigade Staff 1st Brigade 
5th Division† 
F. O. W. Loomis* 13th Battalion 2nd Brigade, 7th Brigade, 
11th Brigade 
3rd Division 
J. F. L. Embury 28th Battalion 2nd Brigade 
R. G. E. Leckie 16th Battalion 2nd Brigade 
L. G. F. M. Lord Brooke§ 4th Brigade 12th Brigade 
D. Watson 5th Brigade 4th Division 
J. M. Ross 29th Battalion 5th Brigade, 10th Brigade 
T. L. Tremblay 22nd Battalion 5th Brigade 
A. H. Bell 31st Battalion 6th Brigade 
A. Ross 28th Battalion 6th Brigade 
W. St. P. Hughes§ 21st Battalion 10th Brigade 
§ Political appointee 
* Shared appointee 
† Did not reach front 
 
Currie 
Name Origin Appointments 
G. E. McCuaig 13th Battalion 1st Brigade, 4th Brigade 
L. J. Lipsett 8th Battalion 2nd Brigade 
3rd Division 
F. O. W. Loomis* 13th Battalion 2nd Brigade, 7th Brigade, 
11th Brigade 
3rd Division 
G. S. Tuxford 5th Battalion 3rd Brigade 
H. M. Dyer 5th Battalion 7th Brigade 
F. W. Hill 1st Battalion 9th Brigade 
                                            
12  Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: 540-543; Canada in the Great World 
War: An Authentic Account of the Military History of Canada from the Earliest Days to the 
Close of the War of the Nations,   (Toronto: United publishers of Canada, limited, 1918), 315-
372. 
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D. M. Ormond 10th Battalion 9th Brigade 
V. W. Odium 7th Battalion 11th Brigade 
* Shared appointee 
 
Under Currie, eight officers reached brigade or divisional command – one of 
whom, F.O.W. Loomis, also served under Turner. Two of these officers, Loomis 
and Lipsett, reached divisional command. Eight of Turner’s officers, excluding 
political appointees, gained brigade or divisional commands. The three political 
appointees – Lord Brooke, William Hughes, and Garnet Hughes – should not be 
included, as their selection was a function of political interference from Sam 
Hughes. Watson had proven himself an excellent battalion commander and 
would likely have been promoted notwithstanding his political credentials. Even 
without the political appointees, Turner’s record was comparable to Currie’s. 
Turner supported and advocated the interests of his staff. He would attempt to 
advance his officers, and this brought him into conflict with Alderson, who 
wanted British officers on Turner’s staff.13 
Turner had an inconsistent pattern of getting results. He was successful 
during the Boer War in a junior position but faltered in the unwinnable 
circumstances of Second Ypres and St. Eloi. His pattern was poor results in his 
initial battle at each senior command level followed by greater success in 
subsequent engagements, as at Festubert and Courcelette. As GOC Canadian 
Forces, Turner achieved significant improvements in the OMFC and made a 
valuable contribution to the fighting power of the Canadian Corps. Furthermore, 
                                            
13  Sims to Aitken, 6 June 1916, A1765, MG 27 II G1, Beaverbrook Fonds; LAC; Turner to Carson, 
7 April 1916, RG 9 III A1 v116, LAC; Turner to Carson, 24 January 1916, 6-Mc-163, RG 9 III 
A1 v184, LAC. 
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he was successful in his challenging endeavour to unify the myriad Canadian 
veterans’ organisations. 
A leader of character encompasses the intertwined concepts of empathy, 
army values, and warrior ethos. Turner embodied the warrior ethos more so than 
did the typical Canadian general. His courage, both moral and physical, was self-
evident. It was indicative of his character that his first reaction to the catastrophe 
at Second Ypres was to demonstrate his resolve to his officers and men by 
strapping on his revolver and vowing to die rather than surrender.  
J.F.C. Fuller in his post-war screed about generalship criticised British 
generals for losing touch with the front-line. Generals were tied to the telephone 
in their chateaux, rather than leading.14 The limitations of communications, 
however, necessitated generals remain close to their telephones in order to 
command. GHQ ordered divisional commanders to position themselves where 
intercommunication with neighbouring formations and superiors were 
facilitated.15 Turner, on the other hand, interpreted this order liberally and was a 
regular sight in the forward trenches, which endeared him to his troops. Turner, as 
a result, could better appreciate what his men were enduring and the actual 
conditions at the front. He was not a chateau general. 
His letters to his wife, his interactions with his troops, and his actions clearly 
demonstrate his empathy. His willingness to bypass army regulations to get his 
men the clothing they needed in 1915 and his attempts to postpone the 1 October 
                                            
14  J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship, Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in 
Command  (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), 18, 54. 
15  Confidential Order, Chief of General Staff, GHQ to Second Army C.B. 888, 3 October 1915, 
Folder 42 File 1, RG 9 III C3 v4098, LAC. 
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1916 attack are two examples. He was genuinely appreciative of his men. In one 
of his letters home, he wrote after Ypres, “thinking of them brings tears to my eyes 
for my gallant lads, Officers and men.”16  
A tension exists between empathy and army values requiring the sacrifice of 
soldiers in pursuit of the mission. Turner’s protests over poor plans and his 
probable refusal to throw away lives at St. Eloi highlights his unwillingness to 
squander troops on profitless operations. This was at odds with the BEF’s culture, 
which was, as Tim Travers phrased it “always to be enthusiastic about attacking, 
regardless of drawbacks.”17 Turner probably acquired a reputation as a 
‘bellyacher’ and this blighted his chances at commanding the Canadian Corps. 
In his approach to the outward displays of discipline, dress, and deportment, 
Turner was not aligned with Haig’s expectations.18 Turner lacked Currie’s 
punctiliousness in ensuring all the brass work was polished. He was more willing 
to make allowances for the realities of the front-line and was less harsh in his 
discipline. This contributed to his positive soldier-commander relationship, but 
while usually effective, it contributed to the problems experienced by the 2nd 
Division with trench foot in 1915 and lowered Haig’s opinion of him.  
To Turner duty outweighed his own ambitions. While ambition is a 
necessary characteristic for any senior role in business, government, and the 
                                            
16  Turner to Hetty, 15 May 1915, DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.17, 19710246-011, CWM. 
17  Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of 
Modern Warfare, 1900-1918: 13. 
18  Cook, The Madman and the Butcher: 189; Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British 
Army. 143. 
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military, Turner sacrificed his aspirations for obedience.19 His grudging 
acceptance of command in England and his refusal to demand Perley live up to 
his promise to consider Turner for command of the Canadian Corps all point to an 
officer for whom duty was paramount. To a modern audience, Turner’s enlisting 
Hughes and Aitken’s assistance is too closely associated with the malign aspects 
of Hughes’ interference in the CEF to be acceptable. Turner’s actions, however, 
were well within the bounds of the Canadian Militia’s ethos. Turner, Currie, and 
numerous other officers benefited from Hughes’ involvement and many were not 
reticent in leveraging their political connections, as the numerous letters to 
Carson, Hughes, and other politicians attest.20 Only later in the war did this type 
of interference diminish, and Turner played a critical role in working to purge it 
from the system.  
Another term often seen in comments about Turner was his modesty. An 
illustration is a comment in a letter to his wife that he hopes his son will grow up 
to be as good as the men that serve with him – not serve under him but with 
him.21 These were not public pronouncements, but his private thoughts shared 
with his wife. Another example is his letter to his wife commenting that Smith-
Dorrien said Turner had twice saved him in South Africa and at Ypres, but Turner 
                                            
19  As Dominick Graham writes,  "It has to be accepted that commanders, like politicians, are, 
even should be, ambitious, self-willed men who pit themselves against other men of similar 
mettle." Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, Coalitions, Politicians & Generals: Some 
Aspects of Command in Two World Wars, 1st English ed. (London: Brassey's (UK), 1993), 93. 
20  See the following for examples of this behaviour Currie to Carson 8 July 1916, 6-R-122, RG 9 
III A1 v207, LAC; Gunn File, File 6-G-18, RG 9 III A1 v148, LAC; ibid; Major-General Sir 
Samuel Steele File, S-9, MG 27 II D9 v161, Kemp Fonds; LAC. 
21  Turner to Hetty, 30 September 1916, DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.17, 19710246-011, CWM.  
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added “This is awfully conceited on my part in writing it, so please keep it very 
much to yourself.”22 Even his obituary remarked on his modesty.23 
Turner was not a physically imposing man, which makes his ability to 
project a commanding presence all that more impressive. Physically, Turner was 
slightly over average height, had a slim build, a weak chin, blue eyes, a fair 
complexion, fair hair and he wore glasses. As he aged, he looked less like a mild 
clerk and developed more gravitas. In photographs, he was usually smiling, and it 
appears as if laughter came easily to him. His habit of visiting the frontlines, his 
speaking skills, confident deportment, intrepid nature, his VC, and his engaging 
personality all contributed to his success in developing his authority over battle 
hardened troops. He was personable, even charming and was, as a result, well 
liked and respected by his men, officers, and staff.24 Contributing to this reputation 
was his habit of visiting the front line, which always endeared senior officers to 
the troops.25 Another crucial factor was his VC, which lent Turner considerable 
credibility with all ranks. Even Alderson when disparaging Turner referenced his 
valour as demonstrated by his VC. 
He was fit and vigorous. His diary’s reports of working twenty-two hour 
days at the Somme indicate an officer with an exceptional capacity for hard work 
                                            
22  Turner to Hetty, 25 June 1915, DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.17, 19710246-011, CWM. 
23  "Turner Obituary." 
24  Some examples of comments include, Cotton to Mother, 19 November 1915, 93/24/1, IWM; 
Parson Diary Entry, 24 October 1915, MG 30 E117 v3, Parson Fonds; LAC; Nickle Interview, 
Tape 5, RG 41 v10, LAC. 
25  Harold W McGill and Marjorie Norris, Medicine and Duty: The World War I Memoir of 
Captain Harold W. McGill, Medical Officer, 31st Battalion, C.E.F., vol. no. 23, Legacies Shared 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007), 192; Interview J.M. Fryday and G. Gibson, 27th 
Bn, RG 41 v11, LAC; Fraser and Roy, The Journal of Private Fraser, 1914-1918: Canadian 
Expeditionary Force: 75; Flanders Fields #7 Apprentices at Arms: Snape Interview, RG 41 v6, 
LAC. 
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and stamina. He continued this pace while in command in England. He does not 
appear to have suffered from any long period of illness or incapacity during the 
war other than suffering a broken collarbone. He had the advantage of relative 
youth in comparison to the average British divisional commander, who in 1915 
was nine years older than Turner.26 
Wavell, in his perceptive description of generalship based on his 
experiences in the Great War, considered robustness – the ability to survive and 
thrive in an environment of incessant shocks and surprises – the critical aspect of 
combat generalship.27 Turner demonstrated resilience during the Boer War, but 
not at the disastrous situation of Second Ypres, as his decision to retreat to the 
GHQ line shows. He displayed a greater equanimity and ability to handle the 
shocks and strains in his battles as a divisional commander. Turner’s quick 
intelligence contributed to him being less phlegmatic in the heat of battle than 
Currie and was probably one of the reasons Alderson considered him less level-
headed than Currie.28  
Good judgement, developed through experience, enables leaders to assess a 
situation, arrive at a reasonable opinion, and render a sensible decision. Turner 
generally satisfied these requirements. In a combat role, Turner did not just 
register disagreements with plans but proposed alternatives, such as at St. Eloi and 
on the Somme. The victory at Courcelette demonstrated sound judgement in 
                                            
26  The average age of the British division commander dropped from 53 in 1915 to 49 at the end 
of the war. Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory: 
527; Age of GOC in the Canadian Corps, GAQ 10-55, RG 24 v1843, LAC. 
27  Archibald Percival Wavell, Generals and Generalship, The Lees Knowles Lectures, 1939 
(Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1941), 2. 
28  Alderson to Second Army G271, 18 April 1916, WO 158/296, TNA. 
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preparation and battle leadership. He showed greater discernment than did GHQ 
in the staying power of the Germans, as he repeatedly dismissed claims the 
Germans were on their last legs.29 His decisions, while the head of the OMFC, 
were appropriate, as the improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
organisation demonstrates. Where he failed was in allowing political support of 
Sam Hughes to intrude excessively in his decision making, such as his pressure to 
change the survey results on the Ross Rifle. His support for Hughes was a 
combination of Turner’s respect for his ‘many good qualities,’ a reciprocal 
response to Hughes’ championing of Turner, and a failure of character.30    
Turner possessed the coup d’oeil necessary for a junior cavalry officer 
during Boer War but lacked it at the higher levels of command. His greatest failing 
as a senior combat officer was his inability to correctly filter and form the welter 
of information flooding into the headquarters into an approximation of the actual 
situation at the front. Lacking this rare talent to discern the battle’s pattern from 
afar, Turner tended to limit his battle decisions by a wariness of what the Germans 
might do. Given the German penchant for launching stinging counterattacks, this 
caution was understandable and appropriate. 
Turner was innovative within the context of the extant paradigm. He did not 
develop novel solutions but being pragmatic, he looked to proven formulae. His 
steps to establish the command and organisational structure of the OMFC were a 
                                            
29  Turner to Hetty, 15 May 1915, DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.17, 19710246-011, CWM; Turner to 
Hetty, 12 September 1916, DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.17, 19710246-011, CWM; Turner Diary 
Entry, 7 October 1916, 19710147-001/ DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.1, Turner Fonds; CWM. 
30  Turner Diary Entry, 15-17 November 1916, 19710147-001/ DOCS MANU 58A 1 9.1, Turner 
Fonds; CWM. 
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clear derivation of the existing War Office model, adjusted for the Canadian 
situation. It was not revolutionary but was appropriate and effective, especially for 
an institution tightly integrated with and partially subordinated to the British 
system. Turner was not innovative in tactics and doctrine. His ‘lessons learned’ 
arising from St. Eloi and Somme dealt with the symptoms of problems and not the 
underlying causes.  
He had an open mind to new technology, as evidenced by his embrace of 
air power or his request to Carson in 1915 to obtain a device to listen to German 
communications.31 Related to this affinity, as well as, his political sensitivity, was 
his attempts to salvage Sam Hughes’ equipment projects, such as the Ross Rifle, 
Bain Wagons and MacAdam Shovel.32 He endeavoured to find ways to make 
them useful, which was laudable, but he persevered with his support too long. 
Turner, like many who think and talk fast, was not always the most tactful.33 
His interactions with Byng, Perley, his subordinates, and peers were positive from 
the available evidence. His clashes with Alderson, Currie, and Gow, however, 
indicate a personality that lacked a necessary element of tact to defuse 
confrontations. In all three cases, however, the other combatant equally, or in 
Currie’s case predominantly, share the blame for the conflict. Kemp’s negative 
comments about Turner suggest that Turner had lost his temper or reacted in a 
way that offended Kemp, but no evidence exists, other than Kemp’s reaction. 
                                            
31  Turner to Carson, 3 October 1915, Folder 42 File 1, RG 9 III C3 v4098, LAC. 
32  Turner to Carson, 11 February 1916, 4-5-13b, RG 9 III A1 v12, LAC; Carson to Hughes 15 
October 1915, 4-10-52, R 9 III A1 v21, LAC; Turner to Carson, 8 December 1915, RG 24 
v6937, LAC. 
33  An officer meeting with Turner complained that Turner spoke too quickly. Lt.Col Harvie to 
Odlum, 27 August 1917, MG 30 E100 v2, Currie Fonds; LAC. 
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Turner lacked the skill of a Marlborough or Eisenhower in dealing with difficult 
personalities and achieving their end-goals. 
Turner, when appointed to command the 3rd Brigade, was as qualified as 
any Canadian Militia officer, but he lacked some of the necessary domain 
knowledge. He was further handicapped by a lack of staff training, which led to 
an under appreciation of the vital necessity of qualified staff officers. Leading at 
the brigade and divisional level, however, was an accelerated course in advanced 
command training. His progress as a divisional commander and improved 
performance at Courcelette shows a learning curve in a structured combat 
situation.  
Turner, like most of his class and generation in English Canada and 
Australia, had a dual identity – as a subject of the British Empire and a citizen of 
Canada.34 He was a strong supporter of Canadian aspirations for more autonomy. 
In this respect, he was a stronger nationalist than Currie. Over the course of the 
war, Turner’s identity increasingly became Canadian. His frustration with British 
attitudes and newspaper coverage in the demobilisation period accelerated this 
identity shift, but not to the point where he abandoned his connections to the 
Empire.  
As a negative characteristic, he could hold a strong grudge against those he 
felt judged him unfairly, such as Alderson. He could be petty and prickly at times, 
                                            
34  For more on this dual identity, see Brennan, "The Other Battle: Imperialist Versus Nationalist 
Sympathies within the Officers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919."; Andrews, 
The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations During World War I: 31. Canadians were 
subjects of the British Empire until 1947, when the Canadian Citizenship Act was passed and 
created Canadian citizenship. "History of Passports,"  
http://www.pptc.gc.ca/pptc/hist.aspx?lang=eng. 
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as witnessed by his conflict with Gow. He also would change his opinion of 
officers under political pressure, such as his recanting of the negative assessment 
of William Hughes.35 He was also defensive about his reputation and was certain 
to resent any disparagement of his performance or honour, hence his conflicts 
with Alderson. He was well aware of Alderson’s enmity and kept the message logs 
from Second Ypres to defend his actions.36 A further issue was his tendency to 
retain officers who had not proven competent, such as Garnet Hughes and C.A. 
Ker. 
Turner and Currie 
An assessment of Turner is incomplete without a comparison with his great 
rival – Arthur Currie. It is essential to recognise the fundamental difference 
between the Canadian Corps of 1915/1916 and that of 1917/1918. In all the vital 
dimensions of weaponry, ammunition supply, doctrine, logistics, and command 
and staff training, the Canadian Corps in the later years of the war was far superior 
to that of the first half, and Currie is rightly credited with contributing to this 
improvement. In addition, the Germans were comparatively weaker in 1917 and 
especially in 1918, than in 1915/1916. As a result, it is misleading to directly 
compare Currie’s results during the Hundred Days campaign to those of Turner at 
St. Eloi. A better comparison is Currie’s record in 1916, which like Turner’s, was 
equivocal. Preceding Currie’s great success at Mount Sorrel on 13 June was the 
defeat of the initial counterattacks. Currie had his share of failures at the Somme, 
                                            
35  Carson to Aitken, 9 June 1916, 8-5-8F, RG 9 III A1 v44, LAC. 
36  Turner to Hastings, 13 April 1918, Folder 41/File 1, RG 9 III D1 v4688, LAC. 
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including 26 September and 8 October, without the compensation of a signal 
victory, such as Courcelette.37 Based on the 1916 record, both officers showed 
strong capabilities, as well as failures.  
Turner, with his experience in England, was a more rounded officer than 
Currie. He showed he could win victories at the Somme and could handle the 
multifaceted challenges of administration. He had a better appreciation of the 
political dimensions of senior command than Currie.38 As Napoleon stated “The 
ability to comprehend the political dimension of war is also implicit and 
unchanging.”39 Currie was a gifted combat commander and well suited to his role 
as commander of the Canadian Corps, but Currie’s relative lack of success as the 
Inspector-General after the war also illustrates his limitations in dealing with the 
political aspects of senior command.40 Turner, more than Currie, appreciated that 
the rough and tumble and necessary compromises of party politics, however 
distasteful to the military mind, were an inextricable feature of an army 
subordinated to a civilian government. 
Could Turner have successfully commanded the Canadian Corps? Turner 
demonstrated a learning curve and his performance at the Somme proved he had 
grown to be an effective divisional commander. Based on his record, he probably 
could have been a capable corps commander, as well. Nonetheless, Currie was a 
better choice for corps command because of Haig’s confidence in Currie – a 
                                            
37  For more on the failures of 26 September and 8 October, see Cook, The Madman and the 
Butcher: 157. 
38  As Gary Sheffield argues “High-level command is as much about politics as operations.” 
Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army. 152. 
39  Jonathon Riley, Napoleon as a General  (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), 4. 
40  For more on Currie’s challenges as the Inspector-General, see Cook, The Madman and the 
Butcher: 289-291. 
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confidence Haig did not have in Turner. As a result, Currie received approval for 
better plans and more guns, shells, and time. These were critical elements of the 
Canadian success. Turner would have been in the position of other unfavoured 
corps commanders that the high command expected to make do with their 
allotment of resources, time, and plan – no matter how exiguous the resources, 
limited the time, or flawed the plan. Further, Turner was a better administrator 
than Currie. As Riley points out in his biography of Napoleon, “the general may 
have to fill a series of incompatible roles: politician, leader, manager, supply 
specialist, public relations man - as well as strategist, operational commander and 
tactician.”41 Currie’s strengths were as an operational commander and tactician, 
while Turner embodied those qualities to a lesser degree but added the attributes 
of politician, leader, supply specialist, and public relations man and so was better 
suited to his administrative role. 
Richard Turner served Canada well in two wars and materially assisted 
veterans in the post-war period. Initially, like all his contemporaries, he struggled 
with the new circumstances of trench warfare on the Western Front, but he 
showed a propensity to learn from the situation and by 1916 had become an 
effective divisional commander. He proved to be an excellent administrator, and 
this played an underestimated part in the Canadian success in the final years of 
the war. He was also a strong but balanced nationalist and supported the 
aspirations for increased Canadian control. Moreover, this study has shown that 
his leadership qualities and the high esteem in which he was held by troops were 
                                            
41  Riley, Napoleon as a General: 5. 
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crucial to CEF’s success. He is poorly thought of today, and that is unfortunate, as 
he deserves more respect for what he accomplished and contributed. 
 APPENDIX 
Appendix 1  Awards1 
Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Ernest William Turner, VC, KCB, KCMG, DSO 
Victoria Cross 
Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath 
Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St. George 
Distinguished Service Order 
Queen’s South Africa Medal 1899-1902 with clasps Johannesburg, Diamond Hill, 
Belfast, Cape Colony, Orange Free State, South Africa 
1914-1915 Star 
British War Medal 
Victory Medal 
Mentioned in Despatches (6 times) 
Canadian Auxiliary Forces Officers' Decoration 
Canadian Forces' Decoration with Clasp 
Legion d'Honneur, Croix de Commandeur (France) 
Croix de Guerre avec Palme (France) 
Order of White Eagle with Swords (Russia) 
 
                                            
1  Richard Turner Service Jacket, RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 9842 - 47, LAC. 
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